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7Abstract
Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) was a leading 20th century theorist and philosopher of 
war. A key architect of American nuclear strategy, Brodie was one of the first civilian 
defense intellectuals to cross over into the military world. This thesis explores Brodie’s 
evolution as a theorist and his response to the technological innovations that trans-
formed warfare from World War II to the Vietnam War. It situates his theoretical de-
velopment within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), as Brodie 
came to be known as “America’s Clausewitz.” While his first influential works focused 
on naval strategy, his most lasting impact came within the field of nuclear strategic 
thinking. Brodie helped conceptualize America’s strategy of deterrence, later taking into 
account America’s loss of nuclear monopoly, the advent of thermonuclear weapons, and 
proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Brodie’s strategic and philosophical 
response to the nuclear age led to his life-long effort to reconcile Clausewitz’s theories 
of war, which were a direct response to the strategic innovations of the Napoleonic 
era, to the new challenges of the nuclear age. While today’s world is much changed 
from the bipolar international order of the Cold War period, contemporary efforts to 
apply Clausewitzian concepts to today’s conflicts suggests that much can be learned 
from a similar endeavor by the previous generation as its strategic thinkers struggled 
to imagine new ways to maintain order in their era of unprecedented nuclear danger.
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Chapter One
Introduction and Literature Review
This thesis explores the theoretical evolution of Bernard Brodie, his strategic and philo-
sophical response to the nuclear age, and his lifelong effort to reconcile the classical 
strategic theories of Carl von Clausewitz to the new found challenges of the nuclear era. 
A foundational architect of American nuclear strategy and one of the twentieth century’s 
most influential strategic thinkers, Bernard Brodie helped not only to reintroduce a new 
generation of American sailors to the fundamentals of naval strategy on the eve of World 
War II, but to later guide the evolution of U.S. military doctrine through the nuclear age 
while also helping to bridge the gap between civilian theorists and military strategists. 
His life spanned a period of unprecedented global disorder, upheaval, and war – from 
the collapse of Europe’s balance of power system in the killing fields of World War I, 
through the even more convulsive and first truly global total war of World War II, to 
the calmer but more dangerous peace of the Cold War period. During Brodie’s lifetime, 
the technology of war advanced dramatically, with a cresting wave of innovation and 
wizardry as creative as that century’s almost endless warfare was destructive. Brodie 
was something of a renaissance man when it came to the many disciplines required 
to truly comprehend the complexity of modern war, with expertise in technology 
and innovation, history and philosophy, as well as the more traditional military arts 
of strategy and tactics. He was, through his unique combination of expertise, one of 
America’s most important philosophers of war, and a pioneering architect of America’s 
Cold War strategy of deterrence. And yet, while his theoretical contributions were 
on a scale shared by very few across history, brilliant minds like that of Clausewitz 
and Jomini in an earlier age whose formative experiences were forged in war, Brodie 
came to the art of war from the academic realm, making him one of the first civilian 
defense intellectuals to cross over from academia to the military world.
In addition to his pioneering work on nuclear strategy – and intimately intercon-
nected to both his theoretical work on the strategic implications of the splitting of the 
atom and his historical work on the strategic implications of technological change – 
Brodie was a pioneer in the field of Clausewitz studies, and an important contributor 
to America’s rediscovery of Clausewitz in the post-World War II era. Brodie has been 
described by many scholars as “America’s Clausewitz” or the “Clausewitz of the Nuclear 
Age” – a title claimed by others of his generation, including, by some accounts, his 
long-time colleague and later rival, Herman Kahn.1 Whereas Kahn became known 
1.  Indeed, in 1991 the editors of Makers of Nuclear Strategy predicted that: “Future generations of are likely to acclaim 
Brodie as ‘the Clausewitz of the age of nuclear deterrence.’” John Baylis and John C. Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear 
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for his bold theories of nuclear warfighting and his unsentimental imagination of the 
“day after” deterrence failed, Brodie was a true believer in the strategic and moral im-
perative of deterrence as a strategy, and as the optimal (and only rational) underlying 
strategic architecture of the Cold War’s bipolar international order. 
Brodie’s first influential strategic efforts were in the field of naval strategy, with his 
first book, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton University Press, 1941 and 1943), 
and his second, A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1942, 
later renamed A Guide to Naval Strategy at the Navy’s request, which went on to enjoy 
multiple printings), positioning him for immediate recognition in the aftermath of 
Japan’s dawn raid of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. But Brodie’s most lasting 
strategic impact would come after the end of World War II, in the emergent field of 
nuclear strategic theory, as he took an early lead in conceptualizing and articulating 
precepts that would guide the emergence and evolution of U.S. strategic doctrine for 
the post-Hiroshima world – refining his thoughts as technology continued to evolve, 
and as the military balance consequently shifted throughout the Cold War era.
This thesis explores Brodie’s evolution as a theorist, and his response to the techno-
logical innovations that transformed warfare from the period just before World War 
II through to the Cold War’s nuclear arms race, up to his death just after the Vietnam 
War. It places Brodie’s theoretical development within a Clausewitzian context, not-
ing that Brodie came to be an apt student of the famed Prussian strategist, and a key 
player in the movement to bring Clausewitz studies to America – partnering with 
leading Clausewitz scholars of his generation including Peter Paret, Michael Howard, 
and briefly Liddell Hart in their ambitious but in the end only partially successful 
Clausewitz Project, which famously yielded the widely read Princeton translation of 
Clausewitz’s On War but whose grand ambition to produce six volumes would be 
dashed. Brodie took Clausewitz’s approach to the study of war, the embrace of com-
plexity, and the important interconnection of war to politics, to heart, and embedded 
his own pioneering work in nuclear strategy in a framework that was in form and 
substance inherently Clausewitzian. This conscious effort at emulation, combined with 
his distinct theoretical elegance and analytical rigor, made Brodie more deserving of 
the mantle “America’s Clausewitz” than any other strategic thinker of his generation. 
The research involves an in depth and comprehensive review of his bountiful written 
works; secondary sources in the literature of nuclear war that reference and contex-
tualize Brodie and his work; as well as his many speeches and letters, draft materials 
and notes from the Bernard Brodie papers at the UCLA archives. 
The aim of this thesis is to come to understand Brodie’s place in the history of 
strategic theory, and in its own humble way to help introduce a new generation of 
Strategy (London: Pinters Press, 1991), 5. 
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students and scholars to one of the most important strategic theorists of the twentieth 
century, whose works transcend the Cold War context but which are infrequently 
assigned in strategic studies courses as interest in the early Cold War strategists has 
faded along with that era’s bipolarity. The nuclear strategists lay the theoretical foun-
dation not only for the rapidly evolving Cold War military doctrine as described by 
numerous Cold War intellectual and strategic historians, including Barry Steiner and 
Fred Kaplan, but also for the foundational strategic-diplomatic architecture of the 
Cold War’s bipolar international order; it was the bomb, and both its unprecedented 
destructive power and the inherent balance perceived by both Cold War adversaries 
in the bomb’s assured mutuality of destruction, that would serve as the kernel from 
which bipolarity would grow.2 
The thesis provides a theoretical and historical context for understanding Brodie’s 
contribution to American strategic thought, embedding his work within the Clausewitz-
ian tradition, and showing how Brodie’s increasing fascination with Clausewitz would 
contribute to the evolution of Brodie’s own theoretical style – one that made his work 
both more sophisticated and enduring in its relevance, though less accessible perhaps to 
the practitioner of war and, ironically, less widely read and thus during his lifetime perhaps 
less influential than several of his peers. The thesis also sheds light on Brodie’s enduring 
effort to bridge the civil-military divide, and thereby contribute to the birth of modern 
strategic studies as a civilian/academic discipline, in part to serve as a counterweight to 
military commanders when it came to strategic decision-making and the formulation 
of military doctrine, and more generally to educate both American civilian and military 
students and scholars on the importance of Clausewitz in addition to his own theoretical 
and strategic ideas on nuclear deterrence. While several scholars have commented on 
Brodie’s interest in, and resemblance to, Clausewitz as a theorist of war during a time of 
upheaval who struggled to comprehend the changes under way and to craft a theoreti-
cal response, the comparisons made have often been somewhat superficial; the parallels 
are in fact many, and deep, spanning decades of Brodie’s work and evident in his many 
articles, book reviews, op-eds, lectures, research memoranda and books, as well as his 
participation in the decade-long Clausewitz Project that would yield the widely read 
1976 Princeton edition of On War. Clausewitz became so central to Brodie, as inspira-
tion and source of emulation, that Brodie’s intentional efforts to integrate Clausewitz 
into his work and to advocate greater scholarly interest in the Prussian became one of 
the central intellectual contributions that Brodie made, and with the end of bipolarity 
2.  Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) and Barry H. Steiner, Bernard Brodie 
and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991). Also see Colin S. 
Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Knopf, 1985) 
and The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980); John Baylis 
and John Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinters Press, 1991); and Roman Kolkowicz, ed. Dilemmas 
of Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1987); among others.
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and declining interest in nuclear strategy generally likely the most enduring dimension 
of Brodie’s legacy with relevance that reaches well past the Cold War and its golden age 
of nuclear strategy. What had long been perceived as the defining dimension of Brodie’s 
intellectual contribution, his articulation of and later refinements to nuclear deterrence, 
would quickly lose its luster when the Cold War suddenly concluded, as interest in the 
nuclear strategists and the very dangerous bipolar world that they helped create – and 
which they endeavored to moderate – just as quickly waned.
In the Literature: In Quest of Bernard Brodie
Although Bernard Brodie played a critical role in the emergence both of the new field 
of nuclear strategy as well as the broader emergence of a new community of civilian 
strategic analysts and advisors who would come to dominate the making of post-
World War II American national security policy, the biographical literature on Brodie 
is somewhat thin, with notable contributions made by Brodie’s students and peers to 
the strategic and academic literature, and an occasional cameo appearance in popular 
and intellectual histories of the Cold War. But for the theorist considered by many 
to be foundational to the birth of nuclear strategy – as persuasively argued by Barry 
Steiner in his 1991 book-length biography, discussed below – he has maintained a 
surprisingly low-key profile in the popular mind, eclipsed during his lifetime and after 
by more colorful and powerful personalities, and more controversial figures, including 
Henry A. Kissinger and Herman Kahn. A full decade before Steiner’s book-length 
survey of Brodie’s strategic influence came to press, a briefer survey of Brodie’s con-
tribution to the strategic literature was presented just three years after Brodie’s death 
in a 1981 article in the U.S. Army War College’s journal, Parameters, by William P. 
Snyder and John A. MacIntyre, Jr. Snyder and MacIntyre championed Brodie as “the 
most original and thoughtful of the civilian strategists who helped shape American 
and Western strategic thought in recent decades.”3 They wrote:
In the weeks and months that followed the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, 
Snyder and MacIntyre recall, the United States became increasingly preoccupied with 
the issue of keeping atomic power in check; “[M]ost, including a small contingent of 
3.  William P. Snyder and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” Parameters Vol 
XI, No. 4, 2. They further describe Brodie’s work: “A historian by training, Brodie’s highly regarded first book, Sea Power 
in the Machine Age (1941), examined the effects of technological developments on naval operations. Following wartime 
service in the Navy, Brodie edited and contributed to The Absolute Weapon (1946), the first careful analysis of the military 
and strategic consequences of atomic weapons. An early advocate of deterrence, Brodie anticipated with remarkable 
foresight the strategic and operational implications of that strategy. In 1950, following service on the staff of the National 
War College, Brodie joined the RAND Corporation where he carried out studies on limited war and nuclear strategy. His 
Strategy in the Missile Age (1959) was a landmark study that synthesized the central ideas on deterrence and limited war 
that had emerged during the 1950s. His subsequent books include Escalation and the Nuclear Option (1966), a critique of 
American policy toward NATO, and War and Politics (1973), an important general treatise on strategy.”
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the scientists who had helped develop the bomb, believed that some form of world 
government was essential to achieve the desired control.”4 Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer 
was at the forefront of this world government movement. But some disagreed—in-
cluding Bernard Brodie, whose 1945 Memorandum No. 18, “The Atomic Bomb and 
American Security,” published by the Yale Institute of International Studies, remarked, 
“Oppenheimer’s categorization of the atomic bomb as a weapon ‘of aggression, of 
surprise, and of terror’ assumed that an aggressor ‘will not need to fear retaliation. 
If it must fear retaliation, the fact that it destroys its opponent’s cities some hours or 
even days before its own are destroyed may avail it little.’ ‘So much the more reason,” 
Brodie continued, “to take all possible steps to assure that multilateral possession of 
the bomb, should that prove inevitable, be attended by arrangements to make as nearly 
certain as possible that the aggressor who uses the bomb will have it used against him.’”5 
Snyder and MacIntyre add that “Brodie’s observation regarding multilateral pos-
session of atomic weapons and his startling suggestion that the threat of retaliation 
provided a feasible solution to the control problem provoked a bitter response from 
world-government advocates,” resulting in opposition to the publication of Brodie’s 
work in the essay collection The Absolute Weapon.6 (Brodie’s paper appeared in the col-
lection nonetheless.) They further note that Brodie’s antagonist in this incident was the 
president of his own alma mater, the University of Chicago, Robert M. Hutchins, who 
himself published a critical review of The Absolute Weapon titled “Scholarly Opinion 
on Atomic Energy – and Its Control” in the New York Times Book Review, on June 9, 
1946—one of the rare critical reviews of what quickly became a classic in the emergent 
field of strategic studies, and whose title gained tremendous metaphorical traction.7
In Brodie’s second chapter, he fleshed out the strategic salience of deterrence: “Thus 
far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on 
its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”8 
Furthermore, “[i]f deterrence was an appropriate strategy for the atomic age, Brodie saw 
with equal clarity that a deterrence strategy presupposed a major restructuring of the 
4.  Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 2-3.
5.  Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 3.
6.  Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 3.
7.  Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 12. As Snyder and MacIntyre 
observe on page three of their article: “The dispute over methods of controlling atomic weapons obscured the remarkably 
prescient ideas on nuclear strategy outlined in Brodie’s two chapters in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. 
In the first of those chapters, Brodie described the destructive power of the atomic bomb and examined the general military 
consequences of atomic weapons. Some of his conclusions were obvious and shared by other writers – that an effective 
defense against atomic weapons was impossible and that other countries would have similar weapons in a few years. Other 
conclusions were contrary to the then conventional wisdom – for example, Brodie argued that ‘superiority in numbers of 
bombs is not a guarantee of strategic superiority’ and that ‘superiority in air forces, though a more effective safe-guard … 
than superiority in naval or land forces, nevertheless fails to guarantee security.”
8.  Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 3-4.
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nation’s military forces.”9 Recognizing that a retaliatory system must be erected prior 
to hostilities, and that “[t]hose military and civilian leaders who envisaged a peacetime 
military establishment that could be expanded rapidly after hostilities commenced 
were guilty of ‘pre-atomic thinking,’” Brodie was one of the first to recognize the “need 
for a ‘force in being’ extended to all types of forces.” Snyder and MacIntyre relate.10
Thirteen years would pass before Brodie’s next great contribution to the strategic 
literature would be published, what many scholars view as his seminal magnum opus, 
Strategy in the Missile Age, whose creation will be examined in detail in the pages 
that follow. Brodie’s own favorite among his many works, however, would be his 
final book, published in 1973, War and Politics, which shared with his 1959 opus a 
self-consciously – both stylistically and structurally – Clausewitzian approach to the 
study of strategy. Snyder and MacIntyre note that Brodie’s 1959 opus “incorporat[ed] 
many of the strategic concepts developed by his colleagues at RAND” and was thus 
“a synthesis of the major strategic ideas that had emerged since the beginning of the 
atomic age.”11 They add that Strategy in the Missile Age “was the most important book 
on American national strategy to appear in the decade of the 1950s” and “provided the 
first detailed explanation of the advantages, indeed the necessity, of a deterrence strat-
egy and an equally thoughtful analysis of the forces required to achieve deterrence.”12 
Brodie would remain at RAND until 1966, producing several articles and two 
books—From Crossbow to H-Bomb (1962), on the interplay between science and war; 
and Escalation and the Nuclear Option (1966), on “NATO strategy, particularly the 
relative importance of nuclear and conventional forces in deterring a Soviet attack.”13 
Brodie’s final book was his 1973 War and Politics, which came to press just as America’s 
Vietnam commitment collapsed under mounting popular pressure and growing anti-
war sentiment; as Snyder and MacIntyre recall, “public interest in defense issues had 
9.  Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 4.
10. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 4. As they observe, “the military 
units assigned the retaliatory mission [require] special attention: this force must be kept in ‘isolation from the national 
community’; its ‘functions must not be compromised’ by other military missions; the force would ‘have to be spread over 
a large number of widely dispersed reservations’; and ‘these reservations should have a completely independent system 
of inter-communications.’ A more accurate blueprint of future American nuclear strategy and of the forces assigned the 
retaliatory mission is hard to imagine!” They add: “An earlier work, Sea Power in the Machine Age, published in 1941, was 
an analysis of changes in naval strategy brought about by technological developments beginning in the mid-19th century. 
A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy appeared one year later; it explained and updated the basic concepts of naval strategy. 
When that book was adopted as a textbook in Navy officer training schools and as required reading aboard ship, Brodie 
became an apostle of naval strategy and interpreter of Admiral Mahan to the naval officer corps of World War II and 
the decade thereafter. But it was The Absolute Weapon that previewed the analytical contribution that Brodie and other 
social scientists were to make on national security policies in the decades after World War II. Further, the major concerns 
addressed in his two chapters – the appropriateness of a deterrence strategy and the design of military forces to achieve 
deterrence – were to become central themes in Brodie’s subsequent writings extending over the next 30 years.”
11. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 5.
12. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 7.
13. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 7.
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soured during the Vietnam War, and War and Politics attracted less public attention 
than Strategy in the Missile Age. ”14
In War and Politics, Brodie observed how, “[u]nlike the two World Wars, Korea 
and Vietnam had involved deliberate restraints on the use of force, and confusion 
regarding strategic objectives; in each instance the war had become a domestic issue. 
Intervention in Korea had been appropriate, Brodie concluded, given the context of the 
Cold War and the American policy of containment.”15 But, in contrast, he “regarded 
Vietnam as a series of ‘virtually unmitigated disasters.’”16 Brodie’s concluding thoughts 
in War and Politics reiterate his Clausewitzian approach to strategy and his critique 
of the less analytical and philosophical Jominian approach: “Brodie concluded this 
insightful work with a lengthy discussion of strategists and decision makers. Soldiers, 
he observed, view themselves as ‘men of action rather than intellectuals.’ Command-
ers are picked for their leadership skills, and ‘that talent which is also, necessary . . 
. , strategic insight, may come off a very poor second.’ Efforts to reduce strategy to 
certain principles, a process that began early in this century, would have ‘appalled’ 
Clausewitz and indicated ‘a basic misunderstanding’ of strategy.”17 
Brodie also lauded “the ‘scientific strategists’ and the RAND Corporation” for their 
“outstanding contribution” with their development of systems analysis.18 
In 1987, Gregg Herken – author of several prominent intellectual histories of the 
Cold War, including Counsels of War (1985); Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Ad-
14. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 8.
15. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 8.
16. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 9.
17. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 10. On page twelve of their article, 
they add: “Four decades of writing and thinking about military strategy convinced Bernard Brodie that Clausewitz was 
the best of the classical strategists. Brodie’s contribution to strategic thinking is neither as original nor as rigorous as that 
of Clausewitz. Still, his contributions – especially the adaptation of deterrence to the nuclear age – make him one of the 
preeminent strategic thinkers of the nuclear age and place him in the historical lineage of genuinely important strategic 
theorists. If deterrence continues to provide, as it has for the last three decades, a means for the superpowers to avoid 
conflagration, future historians of strategic thought may be inclined to rank Brodie with the best of the classical theorists. 
If deterrence fails, then the survivors may wish that national leaders had studied Brodie more carefully.”
18. Snyder and MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” 10-11. As Snyder and MacIntyre 
describe: “Many of the classical strategic thinkers – Frederick, Clausewitz, Jomini, Foch, Upton, Mahan, Douhet, Liddell 
Hart – were men who turned to strategic studies during or after active military service. With the advent of total war in 
the 20th century, the study of strategy began to attract civilian scholars in increasing number. The development of atom-
ic – and then thermonuclear – weapons accelerated this shift in two ways: First, issues of war and peace clearly became 
issues of national survival, ‘too important,’ as Clemenceau declared, ‘to be left to generals.’ Second, maintaining the large, 
combat-ready forces on which deterrence depends changed the quality of military service, taking away the leisure time that 
intellectually active officers of earlier generations had directed to the study of military History and Strategy. Civilian scholars 
began to fill this gap, replacing the military intellectuals of an earlier age. … Bernard Brodie was a leading figure in this 
transformation of strategic thinking. He began his preliminary studies just before World War II, when only a handful of 
civilian scholars regarded national security policies as worthy of academic inquiry. He was involved, in an intimate way, 
with every subsequent development in this transformation until his death in 1978. Along the way, Brodie pioneered the 
adaptation of deterrence to the nuclear age; he also, with remarkable foresight, defined the characteristics of the forces 
required by that strategy. … Brodie was a model of rigor, balance, and personal grace to these scholars and to others whom 
he met and influence.”
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vising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (1992); and Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled 
Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (2002) 
– published a chapter on Brodie’s legacy, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon: Deter-
rence and the Legacy of Bernard Brodie,” in Roman Kolkowicz’s 1987 edited volume, 
Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy, published by Frank Cass.19 This chapter is unusual in that 
it focuses specifically on Brodie and his work, in contrast to Herken’s multi-character 
book-length works that examine the panoply of Cold War thinkers. In his chapter, 
Herken writes that Brodie “has been called – rightly – the ‘dean’ of America’s civilian 
strategists” while noting that “Brodie’s work, and his subsequent reflections upon it, is 
itself a kind of personal embodiment of the crisis which has befallen nuclear strategy 
and strategists, as well as a measure of their current discontent.”20
Herken points out that Brodie “did not invent either the concept or the term ‘de-
terrence’,” which dates back to classical times, and which first made an appearance in 
the Oxford English Dictionary in 1820, but rather was “responsible for popularizing 
‘deterrence’ as it applied particularly to nuclear weapons. He deserves credit for bring-
ing to public attention the fact, as he wrote, that ‘what was distinctively new’ about 
deterrence in the atomic age ‘was the degree to which it was intolerable that it should 
fail’.”21 Adds Herken, “Brodie’s premier standing in the rank of civilian strategists 
was guaranteed by the small volume of essays he and his colleagues at Yale wrote in 
the weeks just after Hiroshima – almost literally under the shadow of the mushroom 
cloud – and published early in 1946 under the title The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power 
and World Order,” a work that quickly became a classic in the field and which, for “the 
next 40 years … would be the essential primer for those seeking to understand how 
the bomb had affected military strategy and international diplomacy.”22
Herken recounts that Brodie only “first learned about the bomb, as did most citizens, 
when he read the newspaper on Sunday morning, 7 August 1945.” He was working 
on an essay on battleships at the time. “In the moment he became aware of the bomb, 
Brodie recognized that it made this essay – and the bulk of his work to date, which 
had mostly focused on naval strategy – instantly obsolete. But as Brodie himself had 
earlier observed with regard to the effect of technological innovation in warfare – ‘when 
a change comes, it is best if it is unequivocal’.”23 And unequivocal it was.
Herken marvels at the “clarity and depth of Brodie’s vision in The Absolute Weapon,” 
noting it was “all the more remarkable considering the fact that the book was begun 
19. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon: Deterrence and the Legacy of Bernard Brodie,” Roman Kolkowicz, 
ed., Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1987), 15-24.
20. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 15.
21. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 15.
22. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 15.
23. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 16.
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within weeks of the event it analyzes and attempts to put in perspective.”24 Herken adds 
that in Brodie’s second chapter in The Absolute Weapon, he “made a case for a secure de-
terrent some 13 years before Albert Wohlstetter’s Foreign Affairs article on ‘The Delicate 
Balance of Terror’. The ‘first and most vital step’, Brodie wrote, ‘is to take measures to 
guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind’. One needed 
‘to make as nearly certain as possible that the aggressor who uses the bomb will have 
it used against him’.”25 Herken agrees that it is “thus fair to say, as Lawrence Freedman 
does in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, that virtually all the basic axioms of nuclear 
strategy – as well as the issues in the current nuclear debate – were articulated in the 
weeks and months just after Hiroshima. And one might add that many of them were 
expressed first and best by Bernard Brodie in The Absolute Weapon.”26 Herken notes 
that many disagreed with Brodie and his embrace of deterrence as a logical strategy 
for the nuclear era, noting that Jonathan Schell has written that Albert Einstein’s “was 
only one of many who rejected Brodie’s conclusion in The Absolute Weapon that it was 
both possible and necessary ‘to develop the habit of living with the bomb’,” and that 
Einstein believed, “‘Unless [world government] prevails, and unless by common strug-
gle we are capable of new ways of thinking’, the famous physicist wrote in September 
1945, ‘mankind is doomed’.”27 In addition to the advocates of world government 
were opponents on Brodie’s other flank, the “warfighters” who lacked Brodie’s faith in 
deterrence’s inherent stability, but who believed the risks of deterrence’s failure could 
be offset by the pursuit of victory in nuclear war. As Herken describes, “If Einstein, as 
Schell claims, was an ‘idealist” and Brodie a ‘realist’, then there was a third category of 
theorists who combined attributes of both schools of thought, but who came up with 
an entirely different conclusion about the bomb. This was the group of theorists who 
believed that a nuclear war could be fought and won. It was these strategists who seized 
24. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 16. He further describes: “In the first of his essays, tilled ‘War in the 
Atomic Age’, Brodie made a series of observations about the effect the atomic bomb would have upon war and peace that 
are now seen to be particularly prescient. First was Brodie’s point that the bomb was in fact a revolutionary new weapon. 
‘Everything about the atomic tomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantas-
tically great’, he wrote. While few would quarrel today with Brodie’s contention that the bomb inaugurated a ‘wholly novel 
form of war’, it was a view widely contested at the time – particularly by some in the military services, who argued that 
the bomb simply made necessary larger conventional armies, navies, or air forces. Brodie was also quick to recognize that 
the prospect of defending civilian populations against nuclear weapons was ‘exceedingly remote’. In the book he dismissed 
as feasible and too socially disruptive some ambitious proposals of the time to disperse population by breaking major US 
metropolitan areas into ‘ribbon’ or ‘cellular’ cities of legally-proscribed size. Though Brodie’s pessimism about civil defense 
is now being challenged, I would argue that the fact we ate still searching for a way to defend cities some 40 years after 
Hiroshima proves that his original point has merit. Brodie also understood that the unique destructiveness of the bomb for 
its size might make it a truly decisive weapon in warfare – one that would finally make practical Douhet’s dream of a war 
fought and decided in an afternoon. At a time when even President Truman’s science adviser was expressing doubt about 
the feasibility of ocean-spanning rockets, Brodie forecast the coming of the nuclear-tipped ICBM.”
25. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 17.
26. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 17.
27. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 17.
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upon the conditional ‘almost’ in Brodie’s theory of deterrence to argue that there was 
another purpose for the bomb if deterrence failed: victory in a nuclear war.”28
Just as Snyder and McIntyre, Jr. observed in their 1981 Parameters article, “Bernard 
Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” Herken writes, on Brodie’s opposition: 
“Ironically, even as Brodie was writing The Absolute Weapon, across the street from his 
office in Yale’s Hall of Graduate Studies, a student at the law school was finishing his 
own book which would have a conclusion diametrically opposed to Brodie’s. In There 
Will Be No Time; The Revolution in Strategy; William Liscum Borden attacked what he 
called the ‘mutual deterrent fallacy’ at the heart of Brodie’s analysis. ‘The essential point 
is that an armed peace cannot persist indefinitely, that either war or voluntary federal-
ism must resolve the truce’, Borden wrote.”29 As Herken explains: “Whereas Einstein 
had concluded that this very choice left the country with no alternative but to pursue 
internationalism, Borden argued that the United States – failing the attainment of one 
world – must prepare to fight and win the inevitable nuclear war. ‘A fall-scale atomic 
war will not be won on pulverizing cities and industry, but by destroying the enemy’s 
military power of retaliation’, Borden predicted. The war he envisioned would be a 
‘one-dimensional aerial duel’ fought ‘between highly decentralized military systems’ 
where each side would – at least initially – refrain from hitting the enemy’s civilian 
population, holding it hostage to the outcome of the conflict instead.”30
Borden’s work was published in 1946 only shortly after Brodie’s. Both, Herken writes, 
“seem today almost tauntingly prescient.” Among other things, “Borden predicted that, 
in order to avoid what he called ‘a rocket Pearl Harbor’, the United States would have to 
station its future nuclear-tipped intercontinental-range missiles in protected underground 
‘hedgehogs’ located well away from cities, and ‘on undersea platforms scattered throughout 
the world’s oceans’.”31 Adds Herken: “Borden himself later characterized his own way 
of thinking about the bomb as ‘relativist’, to distinguish it from what he called Brodie’s 
‘absolutist’ views on deterrence. But contemporary strategists would recognize Borden 
as an early proponent of nuclear war-fighting, and what he termed the ‘war-between-
the-bases’ as perhaps the first exposition of the nuclear strategy of counterforce.”32 The 
dueling foundation for the forthcoming doctrinal battles within the fractious nuclear 
priesthood, as chronicled in detailed in the longer works by Herken, Kaplan, Trachten-
berg, and others, was thus firmly laid in those first months that immediately followed the 
atomic demolition of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Brodie’s work was prescient, “prophetic” 
as Snyder and McIntyre described in their 1981 Parameters article, but it was not uniquely 
28. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 17.
29. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 17.
30. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 18.
31. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 18.
32. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 18-19.
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prescient nor did not monopolize the post-Hiroshima discourse on atomic strategy. 
Borden’s competing vision would prove as prescient, and like Brodie’s imperfect as 
well – contributing to the nuclear dialect in which Brodie would play an important 
role, but not necessarily a predominant one: “As the months and years passed after 
1946, Borden’s dire prognosis of war ‘certain and inevitable’ in the absence of world 
government seemed to be proven wrong. But Brodie, too, in this lime began to admit 
that some of his own conclusions in The Absolute Weapon were either mistaken, or at 
least subject to revision.”33 As the destructive potential of nuclear weapons rapidly 
evolved into something even more nightmarish than Brodie had first anticipated, he 
was quickly faced with new challenges to his views.34
33. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 19. Herken adds, “While contemptuous in the book of what he termed 
the military’s ‘preatomic thinking’, Brodie gradually realized that his own thinking had not taken into account all the ways that 
nuclear weapons would change strategy and the future of war. These unanticipated effects were due, in turn, to unpredictable 
technological advances in the weapons themselves – advances that drastically increased both the number and power of the bombs, 
and in the process undermined some of the basic assumptions behind The Absolute Weapon.” Indeed, Herken points out: that the 
“same technological progress that made nuclear weapons simultaneously more numerous and cheaper also acted to invalidate 
another and more important contention of Brodie’s book – that the bomb did not ‘lend itself to discriminate use’. Brodie’s 
argument in 1946 that ‘for some time to come’ the ‘primary targets for the atomic will be cities’ and that ‘the bomb is inevitably 
a weapon of indiscriminate destruction’ was based upon the assumption that nuclear weapons would remain too few and too 
expensive to use against any but the enemy’s most valuable and most vulnerable targets. But the advent of tactical-sized atomic 
weapons, the Soviet Union’s entry into the arms race, and the subsequent growth of the US nuclear arsenal – which quadrupled 
in size during the three years that Brodie worked for the Air Force – rendered invalid this view of a nuclear strategy dictated 
by scarcity. Perhaps the biggest surprise for Brodie was the phenomenal increase in the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.”
34. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 20. “The real shock had come with the advent of the hydrogen bomb 
in the early 1950s, followed closely behind by the sooner-than-expected appearance of the intercontinental ballistic missile. 
In 1946, Brodie had written that not even the atomic bomb was ‘so absolute a weapon that we can disregard the limits of its 
destructive power’. Six years later, by contrast, the power of the new super-bomb seemed without limit. Brodie’s colleagues at 
the RAND Corporation, the Air Force-sponsored think-tank where he went in 1952 after leaving the Pentagon, remembered 
how he was ‘unsettled’ and even ‘swamped’ by the hydrogen bomb. A friend of Brodie’s at RAND suggested that he had chosen 
the right title in The Absolute Weapon, but that the book had been written about the wrong bomb. In the wake of the H-bomb’s 
arrival, Brodie seemed willing to put less of an absolutist emphasis upon deterrence – perhaps because the prospect of deterrence’s 
failure was now even more horrific than he had imagined in 1946. But Brodie’s subsequent search at RAND throughout the 
early and mid-1950s for an alternative strategy to deterrence failed to produce a more hopeful result. An earlier idea Brodie had 
unsuccessfully proposed to the Air Force as part of his effort to introduce restraint into nuclear targeting – the notion of ‘sample 
attacks’, whereby the US would bomb certain governmental centers in Russia, but only after giving the civilian population 
advance warning and sufficient time to evacuate – he now recognized was no longer feasible, since the Soviets had now acquired 
nuclear weapons and could respond in kind to attacks on cities. For a brief period at RAND, Brodie even entertained William 
Borden’s idea of a counterforce, or war-fighting strategy as an alternative to an absolute reliance upon deterrence, but his own 
quick calculations showed that a supposedly selective attack upon a ‘separated target system,’ in which only military targets 
were struck, would none the less kill an estimated two million Russian civilians. He also was convinced, from the experience 
of the previous war, that hostilities which began with an attack on military bases would in time escalate to attacks on cities. An 
article that Brodie wrote for the October 1955 issue of Harper’s – titled ‘Strategy Hits a Dead End’ – suggests that he had by 
this time already abandoned his search for a preferred alternative to The Absolute Weapon’s reliance upon deterrence. Looking 
back in the article upon the last nuclear decade, Brodie acknowledged how “many of the interpretations’ offered at the dawn 
of the atomic age had since been shown to be ‘too conservative’. ‘In retrospect’, he wrote, ‘it is clear that many of them were 
wedded to presumptions soon to be disproved – for example that the bomb was fated to remain scarce, extremely costly and 
therefore difficult to deliver, and limited to about the some power and spatial effectiveness as the Nagasaki bomb’. Even a year 
before the Harper’s article, Brodie had written to a friend explaining why he temporarily abandoned his work at RAND on 
the book he intended to be a sequel to The Absolute Weapon, which was eventually published as Strategy in the Missile Age – a 
work, incidentally, that Lawrence Freedman has properly described as ‘a gloomy book’. As he progressed, Brodie admitted to 
the friend, ‘it became clear that “strategy” and “unlimited war” are simply incompatible concepts in a world of H-bombs.’”  
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But Brodie found, even in the face of all these changes, he could not cross completely 
over to Borden’s side in the strategic debate. “Unwilling in the early 1960s to join his 
RAND colleagues in promoting counterforce to the Kennedy administration – but 
also unable to evince the same faith in deterrence he had had in 1946 – Brodie in 
his subsequent writings proposed that the United States put a greater reliance upon 
tactical nuclear weapons, as ‘a second line of insurance’ between absolute deterrence 
and all-out thermonuclear war.” But Herken believes that Brodie’s “controversial case 
for limited nuclear war seemed more in the nature of an intellectual argument than 
a seriously proposed solution to the problem of strategy in the thermonuclear age,” 
and observes that even Herman Kahn “believed that by the time of his death Brodie’s 
thinking on strategy had travelled full circle, arriving back at the place it began in The 
Absolute Weapon – with a nearly absolute reliance upon deterrence.” As he concluded 
ultimately in his 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age: “‘A plan and policy which offers a 
good promise of deterring war is ... by orders of magnitude better in every way than 
one which depreciates the objective of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the 
chances of winning.’”35 And, adds Herken, “In the last essay he wrote on the subject, 
which appeared in International Security just before his death, Brodie reaffirmed his 
belief in deterrence – though it was, seemingly, a faith grown rather more worried 
and perhaps even desperate at the end.”36
While Brodie clung to his faith in deterrence, the strategic community would largely 
turn its back on the restraint that Brodie counseled from the very beginning of the 
nuclear age in 1945 through to his death in 1978.37 As Herken wryly notes: “Contrary 
to popular belief, it is not Brodie’s formulation of deterrence as the prevention of war 
that has guided the nation’s strategists and war planners since Hiroshima, but the 
other supposed attributes of nuclear weapons – especially the belief in the political 
utility of strategic superiority, and the related idea that one can ‘extend’ deterrence 
by developing the theoretical capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Perhaps the 
crowning irony of Brodie’s legacy as a strategist is the fact that while the peace we 
have had for the past 40 years is the one Brodie predicted, we have been planning 
35. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 21.
36. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 21.
37. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 21. “There is a certain irony to Brodie’s contribution to nuclear 
strategy when seen in historical perspective. Despite the fact The Absolute Weapon had become a kind of icon of the popular 
faith in deterrence, its central message has been largely disregarded by most members of the so-called strategic ‘priesthood’. 
Foremost in that message, and in Brodie’s legacy, is a comment on the value of restraint. It is thus significant – even if often 
overlooked – that Brodie was in effect fired from his job with the Air Force in the 1950s for counseling restraint in nuclear 
targeting. … Often ignored as well is the fact that Brodie’s advocacy of tactical nuclear weapons – which he promoted as 
an alternative to making deterrence reliant entirely upon the threat of superbombs – had made him virtually a pariah at 
RAND by the time he left the think-tank in the early 1970’s to teach at UCLA. Instead, the emphasis at RAND was upon 
meeting the threat of conventional force with a conventional defense.”  
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all along for Borden’s war.”38 Brodie never gave up on finding an alternative strategy, 
and as he had observed in his 1955 Harper’s article, “Strategy Hits a Dead End,” 
he continued “looking for what he called ‘the new ideas and procedures necessary 
to carry us through the next two or three dangerous decades’. Brodie’s subsequent 
work shows that he consistently rejected both the careless hope of total disarmament 
and the deceptive allure of preventive war as a way out of the balance of terror. By 
the time of his death … it is even possible that Brodie had given up hope of finding 
an alternative to deterrence.”39 But as he had “made plain at the end of The Absolute 
Weapon,” deterrence remained “only as a expedient – a means, not the end – whereby 
the nation would be ‘better able to pursue actively that progressive improvement in 
world affairs by which alone it finds its true security’.”40
Trachtenberg, in his close and comprehensive examination of Brodie’s works, sees 
in Brodie’s circular journey from and back to deterrence as the best of all nuclear 
strategies, an intentional effort to counterbalance the doctrinal excesses of his peers, 
and to make sure that the risks of leaning too far toward either posture – deterrence 
versus war-fighting – were counterbalanced by his persistent nudge back toward a 
middle ground, an essential and everlasting nuclear ambiguity. He describes a con-
tinuity that connects Brodie’s thinking in 1946 as presented in his chapters in The 
Absolute Weapon with his 1959 reassessment in Strategy in the Missile Age and notes 
his seeming contradictory response to the issue of limited war and the challenges of 
escalation evolves into a more nuanced ambivalence, less contradictory by virtue of its 
continued equivocation. The contradiction in Brodie’s initial response evolves into a 
fundamental contradiction inherent in deterrence itself: what may work best for the 
purposes of deterrence might not provide the best posture for a wartime situation. 
Trachtenberg notes Brodie’s first chapter in The Absolute Weapon “reflected the as-
sumption that there was no meaningful defense against the bomb, that the weapon 
would be used mainly against cities, that because the bomb was relatively to produce 
and deliver, any world power possessing a nuclear arsenal could destroy the cities of 
its enemy. Under such circumstances, numbers of bombs, or even gross disparities 
in delivery systems, would not matter greatly.”41 Brodie “took a completely opposite 
line” in his second chapter: “numbers here do matter, defense can make a difference, 
superiority is still a meaningful concept – and the bulk of the chapter is devoted to 
a discussion of how an atomic war should be fought.”42 Thirteen years later, when 
Brodie published Strategy in the Missile Age, he again “failed to take a clear line. If all 
38. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 21-22.
39. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 22.
40. Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon,” 22.
41. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 32.
42. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 32.
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we sought was to maximize the prewar deterrent effect, he wrote, we should ‘assign 
the hard-core elements in our retaliatory force to the enemy’s major cities, provide for 
the maximum automaticity as well as certainty of response, and lose no opportunity 
to let the enemy know that we have done these things.’ The problem was that ‘what 
looks like the most rational deterrence policy involves commitment to a strategy which, 
if we ever had to execute it, might then look very foolish..’”43 
When it came to limited war strategy, Brodie “simply laid out the pros and cons 
and drew back in this book from taking a position on the issue himself.”44 In a foot-
note that spans nearly two full pages of his book, Trachtenberg further elaborates 
on Brodie’s seeming ambivalence on limited warfare and the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons, writing: “Since Brodie’s views in the 1950s on tactical nuclear weapons 
were somewhat equivocal, it was easy to misinterpret his position and label him as 
either a supporter or an opponent of a strategy based on these weapons,” and as a 
consequence, Herken “portrays Brodie as a champion of the strategy based on tacti-
cal nuclear weapons, even in the late 1950s, while Lawrence Freedman assumes that 
Brodie had by that time become hostile to the general idea.”45 Yet others “claim there 
was a dramatic shift in Brodie’s views on the subject from the late 1950s to the early 
1960s,” and that this “shift is most often explained in personal terms – that is, in terms 
of Brodie’s resentment of the increasing prestige and influence of Albert Wohlstetter 
and his followers in the early 1960s, as against his own exclusion from policy-making 
circles.”46 Trachtenberg concurs that “Brodie’s position did shift in the 1960s, not so 
much in substance as in emphasis, and this shift undoubtedly had a good deal to do 
with personal jealousies,” as becomes evident when viewing Brodie’s papers archived 
at UCLA, which reveal “some quite extraordinary examples of his personal touchiness. 
… But this is hardly the whole story.”47
Assuming a role reminiscent of Clausewitz, whose work embraced complexity at the 
risk of persistent ambiguity, Trachtenberg suggests: “A good deal of the explanation 
has to do with what Brodie himself recognized as a certain perverseness of disposition 
… which led him to lean against the prevailing wisdom. From his point of view, the 
pendulum was always shifting too far in one direction or another, and he wanted to 
redress that balance. This particular faculty meant that he was a superb critic, able 
always to see the flaws in other peoples’ arguments. But by the same token, he could 
never be a system-builder; it was much harder for him to construct positive arguments 
43. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 32-33.
44. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 33.
45. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 33, fn 67.
46. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 33-44, fn 67.
47. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 34, fn 67.
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of his own.”48 In a similar vein, Trachtenberg reflects on the development of American 
strategic thought in the 1950s, pointing out that: “Here were some of the brightest 
people in America spending years wrestling it [sic] the most basic problems of strategy 
in the nuclear age, and yet what they finally came up with was not terrible satisfactory. 
Brodie, on the most central issues, did not even pretend to give answers.” 49 By 1975, 
two years after America’s withdrawal from the field of battle in Vietnam and the very 
year Saigon would fall, Brodie, more than most of his peers, came to recognize that 
the strategists had divorced strategy from its historical and policy contexts, separating 
war from its political roots and thus overlooking Clausewitz’s most famous dictum 
at their, and their nation’s, peril – illustrated most tragically by the strategic failure 
in Vietnam. “For Brodie, especially, there was a great shift in perspective,” as the 
“strategists as a group had vastly overestimated the extent to which war could result 
from essentially military factors: the problem of ‘strategic stability’ had been greatly 
exaggerated. He even went so far as to claim that he had never believed in the ‘deli-
cacy’ of the balance, although this was certainly untrue.”50 Trachtenberg adds that the 
“purely military side of war causation, as Brodie later complained, became the focus 
of analysis, as though war itself were not in essence a political artifact – as though the 
basic insight of Clausewitz, whom they all respected, was somehow obsolete. It was 
not that the issues they focused on were meaningless or irrelevant. … It was simply 
a question of balance, of now allowing the tail to wag the dog, and this depended 
on the sophistication of one’s theory of war causation.”51 Brodie hoped to restore 
this balance, and to bring sophistication back to strategic theory, and that meant a 
willingness to embrace both complexity, and ambiguity, as Clausewitz had. Part and 
parcel of Brodie’s solution was to reunite war and politics and thus restore this most 
essential Clausewitzian unity of war, and to ensure that nuclear strategy, like any 
strategy, appropriately matched its political context. As he wrote in a February 1968 
conference paper, “Nuclear Strategy in its Political Context,” “One of the distinctive 
weaknesses of the otherwise spectacular kind of strategic analysis that has developed 
in the United States is that it often seems to be conspicuously lacking in something 
that I can only call historic sense or sensitivity.”52 
Brodie’s lifelong mission would be to restore this historic sense so lacking, and ensure 
that American nuclear strategy regained its Clausewitzian connection to its political 
context. It is this effort, and the inspiration Brodie takes from Clausewitz along the 
way, that will be our focus in the chapters that follow as we explore Brodie’s four-decade 
48. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 34, fn 67.
49. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 38.
50. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 44.
51. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 45.
52. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 46.
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long effort to modernize Clausewitzian strategy for the nuclear age, and to restore a 
Clausewitzian balance to American strategic thought after Hiroshima. Building upon 
the insights of Brodie scholars such as Steiner, Trachtenberg, Herken, and Snyder and 
MacIntyre, who have observed the philosophical and theoretical connection binding 
Clausewitz to Brodie, we will revisit Brodie’s original writings, observing them from 
a Clausewitzian perspective – and in so doing will come to understand the riddle of 
Brodie’s theoretical prominence, even as he became marginalized from the very world 
of nuclear policy that took root in the fertile fields that his pioneering and imaginative 
work first ploughed.
The ‘Pioneer’ of Nuclear Deterrence
An October 1983 article by Captain Craig D. Wildrick, US Army in Military Review 
salutes Brodie with its title, “Bernard Brodie: Pioneer of the Strategy of Deterrence.” In 
it, beneath a photo of a bookshelf where seven of Brodie’s books fill the page, Wildrick 
writes, “For nearly four decades, this nation’s defensive strategy has been based on 
deterrence. While this concept is familiar to most Americans, few know much about 
the man who first advocated such a strategy in the nuclear age.”53 Wildrick credits 
Brodie for being the “first to propose that deterrence be the basis of this country’s 
post-World War II strategy.”54 
He recounts Brodie’s early years, and describes Brodie’s early thoughts on the atomic 
era, noting that The Absolute Weapon, which Brodie edited, “was the first work of its 
kind and the first in which Brodie’s vision and insight into the problems of nuclear 
strategy emerged vividly,” and many of its ideas would evolve into core pillars of deter-
rence strategy.55 Wildrick marveled, “While these ideas seem self-evident today, it is 
remarkable that Brodie espoused them some 38 years ago, when few understood the 
full implications of nuclear war.”56 In 1946 and 1947, Wildrick notes, Brodie served as 
“one of the original resident instructors at the newly founded National War College,” 
and “[h]is experiences there may have contributed to the ideas he advanced in ‘Strategy 
as a Science,’ published in World Politics in 1949” in which Brodie “cited the need for 
civilian participation in the development of national security policy and asserted that 
the military could not and should not be expected to deal with the complex economic 
and political questions inherent in the conduct of war in the nuclear age.”57 Wildrick 
53  Craig D. Wildrick, “Bernard Brodie: Pioneer of the Strategy of Deterrence,” Military Review, October 1983, 39. Public 
domain, US military publication: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp.
54  Wildrick, “Bernard Brodie: Pioneer of the Strategy of Deterrence,” 40. 
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further notes that “[t]his subject was to become a common theme in Brodie’s works” 
and may well have contributed to “his decision to leave Yale to join the RAND Cor-
poration in 1951.”58 While at RAND Brodie authored a number of articles on nuclear 
strategy which were later incorporated into Strategy in the Missile Age, “an expansion 
and development of the concepts in The Absolute Weapon [that] synthesized the ideas 
on deterrence and limited war that had emerged during the 1950s,” and in which he 
“modified his earlier position that ‘war and obliteration are completely synonymous,’” 
as evident in the Korean War, Berlin Airlift, and Lebanon Crisis of 1958.59 Despite 
Brodie’s mid-course correction and recognition after his 1946 work that “future wars 
would most likely be limited in nature,” and his observation that even in a strategic 
nuclear war, “although all outcomes would be bad, some would be very much worse 
than others,” he would soon be outflanked by colleagues who echoed Brodie’s own 
revised viewpoints on limited warfare in the nuclear age.60 The “inadequacies of a 
strategy of massive retaliation, to which Brodie had alluded in Strategy in the Missile 
Age,” would become “the subject of study of several of Brodie’s RAND colleagues, 
but especially Herman Kahn,” who in his lengthy tome, On Thermonuclear War, 
“asserted the ‘the limits of the magnitude of catastrophe [in nuclear war] seem to be 
closely dependent on what kinds of preparations have been made, and how the war 
is started and fought.’”61 Kahn positioned himself as a principal rival to Brodie by 
challenging his 1946 views and countering that “nuclear wars could be won, and the 
purpose of the military establishment should be to ensure victory not merely to avert 
war as Brodie had suggested,” and this victory would be “achieved by targeting an 
enemy’s military forces rather than his cities, as Brodie had advocated.”62 But Brodie 
himself had been moving in this direction, as noted in his many articles and in his 
1959 opus, Strategy in the Missile Age. “Like Brodie, Kahn advised against the use of 
nuclear weapons in a limited war to preclude escalation,’ but to “provide a ‘firebreak’ 
to undesired escalation, Kahn proposed a strong conventional capability in Europe” 
that Brodie himself opposed favoring the current admixture of limited conventional 
forces and tactical nuclear weapons to strengthen their deterrent power.63 As Wildrick 
notes, “Kahn’s ideas were adopted by the Kennedy administration which sought and 
achieved a massive increase in U.S. nuclear and made frequent calls for strengthening 
NATO conventional forces.”64 These “actions by the Kennedy administration marked 
58  Wildrick, “Bernard Brodie: Pioneer of the Strategy of Deterrence,” 41. 
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the beginning of a decline in Brodie’s influence on the direction of U.S. nuclear policy,” 
and over the course of the following decade Brodie “became a dissenting voice.”65 In 
Brodie’s 1966 work on escalation, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, he “challenged 
U.S. NATO policy” and “asserted that existing levels of conventional forces armed with 
tactical nuclear weapons were adequate to deter aggression in Europe,” and split with 
Kahn by arguing that “a large buildup of conventional forces to provide a firebreak 
to escalation could signal ‘a desperate desire to avoid the use’ of nuclear weapons and 
thus indicate a lack of US resolve,” thus undermining deterrence and not bolstering it 
as intended.66 Brodie, so contrary to his relatively timid appearance when juxtaposed 
to more bellicose-sounding warfighters like Kahn, even “suggested that the early use 
of tactical nuclear weapons was ‘the best way … for us to avert not only defeat but 
unnecessary escalation,’ because it would ‘demonstrate that our readiness to take risks 
is not less than theirs.’ He postulated that the Soviets, unwilling to risk such escalation, 
would quickly end the aggression.”67 
Wildrick observes that soon after publishing Escalation and the Nuclear Option, 
Brodie left RAND and joined the faculty of UCLA where he remained for the rest of 
his career, having come to the reluctant realization that he was “[u]nable to influence 
the direction of US NATO policy,” and thereafter “his writings became less prescriptive 
and more reflective in nature,” as illustrated by his 1973 work, War and Politics. This 
marked a notably Clausewitzian turn in Brodie’s writing, which would be reflected in 
subsequent works including his contribution to the 1976 Princeton edition of Clause-
witz’s classic On War. As Wildrick writes, “Clausewitz correctly identified, according 
to Brodie, ‘the single most important idea in all strategy’ – that ‘war takes place in a 
political milieu from which it derives all purposes,’” and that “‘the influence of the 
[political] purpose on the means must be continuing and pervasive.’”68 While others, 
including his critic Barry D. Watts, would see in Brodie’s emphasis of the political 
context of war an unfortunate neglect of the all-important frictional dimensions of war, 
Wildrick observes that “Brodie chronicled the divergence between political objectives 
and military strategy in the four wars” America had fought in the twentieth century, 
and “perceptively noted the problems which have consistently plagued the United 
States: ill-defined or poorly communicated political objectives, frequent midstream 
policy changes resulting from intense domestic debate and the failure to predict the 
political implications of various military actions.”69 Forging a link with his earlier 
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efforts to foster a central place for civilian strategists in the formulation of American 
strategy, Wildrick notes Brodie “placed the primary responsibility for these problems 
on the civilian leadership,” as the generals were “rightly preoccupied ‘exclusively with 
the winning of wars’,” placing the onus on political leaders to “ensure that ‘the basic 
and prevailing conception of what any war … is trying to accomplish’ is clearly un-
derstood and articulated.”70 Thus War and Politics would reflect “Brodie’s final effort to 
counsel ‘strategic thinkers, planners, and decisionmakers’ as to how national military 
strategy should be derived and to re-emphasize the importance of Clausewitz’s dictum 
to a government which appeared not to understand.”71 Wildrick writes that Brodie 
“devoted most of his to attempting to span what he called the ‘intellectual no-man’s 
land’ between those who ‘decide how to wage war’ and those who ‘decide when and to 
what purpose wars should be waged,’” and that Brodie’s main contribution to military 
operations is his “insight into the problems this nation has experienced in executing 
a military strategy that is consistent with political objectives,” as illustrated when he 
“correctly asserted that ‘the civilian hand must never relax,’ for ‘the skills developed 
in the soldier are those of the fighter, and not the reflector on ultimate purpose.”72 
Despite his enormous theoretical contribution to American nuclear strategy and 
his prolific and multi-faceted contribution to the strategic studies literature from the 
years immediately preceding the nuclear age right up to the end of his life in 1978, 
there have been just a few scholarly works fully dedicated to Bernard Brodie and his 
legacy. Most comprehensive is Barry Steiner’s exhaustively researched Bernard Brodie 
and the Foundation of American Nuclear Strategy (University Press of Kansas, 1991), 
which chronicles with the greatest of historical detail Brodie’s contribution to the 
evolution of military doctrine and his military influence during his lifetime.73 Brodie’s 
protracted effort to shape the evolution of strategic doctrine throughout the Cold War 
period, and to help institutionalize an enduring position of influence for the new corps 
of civilian defense advisors expert in the nuances of nuclear strategic thought, was a 
four-decade long endeavor. As Steiner described it, “For forty years, until his death 
in 1978, Bernard Brodie’s career as a strategist coincided with, and spurred on, the 
dispersion of strategic thinking away from the professionals on active military duty 
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who had long monopolized it.”74 This was driven by “the growing legitimation of the 
subject of military strategy, by the rising demand within the military establishment 
for reflection about it, and by the unprecedented change in the conduct of war.”75 
Steiner notes that after World War II, “when Brodie became especially prominent in 
rationalizing and guiding American ideas about strategy – that is, about the shaping 
of war-making forces to national objectives – the extent of the dispersion has been 
unparalleled.”76 
Indeed, as Steiner has observed, “One of Brodie’s major postwar accomplishments 
was to legitimate the study of military strategy for civilians lacking a military back-
ground,” bringing to the study of war and strategy what Brodie described as a necessary 
“genuine analytical method,” in part because “the magnitude of disaster which might 
result from military error today bears no relation to situations of the past.”77 Included 
in his 1991 book on Brodie was Steiner’s earlier article and working paper, “Using the 
Absolute Weapon: Early Ideas of Bernard Brodie on Atomic Strategy” – enhanced by 
what he described in his introduction to the 1991 book as “minor changes” – which 
was published in the December 1984 Journal of Strategic Studies, and earlier that year 
as ACIS Working Paper, No. 44., by UCLA’s Center for International and Strategic 
Affairs. The timing of Steiner’s book, which came to press just at the close of the Cold 
War when interest in the architects of the Cold War would fade from the public mind 
with the winding down of that generational conflict, and marked the endpoint, to a 
significant degree, of Brodie’s profound theoretical and doctrinal influence in America, 
and his contribution to the very creation of the bipolar world order that would define 
the half-century of the Cold War period. 
While Clausewitz is often mentioned by strategic studies scholars in the same 
breath as Brodie, the comparison between these two theorists who bore witness to the 
transformation of war toward its absolute theoretical maximum is generally not fully 
or sufficiently probed, and this thesis aims in part to rectify this. For instance, Barry 
Steiner’s densely-packed, 361-page book includes a mere 23 pages directly discuss-
ing Brodie’s thoughts on and response to Clausewitz, representing the lion’s share of 
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Steiner’s thirty-page “Chapter 9: On Strategy and Strategists,” with a scattering of 
additional references to the Prussian that generally default to a single maxim. Steiner 
would otherwise flesh out in great detail Brodie’s contribution to the rapidly evolving 
field of contemporary strategic studies, and his continuing challenge to advocates of 
“[c]ontemporary axiomic strategy” that remained “most confined … to doctrines of the 
offensive use of military forces, particularly the earliest possible use in war of atomic 
weapons” which would “ensure horrendous casualties without necessarily forcing an 
end to hostilities.”78 
But Steiner does examine the recurring – and evolving – presence of Clausewitz in 
Brodie’s thinking. In 1949, Steiner recalls that Brodie was less certain of the applicabil-
ity of Clausewitz to the nuclear era, writing in “Strategy as a Science” in World Politics 
in 1949 of the profound changes wrought by atomic weapons: “Principles may still 
survive those changes intact, but if they do it will be because they have little applica-
bility or meaning for the questions that really matter. The rules fathered by Jomini 
and Clausewitz may still be fundamental, but they will not tell one how to prepare 
for or fight a war.”79 Brodie’s thinking would remain firm on this until 1950, when 
the consequences of the thermonuclear revolution would profoundly affect Brodie’s 
thinking. Brodie is cited by Steiner as stating in 1950, “War is not now, if it ever really 
was, a continuation of diplomacy by other means – as Clausewitz’s time worn, and, 
in my opinion, outworn expression.”80 Brodie’s thinking would shift throughout the 
1950s, as H-bombs and their proliferation complicated the strategic environment, 
and made warfare between great powers even more dangerous than during the early 
atomic era when Brodie suggested that the splitting of the atom had brought forth 
the “absolute weapon.” As Steiner writes, it was in 1952 that Brodie professed his 
alignment with the thinking of Carl von Clausewitz: “‘Six months ago,’ he declared, 
‘I could have and in fact did deny in print that the famous, often-quoted statement of 
Clausewitz, ‘War is a continuation of policy by other means,’ could have any meaning 
for modern times. … I have since come to believe that Clausewitz was in fact saying 
something very profound … that the procedure and the objective must be in some 
measure appropriate to each other.’”81 
Early in the 1950s, Steiner observes, “Most of Brodie’s work on fusion weapons was 
directed at protecting cities from the effects of those weapons, because he believed, 
especially for political reasons, that war-making could be politically expedient with 
such weapons only if cities were spared their effects.”82 Steiner reiterates that “Brodie 
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associated control and limitations upon contemporary warfare with strategy and policy, 
as when he cited Clausewitz’s maxim that wars should be fought as a continuation of 
policy and therefore as ‘planned violence and therefore controlled.’”83 After the Korean 
War, where limited war in the nuclear age was largely pioneered, Brodie came to the 
realization that “pursuit of Clausewitz’s idea that ‘war is an instrument of national 
policy’ required ‘absolute integration’ between military planning and foreign policy, yet 
it was doubtful that such integration existed in the mid-1950s.”84 Meanwhile, “Playing 
down the search for one-sided advantages in a Soviet-American war in Europe, Brodie 
came out against another Clausewitzian maxim that the object of war was to impose 
one’s will on the enemy, rejecting this maxim … ‘at least for any opponent who has a 
substantial nuclear capability behind him.’”85 Brodie “clearly wished to control limited 
war-making as much as possible, which necessarily entailed manipulating threats and 
risks, but he also wished to keep risks as small as possible.”86 
Steiner observes that “Brodie’s most mature work addressed the political core of 
strategy and the over-valuation of narrower military and technical approaches to war-
making,” adding that “politics was central to strategy Brodie had learned from Clause-
witz;” by 1954, when atomic weapons again revolutionized warfare with the advent of 
thermonuclear weapons, he came to believe that we must “rethink some of the basic 
principles (which have become hazy since Clausewitz) connecting the waging of war 
with the political ends thereof, and to reconsider some of the prevalent axioms governing 
the conduct of military operations.” In his April 1955 article in World Politics, “Some 
Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” and in War and Politics, “[Brodie] applied war-
making to political interests as Clausewitz had done, taking account of contemporary 
experience.”87 Steiner points out that “Brodie had followed a very different approach 
from that taken in his Guide to Naval Strategy and in his essays in The Absolute Weapon, 
explaining in 1955 that ‘I feel the new weapons require that one bring to the center of 
attention in any strategic discourse subjects which the older treatises on strategy could 
easily ignore, like questions of national objectives’”—an approach, Steiner adds, that 
“was unorthodox for a strategist of any era, and Brodie had pioneered it as Clausewitz 
had earlier. Unlike Clausewitz, however, Brodie’s political conception of strategy de-
pended on a very optimistic evaluation of the contemporary great power relationship.”88 
Brodie’s interest in, and inspiration from, Clausewitz achieved its high water mark 
in 1973 in Brodie’s War and Politics, perhaps his most self-consciously Clausewitzian 
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work, particularly with regard to Clausewitz’s most famous dictum interlinking war to 
its political context. As Steiner writes, “The distinction between thought and dogma 
was unappreciated in the past. In 1973 Brodie lauded the nineteenth-century German 
strategic thinker Carl von Clausewitz for his ‘modernity,’ because his book On War 
‘helps warn the general not to be too rigid in his conceptions, especially those that in 
our own times he is likely to have received in the form of simple axioms in his staff 
college or war college courses.’”89 Steiner further explains that “[r]ather than guide 
policymakers in their particular circumstances, Brodie wished as did Clausewitz to 
sharpen the ability of policymakers and planners to apply their prevailing dispositions 
to military problems.”90 In a footnote, Steiner adds that Brodie wrote in his 1973 War 
and Politics: “What we get from Clausewitz is a deepening of sensibility or insight 
rather than a body of rules, because insofar as he does offer us rules he is at once avid 
to show us all the qualifications and historical exceptions to them.”91 
Steiner noted that Brodie presented a potent challenge to the nuclear warfighters, 
who were largely advocates of “[c]ontemporary axiomic strategy” involving weap-
ons that would “ensure horrendous casualties without necessarily forcing an end to 
hostilities.”92 In War and Politics Brodie asked, and then responded, “Why had not 
the most obvious lessons of combat experience been absorbed by commanders who 
were to send great new armies into battle? … Because for the most part experience not 
personal to themselves was not really alive to these commanders, who were not students 
of history, even of military history, but who had absorbed an intensive indoctrination 
laced through with religious fervor on the merits of the offensive.”93 And so even if 
Eisenhower cloaked his reasoning in Clausewitzian terms, his commitment to the of-
fensive was nonetheless rooted in his pre-nuclear thinking – or as Brodie suggested, a 
pre-nuclear instinct forged more by indoctrination to the cult of the offensive and less 
to thinking or analysis proper; Brodie would thus aim to hit a strategic reset button, 
and update Clausewitz for the nuclear age. 
It is no coincidence that Brodie, one of the most Clausewitzian of the Cold War 
strategists, was a also a Clausewitz scholar, and a principal member of Princeton’s 
“Clausewitz Project” that sought throughout the 1960s to bring the famed Prussian 
strategist’s works to an Anglo-American audience, newly translated and freshly inter-
preted by experts that included Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and (briefly) Liddell 
Hart and Raymond Aron – in addition to Brodie. Brodie’s later works would bear an 
increasing resemblance to Clausewitz’s On War in both form and substance, notably 
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his 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age that fleshed out the complexities of nuclear deter-
rence in the thermonuclear era – updating his preliminary (yet remarkably prescient) 
thoughts penned at the dawn of the nuclear age in his 1946 The Absolute Weapon, 
and his 1973 War and Politics which bears both its strikingly Clausewitzian title and 
its fundamentally Clausewitzian analysis of war. Brodie’s unrivaled embrace of stra-
tegic complexity (long before complexity theory became vogue) would, in the end, 
distinguish Brodie’s work from many of his contemporaries, particular the peer of his 
that would emerge as something of an alter ego, with a level of influence matching 
and later exceeding his own, and a level of literary productive output rivaling his own 
prodigious output – albeit with a distinctly less philosophical and a decidedly more 
doctrinal approach to thinking about the unthinkable – Herman Kahn. 
Brodie’s connection to Clausewitz was not just a theoretical or philosophical con-
nection; there were deeper, psychological links, as Brodie empathized with Clausewitz’s 
own battle with depression, and senses a mutuality in their frustrations dealing with 
smaller minds. As Steiner noted, Brodie felt “great frustration at not being called upon 
to exercise policymaking or policy-advising responsibility at high levels of government,” 
which “helps explain his very critical remarks about the military establishment, first 
informally and later in his final study, War and Politics.” Steiner later addresses these 
“apparent parallels between Brodie’s understanding of his later frustrations and those 
he ascribes to Clausewitz in his psychoanalytic explanations of Clausewitz’s career” in 
a separate chapter toward the end of his biography. Steiner alludes to Brodie’s frustra-
tions in his biography, noting in addition to Brodie’s frustration arising from his lack 
of high-level policy advising or policymaking, that he also felt some frustration with his 
work environment at RAND, which became increasingly evident from his criticisms 
of them, including rebuttals of Herman Kahn’s work on escalation and warfighting, 
that appeared in his published work. Steiner noted that “Brodie’s later belief that his 
reputation as a RAND analyst was stagnating relative to that of others,” and cited 
a letter Brodie wrote in 1952 on his motivations for moving to RAND and leaving 
academia: “One may have a lesser audience, measured in number of readers when 
writing from RAND rather than from a university; but one is likely to be a great deal 
more influential.”94 Steiner suggests that Brodie’s “need for approbation would have 
required that others at RAND defer to him,” but that his “major project at RAND 
during the 1950s, published as Strategy in the Missile Age, was largely one of synthesis 
and conceptualization, following rather than leading other RAND analysis and appar-
ently not receiving at RAND the great attention it inspired among informed people 
outside the organization.”95
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Steiner also examined Brodie’s efforts to reunite war and politics along a Clausewitz-
ian axis interconnecting the two, and thus address “the political core of strategy and 
the overvaluation of narrower military and technical approaches to war-making.”96 
Steiner writes: “That politics was central to strategy Brodie had learned from Clausewitz 
when, following news of the first projected test of fusion weapons, he was persuaded 
of the political futility of strategic nuclear war. ‘We must . . . proceed,’ Brodie wrote 
in January 1954, ‘to rethink some of the basic principles (which have become hazy 
since Clausewitz) connecting the waging of war with the political ends thereof, and 
to reconsider some of the prevalent axioms governing the conduct of military opera-
tions.’ In his later works, especially War and Politics, he applied war-making to political 
interests as Clausewitz had done, taking account of contemporary experience.”97 It 
took the leap in destructive power introduced by thermonuclear weapons to induce 
Brodie’s Clausewitzian evolution, and Steiner notes Brodie “had followed a very dif-
ferent approach from that taken in his Guide to Naval Strategy and in his essays in The 
Absolute Weapon,” and his new “approach was unorthodox for a strategist in any era, 
and Brodie pioneered in it as Clausewitz had earlier.”98 
Steiner cites Brodie’s introduction to the 1976 translation by Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret of Clausewitz’s On War, his essay titled “The Continuing Relevance of On 
War,” in which Brodie wrote: “Clausewitz is probably as pertinent to our times as 
most of the literature specifically written about nuclear war … [from which] we pick 
up a good deal of useful technological and other lore, but we usually sense also the 
absence of that depth and scope which are particularly the hallmark of Clausewitz. 
We miss especially his tough-minded pursuit of the idea that war in all its phases must 
be rationally guided by meaningful political purposes. That insight is quite lost in 
most of the contemporary books, including one which bears a title that boldly invites 
comparison with the earlier classic, Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War.”99 Steiner 
notes that “[u]sing Clausewitz to argue for the political irrelevance of attacking with 
thermonuclear weapons, Brodie, like Clausewitz, understood that war would not 
invariably serve ‘meaningful political purposes.’”100 Brodie felt Clausewitz’s concept 
of “absolute war,” which was “characterized by the absence of restraint on the pattern 
of the Napoleonic wars,” was particularly applicable to the thermonuclear era, and 
“shared with Clausewitz an understandable abhorrence of absolute war and the view 
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that guiding warfare by political considerations protected best against the tendency 
of war to become absolute.”101
Just as Brodie would come to believe that the destructiveness of thermonuclear weap-
ons made total war incompatible with political objectives and demanded a rebalancing 
of war and politics, other strategists, notably including Herman Kahn, felt otherwise 
and in fact believed the opposite: that thermonuclear war was no different from any 
other kind of war, making planning for such a clash a Clausewitzian necessity rather 
than a Clausewitzian violation. Citing Kahn, Barry Steiner notes how the famed nuclear 
warfighter recalled, with a note of criticism, that the “invention of the atomic bomb 
. . . seemed to end any constructive thinking about strategy and tactics. Nuclear war 
was simply unthinkable – both literally and figuratively. This phenomenon, known as 
psychological denial, meant that while one side (ours) did little or no thinking about 
nuclear weapons, the other side simple regarded them as ‘bigger bombs’ . . . and also 
did not undertake any fundamental rethinking of classical and strategic assumptions.”102 
Kahn would endeavor to correct this, though critics would conclude he merely mir-
rored the other side by embracing their bigger-is-better approach to classical strategic 
concepts. Kahn viewed Brodie’s 1955 Harpers article “Strategy Hits a Dead End,” a 
relatively rare moment of national prominence for Brodie when his article appeared 
in a national mass-circulation publication, as symptomatic of this “block in strategic 
thinking” induced by the new destructive power of nuclear weapons.103 But Steiner 
believes Kahn overstated the case, and underappreciated the efforts Brodie had made 
to in fact think about the unthinkable, noting “Brodie’s first work on this subject was 
hardly characterized by psychological denial.”104 
Nonetheless, there is indeed an emotional tension separating the works of Kahn and 
Brodie. Brodie feared the destructive powers of total war in the nuclear age, forcing 
him to question the political utility of general war after Hiroshima. As Steiner observes, 
“Brodie’s major contribution to nuclear strategy and his more mature complacence about 
the risks of nuclear war stemmed from his confidence about the narrower but equally 
important area of what the superpowers ought not to do with nuclear weapons.”105 
Steiner further notes that “by 1952 Brodie’s analyses focused more on what not to hit 
with nuclear bombs, notably American and Soviet homelands, than on potentially at-
tractive targets.”106 If deterrence did fail, Brodie persisted in his belief that restraint was 
necessary in the new nuclear order. As Steiner observed, “Arguing that nuclear weapons 
101. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, 203.
102. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, 205.
103. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, 206.
104. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, 206.
105. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, 234.
106. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy, 236.
Introduction and Literature Review 35
could more efficiently destroy enemy assets than their predecessors, Brodie also warned 
that capitalizing illogically and passionately upon force efficiency could be suicidal.”107 
Brodie’s emphasis on restraint did appear to come into some conflict with Clause-
witz’s early emphasis on decisive action, and Steiner cites Brodie’s 1959 assessment 
in Strategy in the Missile Age: “It is of course true and important that we cannot have 
limited war without settling for limited objectives, which in practice is likely to mean 
a negotiated peace based on compromise. Clausewitz’s classic definition, that the 
object of war is to impose one’s will on the enemy, must be modified, at least for any 
opponent who has a substantial nuclear capability behind him.”108 Steiner notes that 
“Brodie was mainly interested in doing in war and in crisis what the superpowers were 
doing prior to those eventualities – that is, maintaining controls on the use of force,” 
and his “horror at any strategic bombing that employed fusion weapons appears to 
have prevented him from studying the consequences of such bombing and the political 
developments conducive to it.”109 Steiner observes that “the most important continu-
ity in his thinking was his advocacy of using nuclear weapons to deter general war,” 
and, as a consequence, “he was much less worried than others that giving primacy to 
deterrence would impair the search for unilateral advantage in nuclear war.”110 
Hence Brodie’s tribute to Thucydides in Strategy in the Missile Age: “What we have 
done must convince us Thucydides was right, that peace is better than war not only 
in being more agreeable but also in being very much more predictable. A plan and 
policy which offers a good promise of deterring war is therefore by orders of magnitude 
better in every way than one which depreciates the objective of deterrence in order to 
improve somewhat the chances of winning.”111 Steiner believes that “Brodie was at his 
best as a strategic analyst when seeking alternatives to scenarios in which the unlimited 
killing power of nuclear weapons was likely to be displayed,”112 such as the scenarios 
that came to define Kahn’s prolific canon of work from On Thermonuclear War to On 
Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. Added Steiner: “If Brodie’s analyses of the physical 
use of nuclear weapons were generally weaker than his discussion of their coercive use, it 
may have been because he invariably assumed weapons yields that were uniform, large, 
and too unwieldy for any strategy apart from the coercive. War-winning scenarios that 
depended upon attacks by a diverse arsenal against a diverse array of targets would have 
required detailed, problematic, and elaborate studies less suited to Brodie’s prevailing 
approach to nuclear strategy. But Brodie did not neglect war-winning strategies alto-
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gether; he merely associated them with the coercive use of nuclear weapons, in which 
visible restraint in force employment was the key ingredient.”113 
Brodie thus came to distinguish the “deterrence of general war” from “deterrence 
in war,” the latter made possible only by differentiating the efforts for “strengthen-
ing deterrence of general war” from “strengthening deterrence of hostilities at other 
levels.”114 So, Steiner reasoned, “Brodie did sharply distinguish, by 1949 but not in 
1946, coercive use of nuclear weapons from purely physical employment of them, 
a refinement critical for military restraint in a major war and for applying nuclear 
warfare to political objectives.”115 But that left the issue of and challenges inherent 
in the physical employment of nuclear weapons largely unexplored, and thus Brodie 
“had little to say about strategic targets.”116 This sharply contrasted with the warfight-
ing tradition that would come to be exemplified by Herman Kahn, as illustrated by 
his many works such as Thinking About the Unthinkable and On Thermonuclear War.
In his ninth chapter, “On Strategy and Strategists,” Steiner considers the “Psychologi-
cal and Psychoanalytical Interpretations of Clausewitz,” noting Brodie was influenced 
by the 1971 biography of Clausewitz authored by Roger Parkinson, titled Clausewitz, 
that suggested Clausewitz, “who had never held a senior command position, had been 
ambitious but later in life saw himself as a failure, had frequently been melancholy and 
depressed, and had broken his melancholia only when anticipating war and participa-
tion in battle.”117 Steiner adds that “Brodie seemed attracted to Parkinson’s presentation 
by his own deeply intuitional understanding,” and in a letter to his colleague Peter 
Paret in 1973 noted Parkinson “came up with some remarkable letters or statements 
that certainly ring some kind of bell.”118 Steiner also mentions that Brodie went on 
to make “a series of deductions about Clausewitz’s character from statements in On 
War, each echoing Parkinson’s findings,” and that “[w]hen he went beyond assertions 
about character traits to more boldly probe Clausewitz’s unconscious motivations, 
Brodie depended even more upon Parkinson’s materials.”119 
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Interestingly, Brodie “conjectured that Clausewitz’s neurotic passions produced the 
first draft of On War, since ‘the first draft is ‘from the heart,’ or from wherever it is 
that emotions reside.’ That draft, Brodie pointed out, deals mostly with winning wars, 
in contrast to the final version, which had been revised to highlight war as policy by 
other means.”120 Clausewitz expert and translator Peter Paret disagreed with Brodie, 
and in a 1973 letter wrote that “Almost to the last day of his life, Clausewitz was active, 
productive, and self-confident, and . . . we have no reason to believe he was a depressed 
human being.” Paret cited many positive dimensions of Clausewitz’s life and career 
including his being “very happily married,” possessing “very close and long-lasting 
friendships,” and thoroughly enjoying his life as a soldier, theorist, and writer, whose 
“creative life was characterized by steady, constant productivity.”121 Steiner suggests 
that “[a]s to why Brodie should have focused so tenaciously on Clausewitz’s depres-
sion, it may be conjectured that because he so much admired Clausewitz as a writer 
on war, he probably focused upon parallels he saw between himself and Clausewitz 
in this and other areas,” and, having himself suffered from depression during his later 
years, Brodie “may well have presumed that Clausewitz’s character was in this respect 
similar to his own.”122 
Steiner also noted that Brodie and Clausewitz each endeavored to prevent war from 
becoming absolute, and thereby losing any rationality of purpose. Brodie strived to 
prevent the very cataclysm that Clausewitz witnessed during Napoleon’s retreat from 
Moscow; “reacting to the Clausewitzian concept of absolute war,” Brodie observed 
how “Clausewitz insists and reiterates that war is always an instrument of policy because 
he knew, and we know today, that the usual practice is rather to let war take over 
national policy.”123 Steiner finds that “Brodie’s assertion in the 1950s that war once 
begun had an inherent tendency to become ‘orgiastic,’ the starting point for his effort 
to strengthen war limitations, is especially compelling from this same perspective. 
Brodie also shared with Clausewitz an understandable abhorrence of absolute war 
and the view that guiding warfare by political considerations protected best against 
the tendency of war to become absolute.”124 Thus Brodie reasoned, in his 1959 classic 
work, Strategy in the Missile Age, that “Clausewitz’s classic definition, that the object of 
war is to impose one’s will on the enemy, must be modified, at least for any opponent 
who has a substantial nuclear capability behind him.”125 
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Steiner believes that “Brodie’s interest in Clausewitz was more abstract than prac-
tical” and that he “used him to caution against tolerating extremes, distinguishing 
as did Clausewitz between total and less than total war-making efforts for a given 
purpose.”126 As Steiner notes, Brodie “accepted Clausewitz’s rational equation between 
war-making and political objectives because he was as committed as Clausewitz was 
to logical strategy and to combating axiomatic views.”127 But he also keenly appreci-
ated Clausewitz’s recognition of the emotional side of war.As Steiner suggests, Brodie 
shared much with Clausewitz, including “their distinctive roles as critics of the con-
ventional wisdom and recognized authority” as well as “their major but unsuccessful 
efforts to gain larger recognition for their ideas and contributions, and their interest 
in the impact of emotions upon war-making.”128
Thus when Brodie set his mind to untangle the riddles of thermonuclear warfare, 
he came up with a decidedly different response from Eisenhower. Steiner cites a letter 
Brodie wrote to Schelling that recalls how, “At the beginning of 1952, when some 
of us here at RAND heard that a thermonuclear weapon would be tested the follow-
ing November and would probably work … I proposed that strategic bombing be 
interdicted altogether. … I was not going to have them bomb any targets … within 
the homeland of the Soviet Union, but sought to confine targets strictly to battlefield 
zones, and to disallow the larger cities even there.”129 Brodie explained to Schelling 
that he “thought then, and still think[s], that it would be easier to preserve a limita-
tion founded on gross distinctions of geography than to distinguish between military 
and civilian targets within enemy territory, especially since the two types might in 
many instances be in very close juxtaposition to each other.”130 Brodie wrestled with 
the many uncertainties associated with limiting war in the nuclear age and, as Steiner 
recalls, “Much of Brodie’s work during the 1950s was to expose what he believed to be 
insufficient attention given, especially by military staffs, to these uncertainties, which 
were both military and political.”131 
As for Marc Trachtenberg, another of the small but dedicated community of Brodie 
scholars who have immersed in the full spectrum of the Brodie literature, his discussion 
of Clausewitz within the context of Brodie’s work is even more succinct – with only 
around a half-dozen references to their connection in his 292-page History and Strategy, 
which also came to press in 1991. Trachtenberg suggests that Brodie’s appreciation of 
the Prussian increased over time as his understanding of Clausewitz’s work evolved 
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and as the dangers of the nuclear era approached the theoretical maximum reflected 
in Clausewitz’s absolute war concept, revealing more common ground between their 
two distinct eras that helped Brodie to straddle the gap between Napoleonic-era total 
war and the more absolute nature of war in the nuclear era. As Trachtenberg observed, 
an increasingly essential component of Brodie’s solution to the fundamental riddles 
and enduring ambiguities that lay at the heart of the nuclear discourse would come 
through his steady application of, and reflection on, Clausewitz’s philosophy of war. 
Clausewitz, renown for the complexity of his thought and his own legacy of contradic-
tion within his sprawling text, is not well-suited to simple solutions of simple maxims 
that boil down complex realities to pithy sound-bites; he offered instead a rich mosaic 
of reflection on history, war and strategy through the lens of deep analysis, one that 
is best appreciated over time. 
As Trachtenberg described:
Peace would depend, Brodie had argued even in the late 1940s, on a universal conviction ‘that 
war is far too horrible even to be contemplated. And the great dilemma is that the conviction 
can be sustained only by our making every possible effort to prepare for war and this to engage 
in it if need be.’ … Brodie had earlier thought that Clausewitz, with his insistence on the close 
linkage between political objectives and military means, had become obsolete: even the early 
atomic weapons were too destructive to be harnessed to rational political goals. But he had since 
come to see that Clausewitz had been ‘saying something very profound.’ He had been saying 
that ‘war is violence – to be sure, gigantic violence – but it is planned violence and therefore 
controlled.’132 
This constant and measured balancing of ends and means, central to Clausewitz-
ian strategy, would become Brodie’s mantra, leading him time and again into combat 
with his peers. Many other strategists took a markedly less Clausewitzian approach to 
strategy, focusing on escalation and the manipulation of risk, such as Brodie’s former 
RAND colleague and Hudson Institute founder Herman Kahn, who gained greater 
notoriety than Brodie but whose work was far less theoretically elegant, and Thomas 
Schelling, the bargaining and game theorist who was one of the first to eulogize Brodie 
and to celebrate his contribution to strategic studies upon his passing in 1978. As 
Trachtenberg described: “For Schelling especially, but to a certain degree for the others 
as well, the emphasis on risk meant that the manipulation of risk became perhaps the 
central concern of strategy,” and the “effect, at least, in Schelling’s case, was to transform 
strategy once again into tactics writ large – not military tactics this time, but bargain-
132. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 7.
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ing tactics.”133 Trachtenberg observes that the “purely military side of war causation, 
as Brodie later complained, became the focus of analysis, as though war itself were 
not in essence a political artifact – as though the basic insight of Clausewitz, whom 
they all respected, was somehow obsolete,”134 much as Brodie had earlier thought but 
which he later reassessed. Brodie would come to recognize that strategy was “a ques-
tion of balance, of not allowing the tail to wag the dog” as many of the escalation and 
bargaining theorists unwittingly did – Schelling’s bargaining approach to the “strategy 
of conflict” much like Kahn’s “escalation ladder,” would catalyze escalatory conflict 
dynamics that were dangerously detached from their political context, blindly driven 
by their own logic; as Trachtenberg noted, a more balanced approach “depended on 
the sophistication of one’s theory of war causation,”135 when it came to sophisticated, 
Brodie stood at the pinnacle of his field. 
Ironically, many of the bargaining and escalation theorists had responded with 
“hostility” to the “military policies associated with Eisenhower and Dulles,” especially 
their policy of massive retaliation which was so disproportional in its response that 
it seemed inherently un-Clausewitzian; but President Eisenhower was no stranger to, 
and was in fact intimately familiar with (and guided by) the Prussian’s wisdom, finding 
in Clausewitz’s thoughts some justification for a vigorous thermonuclear attack to a 
menacing Soviet Union, as he remarked at a July 29, 1954 National Security Council 
meeting where he alluded to “Clausewitz’s principle of ‘diminishing as much as pos-
sible the first blow of an enemy attack,’” – and who three years later again referenced 
the famed Prussian strategist, when noting a Soviet attack on the American homeland 
would cause some 50 million casualties, that “‘the only sensible thing for us to do was 
to put all our resources into our SAC capability and into hydrogen bombs,’” even if, 
as Trachtenberg added, it was “obvious that the only way this additional capability 
could make a difference was if the U.S. struck first.”136 Trachtenberg further discusses 
Eisenhower’s Clausewitzian grounding: “The basic realities of this new world had to 
be faced without sentimentality. Eisenhower was never able to accept the argument 
about a nuclear stalemate and the possibility that a general war might be fought 
with only conventional weapons.”137 Eisenhower rejected the suggestion by General 
Ridgway at a December 3, 1954 NSC meeting that the Soviets might refrain from 
using nuclear weapons if the United States did, retorting that he “did not believe 
any such thing,” and earlier in the year, at a June 24, 1954 NSC meeting, said such 
expectations of restraint from Moscow were “completely erroneous;” the next August 
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he reiterated his view, explaining that he “cannot see any chance of keeping any war 
in Europe from becoming a general war” and, as a consequence, that “we would be 
fooling ourselves and our European friends if we said we could fight such a war without 
recourse to nuclear weapons.”138 Trachtenberg wrote, “[Eisenhower’s] thinking was 
right out of the first few pages of Clausewitz: war has an innate tendency to become 
absolute. It followed that also that no restrictions or limitations could be placed on 
the way nuclear forces would be used in a general war with the Soviet bloc. Thus, for 
Eisenhower, the fundamental role of nuclear weapons was something permanent and 
ultimately inescapable.”139 
While Eisenhower framed his warfighting logic in Clausewitzian terms, it clearly 
was a selective interpretation of Clausewitz, and not rooted in a fuller or more nu-
anced interpretation as Brodie would endeavor. Brodie looked at the same challenges, 
the same transformation of military technology, and the same theorist of war sas Ei-
senhower, but drew far different conclusions.140 Echoing Steiner, Marc Trachtenberg 
– another member of the dedicated community of Brodie scholars whose work has 
helped to chronicle Brodie’s influence and to analyze his voluminous if at times seem-
ingly contradictory body of strategic analysis to ensure future generations grasped his 
subtleties and the full complexity of his thinking – described: “In the 1950s, strategy 
emerged in the United States as a new field with a distinct intellectual personality. A 
small group of men – Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and a 
handful of others – working mainly at the RAND Corporation, had moved into an 
intellectually barren ‘no-man’s land’ traditionally neglected by both military officers 
and students of international politics. The body of thought they created was very 
different from anything that had come before. Their ideas would prove enormously 
influential, and their style of analysis in large measure became the sophisticated way 
of approaching nuclear issues in the United States.”141
While the number of books, monographs, articles and chapters focusing exclusively 
on Brodie is limited, there are numerous works that have taken various levels of in-
spiration from Brodie – including at least one that was explicitly dedicated to him, 
an anthology of conference papers from the Bellagio Conference on deterrence held 
in December 1985 at Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy that first appeared as a special 
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edition of The Journal of Strategic Studies in December 1986 that was later published 
in book form by Frank Cass & Company in 1987: Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy, 
edited by Roman Kolkowicz. As Kolkowicz, who like Trachtenberg and Steiner have 
helped bring attention to Brodie’s important theoretical and doctrinal contributions, 
wrote in his introductory essay: “It is fair to say that the guiding intellectual spirit of 
the Bellagio conference and its proceedings was that of Bernard Brodie, to whom this 
volume is dedicated. Brodie was a pioneer of modern strategic studies in the nuclear era 
whose work has powerfully influenced generations of strategists and decision-makers. 
He was the first to perceive and publicly articulate the revolutionary implications of 
nuclear weapons for war and peace and for the management of international politics 
in a dangerous world. At the very dawn of the nuclear era, in 1946, he defined the 
essential paradox and inescapable truth of the nuclear condition: ‘Thus far, the chief 
purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief 
purpose must to be avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.’”142 Kolkowicz 
also wrote of Brodie: “[He] insisted that ‘we need people who will challenge and dissect 
the prevailing dogmas’ of strategic fashions and fads. Above all, reflecting the teachings 
of Clausewitz whom he greatly admired, Brodie urged the ‘need to stress the superior 
importance of the political side of strategy to the simply technical and technological’. 
He considered ‘the most important single idea in [Clausewitz’s] On War ... the one 
that makes it great, is the idea that war must never be an act of blind violence, but 
must be dedicated to achieving the supreme goal of statecraft’.”143
Kolkowicz noted that the discussion which unfolded at the Bellagio conference 
“pointed out the resistance after the Second World War to Brodie’s revolutionary 
formulation of the nuclear condition and his advocacy of deterrence-only, non-
military use of nuclear weapons” by those who “advocated an American strategy 
that was similar to that of the pre-nuclear era” and who thus “considered victory 
rational and obtainable”—in marked contrast to Brodie, who believed that “the 
idea of actually using these weapons was not thinkable” and that “military victory 
in nuclear war was not possible,” views that became “accepted in the 1960s by the 
official defense community and decision-makers and became the foundation for 
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American strategic policies.”144 This was illustrated by former Defense Secretary 
McNamara in his 1983 Foreign Affairs article, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weap-
ons: Perceptions and Misperceptions”; but, as recounted therein, he came to finally 
believe that America could not “avoid serious and unacceptable risk of nuclear war 
until we recognized ... that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. 
They are totally useless – except only to deter one’s opponent from using them,” 
capturing a sentiment that is at heart Brodien, and which soundly refuted his earlier 
notions of flexible response that captivated the best and the brightest throughout 
the Kennedy-Johnson years.145 
In 1991, the very same year Steiner’s book on Brodie’s legacy came to press, Marc 
Trachtenberg brought to press his own book-length manuscript that focused largely, 
but not entirely, on the Cold War period (with an additional chapter revisiting the 
causes of World War I, whose tragic runaway escalation from isolated act of terror to 
general war was a sobering reminder to the nuclear theorists what was at stake when 
reflecting on escalation): History and Strategy, as part of the Princeton Studies in 
International History and Politics series published by Princeton University Press. Its 
first chapter was a modified version of his 1989 Political Science Quarterly article, with 
the self-same title and which also appeared in the final volume in his multi-volume 
anthology, Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy: “Strategic 
Thought in America 1952-1966,” which focuses heavily upon Brodie’s contribution 
to American strategic thought in this period that immediately followed the arrival of 
thermonuclear weapons, based on a special public release by RAND of fourteen hith-
erto unpublished papers by Brodie written in nearly the identical period (1952-1965). 
Trachtenberg’s discussion sheds much light upon the ambiguity of Brodie’s writ-
ten work, which evolved over time – and in response to a rapid series of dizzying 
technological innovations from the splitting of the atom to the perfection of fusion 
bombs and their successful coupling to intercontinental missiles – and contains, as 
a result, some unavoidable contradictions, particularly on the topic of limited war 
and the battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons. These seeming contradictions 
reflected the natural tension between two paradoxical responses to the new nuclear 
reality of the post-Hiroshima world: as Trachtenberg explained, this “basic tension” 
that permeated the evolution of nuclear strategic thought “was as though the coming 
of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 had released two great shock waves in the world of 
strategic thought,” the first being once both superpowers “had obtained survivable 
and deliverable strategic forces, all-out war … would become an absurdity,” while 
the second was the “equally basic notion that the threat of nuclear war could be used 
144. Kolkowicz, ed., Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy, 6. 
145. Robert McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” Foreign Affairs 62 
(1983): 59-81, 79.
44 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
for political purposes that went well beyond deterring the use of nuclear weapons 
by an adversary.”146 
The resulting doctrinal clash between these two schools, sometimes referred to as 
the “assured destruction” and “warfighting” (or “war-winning”) schools, would define 
much of the literature and suggest a theoretical polarity that clashed with a more 
ambiguous reality, where strategies were pulled like a pendulum between the two, 
sometimes showing much overlap in pursuit of the same end goal: peace and survival 
in the nuclear world. As Trachtenberg noted: “It was not that separate factions rallied 
around each of these two poles: the history of American strategic thought during 
this period cannot be summed up as a dispute between those who believed in ‘simple 
deterrence’ and those who wanted nuclear forces to play a more far-reaching political 
role. Strategic discourse was during this period was not sectarian or doctrinaire: the 
striking thing was that the same people were attracted to both approaches, often at 
the same time.”147 Adds Trachtenberg, “these two basic ways of approaching strategy 
were in obvious conflict with one another. The fundamental question was whether 
there was any way this conflict could be resolved.”148 Such would be the challenge 
that Bernard Brodie would face in his four-decade long journey that started on the 
eve of World War II, as America rose to the heights of superpower status, and carried 
him past the humbling setback in Vietnam where American power – and its theories 
of limited warfare, escalation, and bargaining – were put to the test. 
In addition to the many works of Cold War intellectual history where Brodie played 
a prominent role, there are even more works where he was but one member of a larger 
cast of characters contributing to a conversation that stretched from 1945 until the 
Cold War’s sudden end. In 1981, Lawrence Freedman authored one of the most com-
prehensive intellectual histories of the nuclear age, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 
published by St. Martin’s Press, followed the next year with Colin Gray’s Strategic 
Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience, published by the University Press 
of Kentucky. Then in 1983 came Fred Kaplan’s widely read intellectual biography of 
the nuclear era’s greatest thinkers, the Wizards of Armageddon, based on his doctoral 
thesis for the MIT Department of Political Science, was published by Simon and 
Schuster (to be reissued in 1991 by Stanford University Press as part of its Nuclear 
Age Series) – with colorful (and apocryphal) recollections of Brodie and his contribu-
tions to the emerging field of nuclear strategic thought, along with the other principal 
contributors like Herman Kahn among others. Soon after Kaplan’s widely read 1983 
work, Gregg Herken authored Counsels of War (Alfred A. Knopf, 1985, republished 
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by Oxford University Press in 1987) covering ground quite similar to that covered by 
Kaplan but with greater attention to Brodie’s theoretical development as one of many 
characters in the atomic drama, following up his earlier 1980 The Winning Weapon 
(also published by Knopf ) which had barely mentioned Brodie (and when doing so 
misspelled his first name as Bertrand in the index!) and instead focused more on the 
policymakers of the era. Also in 1985, Princeton University Press published Makers 
of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, a sequel 
to Earle’s famed 1943 anthology with nearly identical title and much shared content; 
the new edition included a chapter by Lawrence Freedman, “Nuclear Strategists,” 
that included Brodie among the key players, a topic he covered in great depth in his 
widely read 1981 work, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (St. Martin’s), now in its 
third edition (now under the imprint of Palgrave, 2003). Brodie had played just as 
central a role in Trachtenberg’s 1991 History and Strategy, especially his first chapter, 
“Strategic Thought in America.” 
In 1992, Herken authored Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the 
Atomic Bomb to SDI (Oxford University Press, 1992) which extended his examination 
of the Cold War’s greatest minds to the efforts by scientists to influence presidential 
policy starting with the atomic scientists who lobbied successfully for the Manhattan 
Project during World War II, and which breathed institutional momentum into the 
new partnership between civilian advisors and the makers of American defense and 
security policy, a partnership that Brodie was both part of, and which Brodie wrote 
about, throughout his career. A decade later, Herken authored Brotherhood of the Bomb: 
The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward 
Teller, published by Henry Holt in 2002 which covered ground similar to that cov-
ered by Herb York in his 1976 The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb 
(W.H. Freeman & Co., reissued by Stanford University Press in 2009) among other 
works covering the H-bomb’s creation and the epic political battles and debates that 
led to the superbomb or ‘Super.’ In 2007, Peter D. Smith authored Doomsday Men, 
published by St. Martin’s (paperback in 2008 from Penguin) examining the scientists 
of the Manhattan Project more broadly; and in 2008, Alex Abella’s Soldiers of Reason 
that recounted the history of the RAND Corporation was published by Houghton 
Mifflin (paperback in 2009); David Hoffman’s Pulitzer Prize winning The Dead Hand 
examining the Russian side of the strategic-nuclear community was also published 
in 2009, by Anchor Books. Interest in the nuclear era appeared to be on the rise 
once more. In 2005, Harvard University Press published Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi’s 
The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War and Herman 
Kahn’s best-selling 1960 tome, On Thermonuclear War, was brought back into print 
by Transaction in 2007, with On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios following in 
2009, with a new foreword by Thomas Schelling. And a new anthology of Herman 
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Kahn’s ‘classic’ writings was published in 2009: Paul Dragos Aligica and Kenneth R. 
Weinstein, eds., The Essential Herman Kahn (Lexington Books, 2009). These works 
have contributed to a revival in interest in Herman Kahn’s work, and this suggests 
there is much potential for a similar renaissance of interest in Brodie’s theoretically 
more elegant and rigorous work. More recently, in 2009, Fred Kaplan’s 1959 was 
published by Wiley – focusing on this often overlooked year that immediately pre-
ceded the tumultuous decade of the 1960s but which played a pivotal historical role 
that Kaplan believes proved transformative, and thereby enabled the phenomenon 
of the sixties to transpire – with a chapter on Herman Kahn that drew heavily from 
Ghamari-Tabrizi’s work as well as his earlier Wizards of Armageddon, but which offered 
no such chapter on Brodie’s work, even though it was in 1959 that Brodie’s seminal 
Strategy in the Missile Age was published.
One reason for this recent neglect of Brodie’s contribution to the nuclear strategic 
discourse could be that Brodie’s influence was more theoretical than doctrinal; and 
another could be that he was something of a strategic maverick, going against the 
grain and thus rubbing those in power the wrong way. As Ken Booth has commented, 
“At several important points in his career Brodie was a dissident” who “did not avoid 
professional discomfort” nor “think it threatening to change his mind;” as well, he “did 
not defer to the authority of air force commanders when he believed them wrong,” 
nor did he “believe that his colleagues at RAND had discovered timeless truths about 
strategy.” Brodie thus “challenged the conventional wisdom” and, “most unusual of all 
for an American strategist of his day, he did not believe that his own country was always 
right.”149 And so, Booth reflects, “it is not surprising that Brodie’s direct influence on 
the making of American strategy … was limited,” but, as he further considers, “does 
influence matter? Who now worries whether Clausewitz had any influence? What 
counts is the enduring worth of what he wrote.”150 Booth describes Brodie’s influence 
as being “indirect rather than direct, and philosophical rather than technical,” with 
Brodie less “a ‘maker’ of modern strategy in a direct sense, like von Schlieffen” – and 
more like the pre-eminent strategic theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.151 
While the literature on Brodie is limited, with only one book-length study exclu-
sively focusing on him, as noted above – authored by Barry Steiner in 1991, and 
building upon his January 1984 ACIS Working Paper, “Using the Absolute Weapon: 
Early Ideas of Bernard Brodie on Atomic Strategy” – Brodie has nonetheless been an 
enduring, and indeed often central, character in numerous journal articles and book 
chapters while also being included among the cast of leading characters in many of the 
149. Ken Booth, “Bernard Brodie,” in John Baylis and John Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinters 
Press, 1991), 51.
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intellectual histories of the Cold War, most famously perhaps in the aforementioned 
Wizards of Armageddon authored by Kaplan, and similar works by Gregg Herken, 
Lawrence Freedman and Colin Gray, among others.152
Barry Steiner, along with Marc Trachtenberg and Roman Kolkowicz, demonstrates 
a rare depth and breadth of knowledge of Brodie’s writings and their impact on both 
the theoretical and doctrinal development of nuclear strategy, and when the study 
of Brodie enjoys a much-deserved renaissance, these scholars will surely serve as its 
foundation. Just as Steiner provides us with a unique and probing depth of insight 
into Brodie’s thought, Trachtenberg provides us with a unique and searching breadth 
with his very unique anthology of preserved facsimiles of original Cold War docu-
ments in his 1988 multi-volume reference set, The Development of American Strategic 
Thought: Writings on Strategy, with a total of 73 papers, articles and reports presented 
in chronological sequence, including several of Brodie’s lesser known articles and 
hitherto classified RAND papers. The first part, Writings on Strategy 1945-1951, in-
cludes seven Brodie chapters among its ten in total; the three-volume second part of 
the series, Writings on Strategy 1952-1960 includes eight Brodie chapters out of nine 
in total in volume one; six Brodie chapters out of 15 total in volume two; and two 
Brodie chapters out of 14 total in volume three; and in the third part of the series, 
152. Articles and chapters that focus on or at least prominently feature Brodie include: Bevan M. French, “Brodie Discusses 
‘Limited’ Conflicts, Says All-Out War is ‘Meaningless’,” The Dartmouth CXV, No. 126 (March 20, 1956), 1; John W. 
Chapman, “American Strategic Thinking,” Air University Review (January-February 1967); Fred Charles Iklé, “When the 
Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” World Politics 19, No. 4 (July 1967), 692-707; Richard L. Curl, 
“Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” Strategic Review 3 (Winter 1975), 46-56; Reginald C. Stuart, “Clausewitz and the 
Americans: Bernard Brodie and Others on War and Policy,” in Brian Bond and Ian Roy, eds., War and Society: A Yearbook 
in Military History (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1977), 166-172; Thomas Schelling’s obituary of Brodie upon 
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passing in Arms Control Today, “Bernard Brodie 1910-1978,” Arms Control Today (February 1979), 10; William P. Snyder 
and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” Parameters XI, No. 4 (1981); Jeffrey 
D. Porro, “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38, No. 6 (June/July 1982), 16-19; Craig 
D. Wildrick, “Bernard Brodie: Pioneer of the Strategy of Deterrence,” Military Review, October 1983, 39-45; Barry Steiner, 
“Using The Absolute Weapon: Early Ideas of Bernard Brodie on Atomic Strategy,” ACIS Working Paper No. 44 (January 
1984), Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA (which also appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies 7, No. 
4 (December 1984), 365-393) and which, as noted above, became chapter 2 in Steiner’s 1991 book-length monograph, 
Bernard Brodie and the American Study of Nuclear Strategy; Gregg Herken, “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon: Deterrence 
and the Legacy of Bernard Brodie,” in Roman Kolkowicz, ed., Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass & Co., 
1987), 15-24; Marc Trachtenberg, “Strategic Thought in America: 1952-1966,” Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1989), 
301-334, which first appeared as his concluding retrospective at the end of his multi-volume anthology, The Development 
of American Strategic Thought (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1987-1988) and which became, in extended 
form, his first chapter in History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and whose knowledge of Brodie’s 
writings, published and unpublished, is extensive; William Huntington, “Clausewitz and Strategy in the Missile Age: A 
Critique of Bernard Brodie’s Strategic Thought,” a paper submitted to Foundations of National Security Strategy, National 
War College, October 9, 1990; Ken Booth, “Bernard Brodie” in John Baylis and John Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear 
Strategy (London: Pinters Press, 1991), for which Kaplan’s Wizards of Armageddon served as a major historical source, and 
whose position as the first chapter of this anthology signifies Brodie’s foundational role at the forefront of nuclear strategy 
(this chapter is also referenced in the literature occasionally as “Bernard Brodie: The Absolute Strategist,” a fitting title); 
Michael Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” Survival 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 107-116; 
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Writings on Strategy 1960-1969, and Retrospectives, Brodie’s chapters comprise 12 out 
of a total 25 chapters, which includes the four “Retrospectives” (two of which were 
authored by Brodie). While this anthology is not widely held by academic libraries, 
and as a complete set can be found in just a small number, it affords a rare glimpse 
into the lesser known Brodie, not the Brodie of The Absolute Weapon or Strategy in the 
Missile Age or even his less widely read Escalation and the Nuclear Option and War and 
Politics, or even his early works on naval strategy, Sea Power in the Machine Age and 
A Guide to Naval Strategy, the writer of heavy and enduring tomes which present as a 
collective a body of work on a scale that has been inhabited by an august few, theorists 
of war like Mahan and Clausewitz, or earlier theorists of the state like Hobbes and 
Machiavelli – but instead the prolific essayist and public speaker who wrote for and 
spoke to the lay public, and at the same time an equally prolific writer of classified 
reports and memoranda read primarily by America’s top political and military lead-
ers as they grappled with the new challenges of the nuclear age. Brodie’s output was 
bountiful, even if many of his works were read by only a small audience and in the 
end, popular celebrity escaped him. And more importantly, as Steiner, Trachtenberg, 
Schelling and so many other leading strategic studies scholars have noted, Brodie’s 
influence was felt far and wide, from the epic naval clashes of World War II through 
to the new challenges of the early post-Hiroshima world as bipolarity emerged, up to 
and beyond the humbling strategic setbacks of the Vietnam War era.
Given Brodie’s pioneering, indeed pivotal, role among the leading intellectuals of 
the bomb from the very inception of the nuclear age, a role faithfully chronicled by 
Kaplan in his widely read Wizards of Armageddon, it seems odd that when Kaplan 
revisited this era in his more recent 1959: The Year Everything Changed published in 
2009, he paid tribute to Herman Kahn’s influence with his very own chapter, but 
largely neglected Brodie, who appears only tangentially in the chapter on Kahn – even 
though it was Brodie’s magnum opus, Strategy in the Missile Age, that came to press in 
that transformative year of 1959, and which was described without any exaggeration 
by Colonels William P. Snyder and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., in their 1981 article in 
Parameters detailing Brodie’s unique contribution to strategy, as “the most important 
book on American national strategy to appear in the decade of the 1950s,” a senti-
ment echoed by Colin S. Gray when he described it as “the most widely praised book 
on contemporary strategy” – though Kahn was at that point traveling the country 
presenting his infamous slide show that would become, in narrative form, his best-
selling 1960 On Thermonuclear War.153 While Kahn has received much recent atten-
tion by publishers, including Harvard University Press and Lexington Books which 
153. See: William P. Snyder and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” Parame-
ters XI, No. 4 (1981); and Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor & Francis, 
2006), 31.
Introduction and Literature Review 49
have contributed to the recent revival of Kahn in the literature, Brodie by comparison 
appears relatively overlooked thus far. But Brodie’s own bountiful contribution to 
the literature more than makes up for the lack of literature about him. His works 
span all manner of formats, from scholarly books bearing Princeton University Press’ 
august imprint to popular trade books published by Dell and MacMillan, and from 
newspaper op-eds and magazine articles to academic scholarly and military journal 
articles, and from public lectures and speeches to his many classified reports, working 
papers, and research memoranda for the military while at RAND and lectures to the 
service academies.154 
Brodie’s approach to nuclear strategy was distinct in its sophistication, his willing-
ness to embrace the inherent uncertainties of war unique among his peers, placing 
his approach to theorizing firmly in the Clausewitzian tradition, a tradition that was 
beyond the reach of many strategic studies scholars whose approach to war was much 
more linear, less nuanced, and less willing to embrace war’s ambiguity or honestly 
confront its dangers while recognizing its uncertainties. But we must go beyond merely 
matching up Brodie and Clausewitz as likeminded philosophers of war, unparalleled 
in their intellect and insight, for the connection that binds Brodie to Clausewitz across 
a more than a century of profound historical change is truly multi-layered. As such, 
Brodie is best understood through a Clausewitzian lens on many levels, not just for his 
theoretical imitation of Clausewitz but also for his role fostering the revival of Clause-
witz studies in the Anglo-American strategic studies community, helping to catalyze 
interest in the Prussian among a new generation of scholars, exposing students and 
scholars to the full richness and complexity of Clausewitz’s thought, thereby fostering 
a more nuanced understanding of war in the modern world, particular in the nuclear 
era when Clausewitz’s theoretical construct of absolute war first became a reality. 
Unmatched among his peers for his rich and diverse range of expertise – from 
military history to classical philosophy to the technology of war – Brodie stepped 
up and filled a giant’s shoes left empty ever since Clausewitz’s untimely death, for a 
new generation that was confronted by the gravest military challenge of all time: the 
splitting of the atom by fallible man and his creation in the laboratory of a technol-
ogy capable of realizing Clausewitz’s hitherto theoretical construct of absolute war. 
Brodie’s distinct style, his recurring references to Milton, his early ruminations on 
Socrates, his successful effort to reintroduce America to its very own “Clausewitz of 
the sea,” Admiral Mahan, his subsequent rediscovery of and inspiration from Clause-
witz himself, led to a richness in theorizing that would set him apart. But along the 
way, this very sophistication would alienate him from the very community he hoped 
154. See the chronological listing of Brodie’s works, including his books; papers, reports, lectures, and chapters; and articles, 
located just after the Bibliography. 
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to influence – as less complex thinkers better-suited for the formulation of doctrine 
than the more complex challenges of theory promised simplicity to an era engulfed 
by a cloud of fear and worry and which did not want to wade deeply into a shadow 
world of complexity and ambiguity, and who would, for their promise of simplicity, 
come to dominate the field of American nuclear strategy.
Looking back to the Napoleonic era and the duel that followed between the Jomin-
ian and Clausewitzian theoretical responses, the former which dominated military 
academies for a century, stretching from the American civil war when Jomini was 
widely read on both sides, to World War I and its tragic stalemate, through to the 
German and Japanese success with land- and sea-based blitzkrieg, quickly overrun-
ning much of the world with bold, aggressive lightning strikes as if in the spirit of 
Napoleon (and in the end suffering the same totality of defeat). But once the nuclear 
stalemate set in, and later the failed application of the Jominian linearity of escala-
tion theory to Vietnam, Clausewitz’s wisdom was “rediscovered” – and Brodie was 
one of the theorists dedicated to that rediscovery. Brodie’s interest in Clausewitz was 
not strictly academic; Clausewitz became in part a metaphor for the very complexity 
of war in a dangerous time, and the frustration felt by the philosopher of war who 
recognized this complexity, its danger, and its many ambiguities, and who did not 
reduce it to simpler catchphrases. The Jomini-Clausewitz rivalry – a battle of ideas 
that would take place long after Clausewitz’s own death – presents us with a lens 
through to better understand Brodie, who was similarly confronted by more popular 
rivals who would achieve greater influence in his time, such as the best-selling author 
and pop-cultural icon Herman Kahn – and also the Nobel Prize-winning presidential 
adviser Henry Kissinger. 
But Brodie brought to the study of war an understanding of philosophy, history, 
psychology, and technology – dynamic and fluid forces where change was the only 
constant. And this provided him with the ammunition to articulate a complex, nu-
anced theory of war and the place of nuclear weapons in the modern world, one that 
demanded restraint and understanding, and sometimes inaction instead of action. All 
unpopular precepts for a more muscular world that favored bold and confident action. 
In a world predisposed to tough talk and bold action, Brodie’s ideas ruffled feathers 
and left him on the sidelines of a field where his ideas, ironically, were superior to 
those offered up by most of his peers, and which evolved in lockstep with the times 
from the early era of American atomic monopoly to the world of overkill that would 
define the latter years of the Cold War. Brodie first thought about naval strategy in the 
pre-nuclear world; the impact of technology change on the conduct of war across the 
ages; and the fundamental ambiguities inherent in digesting the past and interpreting 
it and applying it to the emergent future. Brodie looked first at Socrates, and saw in 
the great philosopher the riddle of his uncertain legacy. When he later looked to Alfred 
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Thayer Mahan, he helped resurrect interest in the central but neglected importance 
of sea power to history, just in time for America to take to the high seas, and rollback 
the wave of Imperial Japanese expansion in the Pacific and to establish the foundation 
for an American century. 
In Clausewitz, Brodie found riddles similar to those he found in Socrates – and in 
his own remarkable if not always fully appreciated contribution to strategic theory in 
the nuclear era, he would leave his own legacy of riddles, rising to a rare and distin-
guished level as one of the truly great strategic minds of all time, joining a Pantheon 
of great thinkers, even if that meant becoming isolated from the world of mortal man. 
With Brodie’s death now more than three decades in the past, and the Cold War itself 
part of history for over two decades, we find our world is again at war, and as we 
navigate this current world of conflict, we witness a new clash between the apostles of 
simplicity, and the more nuanced interpreters of complexity; as these two tidal forces 
array against each other, a re-examination of the last generation’s greatest theorist of 
complex war and his clash with simpler minds, can offer us important lessons for our 
own time – and for all time. We will in the pages that follow turn to the writings of 
Bernard Brodie that span a tumultuous half century, from the years just before World 
War II to those just after America’s humbling Vietnam experience; in so doing, we 
will come to understand Brodie’s pivotal place in the evolution of strategic theory and 
the philosophy of war, as strategic thinkers grappled not only with the cataclysmic 
destruction brought by total war, but the potential extinction of humanity courted 
by the architects of the new, nuclear order as they wrestled with how to harness the 
bomb without being destroyed by it. 
Early on, Brodie enjoyed what Ken Booth has described as “the knack of being in 
the right place at the right time.” He acquired an interest in international relations 
during the 1930s after studying philosophy at the University of Chicago, where he 
stayed on for his doctorate and studied under Quincy Wright, a pioneer in the field. 
According to Booth, Wright was “approaching the end of his mammoth project, The 
Study of War,” for which Brodie’s component served as his doctoral project examining 
“the impact of naval technology on diplomacy in the nineteenth century,” which he 
completed, with perfect timing, in 1940.155 In addition to Wright’s influence, Booth 
notes Brodie “also greatly benefited from Jacob Viner, a member of the economics 
department,” who was also “an impressive thinker about international relations and in 
time became an early and original contributor to thinking about the atomic bomb.”156 
Brodie next went to Princeton, “where he took up a research fellowship, helped by 
Wright’s contact with Edward Meade Earle,” who, like Brodie’s mentor, “was at the 
155. Booth, “Bernard Brodie,” 19.
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forefront of his field and was overseeing a book, The Makers of Modern Strategy, which 
would become a milestone.”157 At Princeton, Brodie “adapted his dissertation into 
his own first book,”158 Sea Power in the Machine Age, whose success led Princeton 
University Press to commission Brodie to write another book on sea power, which he 
quickly finished, with A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy being published in 1942. 
Brodie’s early success and positive publishing experience suggested the possibility 
that “the strategic theorist might be valued by the practitioner,” and that “civilian 
theorists could be appreciated by military professionals,” helping precipitate the birth 
of a new field; but Booth notes that these early successes would face later setbacks and 
disappointments that would suggest to Brodie that such acceptance “was the exception 
rather than the rule.”159 In the chapters that follow, we will explore Brodie’s ideas as 
they evolved from his student years before the outbreak of World War II, when the 
issue of “peaceful change” and what later would be derided as “appeasement” were 
the hot button issues of the day on the minds of international relations students and 
scholars, into the post-Hiroshima world, where nuclear weapons and the riddles of 
nuclear deterrence would pose their own vexing questions. We will see in Brodie’s 
work a striking connection linking his efforts with those made the century before by 
the great philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, whom Brodie studied, and later 
sought to import to the American academy, and in the end emulated – a kindred spirit 
across the chasm of time in many ways and on many levels.
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Chapter Two
Before the Bomb: 
Bernard Brodie’s Beginnings
Newell G. Bringhurst, perhaps the foremost scholar of Bernard Brodie’s wife, Fawn 
M. Brodie – the best-selling historian and controversial pioneer in the field of psy-
chohistory who famously exposed the human sides of such important figures in 
American history as Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon Church and U.S. 
presidents Thomas Jefferson and Richard Nixon – has shed much light on Bernard 
Brodie’s early life and career in the course of chronicling his wife Fawn. Bringhurst 
recounts Bernard Brodie’s early years, as described by Brodie’s brother Leonard in an 
interview: “He was born in Chicago on 20 May 1910 to Morris and Esther Block 
Brody, Jewish immigrants who had migrated from Latvia to the United States in the 
late nineteenth century. The Brody family settled in a predominantly Jewish section 
on Chicago’s west side, where Bernard, the third of four sons, grew up. His father 
provided for the family as an itinerant peddler, selling produce and other commodities 
off a horse-drawn wagon.”160 Bringhurst adds that Brodie’s “parents did not get along. 
The marriage itself, according to son Leonard, was one of convenience, arranged by 
family shortly after Esther’s arrival in America.”161 In addition to their age difference 
of sixteen years, Bringhurst writes that “more serious were the Brodys’ sharply differ-
ing values and attitudes. Morris was extremely bright; he enjoyed books and learning 
in general, and he passed these qualities on to Bernard.”162 
While Esther “had minimal education and learning,” Bringhurst writes that “she 
encouraged her children to go to school and took pride in their educational achieve-
ments,” and after Bernard graduated from Chicago “applauded his achievement as ‘the 
greatest thing in the world.’”163 Brodie’s parents were also very different socially: “Mor-
ris, who was very frugal, never attended a play or even a movie because he considered 
them extravagances” and was described by his son Leonard as having “absolutely no 
friends,” in contrast to Esther who, “by contrast, was quote sociable.”164 Ultimately, 
“their marriage didn’t survive, and by 1924 the two had separated” and “Esther was left 
to raise her four sons on her own.”165 While of opposite social dispositions, Bringhurst 
160. Newell G. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 60. 
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writes they “[b]oth rejected all aspects of Jewish religious belief and practice,” with 
Morris described as “strongly antireligious, believing all religions to be based on fraud 
and designed to gouge money out of people”; but despite his rejection of the Jewish 
religion, he and Esther “retained certain customs and a sense of group awareness” that 
suggests a continuing Jewish cultural identity, and thus “shopped in Jewish-run stores 
and even ate kosher meat, thus remaining at least culturally Jewish.”166
After Brodie graduated from high school at fourteen, he left home to attend Crane 
Technical College, and reduced contact with his family during this period, a situation 
that remained unchanged after he enrolled at the University of Chicago, where he 
earned his bachelor’s and then later his doctorate degrees. As Bringhurst writes, “He 
was ambivalent about his Jewish heritage and ‘sought to disassociate himself from 
anyone, thing, [or] idea [that] might be considered Jewish, including his family’”; 
he “took time to visit his mother only once every six months and avoided all contact 
with his three brothers.”167 Bringhurst speculates that this “rejection was manifest in 
Bernard’s identifying himself as ‘Brodie’ rather than ‘Brody’” and notes that “[i]n later 
years Bernard claimed that the change in spelling was due to an inadvertent error 
made when he first enrolled in College,” a claim rejected by Brodie’s brother Leonard 
who “asserted that the change was deliberate, an attempt to deny his Jewishness.”168 
It was in 1936, while completing her master’s at Chicago, that Fawn McKay – the 
future Fawn M. Brodie – “had met and fallen in love with Bernard Brodie;” and after 
a “whirlwind courtship that lasted a mere six weeks,” they were married on August 
28, 1936. As Bringhurst writes: “Despite marked differences in their backgrounds, 
they were immediately attracted to each other. Fawn found Bernard appealing for a 
number of reasons. First, he was extremely intelligent, with an inquisitive mind and an 
insatiable thirst for knowledge. Then there was his personality. Bernard was dynamic 
and passionate. He was quick to show his feelings and emotions. Fawn’s exposure to 
such behavior was a new, enormously exhilarating experience. Bernard, moreover, was 
charming. Despite a generally quiet, soft-spoken demeanor, he enjoyed interacting 
with others. Fawn particularly appreciated his eloquence, his mastery of the English 
language, both spoken and written, and his subtle, wry sense of humor.”169 But Fawn’s 
family was not pleased with their relationship: “Disclosure of the whirlwind court-
ship and impending marriage caused consternation, bordering on hysteria, within the 
McKay family,” though her mother did attend the wedding in Chicago, albeit only 
after failing to persuade her daughter to change her mind.170 And while Bernard was 
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alienated from his family, he did invite his mother and brothers but they “refused 
to attend;” and, as Bringhurst writes, “According to his daughter, Pamela, Bernard’s 
family interpreted the marriage as a deliberate rejection not only of them but also of 
his Jewish heritage.”171 
In the summer of 1937, the rest of the McKay family finally met Bernard, and 
according to several of Fawn’s relatives, Brodie won their acceptance, “despite the 
initial controversy generated by the marriage itself and despite strong anti-Semitic 
prejudices endemic to Huntsville,”172 and Bringhurst writes that “Bernard’s accept-
ance by Fawn’s family undoubtedly was facilitated by firsthand observations of how 
well the young couple interacted.”173 And interact they did, as they emerged as two 
of their generation’s most controversial and original thinkers, transforming each of 
their fields and casting an enduring legacy over future scholars in their disciplines, 
an intellectual partnership that is reminiscent of that unique bond shared by Carl 
von Clausewitz and his devoted wife Marie, whose own dogged determination after 
her husband’s untimely death ensured that his master work, On War, came to press 
and that his legacy endured for posterity. On their fortieth anniversary in 1975, they 
“celebrated at their Pacific Palisades home, inviting forty of their closest friends and 
family,” and “shared with guests recollections of family opposition, on both sides, to 
the improbable match.” According to Bringhurst, “Fawn remembered enduring more 
abuse from certain members of the extended McKay family for marrying a Jew than 
for writing No Man Knows My History,” her controversial biography of Mormonism’s 
founder.174 Nevertheless, theirs became an “intense relationship, characterized by 
strong bonds and extremely rewarding to both partners.”175 
While Brodie was working on his doctorate, Fawn began research on the origins of 
the Book of Mormon which led ultimately to her first, and very controversial, biog-
raphy of the Mormon Church’s founder Joseph Smith. Bernard “acted as a sounding 
board for her ideas and evaluated her written drafts,” and Fawn “praised her husband 
as immensely helpful in judging her conclusions with a detachment that she herself 
lacked.”176 But Bringhurst writes: “The Brodies’ main concern during this period was 
not Fawn’s research but rather Bernard’s academic work at the University of Chicago, 
where he was completing his doctorate in international relations. Bernard was naturally 
drawn to this field, given the momentous developments in Europe and Asia – specifi-
cally, the Spanish Civil War, Germany’s rearmament and aggressive takeover of Austria 
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and Czechoslovakia, and Japan’s aggression into the heart of China.”177 At the Univer-
sity of Chicago, “Bernard was particularly influenced by two outstanding professors: 
Jacob Viner, a specialist in the politics of international relations and former advisor 
to franklin D. Roosevelt, and Quincy Wright, a world-renowned expert on the causes 
of war.”178 Brodie was “Wright’s star student,” writing a thesis on “the impact of naval 
technology on nineteenth-century diplomacy,” which he completed in June 1940.179 
After completion of his doctorate, Brodie moved to Princeton, his “first of three 
successive moves over the next three years, as Bernard experienced difficulty in securing 
an academic position, despite his outstanding record of scholarship at the University 
of Chicago and his excellent references.”180 This was, according to Fawn’s biographer, 
Newell G. Bringhurst, “at least in part due to his being Jewish at a time when many 
institutions still openly discriminated against Jews,” an observation Bringhurst at-
tributes to Bernard’s son Bruce.181 But in September 1941, after a year as a research 
fellow at Princeton, the Brodies moved again – this time to Dartmouth where Brodie 
joined the political science department from 1941 to 1943, and where, as Ken Booth 
recounts, he prepared a course called “Modern War, Strategy and National Policies” 
– which included one notably Clausewitzian lecture titled “War as a Continuation of 
Politics” – and whose course syllabus has been described by Booth as having “a remark-
ably contemporary ring” and could “claim to be the first modern syllabus course in 
what later became strategic studies,”182 one of many efforts by Brodie to help nurture 
the emergence of a new science of modern strategy. But Brodie soon “discovered at 
Dartmouth that energy and ability do not always lead to success in academic life,” 
and despite his early renown, and his laudable publishing accomplishments, Brodie’s 
“achievements failed to earn him the support of some of his immediate colleagues, and 
his contract was not renewed.”183 Citing Bruce Brodie, Bringhurst writes: “Bernard 
gradually became disenchanted with Dartmouth College, viewing it as an institu-
tion ‘for spoiled rich children … not smart enough to get into the better Ivy League 
schools’”; meanwhile, he “continued the work of turning his doctoral dissertation 
into a book” whenever time permitted.184 In June 1941, these efforts paid off hand-
somely, when Princeton University Press published his Sea Power in the Machine Age, 
which was not only favorably reviewed but also “particularly timely,” coming to press 
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just a few months before the surprise Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor. The Navy “im-
mediately purchased sixteen hundred copies of the book for its naval college, making 
it a best-seller by university press standards.”185 And, “Pleased by the book’s success, 
Princeton University Press commissioned Bernard to write another, A Layman’s Guide 
to Naval Strategy, which came to press a year later and … was adopted as a basic text 
by the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps. … Thus Bernard Brodie, who had never 
served in the navy or even been aboard a naval vessel, came to be considered a leading 
expert on contemporary naval strategy.”186
Despite Brodie’s remarkable early success with his research and publishing, his posi-
tion at Dartmouth was not renewed. As Dean Gordon Bill explained to Brodie in a 
letter, “There is rather a unanimous feeling in the Department of Political Science that 
you are too much of a specialist and, in fact, too big a man in your field to fit into any 
future plans of the Department.”187 As Bringhurst explains, the dean’s letter “clearly 
suggested that departmental infighting and the petty jealousy of insecure academicians 
had doomed Brodie’s career at Dartmouth.”188 So, in 1942, “Bernard Brodie decided 
to join the United States Navy, seeing it as the most appropriate place to contribute 
his skills in naval strategy.”189 Brodie was “assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations … to write ‘combat narratives’” and “also served as chief ghostwriter for 
the chief of naval operations.”190 And so Brodie left the academy, working for the U.S. 
Navy through to the end of the Second World War. According to Booth, “He soon 
began to learn that the relationship between civilian experts and the military could be 
unsatisfactory, as well as important.”191 But as World War II came to a close, Brodie’s 
academic career would finally regain traction with a March 1945 offer from Yale’s 
Institute of International Studies, an appointment starting on August first – just five 
days before the age of atomic warfare began.
Early Reflections on an Uncertain World
It is illustrative to look back to the very earliest work of Bernard Brodie, when still a 
student, over a decade before he rose to prominence first as an expert first of naval strat-
egy and later as one of the first and certainly one of the most insightful of the nuclear 
wizards. The young Brodie, while still an undergraduate student at the University of 
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Chicago in December 1932, penned his own thoughtful reflections on Socrates and 
the riddle of his legacy for Course 101 of the Department of Philosophy, titled “In 
Quest of Socrates – Man and Philosopher.” Even today, we remain confronted by the 
lingering a riddle of Socrates’ legacy, still unsure who the real Socrates was, or how to 
assess the dueling interpretations of this founding father of philosophy. Brodie’s effort 
to reconcile these contending interpretations, and to synthesize from their ambiguous 
parts a coherent whole, is an early indicator of his abilities to grapple with complexity, 
and to find order where others might only see chaos. 
Brodie’s paper on Socrates earned him the following comments from his professor, 
Thomas Vernor (T.V.) Smith, who served as dean of the University Chicago from 
1922 to 1948: “Excellent Work. This is delightfully written and shows an admirable 
knowledge of the sources.” In the paper, one can almost sense anticipation in the heart 
of the young and ambitious Brodie for achieving a comparable level of philosophical 
greatness to that Socrates had achieved. Consider how Brodie introduced his essay 
on Socrates: “A happy thought to fill an idle hour is the reflection on the diversity 
of traits on which men are borne to greatness. Unhappily for us duller ones, genius 
seems an indispensable ingredient, but the consideration of the qualities that may 
adorn genius – or encumber it – is an intriguing one.”192 Brodie further reflects on 
the nature of genius:
This quest stretches back over two millennia to Athens at its peak, “a city of a beauty-
mad people, a city throbbing with activity and political turmoil, yet singularly free 
of the din and clatter and confusion of our own day,” one that is “laid round a hill, 
atop which are set the noblest structures that have ever been struck against a blue sky,” 
marred by but “one atrocity – slavery,” that “gives a life of tranquility and leisure for 
reflection to those who are not slaves.” Noting Athens “is a city with a noble convention 
of deliberative discourse,” Brodie writes that “[o]nly such a city could have harbored 
and nurtured Socrates, for the Attic genius was not a genius but a climate.” Brodie 
confronts one of the riddles of Socrates, noting, “[W]e must search for the imprint of 
his person in the documents of the time,” where “[w]e discover at once that their (sic.) 
is nothing from his own hand,” and speculating in his footnotes, “I wonder if Plato is 
hinting at why Socrates didn’t write in Phaedrus 257.”193 Brodie reflects, “We think for 
a moment on the deluge of printed pulp that pours down upon us today and reflect 
almost sardonically that a Socrates did not write. Nor are we disappointed; somehow, 
it seems in keeping with the man, even as he first takes form in our imagery. We feel 
at once a disdain of fame, we feel a spirit of one who lived only for the living round 
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him.”194 But “[s]ince he did not write, we look to those of his day who wrote of him,” 
finding “him drawn by the pens of three men, a strangely contrasting three – a comic 
poet, a gentleman of letters, and one whose thought has been the dazzling glory of the 
ages. Each draws him or paints rather – and it is a vastly different picture that comes 
from each.”195 Brodie considers Aristophanes’ “grotesque, horribly caricatured sketch,” 
though he adds Aristophanes seems to be “lampooning Socrates undoubtedly not as 
a person but as representative of an institution he hated” – though this lampooning 
had hurtful consequences, evident in “Socrates’ reference to the damage of this play 
on his reputation in Apology.”196
Brodie turns next to the portrait of Socrates penned by “the gentleman of letters,”197 
Xenophon, who was much, much more than a man of letters, becoming one of the 
classical world’s greatest military historians who sought to complete the history Thucy-
dides began but never finished, and whose adventure in Persian regime change nearly 
changed history, and even in failure contributed to one of the most dramatic and heroic 
strategic withdrawals known to military history when he led the ten thousand free men 
of Greece out of Persia. Noting, “If we have by chance already stolen a glimpse at the 
third one,” the image of Socrates presented by his student Plato, “we will perhaps purse 
our lips at this one,”198 and “will likely turn the pages of Xenophon’s Memorabilia of 
Socrates somewhat impatiently, for here will be portrayed a man who, [though] rather 
shrewd to be sure, is constantly engaged in prosaically exhorting others to virtue.”199 
Brodie adds in a footnote that he believes “Professor T. V. Smith’s oral characterization 
of Xenophon’s portrait as that of a ‘stupid good man’ (“stupidly good is the Miltonic 
phrase) represents a sacrifice of some degree of veracity for the admirable succinctness 
of epigrammatism. Of course the Xenophonic Socrates is a far duller man than the 
Platonic one; but ‘stupid’ is a very strong word, and I am afraid I cannot agree with its 
application in this case. For, after all, I feel even Xenophon’s Socrates to be a brighter 
man than I.”200 Brodie writes, “Whether Xenophon was himself dull, or whether he 
was fitting his eulogy to dull readers, we are not quite sure – we suspect the former. 
Only here and there do we sense shining thru the mocking, subtlety and wit of what 
we feel, from our stolen glance, to be the true Socrates – the man, for instance, who 
would teach the courtesan the art of loving ‘if (when she called at his house) another 
194. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 2.
195. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 3.
196. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 3.
197. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 3.
198. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 3.
199. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 4.
200. Brodie, “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” 4.
60 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
more acceptable than you be not within.’”201 Brodie believes “the value of Xenophon’s 
description is not to be ignored,” particularly when “in trying to delineate the phi-
losophy of Socrates, we must sift Socrates from Plato,” when Xenophon’s contrary 
assessment “will be of inestimable usefulness. If his picture is lacking in color, it has 
at lest [sic.] the sharpness of an etching. We can cut from it an outline of the man to 
superimpose upon the less sharply outline, more ‘impressionistic’ form of our third 
picture” drawn by Plato, who “will provide us color aplenty.”202
Brodie next considers his third and final image of Socrates, commencing with a 
reference to Emerson who wrote, “Of Plato, I hesitate to speak, lest there should be 
no end.”203 First Brodie considers the friendship of teacher and student, of which 
the “mere thought entrances us, what a drama.”204 Brodie imagines the beginning of 
this powerful friendship: “We muse for a moment on how they must have first met. 
We have a vision of the youthful Plato, stirred and prodded by the ebullition of his 
expression-seeking genius, yet perplexed for choice of a channel into which to pour 
it. He notices one day in the Lyceum a small group gathered round a single elderly 
man who is discoursing with them. The youth saunters over; unobtrusively he finds 
a place in the outer circle. At once he is enthralled.”205 
Brodie further reflects on this “peerless communion” of two of history’s greatest 
minds: “In the youth of almost any man’s life there comes a meeting with another, an 
older man, in whom he sees embodied the consummation of his highest ideals,” writes 
Brodie, who then cites C.H. Cooley’s Human Nature and the Social Order, “‘Every 
outreaching person has matters in whose . . . presence he drops resistance and becomes 
like clay in the hands of the potter, that they may make something better of him. He 
does this from a feeling that the master is more himself than he is; there is a receptive 
enthusiasm, a sense of new life that swallows up the old self.’”206 Adds Brodie: “That 
Plato, with his unsurpassed discernment of human character, should have so taken the 
man for his pattern in life, and, after the man was dead, cherish all his own long and 
eventful life the living image of him in his memory, round which he was to carve his 
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great work into a monument to him, is itself a mighty tribute to Socrates. It is such 
a thundering salute that the peals of it will never cease to be heard so long as books 
are read.”207 Brodie adds that this “is a monument unique in all literature and art,” 
and in a footnote adds, “With the possible exception of Jesus, i.e., of the gospels built 
around him.”208 Brodie finds that “[i]n Plato Philosophy reaches her loftiest sweep, 
never again to attain those heights; in him Philosophy and Art walk, not arm in arm, 
but interfused – one. It is a philosophy of speculative brilliance, and an art of poetic 
loveliness. Cast in the mold of drama, speculation becomes a setting for character, and 
character for speculation. In all the dialogues” – with the exception, Brodie notes, of 
Laws, and perhaps the “minor role” in Statesmen of the “‘young’ Socrates” – Socrates 
is “a central figure, painted as he was in life.”209 And yet, asks Brodie, “how can we 
trust in the realism of the portrait?”
Brodie suggests we can trust in the accuracy of Plato’s portrait “[m]ostly because 
of the singularity of the figure, and of the consistency of the singularity,” and in ad-
dition, “there is an honesty in the pens of great writers; we feel that a Plato would 
shy from an untrue stroke as a musician from a false note. That the artistic nature 
of Plato should have refrained entirely from embellishments we need not maintain; 
but of marked idealism or caricature there seems to be none. His painting has rotun-
dity, depth, and trueness.”210 And while Plato’s Socratic dialogues are “preeminently 
philosophy of course,” Brodie notes that they “are also human dramas,” since “[l]ike 
the classic landscapers, Plato felt even the grandest vista to be incomplete without a 
touch of the human.”211 Mixing both Xenophon’s and Plato’s portrait, Brodie crafts 
his own distinct synthesis: “What is this composite figure that emerges? A catching 
figure indeed! He is a short and thick man, one who with mock lament bemoans his 
pot-belly. A face of almost startling ugliness, like the mask of Silenius [sic.], yet in a 
sense attractive. Large protruding eyes, broad features, a stubbed nose “with nostrils 
looking toward heaven,” thick lips, a white beard – a face attuned to the changing 
mood of the discourse, the cheeks twitching in sallies of repartee, the countenance 
downcast in mimicked disconsolation at an argument gone askew, always a sober 
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earnestness staring out of the buldging [sic.] eyes – it is a face that in the supreme 
moment can glow in transcendent nobleness. … He would have beauty in all things, 
but most of all in the soul.”212
Brodie notes Socrates “was the constant mocker, the comic sometimes the buf-
foon,” and “[y]et there will slip into this clownishness a moment of seriousness, and 
we have a confession of faith, citing Meno: ‘Some things I have said of which I am 
not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we 
think that we ought to inquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle 
fancy that there was no knowing and no use in searching after what we know not; 
that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of 
my power.”213 And, Brodie concludes, “Where this creed carried him the world well 
knows. He might have preferred to forego the glory of martyrdom, but when offered 
alternatives he can see no choice. In perhaps the most serious hour of his life, still not 
without his jest, he explains to the judges of Athens that for Socrates there can only 
be one way of life. He is the ‘gadfly’ of the Athenians – his ‘inner voice’ wills it. Must 
he live without examining life? Then let him examine lifelessness.”214
In a two-part appendix to his paper, Brodie presented his own “APOLOGIA” to 
Professor Smith: “The foregoing paper represents the product of a mature ‘incuba-
tion’. I enjoyed writing it immensely. However, the unexpected shortening of the 
available time prevented the like development of a more technical approach to the 
Socratic and Platonic philosophies. In the next several pages I am presenting some 
fragmentary ideas I played with. They represent mental abortions, and are to be taken 
indulgently.” The first, “Appendix A,” is “The Daemon of Socrates,” in which he recalls 
a friend riding a swiftly galloping horse, and “with my apprehension over her safety 
quite overshadowed by admiration of her boldness, she turned to me, and with a 
lovely and complete ingenuousness remarked, ‘this damned horse won’t stop!’ It was 
such a horse that Socrates rode – his Daemon. Not a perverse animal to be sure, but a 
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spirited and noble steed it was, headstrong, and unwaveringly carrying his rider down 
the course, though it led into certain mishap.”215 Brodie further probes his analogy: 
“But perhaps my analogy is an unhappy one. Perhaps of the two the daemon was the 
rider. No, we must forego the horse altogether; it was an automobile, with Socrates 
at the wheel, and the daemon was the back-seat driver. Whether this was his playful 
appellation for an imperious voice of conscience, or whether Socrates actually was a 
potential psychiatric patient, may remain an eternal bait for scholarly squabbles. It 
is perhaps more curious than significant. In the gravity of the Apology it seems to be 
something real enough. But in the Phaedrus it is invoked to guide an action of trifling 
pleasantry; that is, to guide it straightway into farce – yet he explicitly calls it a “voice 
in my ear.” Somehow, an orthodox and self-respecting voice would never take part in 
banter. There are the two extremes. One may take one’s choice.”216
Before Deterrence: ‘Peaceful Change’ and the Prevention of War
The ambiguous riddle explored by Brodie as an undergraduate at Chicago in 1932 of 
finding Socrates from the few portraits left to us by his students and contemporar-
ies was for Brodie a “happy hazard.” But by 1938, now a doctoral student there, he 
began to grapple with far more potentially harmful sorts of hazards, those associated 
with war and its prevention – the fundamental challenge that would define his work 
for another forty years. In the spring of 1938, Brodie wrote a term paper titled “Can 
Peaceful Change Prevent War?” for submission to his Political Science 363 course, 
taught by the famed scholar of war Quincy Wright, Brodie’s mentor and perhaps 
Brodie’s most important advocate as he would soon embark upon his first job quest 
as a young scholar. In this paper, which examined the argument, gaining strength in 
some quarters before World War II erupted in full fury – but an argument that Quincy 
Wright would passionately oppose, as a thinker and as an activist – that peaceful ter-
ritorial concessions and boundary revisions could prevent war, a view later pilloried 
(and harshly judged by history) as appeasement to aggression but which many theorists, 
largely within the idealist tradition (who would soon be displaced by the harder-nosed 
realists) before the war hoped would prevent the escalation of violence and thus fore-
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stall the descent of Europe into another fratricidal, continental-wide contagion. In 
Brodie’s analysis, both in its breadth and subtlety as well as its thoughtful discussion 
of the peaceful change advocates’ effort to prevent war, one can gain a foretaste of his 
future theoretical development of deterrence theory, which bore many parallels with 
his earlier analysis of peaceful change, and can be viewed in many ways as Brodie’s 
response to it, modifying it to reflect the darker world view of the realists, and to 
achieve war avoidance not by naïve hope alone, but by a more realistic mutuality of 
fear of the risks and dangers of nuclear destruction.
Fred Kaplan, one of just a few scholars who discuss Brodie’s early, unpublished 
works dating back to his student years, recalls in Wizards of Armageddon that Brodie 
was “Quincy Wright’s start student in his graduate student days,” and when he started 
work on his dissertation in 1939, he “won the department’s only fellowship, an award 
of $350, and was assigned to assist Professor Wright, then in the final phase of his 
leviathan,” A Study of War. Wright was so impressed with Brodie that he would send 
out “well over a dozen letters to acquaintances in top-notch colleges across the country 
advertising ‘an A-number-one man, Bernard Brodie’” the next year.217 In addition to 
learning much from Wright, Kaplan notes Brodie “also greatly admired Jacob Viner 
of the economics department,” who brought to Chicago “a course new to the field 
of economics – the politics of international economic relations.”218 Like Wright, 
Viner embraced interdisciplinarity, and in contrast to so many of his generation who 
embraced econometrics, he came to “see the true nature of economics as an interdis-
ciplinary subject – and one dominated by considerations of political power.” 219 And 
so, as Kaplan observes, from Quincy Wright and Jacob Viner “Brodie learned some 
valuable lessons that Brodie’s contemporaries in other universities were, in the main, 
not getting even by the end of the 1930s.”220 Kaplan notes that Wright was a “major 
figure in the Hyde Park branch of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the 
Allies, an anti-appeasement organization of some influence in 1939 and 1940 that 
favored repealing the Neutrality Act”221 – a view that Brodie’s early writings would 
reflect, and which would influence the younger Brodie to embrace not only realism, but 
to reject the moral underpinnings of appeasement, then known as “peaceful change.” 
In 1938, Brodie wrote a paper for Quincy Wright’s class with the title, “Can Peaceful 
Change Prevent War?” that postulated that, in the face of “the decay of the postwar set-
tlements of 1919 and a resurgence of international violence, a method must be devised 
of establishing procedures for allowing changes in the international system, of avoiding 
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war by accomplishing peacefully the ends for which nations might otherwise despairingly 
resort to war.”222 The peaceful change advocates would, however, become stigmatized by 
another word that would long haunt their effort to engineer preventive re-adjustments 
to international boundaries to prevent war: appeasement. As Brodie wrote in this paper, 
and as cited by Fred Kaplan, in a “particularly Viner-esque passage, Brodie responded: 
‘If change is to be effected to correct an injustice, or to rectify disequilibrium, it neces-
sarily follows that states will find themselves called upon to make material concessions 
without receiving any material compensation, which they cannot be expected to do 
willingly.’”223 And, importantly, using the often unspoken word appeasement, Brodie 
added, “Are we to expect the state yielding its territories to be entirely appeased by the 
proud contemplation of the generosity of its contribution to world order? These are 
questions which cannot be glossed over. If the problems they entail cannot be satisfac-
torily solved, we need concern ourselves no further with the idea of peaceful change.”224 
Strong words, from a young man influenced by realists who approached appeasement 
with a healthy, and soon to be historically verified, skepticism. But after the atomic 
bombings in the final hours of World War II upped the ante considerably, raising the 
price of violent changes to the international system, Brodie would in many ways reprise 
his original views rejecting peaceful change so decisively, and in time would incorporate 
into his views on nuclear deterrence elements that would embody the arguments put 
forth by the advocates of peaceful change who like Brodie sought to prevent the all but 
certain calamity of total war as experienced, seeming without purpose, after World War 
I, embracing not the metaphor of Munich but that earlier haunting vision of cascading 
systemic collapse whose spark took place at Sarajevo.
As for the lessons Brodie learned from Viner, Kaplan writes that these “reinforced 
those of Wright’s and added a new dimension. Power, thought Viner, could be sur-
rendered only to something more powerful still. Governments will not lay down their 
swords before a world government simply out of good will or in the name of interna-
tional cooperation.”225 Viner would also play an influential role later on when Brodie 
was trying to make his mind up about an essential dilemma of the nuclear age: would 
atomic weapons stabilize or destabilize the international order? As Kaplan recounts, 
“On the question of whether the A-bomb would deter or foster war between the great 
powers, Brodie had still not made up his mind” by September 1945, a month after 
the historic atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Tokyo’s subsequent 
surrender. That month he attended a conference at the University of Chicago where 
he presented an outline of his thoughts that would be elaborated later that fall and 
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published as his first monograph on the implications of the atomic bomb, his 1945 
28-page paper, The Atomic Bomb and American Security. But Brodie’s old mentor Viner, 
during his conference talk in Chicago, argued that the A-bomb “makes surprise an 
unimportant element of warfare” since now “[r]etaliation in equal terms is unavoidable 
and in this sense the atomic bomb is a war deterrent, a peace-making force.”226 Viner, 
like Brodie, understood that cities “were the only efficient target of an atom-bomb 
attack,” to which Viner added the logical argument that any atomic-armed nation 
would “certainly retaliate with an atomic attack of its own” if so attacked, neutralizing 
any advantage of striking first.227 Kaplan cites Viner’s remarks before the American 
Philosophical Society in Philadelphia on November 16, 1945: “What difference will 
it then make whether it was Country A which had its cities destroyed at 9 a.m. and 
Country B which had its cities destroyed at 12 a.m., or the other way around?” This 
“logic was indeed unassailable, and Brodie was finally convinced.”228 
Brodie’s views would soon take on their own uniqueness, distinct from those of his 
interwar mentors, and after the nuclear era began his strong advocacy of deterrence and 
consistent rejection of more bellicose viewpoints that he believed brought greater risk 
by undermining the all-important goal of deterring the outbreak of nuclear war would 
come to reflect some similarities with the peaceful change school that he had initially 
approached, in his student years, with the same skepticism expressed by his mentors 
Wright and Viner. Brodie’s approach to deterrence, nuanced as it was, would be perceived 
by some of his critics as sounding weak in contrast to the more bellicose rhetoric of the 
warfighting school – as discussed by Fred Charles Iklé below – and epitomized Herman 
Kahn’s hyperrealism (as noted by Raymond Aron, the philosopher of war and student 
of Clausewitz, who in 1970 wrote of Kahn, “He imagines, invents, and describes with 
minuteness bordering on unreality, dozens of situations of conflict reduced to simplified 
schemes, and the decisions that suit these situations. Failing science fiction, what other 
name but strategic fiction could one give to this form of literature?”229). In contrast to 
this surrealism seen in Kahn’s hyperbolic approach to nuclear war, Brodie’s approach to 
deterrence was marked from the get go by the very same sober realism that had led his 
mentors to become skeptics of peaceful change, and all too aware of its descent from 
noble intention to the all too tragic consequences of appeasement.
In the pages below we will consider Brodie’s early views on peaceful change in 
greater detail – but first, let us consider briefly the genesis of the term, its original 
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aspirations during the interwar years, and its ultimate conflation in the popular mind 
with policies of appeasement, which after Munich would be largely repudiated. In 
his article on peaceful change in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Hisashi Owada explains that “the term peaceful change came to acquire its 
specific sense in the context of the Covenant of the League of Nations, referring to 
the process contained in Art. 19 [of the] League Covenant”; and, citing I.L. Claude 
Jr.’s Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, he 
notes that a “conceptual line of distinction came to separate the general problem of 
pacific settlement from the specific problem of peaceful change,” with peaceful change 
coming “to be regarded as denoting ‘a somewhat specialized concept’ that referred to 
‘the problem of substituting amicable for forcible methods of resolving disputes’ that 
arose ‘out of demands for alteration of the legally established status quo’. Thus peace-
ful change as the specific term became popular in the political and legal milieu of the 
interwar period.”230 Owada recalls that “during the interwar period a few incidences 
of peaceful change to the status quo were moderately successful, albeit not by virtue 
of the invocation of Art. 19.” An example of this was in the Washington Conference 
of 1924, when “a diplomatic compromise was reached regarding the restoration to 
China of former German holdings of the Shantung Peninsula which had been given to 
Japan by the Versailles Peace Treaty. Similarly, the United States of America and Great 
Britain were able to reach agreement regarding the control of the Canton-Enderbury 
Islands.”231 However, Owada notes that in “these cases, however, it was not the proce-
dures of peaceful change that accounted for these results, but the political will of the 
parties involved.” Citing Frederick S. Dunn – whom Brodie discussed in detail in his 
paper on peaceful change, and who would author the introduction to The Absolute 
Weapon, “The Common Problem,” the pioneering book edited by Brodie in 1946 on 
the challenge of nuclear weapons – “It was said on these instances that, ‘[i]f the will 
to find a settlement is present, almost any kind of procedure will do. If the will is not 
there, no procedure will work, no matter how elaborate.’”232 However, Owada notes, 
the “resort to institutional mechanisms of peaceful change can backfire if the politi-
cal will for peaceful change is not there,” citing as an example the Munich Agreement 
of September 29, 1938.233 Again citing Dunn, Owada writes that “World War II 
was blamed on a ‘resort to procedures of peaceful change, especially the procedures 
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which led up to the settlement at Munich.’ While ‘the statesmen who engineered that 
particular alteration of the status quo confidently believed that they were avoiding a 
war’, it turned out to be a disastrous move because ‘it disturbed the existing security 
system, such as it was, and turned the balance in favour of the aggressor State without 
gaining any comparable advantage for the Allied nations.’”234 
Brodie starts his analysis off by noting, “In recent years, with the progressive decay 
of the settlements of 1919 and the alarming resurgence of violence or the threat of it to 
hasten this decay, or to effect other changes deemed by some states to be desirable, we 
have been hearing a great deal about the inevitable necessity of instituting procedures 
for effecting peacefully changes in the status quo.”235 He added, in what one might 
call Clausewitzian fashion, that “[i]n so far as they have attempted to distinguish the 
causes of war from the conditions in which it occurs, students of international affairs, 
and protagonists of world order generally, have argued the simple logic that to avoid 
war one must first of all seek to accomplish by other than warlike measures the ends 
for which states despairingly resort to it.” Brodie further notes that the “only anomaly 
is that these thinkers apparently withhold their approval when a statesman devotes 
himself to the principle with such forthright ardor as does Mr. Neville Chamberlain.”236 
Brodie explains that “territorial revision historically has with relatively few exceptions 
come as the eventuation of a war,” and that it thus logically “follows that if needful 
revision could be accomplished by processes essentially peaceful, war would be unneces-
sary, and its suppression would cease to be so overwhelming a problem.” He adds that 
“propounders of this doctrine are finally confirmed in their views by the observation 
that the states today most threatening to the peace are those dissatisfied with the status 
quo and which feel themselves to have suffered the most damaging and humiliating 
wrongs in the last great territorial reallocations, that is, in the peace treaties following 
the World War.”237 Further supporting this view was the “negative attitude towards 
international cooperation to maintain the peace demonstrated by certain states which 
profited most extravagantly in those settlements, such as Poland, and even Italy.”238 
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While Brodie finds much to criticize in the logic of the argument put forth by the 
peaceful change advocates, it is interesting to note their effort to prevent war by ad-
dressing its root cause (and thereby prevent the calamitous losses brought on by war) 
is reminiscent, to a certain degree, of the motivation, post-Hiroshima, that deterrence 
theorists would bring to their efforts to prevent war through the underlying threat 
of nuclear retaliation, and to thereby prevent an even greater calamity. The peaceful 
change theorists sought to avoid war by pre-emptively modifying territorial boundaries, 
nipping the causes of war in the bud and thereby preserving order, whereas the deter-
rence theorists would later seek to avoid war by mutually affirming the permanence 
of the post-war division of Europe (and much of the rest of the world, albeit in a less 
orderly fashion), and thereby pledge not to violate the new, post-armistice territorial 
boundaries that defined the post-war division of Europe. It may thus seem ironic that 
the younger Brodie, many years before digesting the full strategic implications of the 
splitting of the atom and the weaponization of the unlocked forces of creation, takes 
the peaceful change advocates to task for their logical inconsistencies, and asserts that 
“we can criticize this proposition on purely logical grounds.”239 As he explains, their 
error “compromises, it would seem, two false assumptions: first, that war follows from 
the need of revision rather than merely the desire for it; second, that the revision which 
might be effected by a consultation of disinterested Powers based on considerations 
of justice would be so like the revision sought by war as to obviate recourse to it.” 
Brodie concludes that “territorial revision follows because its provisions are considered 
advantageous by the victor and because the objections of the vanquished are for the 
time being of no consequence.”240
Thus, Brodie observes, war “serves the eminently useful end, for purposes of confer-
ence, of nullifying the claims of one of the parties,” which explains “why the settlements 
following major wars are always so far reaching.”241 Brodie believes that it is mistaken 
“to suppose that by ‘peaceful change’ we avoid change by violence, because the kind 
of change produced in the latter case is reasonably sure to be different from that of the 
other, unless, indeed, the ‘peaceful’ change is nothing other than an obeisance to the 
threat of force.”242 Brodie criticizes Mr. F. S. Dunn, the author of Peaceful Change, for 
“referring to such faits accomplis as the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the Italian 
conquest of Ethiopia, and the German re-militarization of the Rhineland as bearing 
evidence that ‘no peace system can be expected to work for any length of time unless it 
contains adequate provisions for bringing about changes in the status quo as required 
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by changing conditions.’”243 Brodie further notes that “[t]he Japanese rejection of the 
Lytton report, and Japan’s retirement from the League because of the Assembly’s ac-
ceptance of that report, are on the other hand incontestable proof that disinterested 
proposals for revision, even when striving for the utmost in conciliatoriness, will not 
stay the hand of the conqueror.”244
As for “Italy’s claims to revision,” Brodie believes these “would certainly never be 
seriously entertained by a tribunal basing its decisions on principles of justice.”245 Brodie 
cites Gilbert Murray, who in his chapter “Revision of the Peace Treaties,” in the 1933 
volume edited by L. Woolf, The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War suggested that “[i]f 
revision on grounds of justice and self-determination were ever to be realized, the first 
change would be some large surrenders by Italy; a great part of the South Tyrol should 
go back to Austria; some Slovene districts at the head of the Adriatic to Yugoslavia; 
and the Dodecanese, where Italian rules has been particularly oppressive, to Greece.” 
(Brodie adds that “[t]his was of course written before the Ethiopian venture.”246) As 
for the case of Germany, Brodie suggests that “an international committee seeking 
an equitable adjustment of the problem would advocate any such solution as that 
reached by Herr Hitler is more than questionable.”247 Brodie adds, citing Quincy 
Wright: “In justice, it is necessary to point out that the idea of ‘peaceful change’ as it 
is ordinarily conceived by writers comprises two distinct elements, of which territorial 
revision is often the subsidiary one. Frequently the concept foremost in their minds 
is of the peaceful revision of existing international law. Thus, Professor Quincy Write 
explicitly states that: ‘Two types of political change have been and will be from time 
to time necessary, change in the general principles of international law and change 
in territorial boundaries and status.’ … None, certainly, would quarrel with the first 
of these attitudes of approach, and, for that matter, scarcely with the latter either, 
provided there is a sufficiency of clear thinking on what is involved in the proposal 
to institute procedures, other than those that already exist, for the peaceful alteration 
of territorial status, and provided also that not too much is claimed for it as a final 
preventative of war.”248
Brodie suggests that “[m]ost thinkers would agree, for example, with Professor 
Rappard’s appraisal of the international anarchy that prevails as deriving in large 
part from the absence of any pacific means of modifying international law without 
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the consent of all states concerned.”249 Thus, as Brodie explains, “Rappard conceives 
the international community as being ‘in the position of a State whose constitution 
would refuse to allow for legislation by majority and which contained no provisions 
permitting its own amendment.’”250 Brodie adds that “[a]ll would concur also in his 
affirmation that many phenomena of international importance are at present still be-
yond the orbit of international law. Nor would anyone dispute that it would serve the 
cause of peace to amend such glaringly unjust territorial distributions as have resulted 
from the prostration in a recent war of one of the claimants.”251 
“That,” Brodie contends, “surely, is problem enough, and proposals beyond that 
must be regarded very critically,” something Wright “undoubtedly [had] in mind in 
the above quoted passage, as it is implied in the statement immediately following, 
which reads: ‘as yet states which are dissatisfied with treaties and boundaries, such as 
Germany, Italy, and Hungary, are not convinced that these (existing) procedures are 
adequate to effect even such changes as commend themselves to the general public 
opinion of the world.’”252 Brodie cautions that “[o]ne can speak altogether too glibly 
of the necessity of formulating some peaceful procedures for accomplishing whatever 
changes may from time to time in the future be required, or of the potency of such 
a system in the expunging of war.”253 Brodie contends, as he would later in life when 
assessing the impact of atomic weapons on international security, that “any consistently 
negative approach to the problem of peaceful change must necessarily be inadequate,” 
as “[i]n the history of human institutions and relationships, of whatever nature, from 
the political to the aesthetic, the reality of change has been the most persistent char-
acteristic.” He thus cites Henry B. Brewster, who was cited by Steed, H. W. in Vital 
Peace, p. 318: “The subtitle of man’s history might be: Annals in the Discomfiture of 
the Orthodox,” with Brodie suggesting “The ‘Orthodox’ we may interpret as meaning 
those who have too pervasively adjusted themselves to the status quo.”254 Brodie asserts 
that “[c]hange in territorial political status we will have, since, as a glance at any histori-
cal atlas will indicate, change we most certainly have had,” and consequently, “[t]he 
changes to be expected in the future need be neither so rapid nor so violent as those 
that have characterized the past.”255 On the cusp of World War II, Brodie articulates 
a theory on the dangers of rapid change and the necessity to reduce both its degree 
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and frequency. Only a few years later, amidst the smoldering ruins of Hiroshima and 
the start of what would soon evolve into the bipolar, post-war, nuclear order, Brodie 
would extend his thoughts on rapid and uncontrolled change and its inherent dangers 
to the fragility of the nuclear peace.
As he noted in 1938, “there is little reason to suspect that boundaries will ever be-
come wholly static. And since change purchased at the price of major wars of gigantic 
devastation and ruin is far more dearly priced than any civilization can afford to pay, 
the problem of devising procedures for the peaceful establishment of territorial equi-
librium, where that equilibrium is indisputably lacking, is one that must resolutely 
be faced.”256 Much of his post-Hiroshima theoretical work would be devoted to this 
very challenge.257 Brodie worked his way through the concept on the eve of World 
War II, when the imagination of destruction was shaped by the devastation of World 
War I. The specter of nuclear destruction would greatly exceed this, creating the very 
mechanism that did not exist in 1938, one of absolute, unanimous, and ubiquitous 
fear that the price of war was one too high to pay. Brodie argues: “we must first un-
derstand that since the peaceful change of territorial status by voluntary cession or 
incorporation already exists and has long existed, any discussion of new procedures of 
peaceful change necessarily implies constraint by the community of nations of the state 
that must make the requisite sacrifice. Most criticism of Article 19 of the Covenant, 
we ought notice, is not that it amplifies unduly the claims marked by a threat to the 
peace of the world, but that the decision of the Assembly must have an unanimity 
embarrassingly difficult to attain, and that it is only advisory and not coercive. If 
change is to be effected to correct an injustice, or to rectify disequilibrium, it neces-
sarily follows that states will find themselves called upon to make material conces-
sions without receiving any material compensation, which they cannot be expected 
to do willingly.”258 If not, then we must respond to questions such as, “What means 
of persuasion are intended to be employed? What is to guaranteed that the changes 
proposed and enforced are not at the disproportionate expense of the weak states?”259 
Brodie notes that “[h]istory, even the most recent, is markedly barren of instances 
that would support such expectations,” so “[w]hat is to prevent the disaffection of 
the state making the sacrifice from being quite as great an element of disruption in 
our international order as that of the state whose grievance is thereby to be remedied? 
Are we to expect the state yielding its territories to be entirely appeased by the proud 
contemplation of the generosity of its contribution to world order?”260 Brodie suggests 
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that “[t]hese are questions which cannot be glossed over,” and that “[i]f the problems 
they entail cannot be satisfactorily solved, we need concern ourselves no further with 
the idea of peaceful change.”261 A very similar set of questions would pertain to the 
post-Hiroshima world, though instead of world order being sustained through selfless 
generosity, it would instead rely upon a more prudential self-preservation.
Brodie adds that “[a]ssuming these obstacles may be overcome, it is necessary to 
establish our objectives in instituting our procedures of peaceful change,” which he 
notes is intuitively obvious, as the very “term ‘peaceful change’ itself indicates that our 
primary motive in the establishment of such procedures is the prevention of war.”262 
Brodie considers the prevention of war from both the long- and the short-term perspec-
tive, noting that the issue of justice is tantamount to the former but not necessarily 
essential to the latter: “Our presumption has been that in the long term point of view 
this can be secured only when the initial emphasis is on the principle of justice. But 
from the short term point of view the avoidance of war and the dispensing of justice 
may easily be antithetical.”263 Brodie proposes that by “d[i]viding the principle of the 
pursuit of justice into differing categories according to whether our ends are bold or 
modest, our objectives may be posited as being three in number.”264 These are: “first, 
the rectification of conspicuous injustices in the existing situation, particularly those 
brought about as the result of recent wars; second, the pursuit of an ideal equilibrium 
founded on previously deduced and generally recognized principles of justice and 
responsive to the recurrent need of new adjustment; third, the immediate avoidance 
of threatened war.”265 These three objectives would, with some modification, bear an 
intriguing similarity to those of nuclear deterrence, with the third perhaps being most 
salient in the short-term, the second being longer-term in nature and essential to the 
endurance of deterrence as a system of war-avoidance, and the third emerging only 
later, at the end of the Cold War, when the inherently conspicuous injustices of Soviet 
rule were very rapidly, and to most analysts unexpectedly, rectified, though the many 
proxy wars in peripheral theaters of the Cold War suggest lower-risk efforts to rectify 
injustice could regularly be made far from the central front, as Soviet- and Chinese-
sponsored revolutionary movements sought to redress colonial grievances within a 
global system that could tolerate such efforts at rectification along the periphery so 
long as equilibrium was maintained at the center.
On his first objective, “the correction of glaring injustices,” Brodie explains that it 
thus far in his analysis “was directed to those of recent origin,” and that claims rooted 
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in more distant historical wrongs lose saliency in part for reasons of “common sense,” 
noting that “[n]o one can question that the seizure by the United States of Mexican 
territory in the war of 1847 was clearly a wrong as many decried on the continent 
of Europe in the same century. Yet who in his senses would advocate the restoration 
of that territory today?”266 And further, “Such a problem as the restoration of Poland 
was unquestionably compromised by the century and a quarter of the non-existence 
or subjection of that state,” just as “‘righting the wrong of 1871’ in respect to Alsace-
Lorraine after almost fifty years was very far from being clearly unwrong in itself,’ One 
must remember that the French refused, on rather casuistic grounds, the plebescite 
[sic.] besought by the Germans.”267 
Brodie also suggests that the “re-annexation by Denmark of the northern zone of 
Schleswig was similarly embarrassed by the long interim that had elapsed since 1864,” 
and “[o]nly the unusual and far-sighted restraint of the Danish Government of 1919 
prevented undue aggravation of the issue.”268 Brodie argues that “[n]ew political do-
minion over a territory creates a situation to which institutions tend in the long run 
to adjust, and often after a lapse of time ‘natural’ circumstances plead as much against 
a change as did those prevailing at the time the current regime was established.”269 
Brodie further explains that “[t]his tendency varies considerably with the territory and 
the character of the political control, but it always exists, and itself argues powerfully 
against over-readiness to disturb the status quo. It is fatuous to reopen the case of a hu-
miliation that has long since ceased to smart.”270 Brodie believes that “‘Historic’ claims 
generally have been given altogether too much consideration,” and that “[t]hey merit 
consideration only so far as an existing maladjustment can be explained by them.”271 
He recalls that a “recent Czechoslovakian visitor to this country commented ruefully 
on the European habit of beginning all disputes with references to the Year 800!”272 
In our own time, efforts to frame contemporary conflict through a lens of historic 
grievances, such as we have seen in the Balkans, as well as throughout the Middle East, 
including the incessant conflict between Israeli and Palestine, and even American claims 
against Saddam from decades earlier, illustrate Brodie’s point nicely. But Brodie does 
concede that “we must recognize that boundary settlements of some antiquity may 
have caused disturbances of a serious economic character surviving undiminished into 
the present day,” and these “surely deserve attention even, or rather particularly, when 
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not challenged by threats of resort to violence to secure revision.”273 Brodie considers 
several historical cases that illustrate some problems associated with the rectification 
process, and points out that “[w]e must remember that in these instances, and in 
many others, the same powerful considerations would have to be taken into account 
in any attempt at revision and would clearly militate against it. Any change, moreover, 
might very well cause as much discontent as it healed.”274 Brodie has found that where 
such “dispositions have proved ill, the remedy indicated is more frequently the revi-
sion of principles of law, both of the international and the municipal categories, than 
of territories,” as “[t]he problems are such as would remain, in one form or another, 
regardless of how the territories were reallocated.”275 Brodie further notes that “when 
one in investigation uncovers a case of flagrant injustice in the post-war territorial 
settlements, it is as likely as not to be one about which the world as a whole hears 
little,” and “[s]uch is not ordinarily considered as threatening to world peace, except 
possibly indirectly.”276 Brodie also suggests that “it is well to remember that righting 
ancient wrongs sometimes has embarrassing results,” citing the case of Poland to il-
lustrate his point.277 
Brodie concludes that “[s]entimentalism may prove a good deal more disastrous in 
international matters than it usually does even in private affairs, and to say that there 
is considerable room for the development of ethical practices in the relations between 
nations is not to argue that every act of international brigandage committed in the 
last three centuries needs to be dug up and undone.”278 Further, he adds that “it may 
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happen that what was obviously a wrong when brought about would even if of recent 
perpetration, be equally a wrong to adjust.”279 Brodie closes his discussion of the first 
objective of peaceful change by noting, “These are but a few of the difficulties bound 
to be met in the attempt to adjust what appear at first hand as obvious injustices”280; 
and, he adds, “This omits entirely consideration of the practical difficulties of carrying 
out such a procedure, which are stupendous.”281 
With regard to the second objective, “that of pursuing a maximum equilibrium 
responsive to changing conditions,” Brodie cautions that “we must be prepared to 
encounter even more appalling obstacles.”282 First among these, he explains, is “the 
arbitrary and changing nature of our criteria of boundary delimitation.”283 Brodie 
remarks that “until we are certain we have eliminated war from the pattern of interna-
tional relations we cannot ignore the imperative demands of strategic considerations 
in drawing our frontiers.”284 As Brodie observes, “[S]trategic, or ‘natural’, frontiers 
rarely coincide with nationality or linguistic ones,” noting: “the outline of the Bohe-
mian and Moravian provinces of Czechoslovakia was influenced considerably more 
by strategic than by historic or even economic claims, and it created the misfortune 
of the inclusion in that state of Sudeten Germans. Italy’s insistence on the strongest 
possible military frontier resulted in the inclusion within her territories of the quarter 
million Tyrolese Germans, whose lot has been particularly difficult under the rigorous 
Fascist endeavors to ‘Italianize’ them. … Fear of future military attack and demands 
for precautionary frontier delimitations have created irridentas over all Europe.”285
Brodie also considers “the question of creating economic unities,” noting such fric-
tions between states as those caused by “[n]ationalistic impediments to international 
trade,” which “have become a most omnipresent and disjoining reality.”286 As well, 
Brodie considers “the bitter striving for political domination of areas of rich natural 
resources,” noting, “That an area not so great as Connecticut and Rhode Island with 
a population but little larger could cause as much trouble in Europe as did Alsace-
Lorraine is explained in good part by reference to the coal and the enormously rich 
Minette iron region in Lorraine as well as the great potash deposit in Alsace.” Brodie 
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adds, “The bitter dispute over Upper Silesia is a similar case, and the partition of it on 
the basis of an over-meticulous regard for nationality frontiers was one of the conspicu-
ous scandals of the Peace.”287 Likewise, “Poland’s acquisition of the eastern part is more 
easily explained from the circumstances below the surface of the soil than above it.”288
As for issues of language and ethnicity, Brodie writes, “When we approach such 
questions as that of language, and particularly those of nationality and ‘race,’ we begin 
to have such stuff as dreams are made on. Yet these phantasmagorical elements have 
caused scarcely less bloodshed in Europe than the acquisitive ambitions of dynasties, 
and are likely in the future to completely transcend all other causes.”289 He adds that 
“[e]ven scholars who decry the irrationality of it in their philosophic moments are 
prone to accept completely the ascendancy of linguistic and nationality considera-
tions in the less analytical portions of their discourse.”290 But, as Brodie describes, 
“Race, in Europe at least, is a myth, and “nationality” a very ethereal something, yet 
there are a few things people are supposed to be more loath to discard or adulter-
ate. As one journalist recently put it, every miserable back yard in Europe insists on 
maintaining its own ‘historic’ culture. So far as conserving a distinctive culture is 
concerned, the fact is that people do not really want to conserve it half as much as 
they think they do.”291 Indeed, Brodie observes: “Culture is a kaleidoscopic thing, 
its trains are undergoing constant diffusion and development. Peoples are continu-
ally accepting from their neighbors, more or less eagerly, the ideas of new modes 
of life. The process is a direct function of the stage of communication reached by 
the civilization. If things are inherently good because they are ‘natural,’ then surely 
change towards the confluence of cultures is good, because it is natural. It is the 
attempt to hinder this process, to augment isolation rather than to break it down, 
that is inherently evil. The effort to make political frontiers coincide as much as 
possible with ‘ethnic’ ones is the attempt to add political factors of isolation to the 
existing geographic and linguistic ones. ‘In applying the principle of nationality at 
the Peace Conference, the statesmen were using a principle already outmoded, unless 
combined with something else.’”292 
Brodie adds, “Geography, the imperfections and inadequacies of communication, 
ancestral inheritance, will always preserve enough of regional variation of culture for 
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those who think it necessary. It is certainly not worth any wholesale blood spilling.”293 
But, as Brodie points out, “in the matter of territorial status, the attempt to institute 
procedures of adjustment to the requirements of changing conditions brings us at 
once face to face with the fundamental problem of altogether unresolved criteria of 
boundary delimitation. Those we have been accustomed to consulting are mutually 
conflicting. When we have decided upon our principles we are likely to lack our 
facts.”294 And yet, when “we come to the consideration of change to prevent immedi-
ately threatened war – the type of change Mr. Chamberlain has been so assiduously 
cultivating at the expense of weaker states – we are not troubled by the difficulties of 
indeterminate criteria of revision. The recalcitrant and threatening state has ordinarily 
made its wants fairly plain, and it is simply the satisfaction of these wants that bring 
the desired end. The question is, is this peaceful change?”295 
This question, more a riddle, and one that would in many ways mock Brodie well 
into the nuclear age, when doctrinal battles – between advocates of deterrence and those 
who would be described as “warfighters” for their imagination of, and preparation for, 
a time when deterrence failed – raged, and what Brodie called the “cogency of steel” 
loomed uneasily in the imaginations of both, forever unresolved: “If peaceful change is 
to mean anything in the implementing of a system of collective security and order, it 
must rigorously exclude any kind of settlement which while perchance disposing of the 
immediate problem only invites the final day of reckoning through placing a premium 
on the cogency of steel. This may, of course, leave us with the basic dilemma of peaceful 
change: if the use of arms is excluded, how may change be effected at all? But there is no 
gain in toying with an idea or a phrase if we are to employ it merely as a euphemism to 
characterize a procedure with which we are already too familiar. Any established procedure 
of change intended to promote an enduring order of peace must avoid the possibility of 
rewarding those governments which have threatened to upset it.”296
293. Brodie, “Can Peaceful Change Prevent War?” 21. Indeed, as Brodie observes on page 22: “Complete national unity is impossible 
to attain and dangerous to strive for, and we ought to remember that it might not be intrinsically desirable if it were attainable. 
The need is of such limitations and controls upon national sovereignty that a minority may be permitted to conserve its language, 
if it thinks that overwhelmingly essential, without necessarily altering the political dominion. Linguistic boundaries, especially in 
the open country, change remarkably little, even through several centuries.” Brodie adds, “if our proposed future adjustments are 
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Brodie suggests that the “idea of stabilizing the status quo territorially has perhaps not 
been given a fair hearing,” and he believes the League of Nations has “been criticized 
unjustly and excessively as a device of maintaining the status quo.”297 He adds, “Doubt-
lessly, the present arrangement is not an ideal one, and some few changes are in order. 
The few flagrant injustices ought to be rectified, and unquestionably the way must be 
kept open for the graduation into independent status of entities now administered as 
mandates or colonies.”298 Brodie expects that “so long as there are such vast differences 
in kinds of government frontiers will never become unimportant,” and continues: “At 
present, the side of a boundary an individual lives within may make an enormous dif-
ference in his possession of liberties and in his mode of life. But where is the objective 
norm to determine when a form of government is good or evil, when the state is well or 
ill governed; and who is to decide thereupon? We can no more take frontier regions from 
a state because we dislike the Communism, or the Fascism, of its municipal code than 
we can from another because we do not agree with the monarchic principle. Whether 
one is born to live under the relative freedom of a democracy or the regimentation of 
a totalitarian state depends on providence, and perhaps on the political wisdom of his 
forbears. Besides, what is today the most reactionary form of government and the most 
despotic may tomorrow make room for the most enlightened.”299
Brodie cites the work of professor Frederick S. Dunn, author of the 1937 work 
Peaceful Change, and as noted above, author of the introduction to The Absolute 
Weapon, “The Common Problem,” who “has pointed out the ubiquitousness of the 
considerations of power, prestige, honor, and self-sufficiency in any suggestion or 
revision,”300 to which Brodie adds “the absolute and necessary priority of establishing a 
state of peace before we can even begin to discuss peaceful change. The maintenance of 
a state of peace is not concomitant with peaceful change, and most certainly does not 
result from it, but must precede.”301 Brodie next turns to classical philosophyand the 
part of governments to whom justice is a principle of no great compulsion in their conduct of foreign policy. Besides, the 
situation in Europe being what it is, no maximum objective justice could be attained without certain states nevertheless 
feeling themselves to have been unjustly treated. When we consider in addition to this the periodic excrescence of such 
doctrines as that now promulgated by the Nazi Government that all peoples of “German nationality” must be included in 
the German Reich, regardless of whatever other minorities are thereby included, it is difficult to see how the propounders 
of the idea of peaceful change can expect so much of it.” Brodie, “Can Peaceful Change Prevent War?” 27-28.
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ideas of Plato, whose well-crafted image of Socrates was discussed in his earlier paper, 
where he wrote: “Plato’s conception of reality residing in ideas essentially unchang-
ing and everlasting was motivated, we must remember, in good part by his profound 
abhorrence of the political instability of his day. To approach the divine patterns of 
unchangeable perfection, in which wars were embodied the good, the true, and the 
beautiful, required of the philosopher unceasing effort in the contemplation and the 
practice of the good. We need not accept Plato’s metaphysics, as few of us do, but 
his observation of human nature was as good as any man’s and he was a far way from 
thinking that a ‘static’ political order would be likely to result in the stagnation of 
culture. Moreover, if we could conceive of a France, or an England, or any other state, 
whose outline as a state and whose pattern as one ideally governed were permanently 
laid up in heaven, it would give politicians on earth determined to approach that 
reality no time for stagnation.”302
Brodie closes his discussion by reasserting that “the doubts expressed in the foregoing 
relative to the feasibility or the desirability of instituting new procedures of peaceful 
territorial change are not to be construed as ignoring those instances of injustice which 
do survive objective analysis as noxious to world order and offensive to our sense of 
decency,”303 and that “[e]fforts surely ought to be expended on their melioration with 
the hope and expectation of strengthening thereby our proposed structure of world 
order.”304 Brodie concludes, “History, as a great anthropologist has reminded us,305 is a 
ghost with but a single story. We cannot imagine what that story would be like, were 
it different from what it is. Historical accident, we may be certain, will continue to 
resolve our changes for the future, and at best we can only hope and strive with all our 
beings to assure that henceforth historical accident will be less synonymous with war.”306
The Age of Global Sea Power
Coping with the complexities of new weapons technology – even as transformational 
as the atomic bomb – came naturally to Brodie, whose earlier work on sea power forced 
him to confront the continuous evolution of doctrine, strategy and policy, and the 
dynamic impact of technology change on world politics. He was fully aware of how, 
on the eve of World War II, there was a vocal debate over the relative supremacy (or 
looming obsolescence) of sea power vis-à-vis air power. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, 
Brodie recalls, “curiously, at that particular moment it became most fashionable to 
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decry that apostle of modern sea power, Admiral Mahan, as a false prophet,” as the 
“general conviction was that while sea power in the past had been invariably decisive 
in war and had determined the course of history . . . it was now a clearly obsolescent 
factor,” having seemingly been displaced by air power.307 But as Brodie notes, “Un-
fortunately for Mahan’s memory, he is much more often criticized than read,” a fate 
that had also befallen another great theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz – as has been 
noted by several well-known Clausewitz scholars.308 
With regard to Mahan, the first great theorist of war whose writings Brodie came 
to master, Brodie points out that “in his first chapter of his most famous work he 
pointed out that ‘the unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the 
manner of fighting,’” and thus he “would have been the first to welcome the modern 
airplane to the arsenal of naval weapons; and he would have been the first to reject 
doctrines which confuse the aims of military power with the tools for carrying them 
out.”309 Indeed, Brodie notes that the “air forces which so vitally aided the Japanese 
armies in their quick conquests of Malaya, the East Indies, and Burma operated from 
airdromes which in almost every instance had been seized by Japanese armies landed 
from ships … [t]heir local air superiorities, in other words, were derived from sea 
power.”310 Brodie further noted, “Many of the aircraft involved, especially the fighter 
planes, and all their fuel, cargoes, and maintenance crews and supplies were brought 
to the scene of operations in ships,” as were “[m]ost of the materials that went into 
the construction of the British aircraft which hurled back the Luftwaffe in the Battle 
of Britain.”311 Thus, concluded Brodie, “It does not therefore detract in the least from 
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the marvelous power of air forces to say that command of the sea is still as likely as 
formerly to be decisive in great wars, and that in fact the greatly increased quantity 
and complexity of equipment used in modern war has made control of the sea lanes 
more important than ever before.”312 
At least, Brodie later reasoned, with the equalizing effect of atomic weaponry, which 
would enable even a landlocked power to deliver the same retaliatory strike as the 
mightiest of sea powers; but even then, his initial thoughts on the sudden obsolescence 
of sea power would be amended, and in later editions of A Guide to Naval Strategy 
he would acknowledge the reinvigorated role of naval power in the nuclear era. For 
instance, he noted the Polaris sub program, which as of his fifth printing in 1965 was 
“well on its way to completion” and which now constituted “a large and important 
portion of the United States strategic bombing capabilities,” and which in conjunc-
tion with the hardening of land-based silos ensured that U.S. strategic missiles were 
now “enjoying a high degree of safety from surprise enemy attack” – thus alleviating 
any “pressure for ‘going first’ in the event of serious troubles.”313 And, as the Soviet 
Union continued a “further retreat from a surface fleet . . . and a greater than ever 
concentration on submarines,” Brodie postulated that the USN “could thus anticipate 
the disappearance of rival surface navies,” with U.S. surface forces required for both 
“possible limited wars” and for “showing the flag.”314 In all, Brodie concluded, “The 
situation for American seapower at the end of the first score years of the atomic age has 
thus been greatly clarified” as demanding a “deep involvement in strategic retaliatory 
capabilities . . . combined with the traditional role of manifesting the American pres-
ence in far-off and deeply troubled regions. The fact that enemy surface navies have 
largely disappeared has altered the character of, but not greatly reduced the burdens 
on, American seapower.”315 Recalling his thesis from his first work, Sea Power in the 
Machine Age, Brodie noted the Napoleonic maxim that “the moral is to the material 
as three is to one,” and while not always the case, evidence from history showed on 
many occasions that “weak ships and strong men have triumphed over strong ships 
and weak men,” suggesting that even as “the tools of war become ever more complex 
and more deadly, . . . the net result of those changes on the personnel factor is to 
place even greater demands on the spirit and intelligence of the men who plan to wage 
battles.”316 So even though Americans “take such pride in (their) technological skill 
and . . . tremendous productive capacity,” Brodie counseled that we “must beware of 
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relying too much on the material alone.”317
Brodie, in his final chapter of A Guide to Naval Strategy, examined boldness in a 
manner reminiscent of Napoleon and his interpreters, who like Frederick the Great 
concerned themselves with genius and the coup d’oeil, and like Machiavelli considered 
the collision of virtu and fortuna on the outcome of war. Brodie likewise embraces 
boldness in command, but cautions again recklessness. (Brodie wrote that “Napo-
leon was a firm believer in boldness.”318) Noting the tendency for commanders to be 
acutely aware of the danger faced by their troops while discounting or remaining 
unaware of the fear felt by their enemy, Brodie observes that “Napoleon recognized 
the universality of this feeling among leaders, and in one of his many maxims on the 
subject urges the general caught by surprise in a bad position not immediately attempt 
a retirement but adopt a menacing attitude toward the enemy in order to disconcert 
him and make him wonder whether he was right in assuming he had an advantage.”319 
Such a bold response in the face of danger has been practiced by great generals across 
history, including the famed U.S. Civil War general, Grant, and the infamous Japanese 
World War II admiral, Togo. But Brodie acknowledges that, “[o]n the other hand, a 
too doctrinaire belief in the merits of boldness may be exceedingly dangerous,”320 and 
reconciles these views by concluding, in a manner that Machiavelli might have once 
uttered, and perhaps Clausewitz as well, “It is true that the gods favor the bold, usually, 
but they are notoriously harsh with the reckless.”321 One might, when considering the 
doctrinal debates that would emerge during the nuclear era, recognize this discussion 
on boldness, which traces its way all the way back to the classical philosophers and 
which was taken up in turn by all the great modern theorists of war, as especially 
pertinent, and one that helps to frame the otherwise ambiguous debate between the 
advocates of deterrence and the warfighters, who agreed on so many things, but who 
fundamentally disagreed on the issue of boldness, and the danger excess in this area 
can bring when fortune turns away.
Rather than unmitigated boldness, Brodie calls for thoughtful reflection and analysis, 
noting with some disappointment that “[t]he history of most of our wars has been 
marked by the gradual evolution of fine leadership, but only at the cost of a long, 
costly period of the elimination of incompetents.”322 Indeed, he notes that “Mahan’s 
career, it might be observed, was hindered rather than promoted by his penetrat-
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ing and scholarly studies.”323 As he wrote in A Guide to Naval Strategy, “Things have 
changed since Mahan’s time, but that does not mean we can rest in our efforts at 
improvement”; and while a “capacity for original thinking is indeed valued,” this is 
true “only if it is combined with a fine sense of tact” (hence the court martial of Billy 
Mitchell, the prophet of air power who predicted an armed clash between Japan and 
the United States many years before hostilities erupted). With regard to the Navy, 
the focus of this particular work by Brodie, but a point that could be applied across 
the services, he wrote, “Independent and incisive thinking therefore rarely receives 
the preferment it deserves”324; and, furthermore, “Openmindedness and insistence 
upon vigorous thinking ought to reach down to the very beginning of the officer’s 
career.”325 Noting how, “[b]ecause of defective eyesight, the great German strategist 
General von Schlieffen would never have gained admission to the peacetime officer 
corps of any of the American armed forces,” nor would have “[p]oor Nelson, with 
a patch over one eye and with but one arm,” Brodie argues that “[a]n uncommonly 
good brain should be ample compensation for slight physical defects,” and counsels 
that “[w]e must remember always that the basic element of strength in any nation is 
not its machines but in its manhood.”326 
Such a view of manhood as a stately virtue may seem obsolete in our gender-neutral 
age, but at the time of Brodie’s writing was hardly controversial, and much more re-
fined than much of the neo-Darwinian thinking from the generation prior. Indeed, 
an equally independent-minded theorist of naval strategy from the very dawn of the 
twentieth century, Frederick T. Jane, authored a controversial and colorful treatise on 
sea power titled Heresies of Sea Power in which he argued that an inherent “fitness to 
win” overshadowed strategy itself. Jane devotes his concluding chapter to a discussion 
of “fitness to win,” in which he elaborates upon his thesis that a natural predisposi-
tion to victory appears to trump strategical superiority, as witnessed by both Rome’s 
defeat of Carthage and by Sparta’s defeat of Athens. As Jane explains: “It has been 
shown throughout this work that in every war almost the only solid fact common to 
all is that “the fittest to win” were the eventual victors. It has been shown that these 
victors often lacked technical skill equal to that of their opponents, or were tactically 
inferior, strategically inferior, or had not such good ships or weapons. But they always 
had the “fitness to win” quality which made up for every other deficiency and brought 
certain victory at the last. The “fittest to win” have never gone under before superior 
materiel or before superior weapons.”327 Jane speculates, “It is probable that Fitness to 
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Win embodies little else besides the fixed desire to kill the enemy. Good seamanship, 
good gunnery, good torpedo, good engineering – all these things may aid it, but ap-
parently all are not absolutely essential. If essential, or in so far as they are essential, 
the desire to kill the enemy will produce them.”328 Jane’s thesis is controversial in its 
suggestion that strategy and tactics are of far less consequence in the outcome of war 
than most believe and that the inherent fitness to win of the victor is the key to victory, 
so much so that a switch of positions, from one fleet to the other as in the case of the 
Japanese defeat of the Russians in 1905, would not affect the outcome, even if such 
a switch led to a material disadvantage of the original victor. But there is nonetheless 
something compelling about his thesis, and his admission by way of the title of his 
work, that such a view is heretical. 
But a less heretical perspective on naval strategy is presented by Bernard Brodie, 
who was known during World War II as a neo-Mahanian and whose works helped to 
educate American seamen on the broad sweep of naval history, and the fundamental 
principles of naval strategy. His doctoral thesis, which examined the impact of technol-
ogy on naval history and was part of Quincy Wright’s massive Study of War project 
at the University of Chicago, was published by Princeton University Press, updated 
by substantively unchanged, as Sea Power in the Machine Age, and was just one of his 
two book-length works on naval strategy. The other, humbly titled A Layman’s Guide 
to Naval Strategy, would later be retitled at the U.S. Naval War College’s request ever 
since it had become a handbook for America’s war-time seamen, and was thus renamed 
A Guide to Naval Strategy so as to not embarrass the fighting men who depended upon 
this work for an introduction to naval theory, as noted by Kaplan among others.329 
In Sea Power in the Machine Age, Brodie starts out with a brief excerpt from Milton’s 
Paradise Lost, as he did in his 1947 article “The Atomic Dilemma” – a fuller version 
which would later adorn the frontispiece of his 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age. Though 
many have perceived a distinctly separate pre-Hiroshima and a post-Hiroshima strategic 
persona in Brodie – with Kaplan famously quoting him as saying to his wife Fawn on 
August 7, 1945 upon reading of the incineration of Hiroshima the day before, “Eve-
rything that I have written is now obsolete”330 – one can see a more continuous thread 
connecting his early work on naval strategy up to the World War II period with his 
post-Hiroshima strategic thinking, with his embrace of deterrence, the primary objec-
tive of both Mahanian-influenced American naval strategy as well as the slightly more 
nuanced Corbettian naval strategy as practiced by the British in the era of their long 
decline, planting the conceptual seed that would undergird Brodie’s nuclear theories 
328. Jane, Heresies of Sea Power, 326.
329. Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 9.
330. Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 10.
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and which would drive a wedge between his own approach to the bomb and that of 
the military services tasked with planning for nuclear war, which would embrace a 
warfighting strategy that had operational plans for a failure of deterrence. 
While Jane controversially advocated a neo-Darwinian conception of “fitness to 
win” as a military extension of the evolutionary battle in the “survival of the fittest,” 
he also embraced the importance of applying our knowledge of the past to the guide 
as on our journey from present to future, without which our tactics and strategies 
would surely become obsolete, as happened to the Carthaginians in their defeat by 
the lesser-skilled Romans. Brodie followed in this path, applying his pre-Hiroshima 
conceptions of world order, sustained through sea power, to his post-Hiroshima 
conceptions of the nuclear order, sustained through the mutuality of deterrence. It 
turns out that the thermonuclear-tipped ballistic missiles central to Brodie’s Strategy 
in the Missile Age were in fact a realization of that long-sought but fanciful naval in-
novation that Jane pondered of a sort which was beyond his generation’s ability to 
comprehend, and which wedded an expansion of radius with a global extension of 
the reach of artillery, making the finite naval operational radius obsolete in the face of 
the global strike provided by ICBMs. In essence, the missile age modernized precepts 
of classical naval strategy borne of the era of global sea power, and it was Brodie who 
nurtured deterrence forth from its naval originals to the nuclear age. Whether based 
on submarines or in silos on dry-ground mattered not; a fleet of ground-based nuclear 
missiles would in essence turn the interior heartland of a nation into a massive, im-
mobile aircraft carrier that did not need to move anywhere to reach its targets, fusing 
the essence of land war and naval strategy. Continents, islands, naval platforms, all 
merged, becoming launching pads for nuclear payloads capable of pinpoint accuracy 
anywhere on Earth. It was thus naval thinking that paved the way for nuclear strategic 
thought, providing a framework and a legacy of global stability to pacify the horror 
of the bomb and render it into a tool for order, peace and stability. 
Thus Brodie’s inclusion (and expansion) of Milton’s Paradise Lost illustrates the con-
tinuity that he saw between the age of sea power and the nuclear age. In his Sea Power 
in the Machine Age, Brodie would also cite a segment from Book Six of Paradise Lost, 
with the full support of his editor – a work he would look to for metaphorical guid-
ance throughout his career: “Perhaps more valid Armes, Weapons more violent, when 
next we meet, May serve to better us, and worse our foes, Or equal what between us 
made the odds, In Nature none: . . . He who therefore can invent With what 
more forcible we may offend Our yet unwounded Enemies, or arme Our selves 
with like defence, to mee deserves No less than for deliverance what we owe.”331
331. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 2.
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Brodie’s first chapter of this seminal work, “Sea Power and the New Technology,” 
notes how the “machine age came late to the navies of the world.” Indeed, Brodie 
observes: “When the nineteenth century was approaching its halfway mark, the 
capital ship that ruled the seas still differed very little from its predecessor of Cromwell’s 
time. … Not all the implements of sea power were unaffected by the new technology, 
for perhaps a fourth of all vessels of war could propel themselves by steam. But these 
were only the whelps of the battle fleet. The ship of the line with its towering masts was 
still uncorrupted by funnel or fire box. Yet before the century drew to a close, the sail 
of the line dissolved into history and legend. Its place was taken by a monster of steel 
carrying huge ordnance, propelling itself by steam, and capable of hurling destruction 
upon antagonists miles away. What is more, sea warfare had entered a third dimen-
sion measured in depth below the surface. Each of these changes in the character of 
the warship and in the means of naval attack had its effect on tactics and strategy, and 
each influenced the relative capacities of nations to wage maritime war.”332
Brodie, who would later in his career emerge as something of a modern day Clause-
witz, took his Napoleonic-era rival Jomini to task for failing to anticipate the dynamic 
nature of strategic change, noting that “Jomini’s dictum that changes in weapons affect 
the practice but not the principles of war is perhaps the most reiterated pronouncement 
in the whole field of military literature. ‘Methods change, but principles are unchang-
ing.’” And while he considers this “a doctrine reminiscent of the ‘ideas’ of Plato,” he 
notes that “[a]s a dogma it has often impeded full recognition of the changes wrought 
by the changing implements of war.”333 Brodie suggests that it is in fact “specious to 
separate too sharply the principles from the methods of war. The conduct of war is not 
an exercise in metaphysics – it is a practice.”334 Thus, Brodie writes: “To speak of a naval 
invention as having revolutionized maritime war is not to imply that it has affected the 
purposes of naval warfare or even that it has altered the basic process by which those 
purposes are achieved. One may mean only that it has drastically changed the means 
of execution. These do not, however, undergo radical change without introducing 
wholly new circumstances and new problems in the pursuit of hostilities at sea and in 
preparation for them, new circumstances which affect different states very differently. 
However little the advance of technology has affected man’s elemental human nature or 
the basic mores of his culture, it has transformed his mode of life, and it has similarly 
transformed the conduct of his quarrels.”335 Brodie adds that it’s “frequently enough as-
serted in a general way that warfare has been revolutionized by changes in the weapons 
with which it is waged, but little effort has been made to determine the effect of specific 
332. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 3.
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inventions and to clarify their impact on world politics, past or present. It is, of course, 
dearly impossible to isolate the effects of a single invention from the whole current of 
change. It seems a little absurd to consider how naval war would be carried on today if, 
for example, other things remained as they are but machine propulsion were absent. Yet 
the endeavor to do just that may not be without value. It brings sense, integration, and 
perception into one’s confused awareness of constant change.”336 This last line captures 
in a nutshell what it was that Brodie, as a theorist grappling with not only technological 
change but the very evolution of strategic thought in response to that change, sought to 
achieve throughout his career, overcoming the inherent uncertainties that shroud this 
always-changing world – piercing the cloud of ambiguity that he first recognized many 
years before as student grappling with the ambiguous legacy of Socrates, applying his 
own instincts to a riddle forever shrouded by the mists of history. From the mists of 
history to the fog of war, Brodie followed a linear path, one that swapped the inconse-
quential study of history with the greatly consequential process of securing the future. 
By way of illustration Brodie examines the early years of the steamship, when Britain 
feared it might place the island-state in jeopardy: “The steam warship during the early 
years of its existence gave rise to apprehension among the British that it had “created a 
bridge across the Channel” for hostile forces. But it had, on the contrary, removed the 
possibility that a chance shift of wind would favor an effort at invasion. As Winston 
Churchill told the House of Commons on June 4, 1940, “In the days of Napoleon ... 
the same wind which would have carried his transports across the Channel might have 
driven away the [English] blockading fleet. There was always the chance, and it is that 
chance which has excited and befooled the imaginations of many Continental tyrants.” 
The new Continental tyrant who was stimulating Mr. Churchill’s eloquence on that day 
also had in his mind’s eye a bridge across the Channel, one made by machines which 
Napoleon could only have dreamed of and which were quite unaffected by mere shifts 
of wind. Whether these machines, roving some above the surface of the sea and others 
below it, could indeed create the bridge which the steam warship had failed to make 
was not then clear. But neither was it clear that such a bridge was still necessary to bring 
proud England to submission. The strangle hold of blockade would do just as well.”337
Brodie separates in his mind the short-term tactical advantages gained by the first 
adopter of a new technology in war-time with the longer-term strategic advantages that 
are associated with broader sweeps of technological change, often helping the inventor 
(who aspired for an immediate tactical boost) less than his opponent. Brodie observes: 
“The history of warfare from antiquity to the present records innumerable attempts to 
secure by some new contrivance an immediate tactical advantage, perhaps a decisive one. 
336. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 4.
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In such inventions the essential purpose is to obtain one’s end before the adversary can 
bring counter-measures to bear. It is the time interval that counts. The small boats 
introduced by the Syracusans in the Peloponnesian Wars to get under the oars of 
the Athenians and shoot arrows at the rowers, the bridge-like corvus introduced by 
the Romans in the Punic Wars to … overcome Carthaginian superiority in seaman-
ship, the harpago used by Agrippa in the Sicilian War against Pompey for much the 
same purpose, and, in modern times, the Q-boat and the submarine-trawler devices 
used in the anti-U-boat campaign [of ] the World War – these were inventions of 
surprise. They were also the offspring of Necessity.[1] Such examples are the romances of 
history – instances of cunning being joined with brawn to overcome a strong enemy.”338 
Brodie sets out for himself an ambitious goal, one he believes few are equipped in-
tellectually to pursue, elevating himself, in his mind, to the level of Mahan, the famed 
Clausewitz of the sea, his first step along the road of becoming America’s Clausewitz of 
the nuclear age. In so doing Brodie recognizes a unique role for the theorist as distinct 
from the practitioner, one that is not without its own shortcomings. Brodie writes: 
“One cannot begin to tell the story of the technological revolution in naval materiel 
without some attempt to evaluate a whole host of inventions according to relative 
importance. There are many traditional appraisals at hand, but one must be cautious 
of accepting them. Errors in these matters tend to be self-perpetuating. Historians 
rarely possess the knowledge of technology and of military science necessary to make 
such judgments for themselves, and are hence prone to accept without criticism the 
dicta of their predecessors. Even military experts are likely to be of little aid. Those 
concerned primarily with materiel are not often equipped with the scholarship and 
the historical insight of a Mahan. Excursions into history by writers on strategy, par-
ticularly naval strategy, have usually shown remarkable indifference to the implements 
with which the campaigns they analyze were carried on – the result, perhaps, of undue 
subservience to the doctrine of unchanging principles.[2]”339
Brodie explains that in order to “determine which inventions were ‘most important’ it 
is necessary to scrutinize the whole development of naval technology during the period 
under review and to analyze the strategic and political consequences that flowed from 
each major innovation.”340 He adds that “[i]t is impossible, as a rule, to declare that an 
innovation appeared at a certain time and was followed by certain specific results, since 
338. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 7. Brodie notes in this paragraph, note number one, that: “In that portion of 
his poem from which the frontispiece of this book is taken, Milton depicts an incident in the war in Heaven which 
perfectly illustrates this type of invention. To overcome the advantage of the loyal angels, Satan invents the field gun, 
and he proceeds to employ it in a manner calculated to reap the maximum benefit of surprise. Bk. VI, lines 438-669.”
339. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 8. In note 2, Brodie adds: “Note 2: A notable exception is Admiral William 
L. Rodgers. See his Greek and Roman Naval Warfare (Annapolis, 1937) and his Naval Warfare Under Oars, Fourth to 
Sixteenth Centuries (Annapolis, 1939).”
340. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 8.
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a new device no sooner appears than it proceeds to change its character.”341 This was the 
case in the introduction of iron armor to warships, which led to more powerful guns 
capable of breaching, ultimately limiting the objective of the armor itself to the ship’s 
core systems but not the personnel, who were no longer protected by the armor from 
incoming fire. Thus, Brodie argues, “A military invention cannot therefore be isolated 
either in time or in relation to other military instruments. Moreover, the improvement 
of an accepted weapon may result in the appearance of a wholly new one, terrible in 
its potentialities.”342 Because any effort to “describe at all completely the technological 
advances in the world’s navies since the beginning of the industrial revolution would 
require an encyclopaedia of several volumes,” Brodie is forced to be selective, and con-
siders only advances that illustrate an “exclusively naval character of an invention,” 
and which also illustrate “the relative importance of a technical development.” Hence 
his book “considers only the ‘revolutionary’ inventions of the period covered” and 
thus omits a “host of subsidiary naval innovations which in the aggregate mount up 
to considerable importance.”343 In just a few short years, Brodie would devote his full 
attention to one, new revolutionary technology of war: the bomb.
In Chapter 21 of Sea Power in the Machine Age, Brodie discusses “Naval Invention 
and National Policy,” in which he starts out his discussion by noting the importance 
of prestige, and of what Jane had called the “fitness to win,” but which Brodie attrib-
utes not to nationalistic or racial characteristics but to culture and tradition: “In the 
politics of power, military prestige is the medium of account, and nothing gives a 
nation greater prestige than past military victories. The political, economic, and 
most of all technological conditions under which those victories were won may have 
changed, but this counts for little except among the most discerning few. Foreign 
policy tends to run along channels determined by tradition, and Powers which have 
been great are considered great until they are proved otherwise.”344 Adds Brodie: 
“To some extent this may be fortunate. For one thing, the strategic consequences 
341. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 8.
342. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 9.
343. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 9.
344. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 431-32. In the language of the day, Brodie’s discussion of the non-material 
factors of war echoes Jane’s conception of the fitness to win at the dawn of the century: “For, despite what sociologists 
tell us about the ambiguous and loose thinking by which “racial” traits are usually discovered in nations – and they 
are no doubt right – the events of 1939 to 1941 have proved that there are some nationalities which can persistently 
win battles against odds and others which as consistently lose even when the odds are on their side. True, it is culture 
and tradition rather than race which accounts for it, but it is nevertheless a factor, and one which may upset estimates 
based on appraisals of material strength alone. It was easy to say in the summer of 1940 that Great Britain could not 
possibly win against the odds that faced her, and that her decisive defeat before the end of the year was to be expected. 
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survived more than a century of industrial revolution and a generation of political disillusionment.” Brodie would later 
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of military and naval inventions – and undoubtedly other changes as well – have 
often been miscalculated by those living in the period in which they occur. This was 
true of the steam warship and to a lesser degree of the submarine; it may yet prove 
true of the airplane. But even more important is the fact that such a handling 
of national policy implies the recognition of certain non-material factors which 
should be considered.”345
While his research looked back on the century of invention that preceded the world 
wars, he deduced a recurring theme of deterrence, as well as its underlying principles, 
which in a few short years he would nimbly apply to the nuclear age. While he is said 
to have greeted with bombing of Hiroshima with the resignation that his past work 
was suddenly obsolete, the parallel between his pre-nuclear naval thinking and his 
post-Hiroshima strategic thought is striking, with more than Paradise Lost connecting 
his 1941 Sea Power in the Machine Age to his 1947 article “The Atomic Dilemma” 
through to his 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age. Most students of Brodie see something 
of a firebreak between his early naval work and his later nuclear work, but in fact, the 
two works that epitomized each era were very closely connected. 
Foreshadowing his own later neo-Clausewitzian conversion, Brodie addresses the fog 
of naval invention: “The unpredictability of the consequences of new developments 
in military technology must also be considered. One of the most ironic features in the 
history of naval inventions is the frequency with which new devices proved disadvanta-
geous to those very countries which had most energetically furthered their progress. 
This may be due to one or more of three reasons: first, a mistaken interpretation of 
the tactical or strategic consequences bound to eventuate from a specific invention; 
second, failure to predict correctly the technical progress of the invention; and third, 
erroneous conclusions respecting the identity of the enemy country in the next war.”346
All of these reasons would rear their heads during the Cold War era, and present 
challenges to Brodie’s thinking about the bomb. Brodie notes how a new “development 
is often said to have rendered existing materiel ‘obsolete,’ when it merely presents a 
certain degree of superiority in performance or entails a new departure in design,” 
and points out that it “is exceedingly rare that the advent of a military invention at 
once renders existing equipment obsolete in the sense that it is no longer worth con-
sidering in the summation of relative power among nations.”347 Hence, a “new type 
of warship, however radical its improvements, does not make existing ships entirely 
useless until it exists in such numbers that older types have no military functions left 
to perform. … Regardless of how necessary the rebuilding of the fleet may become as 
345. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 432. 
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a consequence of a revolutionary invention, until it is rebuilt the existing fleet remains 
the repository of maritime power. This truism is frequently ignored in references to 
military inventions.”348
Brodie recalls how, “In all the ensuing competition, through the rest of the century, 
whenever there sailed abroad a single warship that apparently outclassed any single vessel 
in their own navy, Englishmen lamented the impotence of their fleet.”349 Adds Brodie: 
“Historians, far from exposing the absurdities in this kind of thinking, have generally 
tended to perpetuate them. The Merrimac is usually regarded as having threatened to 
lift the blockade of the South before being checkmated by the Monitor – as though it 
possessed a pair of seven-league-boots or a magic carpet enabling it to be everywhere at 
once. Much of the course of diplomacy in the immediate pre-World War period is writ-
ten in terms of the Dreadnought, which is supposed to have rendered pre-dreadnought 
types of little or no use – as though those types suffered a sudden extinction of firing 
power and mobility.”350 Brodie further observes, “The lexicographer’s distinction be-
tween the words ‘obsolete’ and ‘obsolescent’ is useful in this connection. In the modern 
world, machines, whether of war or of peace, are in a state of developing obsolescence 
from the moment they are completed. Old arms may still be ‘valid arms,’ even though 
‘weapons more violent’ are constantly being evolved to change the character of war.”351
Brodie briefly considers the confidence fostered by the emergence of a secret weapon, 
and the belief it may be a game-changer in the event of war, thereby inducing recklessness 
on the path to war. It is interesting that upon the advent of nuclear weapons, Brodie 
becomes a principal theorist of nuclear caution, erecting a theoretical and doctrinal 
framework of restraint, embedding the absolute weapon into a framework of mutual 
deterrence, and countering the less cautious ideas of his colleagues, including Herman 
Kahn who approached the waging of nuclear war with much less caution and restraint: 
“It is clear, however, that the possession of a secret weapon, or of a new weapon against 
which the potential adversary is felt to be without countering agents, may be very 
influential in reducing the caution with which a Power would otherwise pursue its 
aims. … Yet it makes a very great difference to the world what tools have been placed 
in the hands of the potential aggressor. If the instruments at his command have given 
him the means of pushing to a quick decision in war, it is obvious that all concepts of 
national security must be revised. “Defense” must then take on a more active and a 
more anticipatory attitude. It was Machiavelli, too often “taxed for his impieties,” who 
pointed out that to delay a war may not always redound to the advantage of the state 
which wishes to avoid its greatest evils. The tragedies of 1939 and the years following 
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were the tragedies of a world which stood hypnotized by the eyes of the serpent, not 
knowing with what terrible swiftness it could strike or how inevitably it would do so.”352
And yet while the world “stood hypnotized by the eyes of the serpent” as much of 
Europe was conquered, Brodie notes that on the sea, the situation remained less volatile: 
“War at sea is ancillary to war on land, and changes in naval materiel have not been 
such as to affect fundamentally the relationship of sea power to land power. Even on 
the sea itself, much is unaltered. The indomitable spirit at the helm and off, and the 
effectiveness of the combination is vastly greater than either one would be by itself. 
On the other hand, it is true that the danger of aerial invasion or at least raiding of 
an island like Great Britain does mean that the British Fleet can no longer guarantee 
almost by itself the security of the British Isles, though the continuing importance of 
its protection is generally underrated.”353 
Brodie would articulate a similar sentiment in his 1946 Foreign Affairs article, 
“New Tactics in Naval Warfare,” in which he observed that in World War II “sea 
power reached the culmination of its influence on history” and that the “greatest of 
air wars and the one which saw the most titanic battles on land was also the greatest 
of naval wars – not alone in the magnitude of naval operations but also in the degree 
to which those operations contributed to final victory.”354 This, Brodie explains, “could 
hardly have been otherwise in a war which was truly global, in which the pooling of 
resources of the great Allies depended upon their ability to traverse the sea” and to 
project power to “remote theaters which could be adequately serviced only by sea.”355 
So while “the land-based airplane was the original cause of the threat, the nature of 
the crisis which Allied sea power met and overcame cannot be adequately described 
merely in terms of ship versus aircraft,” which understates the underlying and recipro-
cal naval dimensions of the conflict.356
352. Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 446-47.
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Even with air forces taking flight as independent military services, the interconnec-
tion of air power to sea power endured. A full half century after Brodie wrote, air power 
still remains (albeit not without some vociferous debate from air power theorists) to a 
substantial degree an adjunct to sea power broadly defined, with aviation still respon-
sible for only a small fraction of world commerce, of which the lion’s share still travels 
by the merchant fleet. Missile power, however, came to offset sea power as the primary 
means by which the superpowers asserted their strategic might – though ultimately 
the last, best guarantor of a retaliatory capability would become the stealthful ballistic 
nuclear submarine, and America’s continued economic primacy would continue to 
be sustained by its unrivaled naval power on the world ocean, a naval supremacy that 
has endured through our time even as a new peer rises in the Far East.357
As Brodie reflected in the pages of Foreign Affairs in 1946, the U.S. Navy “proved 
during World War II that it had the resiliency to overcome a menace of scarcely 
imagined magnitude,” even if this “achievement lay mostly in redeeming past errors 
of omissions” that led to the preventable tragedy at Pearl Harbor. But the advent of 
the atomic bomb “introduces the possibility that in another general war the utility 
of navies will be decided ashore rather than at sea,” since a “nation which has had its 
entire economy destroyed may be able to put a fleet to scant use.” In other words, 
Brodie argued, “[T]raditional concepts of military security which this country has 
developed over the past fifty years – in which the Navy was correctly avowed to be 
our ‘first line of defense’ – must be reconsidered.”358
Ironically, Brodie’s thinking on sea power would very soon be overlooked by many 
scholars, who in their zeal to reconsider those traditional concepts of military secu-
rity, would look to Brodie as one of the founding architects of the new nuclear order; 
but the clarity of his naval thought, and its endurance after half a century and more, 
continues to provide us with compelling reason to revisit his pre-nuclear thinking. 
In the end, as we will see in the pages below, Brodie’s most enduring contribution 
to strategic studies is not that made by his study of sea power, nor to his pioneering 
contribution to the study of strategic nuclear power and sophisticated development 
of deterrence as a theory and a strategy, but to his contribution to understanding the 
357. In a review in the December 1944 edition of the Pacific Historical Review, it was noted that Brodie’s Guide to Naval 
Strategy – which had first appeared in September 1942 “under the title A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy,” and that 
the “cordiality with which it was received necessitated several reprintings and the rapid unfolding of naval actions invited 
revisions” – that the “present edition, though following the general lines of the author’s original interpretations, represents 
a complete rewriting, with the classic lessons of Trafalgar, Tsushima, and Jutland supplemented by illustrations drawn from 
battle actions as recent as the invasions of Saipan and Normandy.” Pacific Historical Review, “Review: A Guide to Naval 
Strategy,” Pacific Historical Review 13, No. 4 (December 1944), 484. It further noted: “Air power, Mr. Brodie freely admits, 
has revolutionized naval warfare,” but Brodie “insists, however, that the surface ship and particularly the battleship still has 
the fundamental role, and certain pronounced advantages, and that the basic principles of naval strategy have not been 
invalidated by the addition of carriers and planes.”
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broader sweep of military history and the constant influence that technological change 
has had – and continues to have – upon its flow. Brodie’s expertise in sea power would 
provide him with insights from the naval services that would serve him especially well 
as he grappled with the implications of the atomic bomb after August 6, 1945, and a 
few years after that with the even more daunting thermonuclear superbomb. For sea 
power, in contrast to land power and even air power, was an especially subtle realm 
of military power, one that more intuitively comprehended the complex workings 
of deterrence, which was rooted in both material and non-material forces. As Brodie 
would observe in his 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age, in his concluding discussion of 
“The Problem of Stability,” that deterrence “after all depends on a subjective feeling 
which we are trying to create in the opponent’s mind, a feeling compounded of re-
spect and fear,” and he cautions that it may be “possible to overshoot the mark” and 
to make the opponent “fear us too much, especially if what we make him fear is our 
over-readiness to react.”359 Brodie counsels that the “effective operation of deterrence 
over the long-term requires that the other party be willing to live with our possession 
of the capability upon which it rests”; or, “[a]s Admiral A.T. Mahan observed: ‘Force 
is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished.’”360 
Therefore, Brodie argues, “Conspicuous aggressiveness in the handling of armaments 
does not always pacify the opponent.”361
Brodie’s thinking about the enduring relevance of sea power in a world that, at the 
time, seemed more enthralled by the rise of air power and its promise transform modern 
war, took place in those ominous years as Hitler’s power and ambitions grew, and after 
Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would help catapult him to an impressive level 
of military influence during World War II, particularly for a civilian strategist – one 
of the first civilian defense intellectuals of the World War II era who would define a 
new pillar of strategic influence for the nascent world power that would come to be 
known under various monikers including the “best and the brightest,” the “civilian-
scientific strategists,” and later on as the “wizards of Armageddon.” Brodie’s book would 
become ubiquitous on America’s ships of war and in the Navy’s ROTC classrooms as 
his once-titled A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy was rechristened A Guide to Naval 
Strategy and provided to thousands of America’s wartime seamen, providing an early 
renown that would carry him across the atomic threshold into the new nuclear world, 
one of the first strategic thinkers to comprehend the revolutionary implications of 
the shocking incineration of Hiroshima, and who would presciently respond to the 
new challenges that were to follow, from the inevitable end to America’s brief atomic 
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monopoly to the dangerous thermonuclear stalemate of his later years. Brodie’s will-
ingness to transcend the specificity of the now and to instead probe for deeper, more 
enduring truths about so fundamental an issue of world order ensured that his work 
would remain relevant not only to his time, but to our time as well – and beyond. 
Technologies evolve, world orders rise and fall, but the fundamental relationships 
of technology to war, and of war to policy, remain constants in a world of dynamic 
change. And central to Brodie’s body of work, from the age of global sea power to the 
nuclear era, was the enigmatic but all-important relationship of war to politics, and 
it was the determination and sophistication of his lifelong effort to illuminate this 
complex interrelationship that would set him apart from his peers, and elevate him 
to a distinguished status shared by only a small handful of strategic thinkers across 
the ages – and which might even justify the prediction made by the editors of Makers 
of Nuclear Strategy that “[f ]uture generations of are likely to acclaim Brodie as ‘the 
Clausewitz of the age of nuclear deterrence.’”362
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Chapter Three
After the Bomb: 
Confronting the ‘Absolute Weapon’
‘Everything that I Have Written is Obsolete’
Fred Kaplan, in his intellectual history of then nuclear strategists, The Wizards of 
Armageddon, recalls the morning of August 7, 1945, the day after Hiroshima was 
destroyed by a single atomic bomb. On the other side of the planet from that city’s 
smoldering ruins, Brodie was out driving with Fawn to purchase that morning’s 
New York Times, whose banner headline read: “First Atomic Bomb Dropped on 
Japan; Missile is Equal to 20,000 Tons of TNT,” with smaller headlines proclaim-
ing: “New Age Ushered,” “Day of Atomic Energy Hailed by President, Revealing 
Weapon,” “Hiroshima is Target,” “‘Impenetrable’ Cloud of Dust Hides City After 
Single Bomb Strike.” As Kaplan recounted, “Brodie read just two paragraphs of 
the story that followed, looked up for a few seconds, turned to his wife and said, 
‘Everything that I have written is obsolete.’”363 Brodie had started at Yale just a few 
days before, on August 1.
Kaplan observed that “Brodie was not the only one for whom everything turned 
obsolete that morning. The whole conception of modern warfare, the nature of inter-
national relations, the question of world order, the function of weaponry, had to be 
thought through again. … From these ashes an entire intellectual community would 
create itself, a new elite that would eventually emerge as a power elite, and whose power 
would come not from wealth or family or brass stripes, but from their having conceived 
and elaborated a set of ideas.”364 And, “[i]n those first months following Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Yale University would become a prime mover on the thinking about 
how to live with the bomb, and Bernard Brodie was at the center of that movement.”365 
On the threshold of the nuclear age, Brodie was best known for his popular books on 
naval strategy and as Kaplan recounts, the title to his 1942 A Layman’s Guide to Naval 
Strategy (which in later printings, at the request of the Navy which assigned it to its 
ROTC courses, was shortened to A Guide to Naval Strategy. Then, with the dropping 
of those two atomic bombs, the world had suddenly changed. As Kaplan recounted, 
“When Brodie came to his office . . . the next day, Bill Fox greeted him with the same 
question Brodie had essentially posed to himself only a few second after glancing at 
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the front page of the newspaper earlier that morning. ‘Where does this leave you with 
your battleships?’ Fox asked. Brodie, still somewhat baffled, just shrugged.”366 
At Yale’s Institute of International Studies at this time could be found “some of 
the key figures … in the development of ‘realist’ thinking about international rela-
tions” – including the institute’s Frederick S. Dunn, William T. R. Fox, and Arnold 
Wolfers, who would later collaborate with Brodie on the widely celebrated 1946 
treatise The Absolute Weapon along with their colleague, Percy E. Corbett, a work that 
Booth describes as a “book of considerable analytical clarity and technical expertise,” 
exhibiting both a “sophisticated application of the ideas of political realism” as well as 
“extraordinary prescience” – so much that there would be “no comparable works for 
over ten years.”367 Brodie was invited to join the institute, where he had planned to 
continue his work on sea power, only to soon learn of the dramatic events unfolding 
in the skies of Japan, which “quickly changed the direction of his study.”368 Citing the 
oft-quoted observation by Bernard to Fawn on the morning after Hiroshima’s atomic 
destruction—“Everything I have written is obsolete”—Newell Bringhurst counters: 
“In truth, he was being overly pessimistic. Adjusting his thinking to the new realities 
of the atomic age, he would soon emerge as a leader in the field of nuclear strategic 
deterrence”369 As Bringhurst describes, “Brodie was thus among the first to come to 
grips with the fact of everyday living with the bomb.”370 
Later that year, Brodie would be appointed to teach at the new National War College, 
an institute for high-ranking military officers, which “require[d] Bernard’s presence 
in Washington from September to December, allowing him to return to New Haven 
only on weekends.”371 The Brodies started out in a modest public housing complex 
but would soon commence building their new “dream home” north of New Haven 
in the idyllic town of Bethany, a place of peace and beauty described by Fawn as the 
first place since her childhood home in Huntsville where “she felt ‘completely at peace 
with the world,’”372 and with a “‘glorious view’ of nearby Gaylord Mountain.”373 In the 
spring of 1947, a year before the house was completed, the couple planted flower and 
vegetable gardens on the land. Bringhurst observed, “For Bernard, gardening provided 
an effective counterweight to the atomic bomb – the grim focus of his research and 
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writing activities at Yale.”374 On August 30, 1948, the new house was at last ready to 
be moved into, though it still required some finishing touches. As Bringhurst recounts, 
“Settling into their dream home, Fawn and Bernard knew that all the time and effort 
had been more than worth it. ‘We are really enjoying our new house tremendously,’ 
Fawn wrote … ‘Bernard’s chrysanthemums are beginning to bloom in all their gorgeous 
profusion of color, and it is wonderful to be able to enjoy them all the time.’”375 The 
new house “attracted national attention through Your House and Home, being featured 
in that publication’s inaugural 1950 issue,” and their “so-called Hilltop House was 
praised for its tasteful planning and careful attention to detail.”376 
While “greatly impressed by the revolutionary character of the new weapon,” Booth 
recalls that Brodie was at first “‘tentative’ on the question of whether the atomic bomb 
would deter or provoke tension,”377 as evident in his November 1945 essay “The Atomic 
Bomb and American Security” that preceded his chapters in The Absolute Weapon the 
next year. But Booth notes that Brodie eventually “came to accept Viner’s argument 
that the bomb would be stabilizing since no promise of victory would be worth the 
price if devastating retaliation was certain.”378 This would become not only the founda-
tion of American nuclear strategy, but the theoretical framework of structural realism 
during the Cold War period, also known as neorealism.
Together, the group of theorists who contributed to The Absolute Weapon, known 
as the “Yale group,” articulated a distinct nuclear realism that rejected both the 
“warfighting” or “war-winning” school of thought that was articulated forcefully in 
1946 by William Borden, author of There Will Be No Time and later by the prolific 
Herman Kahn, as well as the nuclear idealism of those who advocated world govern-
ment as the solution to the new nuclear danger. The Yale group believed “the bomb 
was revolutionary but that states would not put their security in the hands of an 
international organization. As a result, the great powers could not return to old-style 
wars, but neither could they move forward to world government. They therefore had 
to live with the bomb but without war; this meant living in a world of competitive 
arms building and deterrence.”379 
Brodie’s early consideration of the accidents of history that so profoundly shaped 
man’s odyssey, and the value in the effort to ameliorate conditions of injustice which, 
if left festering, could result in war, with the hope and expectation of strengthening 
thereby our proposed structure of world order, as he described in 1938 in his writings 
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on the prevention of war through peaceful change, resonate even more strongly in 
the immediate post-Hiroshima era, when the high price of accident and the unique 
fragility of the emergent world order, allow for a logical and natural progression, from 
considering the merits of “peaceful change” to articulating a philosophy and a strategy 
of deterrence, which one can think of as an update to the peaceful change argument 
for the new, exceedingly dangerous, nuclear era. It is thus no small coincidence that 
Brodie was among the first to turn his full attention to the unique challenges of the 
post-Hiroshima world, taking the lead in conceptualizing deterrence, embracing it, 
and taking the first steps toward operationalizing it. 
Indeed, Brodie’s contributions to the foundational 1946 book on nuclear strategy, 
The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, helped to establish the theoreti-
cal principles that underlay America’s emergent strategy of deterrence. His later work, 
Strategy in the Missile Age, updated his thinking to take into consideration the loss of 
America’s atomic monopoly, the increase in destructive yield as thermonuclear weapons 
entered the arsenals of the superpowers, and the enhancement of the reach and accuracy 
of delivery vehicles, most notably the intercontinental missile. Brodie is perhaps best 
known for his conclusion, articulated most famously in his 1946 contribution to The 
Absolute Weapon, but first presented in his article “The Atomic Bomb and American 
Security” published by the Yale Institute of International Studies as Memorandum 
18 in November 1945: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has 
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose.”380 
Strategic Ambiguity Redux: Lessons for the Atomic Age
Brodie had long recognized an essential ambiguity inherent in naval power: “A navy 
thus has defensive and offensive uses, which are sometimes indistinguishable and 
always mutually reinforcing.”381 This would also be true of nuclear weapons, resulting 
in what would remain a complex and never truly resolved ambiguity with regard to 
defensive and offensive weapons systems, or in the parlance of the nuclear strate-
gists, with regard to the credibility of deterrence versus warfighting – and whether 
warfighting capabilities, doctrines, training, civil defense measures, and declaratory 
statements would augment or undermine deterrence; and if the tools required to 
win major wars in the nuclear age would likely precipitate such wars, or in fact (and 
contrary to intuition) decrease their likelihood. Over and again, from the simplicity 
and glaring inadequacy of massive retaliation strategies, Sunday Punch strikes and 
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other plans designed to deliver a knockout blow that later came to be known as massive 
retaliation, to the more refined but equally ambiguous strategies of flexible response 
for an era of brushfire wars fought to let off steam and reinvigorate deterrence while 
avoiding general war, this most elemental strategic ambiguity would never go away, 
or be fully resolved with clarity. 
And so the nuclear doctrinal and theoretical debates would continue for nearly 
half a century, with Bernard Brodie leading the charge by articulating so clearly the 
fundamentals of nuclear deterrence, and elucidating the requirements for strategic 
stability in the nuclear age. Brodie was driven by the singular goal of ensuring that 
nuclear war never be fought, as the price paid in death and destruction would dra-
matically overshadow any potential political, economic or strategic benefits of war. 
However, as it would turn out, his view was not the only one, and a competing doc-
trine would emerge that postulated that nuclear wars could not only be fought, but 
they could be won, and preparing for nuclear victory was thus a necessity. One of 
the most well-known and outspoken advocates of this competing school of nuclear 
warfighting was Herman Kahn, an equally prolific former RANDite just like Brodie, 
but Kahn came to the opposite conclusion on the wisdom of fighting nuclear wars, 
rejecting the Brodien presumption that fighting a nuclear war was tantamount to 
national suicide. Kahn and his fellow warfighters came to believe atomic weapons, 
and later thermonuclear bombs as well, were primarily an incremental advancement 
in military power, an efficient means of delivering explosive power but not necessarily 
a transformative one and most likely not Apocalyptic in their consequences. But to 
Brodie, atomic weapons, even in their earliest, low-yielding form, were truly trans-
formative and inherently revolutionary, so much so that he would initially accept the 
term absolute to describe them.
According to Frederick S. Dunn, Director of the Yale Institute of International 
Studies and prominent theorist of peaceful change cited by Brodie in his graduate 
work, in the foreword to Brodie’s November 1, 1945 Memorandum No. 18 published 
by the institute, “The Atomic Bomb and American Security,” it was now “obviously 
necessary to know as much as possible about the nature of this new weapon and its 
strategic and political implications. For these are so revolutionary that it would be 
very easy, by looking just at some aspects and ignoring others, to be led unwittingly 
into errors of catastrophic proportions.”382 Dunn offers that Brodie’s analysis “should 
be helpful alike to policy-makers and laymen, whatever program for domestic or in-
ternational action they may favor as the best means of harnessing this most startling 
threat to future peace and stability.”383 
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It was within just 75 days of the unprecedented destruction of Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki, each by a single bomb dropped by a single aircraft, that Brodie published “The 
Atomic Bomb and American Security,” a remarkably prescient analysis that foresaw 
not only the unique attributes of the new weapon as a deterrent, and the spread of 
nuclear weapons to other powers, but also the operational challenges confronting the 
traditional armed services in the face of such a destructive new military technology 
and the risk of nuclear sabotage and terrorism – over a half century before the War 
on Terror made worrying about nuclear terrorism a common occurrence. Brodie was 
struck, like many, but the awesome destructiveness of the weapon: “The introduction 
… of an explosive agent which is several million times more potent, on a pound per 
pound basis, than the most powerful explosives previously known heralds a change not 
merely in the degree of destructiveness of modern war but in its basic character.”384 As 
Brodie observed, “From the viewpoint of human welfare, the fearful accomplishment 
of the bomb itself makes the promise of possible eventual benefits resulting from the 
peacetime use of nuclear energy seem irrelevant and unimportant,” as “the rewards 
of the end result inevitably appear meager against the bare fact that a few pounds of 
substance can blast whole cities into oblivion.”385 From the extraordinary destructive 
magnitude of the bomb emerged two distinct propositions: the first, “that the atomic 
bomb, which in the scope of its effects defies comparison with any military innova-
tion of the past, is not just another and more destructive weapon to be added to an 
already long list” and “is something which threatens to make the rest of the list rela-
tively unimportant”386; and the second, “that it is wholly vain to expect scientists or 
engineers to fashion any counter or ‘answer’ to the atomic bomb which will redress the 
present disequilibrium of offense versus defense to any degree worth mentioning.”387
Before the bomb would so drastically and permanently “alter the basic character of 
war,”388 Brodie had imagined that “a future war between great powers could be visual-
ized as one in which the decisive effects of strategic bombing would be contingent 
upon the cumulative effect of prolonged bombardment efforts which would in turn 
be governed by aerial battles and even whole campaigns for mastery of the air.”389 But 
he held this belief no longer: “The atomic bomb seems, however, to erase the pattern 
described above.”390 As Brodie observed, “A world accustomed to thinking it horrible 
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that wars should last four or five years is now appalled at the prospect that future wars 
may last only a few days.”391 And – foreshadowing the missile age that would not come 
for more than another decade – Brodie predicted that “the power of the new missile 
completely alters the considerations which previously governed the choice of vehicles 
and the manner of using them,” as a “rocket far more elaborate and expensive than 
the V-2 used by the Germans is still an exceptionally cheap means of bombarding a 
country if it can carry in its nose an atomic bomb.”392
And – foreshadowing the post-9/11 concerns about the specter of nuclear terrorism 
– Brodie anticipated that “[a]nother and possibly even more revolutionary change in 
the character of war produced in the atomic bomb lies in the unprecedented potentiali-
ties which it gives to sabotage.”393 Before the bomb “it was hitherto physically impos-
sible for agents to smuggle into another country, either prior to or during hostilities, 
a sufficient quantity of materials to blow up more than a very few specially chosen 
objectives,” and as a consequence “[t]he possibility of really serious damage to a great 
power resulting from such enterprises was practically nil. Far different is the situation 
where such materials as U-235 or plutonium-239 are employed, for only a few pounds 
of either substance is sufficient to blow up the major part of a great city.”394 And 
while “the engine necessary for utilizing the explosive, that is, the bomb itself, seems 
from various hints contained in the Smyth Report to be a highly intricate and fairly 
massive mechanism,” Brodie also suspects it to be “also probable that a nation intent 
upon perfecting the atomic bomb as a sabotage instrument could work out a much 
simpler device, something which permitted the major part of the materials used to be 
gathered and prepared locally in the target area.”395 Brodie speculated that “the war of 
the future might very well take the form of a revelation by one nation to another that 
the latter’s major cities had atomic bombs planted in them and that only immediate 
and absolute submission to dictate would prevent them from going off,”396 a scenario 
that senior Al Qaeda operative, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – the mastermind of the 
9/11 attacks on the United States – says had been implemented when he claimed 
under interrogation in Guantanamo Bay that Al Qaeda had hidden a nuclear bomb 
in Europe to be detonated if Osama bin Laden was ever killed or captured, thereby 
unleashing what he described as a “nuclear hellstorm” – perhaps the first effort by a 
substate terror group to deter the world’s great powers from launching an attack upon 
their leader. Also anticipating some of the civil liberty issues that would arise during 
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the War on Terror, Brodie wrote that for “a community alerted to national danger 
the F.B.I. or its counterpart becomes the first line of defense, and the encroachment 
on civil liberties which would necessarily follow would far exceed in magnitude and 
pervasiveness anything which democracies have thus far tolerated in peacetime.”397
Brodie considered possible methods of defense against nuclear attack, writing that a 
“nation which has developed strong defenses against invading aircraft, which developed 
reliable means of interfering with radio-controlled rockets, which has developed highly 
efficient counter-smuggling and counter-sabotage agencies, and which has dispersed 
through the surrounding countryside substantial proportions of the industries and 
populations normally gathered in urban communities is obviously better prepared 
to resist atomic bomb attack than a nation which has neglected to do these things,” 
but also suggests that “progress is not likely to be confined to measures of defense. 
The use of more perfect vehicles and of more destructive bombs in greater quantity 
might very well offset any gains in defense. And the bomb already has a fearful lead 
in the race.”398 Indeed, “Scientific knowledge today embraces no hint of a possibility 
of neutralizing the atomic bomb; it does contain signposts pointing to the possible 
exploitation of other and equally horrendous means of destroying human life, such 
as radio-active ‘gases.’”399
Brodie next considered the “Military Role of the Traditional Armed Forces,” ob-
serving: “Obviously, the relative importance of the army and navy in wartime would 
be considerably diminished if not eliminated by a device which could be operated 
more or less independently of them and which was capable of producing havoc great 
enough to effect a decision by itself. And in so far as the atomic bomb is delivered 
to the target by means of rockets rather than aircraft, the same would be true of the 
air forces as we now know them. But it is likely that decisions will be won without 
the traditional forces being taken into account? If there is reason to doubt it, those 
forces clearly remain important. The problem then becomes more pragmatic – that 
of discovering the degree and direction of the changes necessary to adapt them to 
the atomic age.”400 While tests were forthcoming on the effects of atomic bombing 
on naval warships such as the Japanese battleship Nagato, Brodie pointed out that 
“they can provide no answer to the basic question of the utility of sea power in the 
future.”401 During an anticipated though finite period of atomic bomb scarcity, Brodie 
expected that “ships at sea are among the least attractive of military objects as targets 
for atomic bomb attack.” He supported this argument by noting that “[t]heir ability 
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to disperse makes them wasteful targets for bombs of such concentrated power; their 
mobility makes them practically impossible targets for super-rockets of great range; 
and those of the United States Navy at least have shown themselves able (with the 
assistance of their own aircraft) to impose an impressively high ratio of casualties 
upon hostile planes endeavoring to approach them.” Nonetheless, Brodie writes, “it 
is still possible for navies to lose all reason for being even if they themselves prove 
completely immune.”402 
Brodie argues that “sea power has throughout history proved decisive only when 
it was applied and exploited over a period of considerable time, and in atomic bomb 
warfare the time may well be lacking. Where wars are destined to be short, superior 
sea power may prove wholly useless.”403 Brodie noted the irony of America’s emergence 
as a world power, and as “the unrivalled first sea power of the world,” just as “all this 
mighty power seems to have become redundant.”404 Brodie could, however, envision 
the “possibility, admittedly slight, that a system of international machinery for the sup-
pression of the atomic bomb can be set up and endowed with such vigor as to enable 
it to function even through another major war,” or more likely that “neither side will 
dare to use the bomb even though both possess it”; and, in this circumstance, “navies 
might have an important role to play.”405 Brodie would elaborate the possible future 
role for a navy in the nuclear world in the months and years ahead as he struggled 
to determine if all his prior work on naval strategy was now obsolete – but already 
he sensed that if atomic weapons could in fact be neutralized by the mutual fear of 
their use, there would indeed be a continuing military role for the traditional armed 
forces in the nuclear era.
In a footnote, Brodie invokes Clausewitz – one of his earliest discussions of the 
Prussian strategist – writing: “Regardless of technological changes, war remains, as 
Clausewitz put it, an ‘instrument of policy,’ a means of realizing a political end.”406 
Brodie would soon come to question this view before again circling back to his first 
instinct that war was, and would continue to be, a continuation of policy by other 
means. And as the atomic era would, a few short years later, yield to the thermonu-
clear era, Brodie would strenuously add the word must to Clausewitz’s old dictum, 
making it much more than an observation, and even more than a prescription; to 
Brodie, it became a commandment. His earlier point, expressed in late 1945, on the 
enduring interconnection of war to policy no matter what the technology was, was 
Brodie’s first articulation of what would become a sacred point to him, that was in 
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the nuclear era would continue to obey the logic – and what would soon amount to 
the moral imperative – of Clausewitz. Brodie would extended the Prussian’s logic to 
suggest that if, as in the case of nuclear war, there could be no rational end to war, 
then such a war could not, must not, be fought. 
One could argue that Brodie was in the process of elevating an observation of the 
Prussian beyond a prescription, in some ways ideologizing what for Clausewitz was 
mere theorizing (albeit with a healthy dose of prescription woven into his Hegelian 
structure, with synthesis the ultimate objective), harnessing it into a normative pre-
scription on the permissibility, or in this case the impermissibility of nuclear war. Or 
if Brodie senses in Clausewitz a shared horror of war in its absolute form, and a shared 
normative commitment to preventing absolute from erupting beyond the ideal form 
of its theoretical description into an orgy of real, physical and human destruction. 
While Brodie’s first, tentative comment is buried in a footnote, it shows that Brodie as 
early as 1945 was thinking about Clausewitz, and while of the belief that Clausewitz’s 
teachings still applied even after the nuclear age had begun, he had not yet realized 
how central they would become, and endeavored in the years ahead to introduce 
Americans to the long-ignored theorist, and to share his wisdom and insight in the 
hope that his precepts would be embraced by others just as Brodie was beginning to. 
So what started as a footnote penned at the dawn of the nuclear age would blossom 
into a lifelong inquiry into the enduring wisdom of Clausewitz and how best to apply 
his lessons to the new age.
It appears prescient that the context in which Brodie addresses Clausewitz and his 
enduring relevance is not to address the question of whether or not war in the nuclear 
age can be waged in a manner that honors the Clausewitzian dictum that war is a 
continuation of politics by other means, but the narrower question of war-termination 
after atomic bombs are used and the role of traditional armed services in post-attack 
military operations, a topic that would enjoy much attention by a later generation 
of escalation theorists who would debate the escalatory (and potential de-escalatory) 
nature of the bomb. “It has already been suggested,” he writes, “that a nation which 
suddenly attacked another with atomic bombs would find it imperative to follow up 
its initial blow with rapid invasion and occupation, at the very least for the purpose 
of minimizing retaliation in kind,”407 and that in order to “obviate retaliation with 
atomic bombs to any considerable degree, the invasion would have to be incredibly 
swift and sufficiently powerful to overwhelm instantly any opposition.”408 But in the 
same footnote where Brodie reflected on Clausewitz’s relevance, he observes that “[c]
ertain scientists familiar with the atomic bomb have argued privately that in any future 
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war invasion and occupation would probably not be necessary at all.” With the World 
War II experience still fresh and with it that war’s necessity for a surrender every bit 
as total as the war itself, Brodie argued , “Quite apart from the likelihood of direct 
retaliation with atomic bombs, this view is wholly untenable. A nation which had 
inflicted enormous human and material damage upon another would find it intolerable 
to stop short of eliciting from the latter an acknowledgement of defeat implemented 
by a readiness to accept control. Wars, in other words, are fought to be terminated, 
and to be terminated decisively.”409
Brodie’s earliest published thoughts on nuclear deterrence appeared in this very 
1945 essay, in a section titled “Is the Atomic Bomb a Deterrent from War?” Brodie 
considers the value of the atomic bomb as a deterrent in a preliminary analysis that 
explores both sides of an issue and in which he does not yet take sides: “Hope mixed 
with horror has provoked the exclamation on some hands that the atomic bomb ‘makes 
war impossible!’ In the sense that war is something not to be endured if any reasonable 
alternative remains, it has long been ‘impossible.’ But for that very reason we should 
suspect that the atomic bomb does not make war impossible in the narrower sense of 
the word. Even without it the conditions of modern war should have been a sufficient 
deterrent to aggression but proved not to be such. Realism therefore dictates the as-
sumption that war remains possible, however more horrible the consequences.”410 
Brodie adds that “a change so fundamental in the character of war cannot but change 
drastically the degree of probability of the recurrence of large-scale war within any given 
period,” though he remembers all too vividly from the 1930s “a deeper and probably 
more generalized revulsion against war than in any other era of history,” noting that 
“[u]nder those circumstances the breeding of a new war required a situation combin-
ing dictators of singular irresponsibility with a notion among them and their general 
staffs that aggression would be both successful and cheap. The possibility of madmen 
again becoming rulers of powerful states is by no means ruled out for the future. But 
can there exist again the notion that aggression will be cheap?”411 It is this latter point 
that would propel Brodie to embrace deterrence as the only logical response to the 
unprecedented dangers of the bomb: “If the atomic bomb can be used without fear 
of substantial retaliation in kind, it will clearly encourage aggression.” But this strikes 
Brodie as quite unlikely, and “[f ]or this reason, the atomic bomb may prove in the 
net a powerful inhibition of aggression. It would make little difference is one power 
had more bombs and were better prepared to resist them than the opponent. It would 
in any case undergo tremendous destruction of life and property.”412 According to 
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Brodie, one situation “where fear of retaliation is at a minimum” is “where one side 
has the bombs and the other lacks them entirely,” but even as far back as 1945 he was 
confident that this “special situation is bound to be short-lived.”413
Brodie speculates that the fear of atomic destruction will be uniformly great even if 
it varies by culture or nation in relative intensity. He observes, “It goes without saying 
that the governments and populations of different countries will show very different 
levels of apprehension concerning the effects of the bomb”; and while “[i]t may be 
argued that a totalitarian state would be less unready than would a democracy to see 
the destruction of its cities rather than yield on a crucial political question,” Brodie 
surmises that “in no case is the fear of the consequences of atomic bomb attack likely 
to be low. More important is the likelihood that totalitarian countries can impose more 
easily on their populations than can democracies those mass movements of peoples 
and industries necessary to disperse urban concentrations.”414
Brodie remains unsure at the time of this writing, in the fall of 1945 just a few short 
months after the leveling of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whether the bomb will restrain 
or unleash the more aggressive instincts of states – and he even considers how it may 
not stop crises from erupting with the potential to escalate. He writes:
But even if one is to assume that in the net – that is, barring the special situations outlined 
above – the atomic bomb will act as a powerful deterrent to aggression against great powers, 
that fact may not be overwhelmingly important with respect to the political crises out of which 
wars generally develop. In a world in which great wars become “inevitable” as a result of aggres-
sion by great powers upon weak neighbors, the important question is whether the existence of 
the atomic bomb will cause a greater restraint on the part of great powers in all their dealings 
with other nations, whether the latter be great or small. It may easily have the contrary effect. 
Hitler made a good many bloodless gains by mere blackmail, in which he relied heavily on the 
too obvious horror of modern war among the great nations which might have opposed him 
earlier. A comparable kind of blackmail in the future may actually find its encouragement in 
the existence of the atomic bomb. Horror of its implications is not likely to be spread evenly, 
at least not in the form of over expression. The response may be a series of faits accomplis even-
tuating in that final deterioration of international affairs in which war, however terrible, can 
no longer be avoided.415
This image of faits accomplis is reminiscent of the years before World War II erupted, 
when a preference for peaceful change placed the diplomatic and strategic premium on 
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avoiding war at all costs, even if that meant allowing for the sacrifice of the sovereign 
independence of smaller states; indeed, the bifurcation of the international system, 
along an “Iron Curtain,” revealed the existence of a recognized limit of western diplo-
matic and military influence, essentially enabling such a blackmail situation to transpire 
across eastern Europe as Soviet power oppressed numerous formerly independent 
nations without a hint of opposition from the West; but within the free world, a 
counter-effect ensured that Soviet power could not be so applied on the western side 
of this new frontier. It was thus a precarious balance, predicated upon a mutuality of 
blackmail that would be enforced by the decreasingly delicate nuclear balance.
In this first effort to flesh out the many consequences of the bomb, Brodie is not 
yet ready to place his bet on deterrence or on the stability it might provide, and even 
suggests that he holds a contrary view which he would, within the year, substantially 
modify: “Finally, and perhaps most important, the anxiety which the atomic bomb itself 
induces, and which is likely to become more intense as the number of bombs and of 
the states producing them increases, will remain a powerful but wholly unpredictable 
factor in world affairs. It may stimulate a sense of urgency which will make feasible 
correctives far more drastic than any that are possible today. It may, on the other hand, 
breed national neuroses manifested in the urge for a ‘preventive’ war.”416 This would 
in fact prove to be a prescient forecast in the years to come when calls for timely ac-
tion were raised by some who feared the loss of opportunity enjoyed first during the 
four-year atomic monopoly and later during the very brief ten-month thermonuclear 
monopoly – calls that were fortunately not heeded. Adds Brodie: “The doctrine that 
the only possible defense is a vigorous anticipatory offense may even acquire some 
military plausibility if the number of bombs in existence greatly increases, but it will 
be the ‘solution’ of total despair.”417
The Absolute Weapon?
When first grappling with the riddles of the new nuclear era, Brodie was especially 
sensitive to the unprecedented totality of warfare, and the prospects of atomic oblit-
eration. As he wrote in the opening words of his chapter “War in the Atomic Age” 
in his widely acclaimed 1946 edited volume, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and 
World Order, “Most of those who have held the public ear on the subject of the atomic 
bomb have been content to assume that war and obliteration are now completely 
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synonymous,” and that the “state of obliteration” might be the “future fate of nations 
which cannot resolve their disputes.”418 Brodie speculates that a “war with atomic 
bombs would be immeasurably more destructive and horrible than any the world 
has yet known,” a fact that is “indeed portentous, and to many . . . overwhelming.”419 
In his second chapter in The Absolute Weapon, Brodie discusses the military implica-
tions of the bomb, and argues that now an “aggressor state must fear retaliation,” as 
“it will know that even if it is the victor it will suffer a degree of physical destruction 
incomparably greater than that suffered by any defeated nation of history,” more so 
than that faced by defeated Nazi Germany; and, by Brodie’s calculation, “no victory 
. . . would be worth the price.”420 From the horrific destruction promised by atomic 
weapons, and the assured retaliation that would have to be absorbed by an aggressor 
in the atomic age, Brodie anticipates not chaos but order, not war but a sustained 
stability – as if having magically created gold from non-precious metals through some 
sort of nuclear alchemy.
Only if the bomb could “be used without fear of substantial retaliation in kind” 
would it “clearly encourage aggression,” so Brodie argues that we should endeavor to 
“make as nearly certain as possible that the aggressor who uses the bomb will have it 
used against him,” even if this means an inevitability of the “multilateral possession of 
the bomb.”421 According to Brodie, so long as any atomic aggressor will inevitably face an 
atomic retaliatory strike, “the bomb cannot but prove in the net a powerful inhibition 
of aggression,” even “if one power had more bombs” or was “better prepared to resist 
them.”422 Brodie suggests that the “first and most vital step in any American security 
program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves 
in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.”423 Brodie famously explained, 
“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From 
now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful 
purpose.”424 This becomes the heart of Brodie’s strategic philosophy for the nuclear 
age, with its central dependence upon deterrence as its pillar. In later years, many 
would disagree, resulting in the bifurcation of the emerging field of nuclear strategy 
into two broad categories: the deterrers and the warfighters, and their fundamental 
disagreement over this singular issue, whether averting war rather than winning wars 
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should be the “chief purpose” of American military power; and even if so, whether it 
was possible to avert war without being prepared to win them. In the end, successful 
deterrence might depend on an opponent’s belief that its enemy was preparing not 
only to fight a nuclear war, but to win one, forever obscuring the clarity evident in 
Brodie’s original analysis in a subsequent cloud of irresolvable strategic ambiguity and 
doctrinal debate. 
On June 10, 1946, Time magazine published a favorable review of The Absolute 
Weapon, an indicator of how important this early effort to grapple with the implica-
tions of the atomic era was considered beyond the hallowed halls of academia. As Time 
wrote, “Since Hiroshima, thinkers have started one chain reaction after another about 
The Bomb,” and “‘To clear away the hysteria,’ five of them published The Absolute 
Weapon … the best overall job yet on the atom’s actual political implications. They 
make it more real by frankly presupposing that the only two powers likely to engage 
in an atomic-armament race are the U.S. and Russia.”425 The review considers the 
“Threat of Retaliation,” noting, “While some scientists think that an atomic-arms 
race is the most dreadful thing that could happen, The Absolute Weapon’s text argues 
that it would be still more dreadful for only one nation to have bombs – for only 
then could they be used with impunity. ‘In the atomic age the threat of retaliation is 
probably the strongest single means of determent.’”426 The review next considers the 
“Threat of Stalemate”: “In developing this theme The Absolute Weapon’s text refutes 
the rather silly title. The atom can and will be fitted into military and political strat-
egy, like all other weapons. A surprise atom-bomb attack could make Pearl Harbor 
look like a mere raid, but continental areas such as the U.S. and Russia are too great 
for immediate knock-out blows. A surprised but still surviving nation with atomic 
stockpiles could in its turn destroy the aggressor’s cities and industries. After the first 
heavy devastation, both sides would have to fight minus most of their production; 
the war might well degenerate into a long stalemate with neither side able to launch 
a successful long-distance invasion.”427 Time further notes, “More dangerous than 
the atom itself is the idea that a quick atomic blitz would defeat any great nation. 
No possible atomic aggressor would be able to think that if other great nations are 
automatically prepared. In mutual atomic war, even the ‘victor’ will suffer ‘destruc-
tion incomparably greater than that suffered by any defeated nation in history. . . . 
Under those circumstances no victory, even if guaranteed in advance – which it never 
is – would be worth the price.’” 428
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Just one day earlier, in the pages of the New York Times, this pioneering work enjoyed 
similarly broad exposure to the lay public – further testimony to both the importance 
of the subject matter in the public mind as to the esteem merited upon the authors. But 
in great contrast to the Time review, the article in the New York Times was absolutely 
scathing. Authored by none other than the Chancellor of the University of Chicago, 
Robert M. Hutchins, the review starts out with all guns blazing directly at the otherwise 
distinguished authors of this work: “This book, in which five distinguished scholars 
take part, is confused and contradictory in its thinking, and unimaginative and defeat-
ist in its conclusions.”429 As Hutchins critically observes, “After showing that neither 
international agreements, inspection, nor the fear of retaliation can prevent atomic 
war, it recommends that we rely on a combination of all three to save civilization. Of 
the three measures, the authors look with the most favor upon the fear of retaliation. 
Freedom from fear is no longer an aim toward which America should strive, they seem 
to suggest; only a world living in fear can be safe.”430 Rejecting the authors’ consensus 
on the logic of deterrence, and citing Frederick Dunn’s introductory comment that 
the “atomic bomb is one of the most persuasive deterrents to adventures in atomic 
warfare that could be devised,” Hutchins suggests – as many critics of neorealism would 
similarly do during its theoretical reign at the end of the Cold War – that “[a]t this 
point it would seem that we could adjourn and go home, because if the atomic bomb 
itself is going to prevent war none of us needs to do anything about it, except that 
we should urge our Government to distribute its supply of bombs all over the world. 
Then every nation would enjoy the pacifying influence of the fear of retaliation”431 – 
a controversial premise that the father of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, himself would 
later suggest: “But this the authors of this book do not propose. They do not even 
advocate making our knowledge of the technique of bomb manufacture available to 
other nations now.”432 Hutchins holds back some fire on Brodie, saluting his “useful 
list of the military qualities and consequences of the atomic bomb,” and finding only 
two faults with it: the first being Hutchins’ belief that Brodie’s five-to-ten year estimate 
for the end of the American atomic monopoly might be excessive, citing a competing 
viewpoint that Russia would be capable of manufacturing atomic bombs “in about 
three years”—a time frame that proved more accurate than Brodie’s. But Hutchins 
also suggests that Moscow will then also become capable of producing atomic bombs 
“at a far higher rate than we can,” which turned out not to be the case.433 
Hutchins also disputes Brodie’s contention that “the possibilities of sabotage by 
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atomic bombs are greatly exaggerated,” finding a more persuasive case made for the 
dangers of nuclear terrorism by National Bureau of Standards director and atomic 
bomb expert E. U. Condon.434 However, with the passage now of over half a century 
since publication of The Absolute Weapon, no case of atomic sabotage has yet to take 
place – not even in the chaotic post-9/11 world nor during the even more chaotic col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. But apart from limited praise for Brodie’s analysis, Hutchins 
takes aim once more at Brodie’s embrace of deterrence, writing, “After making his 
military diagnosis, Mr. Brodie goes on to discuss its implications for military policy,” 
and it is here that “we meet again with the fear of retaliation.”435 Hutchins finds 
Brodie “highly unconvincing when he sets out to show how we may counter-attack 
and fight on after an atomic assault upon us,” and states that he “overlooks the great 
fact about the atomic bomb, even though it appeared on his list of its qualities and 
consequences; and that is the fact that there is literally no defense against it.”436 And 
so, if “as we are told on high authority, 40,000,000 Americans could be killed in a 
single night of atomic explosions; if in the same period all our cities could be destroyed 
and all our transportation and communications disrupted, how could we carry on 
anything that would look like organized warfare?”437 According to Hutchins, Brodie 
“merely wants to have us get ready to fight so that we shall not be a tempting target”; 
and if we comply, Brodie suggests that as a nation we will be able to “pursue actively 
that progressive improvement in world affairs by which alone it finds true security,” 
a contention that Hutchins rejects as nonsensical: “The elaborate measures urged by 
Mr. Brodie are more likely to divert us from the task of improving world affairs than 
they are to encourage us to tackle it,” and may very well induce an opposite reaction, 
resulting instead in the “progressive deterioration in world affairs.”438 
Hutchins directs even more hostile fire at Brodie’s co-authors, describing Arnold 
Wolfers as “unintelligible”; taking Percy E. Corbett to task for joining his colleagues 
“in saying that the fear he wishes to overcome offers the greatest hope for peace”; and 
finding fault with all five authors for being “scornful of world government,” repeatedly 
challenging their embrace of perpetual fear of retaliation as a foundation for peace.439 
He sees a glimmer of reasonableness in William T.R. Fox’s observation that a “world in 
which two or more states were sitting on powder kegs powerful enough to destroy every 
major city on earth would be a world of half-peace at best” – a conclusion Hutchins 
finds to be “so obvious that one wonders why Mr. Fox is the only one of the five au-
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thors who ever shows signs of seeing it.” Hutchins wonders “why he did not confide 
in his colleagues and why the reader is not told until the third page from the end?”440 
In a more formal – and favorable – academic review in the January 1947 edition 
of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, University of 
Pennsylvania’s Robert Strausz-Hupé writes that “[a]lthough the authors eschew the 
doomsday rhetoric which the general public has learned to expect from experts on 
atom politics, they succeed in presenting the most impressive analysis of the terrible 
dilemma which thus far has appeared in print.” Strausz-Hupé writes that the authors 
“are agreed that the political problem of the atom bomb, superimposed on the stag-
gering problems of pre-atomic world politics, cannot be isolated from the syndrome 
of international crisis; that control of atomic energy as a weapon is tantamount to 
the imposition of political, not merely technical, controls; that the United Nations 
offers the most practical alternatives now available for averting ‘a clear-cut polarization 
of power around . . . the Soviet Union and the United States,’ the tendency toward 
which is fraught with the most immediate threat of war, atomic or old-fashioned; and 
that the best defense of the United States against the threat of atomic attack, although 
not against terrible destruction once that attack has been launched, is determent-
power, i.e., capacity for instant retaliation.”441 He also observed how, “Paradoxically, 
The Absolute Weapon is a valuable contribution to the controversy on Man and the 
Atom just because it rejects absoluteness as a basis of discussion,” writing, “Since the 
authors are apparently agreed that capacity for retaliation is the factor most likely to 
deter a would-be aggressor, they contend implicitly, it seems, that the effectiveness 
of atomic weapons is relative, i.e., relative to other atomic weapons” – an impression 
that is “strengthened by Dr. Brodie’s two chapters on the strictly military implications 
of atomic energy.”442 
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Ken Booth, in his biographical chapter on Brodie in Makers of Nuclear Strategy, 
described The Absolute Weapon as “a landmark in the story of thinking about nuclear 
weapons;” but he goes on to clarify that this “is not to say that it was an influential 
or widely read book,” and further observes: “Like several of the key works in strategic 
theory, it has been referred to more frequently than actually read, and in hindsight 
its reputation has become more significant than in the late 1940s. Even today it is 
unlikely that most members of the strategic profession know more about it than 
a couple of much-repeated quotations.” 443 In a footnote, Booth elaborates on the 
book’s overstated influence, arguing that the “book’s landmark status when it was first 
published is exaggerated by Herken and Kaplan,” and citing Freedman’s appraisal as 
more accurate—that is, that “the book stands out only in retrospect.”444 Nonetheless, 
Booth does recognize that The Absolute Weapon “was the first comprehensive exposition 
of American strategy for the age of nuclear deterrence,” and that it was notable for 
being both “[q]uickly produced” and “of exceptional quality,” even if its influence is 
somewhat more ambiguous, and certainly less immediate, than history now suggests.445
A ‘Few Basic Propositions’ for the Atomic Age
While Brodie’s contribution to The Absolute Weapon is often presented as the starting 
point of his nuclear strategic thinking, with his earlier Yale memorandum less well 
known, he was actually quite prolific in the first years of the atomic era with many 
conference presentations, book chapters and articles to his credit. Indeed, just a month 
after the favorable review in Time, he participated in the 22nd Norman Wait Harris 
Memorial Foundation lectures held at the University of Chicago in July 1946, present-
ing a paper titled “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy” that starts 
out by noting – as he would again more famously in his “Strategy Hits a Dead End” 
will be read by all statesmen and others upon whose work and decisions, over the next few years, will depend the peace of 
the world.” Cavell concludes that The Absolute Weapon is a “constructive book which should be widely read; its reading by 
the right people might help to clarify their minds and thus avoid further misery to those millions, particularly in the Far 
East, who suffer so terribly now, largely because the Great Powers fear and distrust one another.” R. G. Cavell, “Review: 
The Absolute Weapons, edited by Bernard Brodie,” Pacific Affairs 19, No. 4 (December 1946), 450. Also on p.450, Cavell 
notes the book “is written by five members of the Yale Institute of International Studies under the editorship of one of 
them, Bernard Brodie, an authority on modern armaments,” and that “Brodie divides into two sections a comprehensive 
chapter entitled ‘The Weapon,’” and in his first, “‘War in the Atomic Age’, he discusses very realistically, the effect of the 
bomb on the character of war” while in the second, “‘Implications for Military Policy’, he goes into problems of attack 
and defence and stresses the fact that ‘military authorities will have to bestir themselves to a wholly unprecedented degree 
in revising military concepts inherited from the past’.” Brodie also “outlines the possibilities of defence against this new 
weapon,” and points out that, “So far he sees no evidence that American military authorities have begun really to think 
in terms of atomic warfare.”
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article in Harper’s a decade later – that “strategy seems to have lost its entire reason for 
being. Certainly, the famous remark of Clausewitz, that ‘war is a continuation of policy,’ 
has now become a complete absurdity.”446 Brodie would a few years later reprise his 
early thoughts on Clausewitz’s obsolescence, finding new relevance as the atomic era 
gave way to the more dangerous thermonuclear era – and given Brodie’s long interest 
in Clausewitz it is fascinating to observe him invoke the Prussian so early on and in 
a manner so contrary to both his later efforts to integrate Clausewitzian theory with 
nuclear strategy and to his first instinct captured in his aforementioned footnote less 
than a year earlier. As Brodie explained, “In a war in which both sides use the atomic 
bomb it is hardly conceivable that the victor, if there is one, can derive any benefits, 
even negative ones, at all commensurate with the costs. Whether that was true or not 
before is arguable; it is now inescapable.”447 America’s strategy through to its victory 
in World War II was “the age-old policy, which has always been basic to strategy, of 
destroying the enemy’s armed forces – and there again we see one of the basic tenets 
of strategy collapsing.”448 As the nuclear era began, Brodie suggested that there are 
three things that we will want to know: “whether the atomic bomb does nor does 
not facilitate aggression”; what are the “minimum requirements of any international 
system for the control of atomic energy”; and “whether there is any useful course of 
defense policy left to us in the event of a failure to attain a system possessing those 
minimum requirements.”449 
Brodie proceeds to list a “few basic propositions” he had hitherto discussed else-
where, his first being that “in the atomic bomb we have a weapon of which one to 
ten units is sufficient to destroy any city in the world.”450 He noted one colleague’s 
objection “to our use of the term the ‘absolute weapon’ in speaking of the atomic 
bomb,”451 which Brodie explained by saying, “When you have a weapon as effective 
as this one is, it does not make much difference whether you succeed in devising one 
which is more effective”—a point he would later revisit when the thermonuclear 
leap in destructiveness became apparent. But at this early juncture, he still remains 
“completely unimpressed by the discussion that this bomb is only a beginning and 
that ten or twenty years from now we shall have one a hundred times more powerful,” 
not because this was unlikely – indeed, the H-bomb would yield a punch a thousand 
times greater than the A-bomb – but because he does not believe “the order of differ-
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ence between that situation and the present one is at all comparable to the difference 
between the atomic bomb and the preatomic-bomb era.”452 Indeed, “with air forces 
no greater than those which existed in the recent war, it is at least physically possible 
for any power to destroy all, or at least most, of the cities of any other great power.”453 
Brodie’s second proposition is “that no defense against the atomic bomb is known, 
and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote.” He adds 
that “the experience of the past, which superficially leads one to believe that aggres-
sive weapons have always been successfully countered, breaks down under analysis as 
misleading or irrelevant. … What we have always had in the past is an adjustment to 
new weapons which tended to qualify those weapons, and such adjustments will not 
be sufficient in terms of the atomic bomb.”454 Indeed, London’s successful response 
to the German V-1, which on their “banner day” succeeded in downing 97 of 101 
missiles launched, would have seemed less a victory had they been tipped with atomic 
warheads: “then the survivors in London would have had little cause to congratulate 
themselves.”455 This leads to Brodie’s third proposition, “that superiority neither in 
numbers of bombs nor in numbers of air forces, let alone armies and navies, is suf-
ficient to guarantee security.” According to Brodie, even an inferior air force stands a 
reasonable probability that it “can succeed in penetrating”456 its opponent’s air space, 
and the consequence is that the “concept of command of the air … breaks down.”457
Brodie reflected on Britain’s long experience participating in foreign wars, an involve-
ment “designed to maintain on an economical level those defenses which Britain found 
sufficient to her security,” which Brodie conceived as the very “purpose of the balance-
of-power principle.”458 Until the atomic era, Brodie argues, the “British experience is 
certainly relevant to the American case”; and the United States “prior to the atomic 
bomb could have felt some assurance that … [it] had a fairly effective guaranty against 
devastation, or invasion of its homeland.”459 But with the atomic bomb, everything had 
now changed. Brodie next discussed his fourth proposition, the “effect of the atomic 
bomb on the ranges even of existing aircraft, not to mention long range rockets, which 
are certain to be developed within the next several decades.”460 He noted, as he had 
elsewhere, that the bomb enabled aircraft to extend their range “to practically its entire 
452. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 91.
453. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 92.
454. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 92.
455. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 92.
456. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 92.
457. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 93.
458. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 93.
459. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 93.
460. Brodie, “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” 93.
118 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
straight-line cruising radius without payload,” albeit at the “sacrifice of the plane and 
crew” – far greater than the current conventional bombing range for an aircraft of on 
average “one-quarter or less of its straight-line cruising radius.”461 In effect, an atomic 
bomb-equipped aircraft would become a manned cruise missile whose mission was 
in effect a one-war suicide mission, since it was “not likely that belligerents using the 
atomic bomb and delivering it by aircraft would be particularly interested in getting 
back after each mission the particular plane or crew which delivered it.”462 Brodie 
turns to his fifth and last proposition, that it was “pretty clear by now that there is no 
question at all of world-wide scarcity of the materials for producing the bomb,” and 
that, “[r]elative to the tremendous destructive powers of the bomb, such materials are 
not scarce” even if “their distribution is still incompletely known.”463 Hence, “we all 
know that it is only a matter of time before there is multiple possession of the bomb 
among the great powers”; and while how much time remained a matter of conjecture, 
Brodie noted that “estimates range from three to about twenty years.”464 
Brodie puts all these propositions together, coming to “the conclusion that military 
forces can no longer defend a territory in the sense of offering protection; the only 
defense possible is of the deterrent type. In other words, defense becomes synonymous 
with measures to guarantee the ability to retaliate if attacked and also of measures to 
diminish the ease with which the enemy can overwhelm the country by his attack.”465 
Brodie recalled the controversy this view had precipitated, including the “violence 
against this suggestion, not least [by] the chancellor of the University of Chicago,” 
and concedes that “a defense based on deterrence is of less than no value if it fails to 
deter,” and that a “reign of mutual fear which such a system implies would unques-
tionably would produce psychoses, which, in turn, would have effects, the direction 
and magnitude of which are unpredictable, almost unimaginable.”466 But, he argues, 
“[W]e should not for those reasons too readily write off the real deterrent value of 
the ability to retaliate against an aggressor, provided that that ability is somehow 
maintained.”467 And so Brodie pragmatically, and realistically, embraces deterrence as 
our last, best hope for peace.
Brodie considers some other consequences of the nuclear era, including his reali-
zation that “in an atomic-bomb war there would be almost no scope whatever for 
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sea power,”468 extending a bridge to his earlier work on sea power while at the same 
time emphasizing the break with history precipitated by the advent of the bomb. He 
adds that it is “a matter of no consequence at all that a navy is completely immune to 
the atomic bomb if the whole reason for its existence collapses,”469 which would be 
the consequence of nuclear war; for the navy would thenceforth be “operating from 
a country which has lost its entire industry” and would consequently “lose both its 
ability to operate and its reason for operating.”470 With subsequent advances in mis-
sile technology and the deployment of ship and submarine launched missiles, Brodie 
would later come to recognize that sea power would become an essential component 
of an assured retaliatory capability – restoring sea power from this predicted obsoles-
cence. But at this early stage of the atomic era, Brodie believes sea power to be past 
its historic peak. As he explains, this “is an issue of tremendous significance for the 
United States,” which “has just inherited from Great Britain the mantle of leading sea 
power of the world.” He continues, “I think also, contrary to the opinions of a great 
many observers, that sea power reached its apogee in the war just ended. It was often 
spoken of as an obsolescent force, of less importance than other forces, especially air 
power. I can think of no war in history in which sea power played a greater role.”471 
Indeed, Brodie suggests that “the Allied air attack on Germany … and Japan would 
both have been impossible without British-American command of the seas.”472 He 
adds, “The ability of the three major powers to marshal and combine their forces and 
choose first one enemy to concentrate against and then the other was also a function of 
their command of the seas; and, of course, a large amount of the relatively high degree 
of security which the United States enjoyed was the result of its great sea power.”473 
But now, in the atomic age, “geographical distance loses much of its importance as a 
barrier against attack,” so much so that the long geographical isolation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union that provided an “impedance or obstacle to any 
outbreak of conflict” was, if not “entirely obliterated by the appearance of the atomic 
bomb,” at the least “vitally affected.”474
With the emergence of the atomic bomb, Brodie observes, comes “the collapse of 
the threat of war as an instrument of policy on the part of responsible governments” 
– but at the same time that threat becomes a “much greater instrument in the hands 
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of irresponsible governments.”475 This concerns Brodie, as the “threat of war … on 
the part of responsible governments has had a tremendous utility in the past”; indeed 
he believes that while it “obviously has not prevented war … it probably did reduce 
the frequency of wars.”476 While Brodie does not allude to his early reflections on the 
dangers of appeasement, he does confront the specter of a new nuclear appeasement 
arising should an aggressor become a nuclear power, lacking the same sense of re-
sponsibility to its own people as a more responsible state: “Now we have the situation 
in which a government comparable to the Hitler government could pursue a line of 
policy comparable to that pursued by the Hitler government in 1938, and the cards 
would be stacked even more in its favor than was true in the past.”477 
And so we find a bridge, directly interconnecting Brodie’s thoughts on, and concerns 
about, peaceful change advocates and the corrosive dangers of appeasing a hostile power, 
as articulated during the interwar years that preceded World War II, and the more dan-
gerous era of nuclear arms, when the threat of war made by a similarly aggressive state 
would certainly cause a more responsible government to pause, and perhaps once again 
accept the moral compromise that led down a very slippery slope toward continental 
conquest by a very dark regime. Brodie confronted such riddles, as he did before the 
advent of atomic weapons, and dared to think about what he himself described as “un-
thinkable” many years before another strategist, Herman Kahn, would make “thinking 
about the unthinkable” a household phrase. Brodie was not just a pioneer in his early 
linkage of atomic war with the phrase “unthinkable,” but in his prescient anticipa-
tion of the missile age, years before the technology for such an age had even matured. 
Though it was only 1946 when Brodie participated in the 22nd Norman Wait Harris 
Memorial Foundation lectures, Brodie was already imagining the forthcoming missile 
age that he would christen about a decade later: “The Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy 
has developed some so-called guided missiles, some of which depend on infra-red rays 
and some on radar, which are used for short-range bombing. It is no secret now. … 
Possibly that kind of technique might be devoted to very long-range rockets. And also 
we have to consider the fact … that, with the atomic bomb, you have a premium on 
the development of long-range rockets such as you have never had before – and from 
the point of view of physics it is theoretically possible to build, even with existing fuel, 
a rocket capable of a few thousand miles’ range. … I should imagine a nation which 
had, let’s say, four thousand-mile rockets which had the capacity of being guided ac-
curately would be in a somewhat better position than a nation which depended on 
aircraft. How much better depends on what kinds of variables.”478 
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The War in Heaven
Five years before the arrival of the H-bomb, Brodie would turn again for metaphori-
cal, and one might add doctrinal, inspiration – just as he did in his 1941 Sea Power 
in the Machine Age – to the epic story of the “War in Heaven” as described in Book 
VI of Paradise Lost in his January 1947 article “The Atomic Dilemma” in the Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.479 Here he further elaborated 
on Milton’s haunting but prophetic allegory, from which Brodie coined the term 
“super-absolute weapon,” suggesting something more fearsome than the “absolute” 
weapon of the immediate post-Hiroshima period. 
It is intriguing that five years later, such “super-absolute” weaponry would indeed 
emerge in the arsenals of man, and that it would be initially called the “superbomb” 
or “super” by most before the more sanitary term H-bomb came into vogue. Then, the 
atomic era, with its menacing increase in the totality of war toward what looked to be 
the equivalent of Clausewitz’s theoretical abstraction of “absolute war,” would experi-
ence another jarring leap in destructiveness only a five years after The Absolute Weapon 
came to press, as fusion weapons, long known to be theoretically possible, quickly 
became practicably possible as well – with expectations gaining currency throughout 
1952 that forthcoming tests of the new thermonuclear “superbomb” were expected 
to be successful, which proved to be the case when on November 1, 1952, America 
detonated the very first hydrogen bomb – more like a small factory than a working 
bomb since it weighed over 62 tons and stood nearly 20 feet tall – code-named “Ivy 
Mike,” yielding between 10 and 12 megatons of explosive blast, and generating a 
fireball over three miles in width.
Revisiting the epic war for Heaven, Brodie recounts: “After a day of fighting, 
Raphael relates, the issue is still in doubt, although the rebellious angels have received 
the more horrid injury. … Satan is persuaded that their inferiority is one of weapons 
alone, and he announces that he has already invented the instrument which will shift 
the balance. … The following day the rebel seraphs, exploiting to the utmost the 
benefits of tactical surprise, secretly bring up their field pieces and commit them at a 
critical moment to action. At first the infernal engines wreak dreadful execution. But 
the loyal angels, not to be surpassed in the application of science to war, seize in the 
fury of the moment upon the ‘absolute’ weapon. Tearing the seated hills of Heaven 
from their roots, they lift them by their shaggy tops and hurl them upon the rebel 
hosts. Those among the latter who are not immediately overwhelmed do likewise. In 
a moment the battle has become an exchange of hurtling hills, creating in their flight 
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a dismal shade and infernal noise. ‘War,’ observes Raphael, ‘seemed a civil game to 
this uproar.’ Heaven is threatened with imminent ruin, and the situation is resolved 
in the only way left open-the intervention of God himself, who introduces what the 
modern radio announcer would unquestionably call the ‘super-absolute weapon.’”480
Brodie explains that this epic war for Heaven “casts into its ultimate dramatization 
the chief dilemma which confronts modern man and which, while commonplace, 
has with the coming of the atomic bomb reached truly tragic if not catastrophic 
proportions – the dilemma of ever widening disparity in terms of accomplishment 
and of magnitude of consequences between man’s physical inventions and his social 
adaptation to them.”481 Brodie is troubled that “even in the most favorable of contexts 
and with an omniscient and all-powerful God as a directly interested party, these 
nearly perfect celestial beings were unable to prevent the outbreak among themselves 
of a civil war which was saved from being suicidal only by the ulterior circumstance 
that angels cannot die,”482 in contrast to mortal man. With man as fallible as he is 
mortal, the particular destructiveness of the atomic bomb deeply worries Brodie, who 
discounts the virtues of peacetime atomic energy and medical uses of radiation for 
treating cancers when confronted by the sheer dangers presented by the bomb: “We 
may be solaced by the promise, but we should not be deceived by it. Cancer is a hor-
rible disease, and the radioactive materials generated in uranium piles may carry us far 
towards alleviating or even eradicating it. But under modern conditions of sanitation, 
neither cancer nor the whole complex of known diseases even remotely threatens the 
basic fabric of our civilization, as the atomic bomb clearly does.”483 Adds Brodie: “In 
terms of power, nature has already bountifully endowed man with fuels to turn his 
machines and propel his vehicles. The increasing efficiency of those machines and 
vehicles has been generally assumed to be a good thing, and the use in them of atomic 
fuels-to the degree that such fuels prove adaptable will no doubt greatly accelerate the 
trend towards higher mechanical efficiency in the tools of peacetime pursuits. But 
the rewards of the end result inevitably appear meager against the bare fact that a few 
pounds of substance can blast whole cities into oblivion. The scientists who worked 
on the bomb must have felt that intuitively, for Professor Smyth tells us that many 
of them wished during 1943 and 1944 that the experiments upon which they were 
engaged would fail.”484
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In addition to the medical and energy promises of atomic energy, Brodie consid-
ers the hopes among many that the advent of the bomb would motivate mankind to 
embrace world government, dismissing such an outcome as highly improbable: “[M]
y own limited experience with proponents of the principle [of world government] is 
that few of them have in mind a blueprint for a system which would make sense to 
themselves, let alone others. Their entire intellectual capital in this respect is an insist-
ence that mankind will now be united by an intensification of the kind of fear – the 
fear of one another – which has always thus far had the opposite result.”485 Brodie notes 
that “[p]rominent among those who are determined to bring our politics abreast of 
our physics, in other words to institute ‘world government,’ are many of the leading 
scientists who assisted in the production of the atomic bomb.” According to Brodie, 
these scientists were, “understandably enough, gravely shaken by the appalling miracle 
they have wrought. They are also aware of their limitations as producers of further 
miracles in their own field. None of them, so far as I am aware, has any confidence in 
the ability of science to devise some agent which will counter the bomb and rob it of 
its terrors. They find it more profitable, therefore, to enter a field in which they have 
no specialized knowledge to encumber them in their designs, to mitigate the effect of 
their earlier work.”486 Brodie takes these scientists to task for presuming they could 
tame the chaos of world politics when they proved impotent to tame the inherent 
lethality of their atomic creation, plutonium:
It is really unfortunate that these scientists have not been consistent in their methodology. If 
they had used in the laboratory the same kind of reasoning they have demonstrated in the po-
litical forum, we should not now have the atomic bomb to worry about. The physical scientist 
learns at the very outset of his career to analyze the properties of his materials and to adjust his 
techniques completely to those properties. He has, to be sure, created elements not previously 
found in nature; but even plutonium, once created, showed itself to be a true child of nature 
in having a will of its own concerning its proper behavior as Element No. 94. It has specific 
characteristics which determine its utility, and in order to exploit that utility the physicist had 
to adjust to all the peculiar manifestations of its coy and spritely individuality. The physicist 
would never dream of exhorting an element to behave like something which it was not, and 
it is only because he wastes no time doing so that he is able to accomplish such marvels. The 
physicist might therefore be expected to appreciate the fact that the cure for the world’s ills 
does not lie in exhorting men, or the states into which they have become organized, to behave 
in a way which the facts of day-to-day events indicate to be utterly foreign to their natures.487 
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In a world of “two giants,” the United States and the Soviet Union, “an agency 
with superior power not only does not exist but cannot be manufactured out of ex-
isting ingredients, even if the genuine will to do so existed, unless that will goes to 
the extent of preparedness on the part of the United States and of Soviet Russia to 
dismember themselves. Splitting the United States and splitting Soviet Russia seem 
to present a more difficult problem than splitting the atom proved to be.”488 Brodie 
rebukes University of Chicago Chancellor Hutchins, who “asserts that world gov-
ernment is ‘necessary, therefore possible,’” noting that “one might overlook the non 
sequitur and reply that what is manifestly impossible it is a waste of time to regard as 
necessary. What is necessary is in any case not world government but control of the 
atom bomb, by whatever means are possible.”489 (Brodie further notes, in a subtle and 
indirect reference to Hutchins’ rebuke of Brodie in an earlier review of The Absolute 
Weapon published by the New York Times in which Hutchins – as described by Brodie’s 
mentor Quincy Wright “championed the argument that only world government can 
help,” a view that Wright, like Brodie, rejected – how “in the same article Chancellor 
Hutchins admonishes certain persons, whose negative views on world union he regards 
as reprehensible, to ‘read The Federalist’ – thus bringing in the inevitable example of 
the American Union – one might refer him especially to the second of the papers 
known by that name.”490) Brodie instead “urges realism,” adding that it “behooves the 
political scientist to set about analyzing the problem of atomic-age security in a two-
power world. … If the scholar insists on speaking in terms of an ideal world wholly 
different from that which confronts him, he is merely rejecting his problem.”491 Thus, 
Brodie concludes, “The business of devising and pursuing a sound national policy in a 
desperately dangerous world is something which demands all our intelligence as well 
as our moral strength. If the words ‘national policy’ sound too narrow, I submit that 
national policy is the only policy upon which we can hope to exercise any influence, 
and is our only channel for affecting international policy.”492 
Early Thoughts on Limited War in the Atomic Age
Brodie next presents a discussion of various proposals with regard to “limited warfare” 
rooted in a realist approach to the new nuclear world that “are at least based on the 
determination to work with the materials available rather than those we would like to 
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have,” rejecting the notion proposed by famed British strategic theory, Liddell Hart, 
“who takes the position that since it seems impossible to eliminate war, we should 
at least attempt to restore to war the limited character it possessed in the eighteenth 
century.” Brodie finds this position “fanciful” but notes that it “has at least the virtue 
of representing a situation which did actually obtain historically,” and which was 
furthermore “in part reflected in the proposed draft convention presented by Mr. 
Gromyko before the Atomic Energy Commission, which on the surface is primarily 
a convention for the outlawry of the atomic bomb.” This, like Liddell Hart’s proposal, 
was “essentially a plan to limit the nature of wars, differing essentially, however, from 
previous proposals along such lines in the tight system of guarantees incorporated in 
it.”493 
Brodie points out, however, that the “limited-warfare characteristic of the period 
between Grotius and Napoleon was never a matter of deliberate restraint of power in 
the sense that a renunciation of total warfare would be today, for the concept of total 
war did not exist, and under the circumstances prevailing could not exist.” He observes, 
“The limitations obtaining were imposed in part by material considerations,” includ-
ing the fact that “campaigns were fought by mercenaries, who would desert if pressed 
too hard,” and that it was also “necessary to restrain their avidity for plunder partly 
as a matter of discipline, partly out of fear of retaliation in an era when all territories 
were at one time or another subject to the passage of enemy armies, and partly out of 
desire to refrain from offending a population which was not necessarily predisposed 
to hostility.”494 Additionally, warfare was “the calling of the aristocracy, whose lopsided 
code of morals, however deficient in other respects, permitted no compromise with 
the code of the duel,” and as a consequence was “an art governed by tradition and 
managed by conservatives.”495 It took “the plebeian Napoleon, exploiting the nation-
alistic fervor of the French Revolution, who involved the populations in war and who, 
especially in Iberia, plunged hostilities back into the bestial character of the Thirty 
Years’ War”496 – and whose contribution to the history of war marked the arrival of 
total war, or war without limits. Ever since, Brodie observes, “all the sanctions making 
for limited war have collapsed – moral, social, and economic. Whether or not the two 
great wars of this century were in fact ‘total wars’ (and there were in fact important 
qualifications to ‘totality’ in each belligerent country even during the recent war), the 
fact is that the basis for total warfare may now be considered firmly established.”497 
That is because total warfare “stems from total mobilization, and total mobilization 
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could have no meaning prior to the industrial revolution when there existed no great 
margin of resources to be converted to war.” Brodie suggests that it “would be much 
easier to expunge from the human race the knowledge of how to produce the atomic 
bomb than the knowledge of how to produce total mobilization.”498 
Brodie refutes the logic of the argument put forth by some advocates of proscribing 
the atomic bomb that we should take solace in knowing that “poison gases were not 
used during the recent war,” writing that “poison gas and atomic bombs represent 
two wholly different orders of magnitude in military utility,” and that, “unlike gas, 
the atomic bomb can scarcely fail to have fundamental or decisive effects if used at 
all.”499 And while this would reduce both the logic and likely effectiveness of efforts 
to similarly outlaw the bomb, Brodie concedes that such efforts are not without value 
(much as future, protracted arms control talks) since the very effort “might prove the 
indispensable crystallizer of a state of balance which operates against use of the bomb.” 
According to Brodie, “[W]ithout the existence of a state of balance-in terms of recip-
rocal guarantees against manufacture of the bomb or reciprocal ability to retaliate in 
kind if the bomb is used-any treaty purposing to outlaw the bomb in war would have 
thrust upon it a burden far heavier than such a treaty can normally bear.”500 
Thus any effort – whether the Lilienthal plan then under negotiation, or a subsequent 
endeavor – by the U.S. government to control these new weapons of mass destruction 
must be pursued within a realistic framework, and “will need at every turn the criticism 
and support of a sober and informed public opinion; and one may earnestly hope that 
specialists in the field of political science will assume their proper function of leadership 
in the instruction of that public opinion.”501 Adds Brodie, “For the scientist it is better 
to arrive at truth than at an optimistic conclusion which is false – though, incidentally, 
I should regard as the most pessimistic of all possible conclusions the notion that our 
safety depends on a complete revolution in the hearts and minds of men.” 502 According 
to Brodie, “Absolute security against the atomic bomb lies irretrievably in the past, and 
neither panic nor incantations will help us to reinvoke it.”503 
The Unity of War and Politics: ‘The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker’
In his October 1948 Foreign Affairs article “The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker,” Brodie 
continues his examination of the unfolding strategic transformation in world politics, 
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and the central place of nuclear weapons in the emergent bipolar order.504 He noted 
that it was “now three years since an explosion over Hiroshima revealed to the world 
that man had been given the means of destroying himself,” and that each of the eight 
atomic detonations achieved thus far “was in itself a sufficient warning that the promise 
of eventual benefits resulting from the peacetime use of atomic energy must count as 
nothing compared to the awful menace of the bomb itself. The good things of earth 
cannot be enjoyed by dead men, nor can societies which have lost the entire material 
fabric of their civilization survive as integrated organisms.”505 
But despite this unprecedented danger to humanity, Brodie notes the continuing 
relevance of realism, and that the “dilemma nevertheless faces us that the enforcement 
of tolerable behavior among nations will continue for an indefinite time in the future 
to depend at least occasionally upon coercion or the threat of it, that the instruments 
of coercion against Great Powers will most likely be found only in the hands of other 
Great Powers (who can dispense with them only by acknowledging their readiness to 
forfeit whatever liberties they may happen blessedly to possess), and that those instru-
ments appear fated, largely because of those same imperfections of our society which 
make power necessary, to include the atomic bomb and perhaps other comparable 
instruments of mass destruction.”506 Taking a swing at idealists who deny this unsavory 
reality, Brodie writes, “Individuals may retreat from this dilemma behind a barrage 
of high moral protestation, usually combined with glowing predictions of a better 
world to be. Such retreat is rendered doubly sweet because it is more often than not 
accompanied by applause, especially from the intellectual wing of our society. But 
the nation as a whole cannot retreat from the problem, and those who desert simply 
leave the others to think it through as best they can.”507 
Brodie observes that American policy during the first three years of the atomic era 
“has thus far been evidenced most clearly in the almost frantic effort to secure the 
adoption of a system of international control of atomic energy,” noting critically that 
it is “difficult if not impossible to find an historical precedent for the eagerness with 
which this nation has pursued an endeavor which, if successful, would deprive it of 
the advantages of monopoly possession of a decisive military Weapon.”508 While he 
admits this “monopoly is bound to be temporary,” such a fate “has always been true of 
new weapons,”509 as evident in the historical lessons of naval history that he explored 
in Sea Power in the Machine Age a decade earlier. Brodie contends that America’s ef-
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fort to internationalize the control of atomic energy was driven not by a “national 
generosity” but instead by a “well-warranted fear of living in a world which morally 
and politically is little different from the one we have known but which in addition 
is characterized by multilateral possession of atomic weapons,” a fearsome prospect 
even to those nuclear realists unwilling to, in Brodie’s words, either retreat or desert 
from the new nuclear challenges.510 Brodie notes that “the fear which engendered the 
pursuit of international control also provoked the resolve that any control scheme must 
contain within itself practically watertight guarantees against evasion or violation” 
which “greatly reduces the chance of securing the requisite agreement,” and which 
after two years of unsuccessful diplomatic effort “leaves us … with the unwanted 
bomb still in our hands, and, so far as we know, still exclusively in our hands.”511 This 
sober nuclear realism leads Brodie to suggest that “we must also begin to consider 
somewhat more earnestly and responsibly than we have thus far what it will mean 
for the nation to adjust to an atomic age devoid of international controls,” adding 
that that the “ramifications of that adjustment process are legion, but certainly they 
involve above all a continuing reconsideration of the effects of the bomb upon our 
plans for the national security.”512 
Brodie challenges the internationalists who believe that nuclear weapons render the 
concept of national security obsolete in the face of the bomb’s global consequences, 
adding that America’s security was now “for all practical purposes synonymous with 
world security” and that “large-scale war without American participation borders 
on the inconceivable.”513 Moreover, Brodie adds, national security remains “the only 
policy upon which we as citizens can hope to exercise any direct influence, and it is 
our only channel for affecting international policy,” while “world security, on the 
other hand, is an abstraction which gains meaning … only to the extent that [we 
are] persuaded that American security is enhanced thereby.”514 Brodie considers four 
propositions that “are basically unaffected by the existence of the atomic bomb” and 
which argue against internationalizing control over atomic weapons: “International 
organization at its existing level of development is obviously inadequate to guarantee 
either world or American security”; “a highly reliable and effective mechanism for 
the collective guarantee of security can hardly be deemed to lie within the range of 
conditions reasonably to be expected within our time”; the “pursuit of security against 
war – the objective which takes precedence above all others in the modern world – is 
not inevitably identical with the pursuit of smoother and more intimate international 
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cooperation, the two being especially divergent where the latter holds out little promise 
of significant success”; and, for “the purpose of threat or warning, adequate national 
strength is indispensable. The statesman who possesses it can choose whether to ap-
pease or warn; the one who lacks it can only appease.”515 
Brodie turns his attention the emergent bipolar structure of world politics, noting 
that the Soviet Union remained the “only foreign Power whose defeat would require 
great exertions on our part,” and that this uniqueness – the Soviet Union’s substantial 
military might – accounts for the new post-war bipolarity. As one unnamed admiral 
cited put it, “[T]here would still be a problem to concern us even if the Soviet Union 
were something other than what it is; and that the fact that the power system of today 
is a bipolar one has dominant implications of its own. The main trouble with a bipolar 
system, as a colleague has so tersely put it, is that the target is all too unambiguous.”516 
Brodie ascribes the bipolarity to “special reasons residing in the character of the Soviet 
state (or, if one insists, in the difference between our two systems) and in the events 
resulting from that character (or difference in characters) which account for the special 
dangers and the present acute degree of tension.”517
But for all Moscow’s military might, and its willingness to use force in pursuit of its 
objectives, Brodie finds that a “saving grace of the Soviet philosophy so far as interna-
tional relations are concerned is that, unlike the Nazi ideology, it incorporates within 
itself no time schedule.” He further notes that even if Moscow was “convinced that 
ultimately there must be war between the Communist world and they call the ‘capital-
ist’ one,” such a war was not necessarily imminent, and America could thus endeavor 
“to persuade them each time the question arises that ‘The time is not yet!’”518 Brodie 
thus turned his attention to the “problem of how to accomplish this act of persuasion 
in an atomic age, when the already precious objective of peace is made immeasurably 
more precious by the immeasurably enhanced horror of the alternative,” a problem 
that Brodie would continue to wrestle with for the next thirty years. 519 Ever the realist, 
Brodie adds that “since preoccupation with the horror has brought us nothing posi-
tive thus far, and offers exceedingly little promise of doing so in the future, it is time 
for a shift to a more sober position. There are a large number of questions pressing 
for an answer, and consideration of many of them requires appraisal of the atomic 
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bomb as an instrument of war -- and hence of international politics -- rather than as 
a visitation of a wrathful deity.”520
Revisiting his thesis presented in 1946’s The Absolute Weapon, Brodie recalls how, 
before the atomic era, “it was as nearly certain as any military prediction can be that 
a conflict between the two major centers of power would be a prolonged one – com-
parable in duration to the two world wars – and not promising the same finality of 
decision achieved in each of those instances”; but, he writes, the “atomic bomb has 
changed all that.”521 It had become “difficult to see how the decisive phases of a war 
fought with substantial numbers of atomic bombs could be anything but short.”522 
With the inevitable loss of America’s atomic monopoly – which would take place 
just a year after this article’s publication – “the atomic bomb has deprived the United 
States of what amounted almost to absolute security against attack upon its continental 
territories,” and “has in military effect translated the United States into a European 
Power.”523 Alluding – as he did in The Absolute Weapon and would again in Strategy in 
the Missile Age – to Milton’s Paradise Lost, Brodie adds, “However, though Heaven is 
lost, not all is lost.”524
‘Living with the Atomic Bomb’
To confront the dangers of America’s emergent atomic vulnerability, Brodie challenged 
the “frenetic pursuit of international control of atomic energy at almost any cost, 
including the cost of neglecting to consider any possible alternatives,” noting how 
it was an earlier generation’s effort at arms control, in the form of the Washington 
Naval Treaty of 1922, that “made the Pacific phase of World War II possible, for it 
assured to Japan something much closer to naval parity with the United States than 
would have been anywhere near her reach in any real building competition ensuing 
from the absence of such a treaty.” And even if the treaty did succeed in postpon-
ing a “‘costly’ naval building competition,” Brodie suggests that war with Japan was 
“immeasurably more costly,” asking rhetorically, “[W]ould Japan have dared embark 
upon a war against an America boasting a naval power which was – as it easily could 
have been, without any untoward strain upon the American economy – two or three 
times her own?”525 Brodie thinks not, suggesting that at least the Pacific War could 
have been avoided had America sought to deter Japanese aggression by maintaining 
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a decisive military advantage, and not surrendering to the false temptation of parity 
through arms control. It would thus be the deterrence of future major wars between 
great powers that would come to define Brodie’s contribution to the strategic riddles 
of the nuclear age, reuniting strategy with policy in the tradition known to many as 
Clausewitzian.
The underlying mechanism of deterrence, Brodie writes, undergirded the long 
Pax Britannica, which ultimately depended upon the maintenance of British naval 
supremacy. Thus Brodie writes, “Those to whom armaments competition appears 
disastrous as well as wicked are somewhat inconsistent when they look back nostalgi-
cally on the relatively peaceful nineteenth century and on the marvelous role played by 
Great Britain in helping to preserve that peace,” especially when they “speak vaguely 
of Britain’s invulnerability as a contributing factor, as though that invulnerability were 
something handed down from on high.” He continues, “It was indeed Britain’s invul-
nerability at home which enabled British statesmen to play such an active and on the 
whole beneficent part in helping preserve the peace of Europe, but it was not simply 
the accident of the Channel which made Britain invulnerable. It was her clear-cut 
naval superiority over the Channel and adjacent seas, the impairment of which Britain 
would not brook, which gave her that enviable position.”526 
The coming Pax Americana would thus depend as much upon deterring war as Pax 
Britannica did; and, while not often noted, Brodie firmly connected the lessons learned 
from age of sea power to the emerging challenges of the atomic era: “Returning again 
to the atomic bomb, the issue is not whether our country ought to seek to maintain 
its present superiority in atomic armaments but whether it has any chance at all of 
succeeding in such an effort. It has been argued by some (including at one time the 
present writer) that it was in the very nature of atomic armaments that the kind of 
clear and decisive military superiority that was feasible in the past – conspicuously in 
the case of naval armaments – could no longer be realized.”527 Brodie notes that this 
argument, as he advocated in The Absolute Weapon, was “based fundamentally on two 
considerations: first, that there was ‘no defense against the atomic bomb,’ and second, 
that when a nation had enough bombs to overwhelm its opponent in one surprise 
attack and was willing to make such attack, it would make little difference whether 
its opponent had two or three times the number.”528 But in the two years since he first 
put pen to paper and grappled with the nuclear riddle, his thinking had evolved in 
lock step with both the horizontal and the vertical proliferation of atomic weapons – 
and it would continue to evolve with each new phase of the nuclear age. As of 1948, 
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Brodie found that there was “now reason to believe that the situation is not so simple 
as all that.” He wrote: “A great deal depends on the total number of bombs which 
it will be possible for the various Great Powers to make in any given period of time. 
Clearly, a three to one superiority in numbers of bombs would mean one thing if the 
numbers of bombs on each side were numbered at most in the scores or hundreds, 
and something quite different (and much less significant) if they were numbered in 
the thousands. Information which would enable private citizens to make intelligent 
estimates concerning rate of bomb production has not been made public, but there 
appear to be hints in various quarters that the maximum feasible rate of bomb pro-
duction is substantially less than was being generally assumed two years ago. It is also 
clear that the richer of the known deposits of uranium and thorium are much more 
accessible to the United States than to the Soviet Union.”529 
Imagining the world to come in just a few short years, Brodie considers the techno-
logical dimensions of the atomic era, writying that the “enormous technological lead 
which the United States has over the Soviet Union -- and which shows no conclusive 
signs of diminishing … is bound to mean a great potential advantage for the United 
States in the design of the instruments for using the atomic bomb. The bomb by 
itself has no military utility. It must be delivered to the target in some kind of vehicle 
which, unless it is a free-flying rocket, is subject to various kinds of attack. Marked 
superiority in the vehicle or in the means of shooting down the enemy’s vehicles may 
be no less important than superiority in numbers of bombs, especially if those numbers 
are something less than gigantic. If those several types of superiority are concentrated 
on the same side, the disparity in atomic fighting power may be sufficient to warrant 
comparison with outright monopoly.”530 Even with the Soviet Union’s efforts to advance 
its military technology, Brodie remained confident that America’s “lead in types of 
aircraft, in the ordnance of combat aviation, and in anti-aircraft materiel should, or 
rather could, be as great during the next 20 years as it was in the recent war,” adding 
that the “only question is whether we will make the necessary effort to keep in the 
lead in our military technology. That the Soviet Union will spare no effort within her 
capabilities to over take us goes without saying.”531 He writes: “We are often told that 
our monopoly of the atomic bomb is a wasting asset … in the sense that some day it 
is bound to end and we are constantly getting closer to that day. But is our superior-
ity similarly a wasting asset? In one respect, at least, we know that it is not, for our 
fund of bombs is increasing steadily during the period in which the Soviet Union 
remains without any. On the day that the Soviet Union produces its first bomb, we 
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will have many more than we do at present. What happens thereafter depends on a 
large number of variables. But looking forward from the present, we may say with a 
good deal of assurance that our present superiority in atomic armaments will increase 
considerably before it begins to wane, that it may continue to increase even after the 
Soviet Union is producing bombs, and that it may be a long time in waning thereafter. 
At any rate, we know that merely to distinguish – as is usually done – between the 
monopoly period (in which we are safe) and the post-monopoly period (in which we 
are lost) is not enough.”532 
But even if the end of America’s atomic monopoly need jeopardize America’s 
military superiority over the Soviet Union, Brodie is nonetheless concerned with the 
American political and military leadership’s capability to effectively wield American 
power in the atomic era. As he puts it, “Concerning the effects of the atomic bomb 
upon our military organization and strategic plans, we must recognize first of all that, 
to paraphrase Clemenceau, the matter is much too important to be left to the generals 
– or to the politicians either for that matter.”533 Brodie finds that not only do political 
leaders tend to gravitate toward what is “politically safe,” but they also have “neither 
the time nor the inclination to preoccupy themselves with the long-term significance 
of changes in military technology, and rarely the competence to make anything of 
it if they do,” and must therefore “rely upon the advice of their military aides, who 
belong to a profession long recognized as markedly conservative.”534 As a consequence, 
Brodie thought it unlikely “to find military leaders, or the civilian officials whom they 
advise, accepting readily upon the advent of some revolutionary military device that 
drastic adjustment which free and objective inquiry may indicate as necessary or at 
least desirable.”535 
Brodie suggests, “If we consider national defense policy in its broader aspects, 
and look beyond the period of American monopoly of atomic weapons, we see that 
recognition of the loss of American invulnerability to overseas attack and expectation 
of quick decisions in the event of war will no doubt entail a violent wrench to our 
defense traditions.”536 But traditions can be hard to change—particularly military 
traditions—and as of Brodie’s writing in 1948, he concluded that “our military plan-
ners are thinking of an atomic bomb which is an ‘important military capability’ but 
nevertheless only an ancillary rather than a decisive weapon. The chief danger is that 
the inevitably transitory nature of the conditions presumed will not be recognized 
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sufficiently or in time.”537 He added, “Regardless of what the Soviet Union may ac-
complish in the field, our own production of atomic bombs is proceeding apace, and 
the justification for regarding the weapon as an ancillary one is bound to evaporate 
as our stockpile accumulates.”538 Once the revolutionary nature of the new weapons 
becomes evident to war planners, Brodie expects that “[p]reparedness in the old sense 
of the term, which meant mainly provision for great expansion of the military services 
and of military production after the outbreak of hostilities, will appear even less ad-
equate than it has been charged with being in the past. … Unquestionably the costs 
will increase, as they have already begun to.”539 Brodie notes the “problem of avoiding 
military expenditure which is improvident not only because it is too large but also 
because it is misdirected,”540 such as the proposal to disperse American cities to reduce 
their vulnerability – an issue that he first examined in The Absolute Weapon: “It is clear 
that such dispersion would result in a tremendous loss of fixed and sunk capital and, 
in all probability, in a less efficient spatial arrangement of industries than previously 
existed. Thus, even if one should make the wholly untenable assumption that wholesale 
dispersion of our cities and the losses resulting would be tolerated by the public, the 
project might still appear to be militarily wasteful. A great many combat airplanes 
could be provided with what it would cost to disperse even a relatively small city.” 541 
Brodie concedes that “[t]hese observations are of course not very reassuring to those 
who, like the present writer, deplore the necessity of spending on military protec-
tion even so substantial a portion of our national income as we are spending today,” 
predicting that “what will occur in this country when the conviction settles upon it 
that the Soviet Union is producing atomic bombs is the big question of the future.”542 
Brodie concludes with a note of guarded optimism on our prospects for living in a 
nuclear world, and preventing the unthinkable from transpiring: “Our problem now 
is to develop the habit of living with the atomic bomb”; and he finds some comfort 
in knowing that “the very incomprehensibility of the potential catastrophe inherent 
in it may well make that task easier.”543 
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Chapter Four
Beyond the Bomb: 
Confronting New Dangers: H-bombs,  
ICBMs and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
America would lose its atomic monopoly on August 29, 1949, and little more than 
three years later, on November 1, 1952, it would lead the way forward into the ther-
monuclear era with its first successful ‘superbmb’ – also known as the ‘super’, hydro-
gen bomb, or H-bomb – test. As the complexity and potential destructiveness of the 
nuclear era increased, Brodie would revisit his assumptions as first expressed in “The 
Atomic Bomb and American Security” and in his subsequent chapters in The Absolute 
Weapon and test his faith in deterrence, and in the process would become something 
of an advocate of limited war. As the number of nuclear states increased – as he had 
long predicted would happen, and as the yields of nuclear weapons increased by an 
order of magnitude, Brodie’s thinking reflected a recontextualization of the totality 
of atomic warfare, allowing for relative and not absolute considerations to come into 
play. Thermonuclear weapons, whose destructive yield would peak with the Soviet Tsar 
Bomba test in 1961 with a theoretical yield of 100 megatons and a dialed-down yield 
of only 50 megatons to reduce fallout (twice the yield of the United States’ maximally 
destructive device), made the first generation of atomic fission bombs seem much less 
than the “absolute weapon” first imagined, realizing in destructive horror Milton’s 
“super-absolute” weapon from the epic War in Heaven.
As recounted by Fred Kaplan in Wizards of Armageddon: “Living with the bomb 
suddenly became more awkward, difficult and perturbing than ever,” and even prior 
to the Soviet acquisition of a nuclear capability, Brodie had written in 1948 that, with 
the rapid demobilization of American forces after World War II, “the fact remains that 
the atomic bomb is today our only means for throwing substantial power immediately 
against the Soviet Union in the event of flagrant Soviet aggression,” and the precari-
ous international situation “requires appraisal of the atomic bomb as an instrument 
of war – and hence international politics – rather than as a visitation of a wrathful 
deity.”544 Kaplan cited “[a]n epigram Brodie had composed two years earlier” that now 
seemed “immediately relevant: ‘War is unthinkable but not impossible, and therefore 
we must think about it.’”545 Again we find Brodie at the forefront of “thinking about 
the unthinkable,” even though later generations would often attribute that epigram 
to Herman Kahn. Kaplan commented that “it seemed that one of Brodie’s main as-
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sumptions in The Absolute Weapon was now unraveling – the notion that superiority 
in atomic weapons offered no strategic advantage.”546 With atomic weapons assuming 
“enlarged importance in American policy,” and with the “supposed condition of even 
greater atomic scarcity than previously imagined,” Kaplan writes, “the question of 
how to use the bomb” and “which targets to strike, in what order, for precisely what 
desired effects” had “suddenly emerged, at least in Bernard Brodie’s mind, as a vexingly 
pertinent problem,” and this became all the more important once the Soviet Union 
joined the nuclear club in 1949.547 
Lessons of Strategic Bombing: A Scientific Assessment
Finding a “shockingly shallow” level of strategic thought in military circles with regard 
to the bomb, Brodie considered the effects of strategic bombing in World War II, 
looking to history for guidance, something he had been doing since his very first work 
of scholarship, Seapower in the Machine Age. He found from his study of the United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey and from interviews with participants that American 
forces “had given very little systematic thought to the problem of target selection” 
until late in the war; that area bombing of cities proved wasteful in terms of both 
bombs and lives; and that precision bombing was often undermined by the selection 
of “illogical points at which to aim.”548 With the scarcity of atomic bombs and the 
questionable results of World War II’s strategic bombing, Brodie concluded that “the 
bombing of cities for its own sake . . . should not dominate the strategic bombing of 
World War III.”549 Brodie presented his “preliminary thoughts in the August 15, 1950 
issue of The Reporter” – the new journal of liberal opinion published by Max Ascoli 
since 1949, and which would continue publishing for the next twenty years – “under 
the title ‘Strategic Bombing: What It Can Do.’” 550 
Five years to the day after World War II came to its formal conclusion, less than 
one year after the Soviet Union joined the nuclear club, and just under two months 
after frustrating the Korean War got under way – marking the start of the limited 
war era, Brodie published his article on strategic bombing in The Reporter, revisit-
ing the lessons of the Allied strategic bombing effort during World War II, and the 
implications for the future of war – not just limited wars of the sort unfolding on the 
Korean peninsula, but total wars as well. Brodie noted that “what is most distinctive 
about Korea is that there are practically no targets outside the transportation system 
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for strategic bombing forces,” and while “B-29’s are not useless in Korea” that “they 
would seem to be among the weapons we need least.”551 Brodie added that that “de-
tractors of strategic bombing are certainly going to have a field day-but even so our 
nation as a whole is not likely to fall into the delusion that perimeter war is the only 
kind we ought to be worrying about. It is worth repeating that in a war directly with 
the Soviet Union, strategic bombing would be our chief offensive weapon” since the 
Soviet Union was “as immune as we are to naval blockade, and has on two historic 
occasions shown that it can absorb great enemy armies and destroy them.” 552 And while 
a “strong, well-equipped army supported by a powerful tactical air force is obviously 
indispensable for the containment of the Soviet armies,” and “western Europe and 
other key areas can be defended,” Brodie writes that “defense alone will not win the 
war. Soviet power must be shattered by an offensive” and in the years before the advent 
of ICBMs, “strategic bombing offensive present[ed] fewer technological and logistic 
difficulties than any other kind.”553 And although the ““strategic bombing lessons of 
the last war would not automatically apply to another one” as “the technological cir-
cumstances and the character of the target would be very different,” Brodie argued it 
as “ nonetheless important to know whether our bombing of Germany was a success 
or, as the dissenters cry, a failure.”554 Brodie believed without hesitation that it was a 
success, and that “our strategic bombing knocked the German war economy flat on 
its back,” though he notes “this great result came too late to have anything like its full 
effect on the battlefields” and that “the decisive results achieved by bombing could 
have come much sooner.”555 He observes that “the biggest single factor in delaying 
usual results was the effort devoted to ‘area’ or urban bombing – which simply did 
not payoff militarily,”556 and though he challenges those who argue that area bombing 
actually boosted German morale, he finds the impact was more subtle: morale was 
undermined but the effect was diluted across the whole of society, including many 
nonessential industries, where the decrease in morale did not thereby undermine 
Germany’s war effort, thereby diminishing the strategic effects of urban bombing and 
suggesting to Brodie that a more targeted approach would be more effective, one he 
would continue to strongly argue during the nuclear era.
Critics point to findings in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that Germany’s “war 
production in almost all categories increased drastically between the middle of 1942 and 
the middle of 1944,” but Brodie points out that this “is quite beside the point, because 
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the decisive bombing results we are talking about had barely begun by mid-1944.”557 
Brodie further points out “it wouldn’t matter whether or not production as a whole 
diminished at all if the Germans were denied one indispensable war commodity – such 
as oil or liquid fuel,” and that “in the final stages of the war, is just what happened” 
when “Allied bombers knocked out two essential German industries – liquid fueled 
and chemicals.”558 In May 1944, Brodie recounts, “German oil-production facilities 
were chosen as a top priority target,” and “[i]mmediately German oil production 
dropped precipitously,” from 662,000 tons per month on average to 80,000 in less 
than a year, and Brodie adds: “As for aviation and motor gasoline, our results were 
even better,” with a “tremendous” effect on the Luftwaffe, though a “somewhat slower” 
effect on ground operations.559 And while Germany’s chemical industry was “never 
singled out as a target,” because “most of the chemical industry was closely integrated 
with synthetic-oil production, attacks on the latter served to dispatch the former as 
well” and so by August 1944, these indirect “attacks on chemicals were threatening 
Germany’s ability to carry on the war.”560 Brodie notes that the German transportation 
sector “became a strategic target system in March, 1944,” and that “heavy attacks did 
not start until September, 1944,” yet by the end of the next month, “carloadings were 
declining rapidly and showing immediately effects in overall production.561 By late 
November and early December all munitions production had been severely affected 
by the failure to move critical materials” and as “the Strategic Bombing Survey put 
it: ‘Even if the final military victories that carried the Allied armies across the Rhine 
and the Oder had not taken place, armaments production would have come to a vir-
tual standstill by May; the German armies, completely bereft of ammunition and of 
motive power, would almost certainly have had to cease fighting by June or July.’”562
Even though the results came late in the war, Brodie believes “a strong case that our 
strategic bombing was decisive anyway,” with “the fact that from the time of our Nor-
mandy landing onward our ground forces did not have to contend with any significant 
enemy air opposition, while our own planes were making things very rough” for the 
German armies, owes a great deal to our strategic bombing.563 And undeniably the 
shortage of materials, especially oil, which our bombing was imposing on the Germans 
did in fact hasten the final collapse of their armies.”564 But “the fact remains” that “[b]
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y the time those results were making themselves felt in a really big way, the Battle of 
the Bulge was a thing of the past and the Allied armies were well into Germany;” but 
had those results “come six months or so earlier, no one could say that our strategic 
bombing of Germany had no significant effect upon the outcome of the war.”565 Of 
course, had the Allies made an earlier commitment to strategic bombing, Brodie points 
that that they “might have suffered fewer casualties ,” but at the same time, “the Rus-
sians might have made a separate peace” or “[i]f they had gone on fighting, it would 
have been their armies and not ours which would have liberated western Europe.”566 
While Brodie at this stage in his writing does not often refer to Clausewitz, he does 
talk about the necessity of balancing military means with the political and diplomatic 
ends of war, and notes that while a “directive of June 10, 1943, gave both Allied air 
forces the primary objective or preparing the way for the invasion of France,” which 
he describes as an “entirely proper objective,” as “was the derivative conclusion that 
the first priority was the elimination of the Luftwaffe as an effective force.”567 But he 
explains that “the selection of the proper objective does not guarantee the choice of the 
proper target system,” and it was the process of determining through trial and error 
amidst the fortunes of war that ultimately hampered the effectiveness of the strategy: 
“We now know that the attack upon the German aircraft industry was a failure,” forcing 
Germany to “disperse their facilities, which proved relatively easy to do,” in contrast to 
the oil industry.568 Brodie also finds the failure to select the chemical industry, which 
ultimately collapsed under the collateral pressure of Allied bombardment of the oil 
industry, to be “[a]nother great failure,” as was, Brodie believes, the deliberate bombing 
of German cities, which “turns out to have been an inordinate waste of bombs and of 
bombing effort,” even though cities were both “easier to find and hit,” particularly in 
unfavorable weather conditions, and were also home not only to civilian populations 
but also much industry.569 But because the “chief objective of the deliberate attacks 
on urban areas was enemy civilian morale,” which “of course suffered-the arguments 
that bombing heightened the enemy’s will to resist are simply not supported by the 
evidence-but the effect of that diminished morale on production was spread out over all 
industrial enterprises, including nonessential ones, and in the end was trivial compared 
to the results of knocking out vital industrial complexes.”570 Brodie concedes that “[t]
hese conclusions about city bombing and the morale factor may have no relevance for 
the future” as the “atomic (or hydrogen) bomb may give a wholly new and horrible 
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meaning to city bombing,”571 and in his later work, particularly on the strategic and 
tactical consequences of the H-bomb, would endeavor to apply the lessons from World 
War II’s strategic bombing experience to the new nuclear realities.
Brodie concludes by reiterating, “But let no one say that strategic bombing was 
a failure against Germany. The facts disprove it.”572 Indeed, Brodie adds, “We know 
for a fact that the destruction of the German economy was achieved with a minute 
percentage of the bombs actually dropped on Germany,” and as a consequence, “[w]
e may therefore conclude that given only a moderate improvement in our use of the 
means at our disposal, the decisive effects of strategic bombing could have come soon 
enough to make a great, rather than only a marginal, difference in the outcome.”573 
The challenge, of course, is how best to apply this lesson to the next conflict. Brodie 
points out some major differences between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, not-
ing the latter has a “far less resilient and more thinly stretched” economy, “especially 
in terms of transportation,” and that “it is also much farther away, and much greater 
penetration would be necessary to hit at vital targets;” but this more challenging ge-
ography would be partly offset by the increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons, 
enhanced by the “promise of a fairly long-range jet bomber, of perfected instrument 
bombing, and of guided bombs.”574 Brodie’s concern, felt since he first turned his 
thoughts to this new, seemingly absolute, weapon, was that there was “no guarantee 
that a strategic bombing campaign would not quickly degenerate into pure terroristic 
destruction,” and that the “atomic bomb in its various forms may well weaken our 
incentive to choose targets shrewdly and carefully, at least so far as use of those bombs 
is concerned. But such an event would argue a military failure as well as a moral one, 
and it is against the possibility of such failure on the part of our military that public 
attention should be directed.”575 But despite these new dangers, Brodie reaffirmed that 
with the lessons “we have learned from the German experience,” if we “had to do the 
business all over again with the same weapons, we could do in a few months what in 
fact took us two years,” and “with far less destruction of urban areas and of civilian 
lives than occurred in Germany,” and losing “far fewer lives among our own combat 
men, both in the air and on the ground.” In short, “Strategic bombing can be a way 
of saving life in war as well as of destroying it.”576
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Anticipating the H-Bomb: Must We Shoot from the Hip?
Brodie authored an internal RAND working paper, “Must We Shoot from the Hip?” 
on September 4, 1951, a year before America’s first thermonuclear test but well after 
its forthcoming arrival had been anticipated by many within the strategic community. 
The title may seem somewhat casual, but the content was deadly serious – fully rebuk-
ing the then-current Air Force strategy known in some circles as “Sunday Punch,” a 
full and total strategic nuclear assault of the enemy in the event of war. 
With the H-bomb on the horizon, such a massive assault would soon be excessively 
disproportionate, and shooting from the hip would be inherently un-Clausewitzian, 
even if not yet so described. While applying lessons learned from World War II’s 
strategic bombing efforts, the lessons applied by the Air Force were contrary to those 
Brodie had himself derived from his analysis of the experience. While the Air Force 
looked to the aerial assault on Japan as the salient experience, which defanged a poten-
tially vicious opponent without the need for a land invasion (and thus giving credence 
to Brodie’s later argument in his 1950 article in The Reporter, “Strategic Bombing: 
What It Can Do?”), it did not, according to Brodie, properly integrate the lessons of 
the European air war, which demonstrated the decisive strategic benefits of precision 
targeting of military-industrial targets but questioned the value of urban bombing 
– in contrast to the Pacific air war, where it was urban bombing that was primarily 
practiced, including the two atomic bombings. The Air Force embraced the metaphor 
of Tokyo’s surrender, while Brodie found greater value in Berlin’s.
Anticipating the greater risks that would accompany the crossing of the thermonu-
clear threshold, Brodie addressed the emergent strategic transformation that would be 
realized a year later. In subsequent years, Brodie would revisit and largely reiterate his 
argument as presented in late 1951. In Brodie’s “Statement of the Problem” at the top 
of his report, he writes that the “spacing or scheduling or atomic air strikes in the event 
or war has thus far been considered by the Air Force as strictly an operational problem 
to be left to Strategic Air Command for resolution according to its maximum delivery 
capabilities,” and whose “prevailing attitude is that the more rapid the delivery or our 
atomic stockpile (or at least that major portion or it allocated to Phase I operations), 
the better,” as “compressing and pushing forward in time a campaign disposing of 
a given number of bombs will mean, according to this conception, more bombs on 
target and also more effectiveness per bomb,” adding, “that unlike most other biases 
with which RAND has had to contend, this one is practically universal within the Air 
Force and for that matter within the Military Establishment,” and while “there are 
differences in fervor” there nonetheless “appears to be no important officer or party 
within the Military Establishment who seriously questions that principle” resulting 
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in its “universality” within the service.577 Illustrating this, Brodie cites a classified staff 
memo “prepared by Col. H. R. Maddux for Lt. Gen. Edwards” that states “Explicit 
in Air Staff thinking has long been a philosophy of strategic bombing which firmly 
believes the effectiveness of the strategic bombing offensive will be greatly increased, 
provided a saturating number of atomic bombs are released simultaneously over all 
important targets. This destruction time over target should be as early in the conflict 
as is practicable with achieving maximum effects” with a specific “goal of dropping 
1,000 atomic bombs simultaneously over the Soviet Union if possible on the day – or 
the day after – the Soviet Union launches World War III.”578
But Brodie strongly disagrees with the proponents of the Sunday Punch. Brodie 
notes that the “methods of use which have brought the atomic weapon its greatest 
triumphs to date are the methods which, under existing biases, we would abandon in 
the event of war. Insofar as the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the end 
of World War II, as they undoubtedly did by some unknown margin, it was not the 
two expended but the threat of more to come which tipped the balance.”579 And so it 
would always be; expending the full or even a substantial part of the arsenal in a single 
concentrated attack would severely undermine the deterrent power that remained: 
“The damage done by those two explosions was, in terms of remaining overall enemy 
capabilities, literally nothing; the demonstration value was everything. Similarly, in the 
post war period we have kept the Soviet Union in check almost exclusively through 
the threat of our growing and much publicized atomic stockpile – at least through 
nothing else that is visible to us.”580 
So “to seek to expend almost all we have as quickly as we can” as the Air Force 
then planned, required “that the results will be absolutely decisive” when it remained 
unclear “[w]hat grounds we have for expecting such decisive results.”581 Adds Brodie, 
“One hears in the Pentagon assertions that so powerful and early an attack as that 
now planned by SAC would ‘break the back’ of the Russian economy, which, whether 
true or not (and I think not), still leaves open the question whether such physical and 
economic results will cause political changes within the Soviet Union which will induce 
their leadership to surrender or seek a negotiated peace on terms favorable to us, or 
whether they will not be offset and possibly even nullified by the Soviet conquest of 
the economy of Western Europe.”582 Brodie notes that “[o]ne encounters references 
to the psychological and political results which will follow from the crushing impact 
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of the initial blow, but these references are always extremely vague and often naive in 
terms both of realities of the Soviet governmental structure and of existing knowledge, 
however meager, about human psychological and political behavior in disaster situ-
ations,” and he believes instead that “we have no right to expect” that “political and 
psychological conditions highly favorable to us” will necessarily “follow,” and that 
furthermore, “our techniques of bombing have scarcely been chosen to exploit such 
effects, let alone maximize them.”583 
Brodie logically suggests that “[o]ne would think that the aim of producing im-
portant psychological and political results would demand above all the capacity to 
continue exerting pressure in some way comparable to that exploited in an initial 
blow,” but by concentrating the attack on the initial blow, it will lose its primary source 
of pressure.584 Moreover, the “kind of mass attack envisioned for the opening period 
of the war will leave an urban population completely unnerved, distraught, and for 
the most part benumbed,” and “will be preoccupied with personal loss and with bare 
problems of existence,” a situation not unlike that experienced by the bombed-out 
cities of Germany and Japan, and if the “World War II experience is any guide, such 
a population is politically apathetic,” so much so that we can “have no valid grounds 
for supposing that the governmental structure, with all its coercive apparatus, will be 
critically impaired.”585 Or as Brodie puts it: “it is not too much to say that we shoot 
our bolt and then wait for something to happen, being then quite unable to affect 
what will happen,” and in a fashion the suggests the logic of Clausewitz while not 
directly attributing the famed Prussian theorist, Brodie explains that “[w]e permit 
ourselves little or no opportunity for coordinating bombing attacks with political 
warfare. We permit ourselves no means of tying our attacks, especially on cities, to 
specific war acts of the Russian government and armed forces in a manner calculated 
to impress the Russians, first, that the sole responsibility lies with their government 
and; secondly, that they have an alternative to being destroyed.”586 Moreover, “the com-
pressing of the campaign in time leaves no opportunity for gauging the strategic as 
opposed to the physical effects of our earlier strikes,” and thus “leaves untouched the 
question of what effect the actual destruction is having upon the enemy’s economy and 
political structure, and upon his capacity to survive and to wage war.”587 Adds Brodie, 
“These considerations suggest that one cannot wisely select targets or target systems 
on a comprehensive basis without some knowledge (or control) of the sequence in 
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which will hi t and of the collateral pressures to be exerted.”588 A full decade ahead 
of many of his peers, Brodie recognizes the need for developing what would later be 
called a flexible response, and which Brodie described as follows: “In other words, the 
relationship between the target on the one side and a time and method of attack on 
the other is properly a reciprocal and not a one-sided one. One must leave some room 
for playing by ear according to previously-prepared but flexibly-held concepts. That is 
the way we would fight a war if we did not previously bind ourselves to another way, 
which is what we are in danger of doing.”589
Brodie concedes that one “the operational side, there is no doubt much to be said 
for the importance of hitting while the hitting is good,” but questions “the assumption 
that that pertains only to the opening stages of the war,”590 and suggests there may be 
“questions concerning this proposition which seem not to have been considered” but 
which, given the nature of war, its inherent uncertainties, and its interactive nature, 
merit a close look.591 One could view Brodie’s questions as inherently Clausewitzian, 
an effort to firmly anchor strategy in the unfolding realities of war in the atomic age, 
and to learn from the strategic interactions that do take place how both sides in the 
conflict adapt to the frictional dimensions that so clearly separate war on paper from 
war in reality. With an eye to the lessons learned from World War II, where strategic 
bombing was practiced in earnest for the very first time, Brodie further suggests that: 
“We need to know, among other things, the minimum size cell for any attacking 
force if disproportionate losses are to be avoided, the utility of isolating geographical 
areas within the target region and taking them one at a time, and the ways in which 
techniques of approach can be varied through a campaign to give the defender a maxi-
mum of confusion.”592 Further, Brodie reminds us that “the operational factor is after 
all not the only one that matters,” and while “[i]t gives us the limits of the possible,” 
Brodie explains that”[w]ithin those limits, the operational factor becomes one input 
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among several – a vitally important one to be sure, but nevertheless subject to other 
considerations;” and, in a Clausewitzian fashion, he adds that the “ultimate payoff 
is the only thing that counts, the forces involved being a means to that end (and an 
expendable one at that).”593 
Brodie – as he tended to do during those first years after graduate school after 
penning his lengthy doctoral thesis and subsequent books on sea power, looked to 
the naval realm for insight; in the beginning, he found a long history of deterrence 
as strategy that would shape his thinking about the new absolute weapon, and later 
he would mine from his vast knowledge of naval matters metaphorical insight that 
remained relevant well into the atomic era – observed that the this new Air Force 
“doctrine of ‘Don’t divide the attack’ is reminiscent of the similar doctrine of ‘Don’t 
divide the fleet’ which betrayed Admiral Halsey at Leyte Gulf and committed him 
to the absurdity of hurling ninety ships at sixteen inferior ones while leaving the es-
sential area unguarded,” an incident that Brodie would frequently cite in his effort to 
persuade Air Force officials of the folly of their concentrated Sunday Punch strategy, 
but which may have provoked greater resistance to his ideas due to the interservice 
biases that were the quite strong. Brodie notes that “Halsey lost only a gambit and 
not a war; in one sense he did not even lose the battle, and he was able at the end of 
his service to retire with honors,” adding that in marked contrast, “We are dealing 
here with far greater risks, and also with a situation in which the strategic bombing 
campaign must perforce play a far greater role in our overall strategy than Halsey’s 
isolated action could possibly have done.”594 More generally, Brodie derives from the 
experience of both world wars an importance insight: “One might also point out 
that the predictions concerning the two World Wars which proved almost universally 
wrong were the predictions concerning their duration,” and that “in each or those 
wars, the side which made the most telling early blows and the farthest advances was 
the side which ultimately lost.”595 While Brodie concedes that there is “certainly no 
necessary connection in those events” he believes they do “suggest some qualification 
to the doctrine of always ‘getting thar fustest with the mostest,’” to which he adds, 
“Incidentally, it was a Confederate general (Forrest) who originally made that crack, 
and the Confederates also lost.”596
Brodie next discusses the material and non-material results of nuclear warfare, 
noting that the psychological dimension is a necessary element in assessing whether 
or not victory was possible through strategic bombardment alone, and suggesting 
it “may be that we cannot achieve our objectives unless we rise above the purely 
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hardware conception of strategic bombing. The question of whether steel or electric 
power is the better system to attack becomes relevant only after a number or other 
questions have been answered.”597 He looks at the heavy Soviet losses sustained during 
Germany’s invasion, and suggests that the “achievement of such results by strategic 
bombing would no doubt be considered very good. … Yet despite these great losses, 
and despite the fact that great attritional land battles were going on concurrently … 
the Russians managed to stop the huge German armies and subsequently to launch 
an offensive which contributed enormously to the common victory.”598 And while the 
war was fought with conventional arms, Brodie notes that “if horror be a necessary 
ingredient, the German provided that in plenty.”599 When also considering the great 
suffering experienced by Russia in the decades prior to World War II, from its violent 
civil war through its economic collapse and famine that preceded that Nazi attack, 
Brodie suggests that “[o]ne might well wonder whether the A-bomb destruction we 
are presently capable of inflicting in the Soviet Union would actually overshadow 
the horrors which that country has already experienced under its present regime and 
which that regime easily survived.”600
Brodie has found implicit in Air Force target selection an implicit interest in the 
psychological and political effects of bombardment, an interest that is “much more 
often implied than mentioned.”601 As Brodie explains, “Capacity to fight effects willing-
ness to fight and visa [sic] versa, and faith or lack of faith in ultimate victory certainly 
affects the efforts which will be directed towards restoration of damaged industries; but 
that is by no means the whole story.”602 But Brodie adds that even “[m]ore important 
is the fact that psycho-political results cannot be divorced from economic ones, so 
that it is impossible to rule them out in effect even when we are indifferent to them 
in theory.”603 The trick is that “the results we achieve on the political front may be 
the opposite to those we desire and may tend to offset to some extent the favorable 
economic results. Both categories are after all only means to an end, that end being the 
early and favorable conclusion of the war, and on a basis that will make the peace at 
least livable.”604 And this ultimate objective, the “goal of securing a final and favorable 
conclusion to a war usually argues a basic change in the psycho-political climate in the 
enemy country,” which Brodie believes should remain at the forefront of our targeting 
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strategy in the nuclear era: “Psychological objectives can no doubt be to some degree 
independently targeted from economic ones;” with psychological objectives in mind, 
we “might concentrate on cities,” while the pursuit of economic objectives “would 
concern itself with vertical systems with small regard to the urban or non-urban loca-
tion at individual targets.”605 Brodie suggests our “choice at targets may be much less 
important than methods at attack,” and that the oft-debated “question of whether or 
not we go after cities would be quite secondary to the question at whether or not we 
introduce some system at warning … the resident population,” and further that “the 
spacing of attacks, and the propaganda exploitation of those already made and those 
to come, will make more difference in psychological impact” than the particularities 
of the target itself.606 Ultimately, Brodie argues that it “cannot be too much stressed that 
there is no essential conflict between economic objectives and psychological ones.”607
Brodie has often been portrayed as especially sensitive, attuned to the underlying 
psychological issues but perhaps a tad squeamish when it came to the hard, military 
realities of warfare in the nuclear age, less muscular in his approach, and in his rhetoric, 
when compared to his colleague Herman Kahn who came to fame for thinking about 
the unthinkable without blinking. But a close look at Brodie’s discussion of human 
casualties, in a section titled “Are Human Casualties a Bonus?”, seems particularly 
Kahnian, or perhaps one might say, Strangelovian and reveals Brodie was no less willing 
to think about the unthinkable than Kahn, and no less willing to embrace the notion 
that the collateral slaughter of millions of people could in fact be construed to be a 
strategic advantage to the attacker, a bonus of sorts in addition to the strictly material 
effects of strategic bombardment. While not using the term, he certainly embraces 
the concept, of megadeath. And while in a RAND report and not in his publicly 
published books and articles that sought to cultivate a more benign impression, it is 
nonetheless telling to see Brodie wading into the raw, unpolished world of nuclear 
warfare and not shrinking from the task, and shows that Brodie was not so different 
from, say, Machiavelli in the Renaissance who whispered in the ear of his would-be 
Prince forgiveness for the necessary brutality, counseling the strategic supremacy of 
fear over love: to court the powerful, in this case the nuclear-armed military services, 
he talked tougher than he tended to talk to the lay public. This is a very different 
Brodie from the general impression imprinted in the minds of most scholars, such as 
Ken Booth, Fred Kaplan or Gregg Herken who emphasize Brodie’s torment. Brodie, 
at least at the dawn of the thermonuclear era, did not seem at all tormented by the 
gravity of the decisions that must be made.
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As he writes, “Among the basic questions which appear not to have been clearly re-
solved either in Air Force doctrine or in RAND studies concerning strategic bombing” 
is this question: “is it desirable to maximize human casualties or to minimize them, 
or is it a matter of relative indifference how many casualties result from the destruc-
tion of targets selected on other grounds? The answer adopted by the Air Staff, and I 
believe by most of RAND for that matter, is the one which embraces indifference but 
which regards slaughter of people attending destruction of an economic target as a 
‘bonus’.”608 In an especially Kahnian passage (one might venture to say Machiavellist), 
Brodie adds: “Let us be clear that for the purpose of the present discussion we are not 
concerned with moral considerations per se. Agreed that no one wants to kill people 
uselessly, and that the war we are talking about would be one in which the stake is 
nothing less than sheer survival, the question whether we should maximize, minimize, 
or disregard human casualties in our strategic bombing campaign can be put on a plane 
where the sole criterion is whether we thereby help or hinder our program towards 
victory and the achievement of our national objectives. Certainly it is intrinsically an 
important enough question to be considered in itself.”609
RAND’s prior studies of this seemingly unthinkable question were “usually from 
the point of view of economic consequences alone” premised on the idea that “people, 
especially in cities, represent certain skills, and that to deprive the enemy of those 
skills may be a very good supplement to or even substitute for depriving him of his 
industry.”610 Brodie adds there was “no unanimous agreement on the matter among 
RAND staff members in both the Social Science and Economics Divisions” but that 
“there does seem to be some consensus on the view that highly developed war essential 
skills are rather thinly distributed in a population even within a city; that people, un-
like buildings, can hide or flee; and that some measure of warning is likely even if the 
attacker does not offer it,”611 all presenting tactic obstacles to achieving any meaningful 
success from purposeful human targeting. Brodie observes that “these questions are 
considered almost exclusively in terms of economic results is only another example 
of the heavy economics bias which has prevailed in this area of thought since World 
War II,” which emerged from the realization that the devastatingly destructive “morale 
attacks on cities were or appeared to be a complete bust.”612 That notwithstanding, 
Brodie, in a bold Kahnian departure from the conventional wisdom, writes: “The 
question now is whether we should not be ready to revisit our thinking in view of the 
radically new conditions created by atomic and other weapons, of the availability of 
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new methods of attack, and of the great difference in political climate between Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union.”613 Without saying it, Brodie suggests it was now 
time to think about the unthinkable, and to do so with a hitherto unprecedented 
boldness – and a balanced Clausewitzianism that never lost sight of the fundamental 
link binding war to politics (and thus political objectives.) Brodie notes the Soviet 
system was entirely different from that of Nazi Germany, marked by a notable lack of 
public support; as he recalls, “There was very little basis for distinguishing between 
the people and government in Nazi Germany because of our knowledge that Hitler 
had the fervent support of the overwhelming mass of the German people,” in contrast 
to the Soviet Union where intelligence “indicates a very different state of affairs” that 
suggests the merits of considering “whether and how we could exploit that situation in 
our strategic bombing”614 – a question that Brodie commences exploring, and which 
he will continue to explore in the coming years.
Brodie observes that “[a]lmost all references to psychological results of a bombing 
campaign reflect the quite unexamined assumption that such results are increased only 
through killing more people,” but a closer look presents several “considerations which 
would seem to suggest the opposite, that is, the desirability of minimizing casualties 
-- or at least of appearing to wish to do so.”615 In a description that echoes the Kahnian 
(or even Strangelovian) style Brodie has rarely been associated with, he notes “a corpse 
presents no problems other than disposal. All his anxieties are liquidated as are those 
of his family concerning him. Liquidated too are all his potential hostilities to the 
regime which governs him. A corpse makes no demand for food or shelter.”616 Further, 
he notes, “Fear and flight of survivors are the maximum dissolving agent, especially 
if the regime proves powerless to provide for fugitives and if we provide incentives 
to the population to bring pressure to bear upon the regime. To do so requires some 
connection between our bombing and our stated war aims, and presentation of that 
connection in a form which can be translated into operational demands.”617 Brodie 
also notes “it would probably require far fewer bombs per thousand head to create 
fugitives than to create an equal number of corpses.”618 Brodie also suggests that “in-
discriminate bombing of populations will very likely have a disproportionate effect 
upon the ruled as against the rulers, since the latter will enjoy the prompted internal 
warnings and the deepest air raid shelters” whereas the ruled will suffer dispropor-
tionately – when perhaps a reversal of this would better serve American interests, 
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particularly since “intelligence indicates overwhelmingly that the Russian people do 
not love their regime,” and if Russian populace “become convinced that we want to 
kill Russians rather than destroy Communism, all the value of that potential disaffec-
tion is destroyed,”619 much like what happened to the Nazis, who were initially greeted 
as liberators when they invaded the Ukraine but who squandered this opportunity 
by their poor treatment of the populace. Lastly, in perhaps the most Kahnian point 
raised by Brodie, he writes: “There are in any case far too many Russians for us to kill. 
It is not too much to say that we need Russians in order to defeat Russians.”620 All 
these points raised by Brodie, he writes, are “intended only to be suggestive of points 
which deserve further study” but which “suggest things we could do (or avoid doing) 
without serious cost and with the possibility of great profit,” but which, even if still 
speculative, suggests that “we have no justification for regarding whatever large scale 
slaughter results from our bombings as a ‘bonus’” as it may well prove “harmful to 
our strategic and political goals.”621
Brodie concludes that much potential benefit will come from making an effort to 
spare civilian populaces from nuclear annihilation: “If we do not know that it is a bad 
thing to kill Russians indiscriminately, that is not the same as saying that we know it 
to be a good thing.”622 And so Brodie counsels that if “we find ourselves obliged for a 
variety of reasons to bomb targets situated within cities – as seems almost inevitable 
– it may becomes [sic] a matter of great urgency so to space our attacks and to attend 
them with such warning that the Russian population will not inexorably conclude that 
we are solely bent upon their destruction, denying them all opportunity of reprieve 
or escape.”623 And “it might be a very important factor in helping us to decide such 
problems as whether the centers of cities or industrial concentrations within cities” 
should be targeted for attack.624 While the long, hard fight to “the very end of her 
capacity” by Nazi Germany may have been on the minds of many war planners in the 
ascendant United States armed forces at the dawn of the Cold War, Brodie suggests 
this may have been “an exception,” and points to the “surrender of Italy and Japan in 
the same war, and of Germany and especially of Russia in the previous war,” which 
“show that the will to resist may collapse long before the physical capacity to do so – 
provided that that will is properly conditioned by the conqueror and that the seeds 
of disaffection already exist in the target population. The Soviet Union looks like a 
perfect setup for the attack which exploits psychological weapons, and the atomic 
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bomb looks like the perfect weapon for psychological exploitation. Why not bring 
these two things together?”625
In Quest of Sound Strategy
In a lecture delivered to the Naval War College on March 17 1952, Brodie returned 
to a more traditional Clausewitzian discussion of strategy, picking up on some of 
the themes he developed in his 1949 World Politics article, “Strategy as a Science.” 
His lecture, titled “Characteristics of a Sound Strategy,” started off with an apology 
of sorts, as Brodie confessed that the “lecture title assigned me is at once convenient 
and embarrassing – convenient, because it gives me a very wide latitude indeed; and 
embarrassing, because it implies on my part pretensions to oracular wisdom,” to which 
he added, “I don’t think I can describe the characteristics of a sound strategy except, 
perhaps, in the most general and abstract terms. I think I can, however, occasionally 
recognize an unsound strategy when I see one, as I believe I sometimes do. I shall, 
therefore, for the legitimate purpose of being specific rather than abstract, talk more 
about unsound strategies than about sound ones. In other words, I shall take a leaf 
from the revivalist preacher and point the way to the good life by preaching against 
sin.”626 Brodie had begun to preach against sin a year earlier, challenging the dogma 
that underlay the Air Force’s concentrated Sunday Punch strategy. In this lecture, he 
would more directly address the problem of dogma, weaving together the specific 
criticisms that he had about current strategy with his deeper misgivings on the dangers 
of an unreflective approach to strategic thinking. As Brodie explains, “my views here, 
too, tend to be somewhat negative” and “may perhaps conflict with those current 
here, but that is all to the good in an academic institution, for argument is after all 
the stuff of learning. If we all thought alike we should all be infinitely wise or, more 
likely, very stupid.”627
Brodie dives straight into a critique of the so-called principles of war, making an 
argument that he would restate but never truly deviate from across the span of his 
career. He tells his audience, “Now, if by Principles of War we mean that group of 
maxims or axioms which are usually presented in a list of 7 to 10 or more numbered 
items and which are supposed to be unchanging despite the most fantastic changes in 
everything else, then my feeling about them is not that they are wrong or useless but 
that we tend to be altogether too respectful of them. And if our respect becomes so 
extreme that we enshrine them as dogmas, as sometimes happens, then I think they 
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become positively dangerous.”628 He adds, “You have, no doubt, heard or will hear 
references to bad strategies of the past where the badness is summed up in terms of 
its being a violation of this or that Principle of War,” and suggests “it is equally true 
that one could point to the most egregious blunders of past actions (and I fear also of 
present planning) which have been committed in the name of this or that Principle 
of War.”629 He notes that the “so-called ‘principles of war’ … were first formulated 
systematically by Jomini and developed later by subsequent writers,” and that “they 
are essentially common sense propositions,” with “all the virtues of common sense 
propositions,” as well as “the limitations of common sense propositions, including 
the limitation that occasionally a strict adherence to them will be extremely offensive 
to common sense.”630
Sounding much like the Roman poet Ovid, who was for the art of love what 
Machiavelli would later be for the art of politics and war, Brodie compares the art of 
strategy with that of courtship: “Now, because the principles of war are really common 
sense propositions, most of them apply equally to other pursuits in life – including 
some which at first glance seem to be pretty far removed from war. For instance, if a 
man wishes to win a fair and virtuous maiden and if he is not too well endowed with 
looks or money, it is necessary for him to clarify in his mind exactly what he wants 
of this girl – that is, the principle of the objective; and then to practice rigorously 
the principles of concentration of force, of the offensive, of economy of forces, and 
certainly of deception.”631 Referring to his “analogy of the way of a man with a maid,” 
Brodie notes that the man “may know that he has to concentrate all his available 
resources on achieving his objective. In fact he is automatically driven to do so by a 
deep impulse of nature, but he needs deeper intuitions to tell him just how to apply 
those resources. He may take her to symphony concerts – when she is not that kind 
of a girl at all.”632 And so it is with the art of war. To illustrate this he discusses the 
concept of “economy of effort,” as defined by the Canadian Armed Forces, which is “a 
balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the 
object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.”633 The 
challenge is in understanding how this proper balancing is achieved: “if we had the 
wisdom to know what a balanced force should properly be in the present day with all 
the new weapons and techniques that are crowding upon us; if we really knew what 
was meant by judicious expenditure of resources for the sake of achieving an effective 
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concentration; and, if we knew what a decisive time and place was – how to recognize 
one and choose one – then, I should say people endowed with that wisdom would 
more or less intuitively know how to put those factors together in the way suggested 
here. Mind you, I’m not saying this particular idea is unimportant – one can point 
to instances in the past where it has been overlooked, to the sorrow of those who 
did so.”634 But the trick is in the doing; such was the realization of German grand 
admiral Karl Doenitz, who after “becoming a captive of the Allies” had “written an 
essay on ‘The War at Sea’ from the German point of view of World War II” in which 
he “points out that the German submarines in the first year of the war were ten times 
as effective per day at sea as they were in the second year of the war. One therefore 
gathers (though he doesn’t make this point) that if Germany had started the war with 
some 300 submarines instead of 60, they would have stood a very good chance of 
winning the war at sea, and therefore the whole war – and relatively early.”635 Asks 
Brodie pointedly, “why didn’t they have those 300 submarines? Well, one reason is that 
they were enamored of the idea of a balanced force and devoted a good deal of their 
naval resources (which had to be limited in view of their ground and air force needs) 
to surface vessels, including battleships. That gave them what according to a static 
conception was a balanced force. The trouble was that it was highly unbalanced for a 
war with Great Britain. This is only one example of where the word ‘balance’ denotes 
no ready answer. The balance must always be thought of in terms of strategic needs 
against the particular prospective enemy.”636 The salient question now was, “What is 
balanced force in an atomic age? … It is certainly the great problem of our time.”637
As he did in his 1951 RAND working paper, “Must We Shoot from the Hip?”, 
Brodie again turns to the Battle of Leyte Gulf to illustrate the dangers of following 
the so-called principles of world unthinkingly, as dogma – with the principle in the 
case being the admonition never to divide the fleet, which would violate the principle 
of concentration. Fortunately, Admiral William Frederick Halsey, Jr., commander of 
the Third Fleet, recognized mid-battle the danger of following this dictum to the let-
ter, narrowly avoiding disaster. As Brodie explains, “The purpose of the principle of 
concentration of force is to suggest that one should so allocate one’s forces that one 
can hope to be superior to the enemy somewhere, preferably in the most important 
place, or at least minimize one’’ inferiority in the decisive place. I submit that the 
Commander of the Third Fleet had forces so overwhelmingly superior to those of 
the enemy that he could have divided his forces between San Bernardino Strait and 
the north and have remained overwhelmingly superior locally to each enemy force. 
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And when you are overwhelmingly superior – how much more superior do you want 
to get?”638 This would be a salient question throughout the nuclear era, as a stable 
structure for ensuring mutual deterrence was sought – and in its pursuit, the notion 
of overkill emerged. As Brodie concludes, “So much for the principles of war which, 
to repeat, are useful as far as they go – but which simply don’t go very far at all. The 
real military problems facing us today are problems for which the principles of war 
not only offer little or no guidance but in some instances are positively misleading.”639 
While Brodie firmly rejects an approach to strategy that he defines as Jominian, he 
does not yet affirm in response a Clausewitzian approach; the elements are there, but 
not yet the attribution. By the end of the decade, he would embrace Clausewitz not 
only in principle but in name, and dedicate his scholarship to the revival of the great 
Prussian theorist’s influence. But at this moment, he is still battling the ghost of Jomini.
Brodie, in addition to rebuking Admiral Halsey, challenges other principles of war 
that became elevated to dogma, including the previous century’s tactical axiom, “The 
ram is the most formidable of all the weapons of the ship,” which became “a dogma 
which prevailed for half a century and which never had any real substance in fact.”640 
He similarly dethrones a principle attributed to the French theorist of the nineteenth 
century, Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq, whose famous slogan postulated 
that “He will win who has the resolution to advance,” which “which encouraged the 
school of the offensive a outrance in France, which cost the French so very dearly in the 
first weeks of World War I.”641 Returning to the lessons of Leyte Gulf, Brodie suggests 
Admiral Halsey nearly fell victim to a “slogan which was relatively new, but which had 
certainly become firmly fixed – ‘The enemy’s main force is where his carriers are.’”642 
As Brodie observes, “In that battle the enemy’s main force comprised in fact his battle-
ships. That would have been clear except for the existence of the slogan. The slogan is 
objectionable for the same reason that an undue deference to the principles of war is 
objectionable – it acts as a substitute for thinking, and any substitute for thinking is usu-
ally a bad substitute. Worse still, it introduces a rigidity of thought which is, after all, its 
purpose. This may prevent the realization of the absurdly obvious.”643 Such a “slogan may 
represent a brilliant insight of the past, but as a rule only at its first utterance. When it 
becomes common currency, it is likely already to be counterfeit. I submit, therefore, that 
one of the first tests for a sound strategy is freedom from the dominance of slogans.”644
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Instead, Brodie offers that “an intelligent strategy” should be based on “the sound 
appreciation of existing realities, which will then enable us to make predictions 
which have real planning values – and that is easier said than done. It is a very big 
order.”645 Strategic matters, Brodie notes, concern “a major portion of the entire field 
of human knowledge,” and thus “to be covered by those responsible for strategic deci-
sions, the military profession would have to be far and away the most learned of all 
professions.”646 But “other characteristics are desired in the commander – ability to 
lead, forthrightness, and ability to make decisions,” and these may be “incompatible 
with the contemplative way of life” – creating a challenging dilemma for profes-
sional military education that “is only partially and very unsatisfactorily served by 
specialization.”647 Brodie considers the role that social science can play, noting from 
his time at the National War College in 1946 that he “had some misgivings at the 
very great amount of time, relatively, which was being spent on what one might call 
the social sciences,” but wondered, “who is going to do the intensive study which 
the situation requires in matters concerning the proper utilization of new weapons, 
the changes in techniques indicated by those new weapons, the problem of proper 
targetting for strategic bombing, and the like?”648 Brodie found that the “problem 
is that more and more fields of knowledge are becoming more and more intimately 
related to strategic decisions,” such as the place of psychology in military operations: 
“For example, we are becoming aware of the tact that the use of weapons in war can 
be manipulated to have greater or less psychological effect,” particularly in the “use 
of fire power to maximize the psychological effects of that firepower on the enemy. 
This is obviously a requirement for military intelligence, for military analysis.”649 But 
psychology remains a “field of knowledge” that “happens to be quite poorly developed” 
and as a consequence, there remained “a vast universe of things we don’t know about 
the psychological effects of weapons. Nevertheless, our first priority problem is not 
our deficiencies in knowledge (which we can leave to the researchers), but rather the 
intelligent, imaginative and comprehensive application of the knowledge we do have. 
What we need is a steady awareness of what we know and, more important perhaps, 
a steady awareness of what we do not know. Above all, we need that simple but rare 
and indispensable thing called ‘logical reasoning.’”650
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He illustrates this need for – and challenge of – logical reasoning with a topic that 
has been on his mind at least since the end of World War II, namely, “if we must say 
that we do not know whether a certain proposition is true – that does not mean that 
we know the opposite to be true. I refer here to some different schools of thought on 
strategic bombing. One of the things that we don’t know about strategic bombing is 
whether it is politically and militarily desirable to maximize human casualties, to mini-
mize them, or to choose targets which show indifference to casualties. We don’t know 
that it is a bad thing to maximize casualties, but that is not the same as saying we know 
it to be a good thing to maximize casualties.”651 Thus it remains essential to challenge 
dogma with logic: “The winning of a war (and I would add of the subsequent peace) 
is more important than that some doctrine should be realized in practice, such as the 
doctrine of balanced force or the doctrine of strategic bombing, or whatever doctrine 
you like – good, bad, or indifferent.”652 And so “if all one’s assets are to be committed 
to a particular plan, I should expect that one would have a reasonable prognosis of 
the military and political consequences of executing that plan. That, I have found, is a 
most unreasonable expectation. I have seen studies which thought they were attempts 
at war plans, but which ended simply with putting bombs on targets.”653 
Sounding very much the disciple of Clausewitz, Brodie observes that “war is a very 
complex thing indeed and interpretations of past wars, upon which our planning for 
future wars have to be in some part based, is not easy,” and “any monistic interpreta-
tion, any interpretation which finds the answer in one particular thing, is likely to be 
wrong simply because it is monistic.”654 He suggests “humbly” that all “easily available 
knowledge which is relevant should be absorbed,” and that we resist dogma wherever it 
arises: “Now, if our staff planners diligently follow the few precepts I have mentioned, 
we would have fewer of those studies which so beautifully bear out the words of our 
great and good friend, Uncle Joe Stalin, and I quote: ‘Paper will put up with anything 
that is written on it.’”655 Brodie identifies “some of the touchstones for finding a plan 
wrong,” noting “if the assumptions are clearly unrealistic, or at least unstudied, we can 
suspect a poor foundation for the study.”656 He also cautions that “there may be many 
important assumptions which are implicit in the plan but which are not recognized as 
such by the authors,” as well as “internal contradictions of a significant character” and 
“factual data presented” that “may be susceptible of being proven incorrect.”657 To avoid 
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these touchstones, Brodie encourages a wide exposure to critical minds and opposing 
views – he notes that “war planning is the only important function of government – 
perhaps the most important function of government – which is carried on entirely 
without benefit of criticism from the outside, of criticism from the public”658 – and 
thus to “so far as possible avail themselves of the insights and novel points of view of 
persons who would not ordinarily be drawn into the planning process.”659
Brodie closes his seemingly Clausewitzian rebuke of the Jominian mindset perme-
ating war planning by at last invoking the famed Prussian strategist: “I want, finally 
at the end, to say a few words about national objectives – particularly in view of the 
age in which we live. We are living in an age in which atomic weapons already exist 
in substantial numbers, in which the numbers are steadily and rapidly growing, and 
which may at some future time include new and even more deadly weapons. If we 
look ahead only five years from now, we see a world in which war – if it comes – 
must mean a devastation (assuming that present principles are carried into practice) 
such as the world has never seen to any degree of approximation.”660 Brodie turns 
to Clausewitz for guidance in these dangerous times: “As you all know, Clausewitz 
somewhat over a hundred years ago made a statement in his famous book which 
has since been very often quoted, namely: ‘war is a continuation of policy by other 
means.’ I confess that for a very long time I was convinced that that statement had no 
meaning. To me, modern war was so different, so much more violent than diplomacy, 
that I could not conceive of it in terms of its being a continuation of diplomacy. To a 
degree that is true, but I have now become convinced that what Clausewitz said has 
profound meaning. What he was saying by implication was that war should follow a 
planned procedure for the sake of securing certain political and social objectives. By 
implication, too, the procedures and the objectives should be rational and to some 
degree at least appropriate to each other.”661 Once a skeptic who thought Clausewitz 
had become obsolete, Brodie now found much relevance in the Prussian’s theory of 
war – and he would increasingly turn to Clausewitz for answers and guidance in the 
years to come, wrestling with how to apply Clausewitz to war in the era of the ‘abso-
lute weapon’, and concluding that: “Total victory, like total war, may well become an 
obsolete concept. It seems to me that with these new mass destruction weapons, the 
science of war ceases to be such. Destruction becomes all too efficient, all too easy. 
But there is an enormous area for wisdom and science in determining what to hit as 
well as what not to, in determining what can be achieved by war, and in what way, 
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other than by unloosing destruction on an unlimited basis.”662
In the coming months, the atomic age would give way to the even more dangerous 
thermonuclear era, and Brodie continued to grapple with the consequences of the 
increasing destructiveness of the new weapons in a frantic effort to help American 
strategic thinking catch up to the new strategic realities. He had already launched 
a steady assault on the dangers of dogma, the reliance on outmoded and inflexible 
slogans, and the need to look beyond simple principles of war to fully grasp its un-
derlying complexity. In his lecture, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 
presented to the Air War College on April 17, 1952, Brodie extended his discussion 
of realism as the theoretical foundation for modern military strategy, discussing as 
well as Clausewitz the classical Greek strategist and historian Xenophon. In his dis-
cussion of Xenophon, Brodie recounts how, “[i]n the beginning of the 4th century 
B.C., an army of some 13,000 Greek mercenaries under a committee of generals of 
whom one was Xenophon – who has handed the story down to us – was hired by 
Cyrus, a prince of Persia, who intended to use these troops along with some of his 
native contingents for the purpose of unseating his elder brother, Artaxerxes, from the 
throne of Persia.”663 After marching “some 1100 miles across Mesopotamia into the 
heart of the Persian Empire, fighting some battles on the way,” this mercenary army, 
“at a place called Cunaxa, near Babylon, met the vastly superior armies of the great 
king and administered to those armies a decisive defeat,”664 but “during the battle, in 
a moment of vainglory, Cyrus quite unnecessarily got himself killed, thereby depriv-
ing the Greeks not only of a leader but of an objective. Without Cyrus there was no 
longer any point in trying to unseat the King. So on the very next day this victorious 
army began to negotiate with the enemy for the purpose of getting the opponent to 
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which, if they provoke in the enemy (as they must) an equal and opposite reaction, will effectively destroy what they are 
designed to protect? Perhaps the chief problem of the future is to find some means of controlling events even after hostilities 
begin – not to let them get out of hand. The price of control, if it is possible to achieve it at all, must clearly include not 
only limitations in the means of waging war – but also limitations upon war objectives. Total victory, like total war, may 
well become an obsolete concept. It seems to me that with these new mass destruction weapons, the science of war ceases 
to be such. Destruction becomes all too efficient, all too easy. But there is an enormous area for wisdom and science in 
determining what to hit as well as what not to hit: in determining what can be achieved by war, and in what way, other 
than by unloosing destruction on an unlimited basis.”
663. Bernard Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” Lecture to the Air War College, April 17, 1952, 2.
664. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 2.
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permit it to depart in peace. It was not going to lay down its arms, mind you, but it 
wanted to leave; and the bulk of Xenophon’s story is the saga of the passage of this 
army through the deserts and the mountains, through many hostile lands in which they 
had to fight many battles, back to the shores of Greece.”665 Brodie explains that “[o]
ne of the things that impressed me about the story was that in every battle the Greeks 
fought, in every maneuver they performed, many of them aggressive, they had only 
one objective; and their strategy and tactics adhered to that one objective, and that 
was to bring their army intact back to the shores of the Black Sea,” adding that “[s]ix 
months ago I should not have appreciated that particular lesson in Xenophon. There 
are many other things in it that would have been interesting, a cognizance for example 
of what we call the principles of war long, long before these principles were codified. 
But the principle of tailoring the operation to match the objective is something I’m 
afraid I should not have appreciated.”666 Brodie admits that he had “read this book 
only on the trip here this time without any idea of using it for this particular talk,” but 
made the important connection linking Xenophon’s laser-like focus on the strategic 
objective during his historic – and in the end successful – retreat from Persia over two 
millennia ago to the current strategic nuclear challenges, and the often overlooked 
necessity, in Brodie’s mind, of balancing the means of war with the ends reflected in 
the national political objective.667 
Brodie reflects on how “six months ago I could and in fact did deny in print that 
famous, often-quoted statement of Clausewitz’s, ‘War is a continuation of policy by 
other means,’ could have any meaning for modern times,” and “felt that modern war, 
modern total war, is much too big, much to [sic.] violent to fit into any concept of a 
continuation of diplomacy,” and “that war by its very outbreak must create its own 
objective – in modern times, survival – in comparison with which all other objec-
tives must hide their diminished heads.”668 Brodie adds that he has “since come to 
believe that Clausewitz was in fact saying something very profound,” and in so doing 
was very much still relevant: “What he was saying, it now seems to me, is that war 
is violence – to be sure, gigantic violence – but it is planned violence and therefore 
controlled. And since the objective should be rational, the procedure for accomplish-
ing that objective should also be rational, which is to say that the procedure and the 
objective must be in some measure, appropriate to each other.”669 Brodie notes that 
“Clausewitz was himself a general, and it is interesting to notice that he insisted that 
the policy maker, by which he meant essentially the civilian policy-maker, must be 
665. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 3.
666. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 3.
667. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 3.
668. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 3-4.
669. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 4.
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supreme even in war,” and “argued that where the general resents the intervention of 
the politician, it is not the intention which he should resent but the policy itself if it 
is in fact bad policy –that is, it is the policy and not the intervention which should 
be the subject of criticism.”670 Brodie observes how, “after developing these thoughts 
I went back to Clausewitz, and I’m now doubly satisfied that that is in fact what he 
really was saying.”671 He adds that Bismarck, the great Prussian unifier, “must have 
taken his leaf from Clausewitz when he remarked in a letter of advice to the King of 
Prussia that ‘Wars must be fought in such a way as to make a good peace possible.’”672 
Adds Brodie: “Notice, it is not merely that the objective is good peace, but that the 
war should be fought in such a way as to make a good peace possible. Bismarck’s own 
wars, even though aggressive, provide on the whole an excellent example of procedures 
being tailored to meet the objective,” as the “century between Waterloo and 1914, as 
you all know, has often been called a peaceful century” – and was certainly one where 
war remained limited, linked in a balanced manner with the political objectives being 
sought, after the balance of power had been restored at the Congress of Vienna and the 
specter of total war that Napoleon had unleashed returned to the bottle from which 
it came, at least until the orgy of bloodshed unleashed by the total wars the twentieth 
century.673 In the era of limited wars between Napoleon’s defeat and the outbreak of 
World War I, Brodie points out that “with one exception all these wars were fought 
for limited objectives,” with the “one exception” being “the American Civil War” 
– “and civil wars are by definition wars in which one side seeks the political extinc-
tion of the other. Therefore, they cannot be limited in terms of objective.”674 Brodie 
finds, however, that “even the American Civil War was limited in terms of military 
procedures” and that the U.S. Army’s “Manual of 1861 happened to present the first 
codification of the laws of war, that is, restrictions upon the use of force” a “tradi-
tion” that “continued at least through the Spanish-American War” when it was “the 
American Admiral Sampson who, when he fished Admiral Cervera out of the waters 
off Santiago Bay after destroying his fleet, remarked to him, ‘My dear Admiral, you 
understand there is nothing personal in this.’”675 Though Brodie does seem to gloss 
over General William Tecumseh Sherman’s methods on his infamous March to the 
Sea – which included the burning of crops and cities in an effort to bring the war to 
the enemy’s heartland and population centers, a precursor not only to total war but the 
very sort of counterpopulation warfare that Brodie would decry in the nuclear period.
670. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 4.
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After discussing the horrific outbreak of total war in World War I, he turns his 
attention to the even greater horror of total war in the atomic age, writing that the 
“A-bomb struck us as a horribly destructive weapon when it was first used in 1945,” 
and explaining that “[n]othing has happened since to make it less so. Quite the 
contrary. We’ve merely gotten used to it – too much so in many respects,” as the 
“A-bomb produced a real strategic change in the conditions of war.”676 But with the 
H-bomb on the horizon – Operation Ivy Mike would take place later that year, on 
November 1, and while not weaponized, it demonstrated the viability of a fusion 
weapon – Brodie recognized that the A-bomb, the once seemingly absolute weapon, 
but now “conventional nuclear fission weapon – is not so absolute a weapon that we 
can disregard the limits of its destructive power.”677 Indeed, Brodie explains that the 
“problem of target selection, for example, is still important. It is important because 
the numbers of weapons are still too limited to warrant our throwing them around. 
It is important also because attrition rates to the bombing forces, operational losses, 
navigational and gross aiming errors, may mean that well under 50% of the bomb 
sorties reach the so-called proper bomb release point.”678 And while “[t]here has been 
some unhappiness in certain sections of the Air Staff about the targets we have been 
selecting,” Brodie believes that “[w]e have yet to develop a target philosophy suited to 
the Atomic Age. The concepts most often applied are those developed under World 
War II conditions with HE,” or high explosive.679 With A-bombs, Brodie writes, 
we still “have to be concerned about bombing-accuracy”680 and “with the physical 
vulnerabilities of the target selected,” and Brodie adds that “[o]ne detects also certain 
unsophisticated attitudes towards the psychological and political results to be derived 
from any bombing plan.”681
And while Brodie expected the number of atomic weapons being produced was 
going to be shortly ramped up significantly, noting “our atomic weapons are increas-
ing in numbers, and from all the build-up of the facilities we’ve been hearing about, 
they are either already or shortly will be increasing at an accelerating rate,” and as their 
numbers rise, Brodie suggests that “military planning can anticipate these changes 
in at least two ways. We can find more and more targets in the strategic bombing 
category on which to expend our greater numbers of bombs, or we can allocate an 
increasing proportion of them to tactical usage.”682 But an even greater increased was 
676. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 9.
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expected – not in number of devices, but in their yields: “As you know, the President 
made an announcement that we were going to go ahead with the H-bomb, and that 
announcement was made about two years ago. Only last week or maybe the week 
before, Senator McMann stated publicly … that we were continuing to work on the 
H-bomb.”683 Brodie noted that the “newspapers have also used that magic factor of 
1000 by which the ‘H’ is supposed to be superior to the Nagasaki bomb,” and “Since 
the Nagasaki was a 20 KT bomb,” he proposed that we “consider what might happen 
with a 20 megaton weapon, if and when it is delivered.”684 Brodie and his colleagues 
had “done some quite rough-and-ready computations” and “came out with some 
rather interesting conclusions. First of all, CEP no longer matters – that is, up to 
two miles it no longer matters. If your CEP is two or three times what the present 
official estimation of it is, we still get the targets. Physical vulnerability of the target 
selected no longer matters – at least not as much.”685 Indeed, “Even the combination 
of these, physical vulnerabilities and CEP, matter astonishingly little. One might even 
be tempted to say that attrition rates no longer matter.”686
And, in an analysis that showed a certain antiseptic or callous nature one might 
intuitively expect more from Brodie’s colleague Herman Kahn who leapt to fame 
on his willingness to think about the unthinkable, Brodie writes: “Our computations 
indicated to us that some 55 bombs of the kind I have indicated could eliminate the 
50 largest Russian cities, including the practically complete destruction of most of 
the industry gathered in those 50 largest cities. And after you had done that much 
destruction, everything else would be quite marginal, in fact useless. Eliminating the 
50 largest Russian cities would mean destroying upwards of 35 million people (dead, 
rather than casualties), assuming that they were in the World War II type of shelters. 
Notice that this business could literally be done overnight, so that if you didn’t want 
them to escape they probably could not escape.”687 Added Brodie, “We found that 
picking targets with the idea of minimizing casualties, that is, picking industrial com-
plexes which were important but which would minimize casualties, would bring the 
enemy dead down to something like 10 or 11 million. Of course, this assumes that 
the enemy will not have a chance to warn his people and that we ourselves will not 
seek to warn these target populations.”688
Brodie finds that “All this makes strategic bombing very efficient – perhaps all 
too efficient. We no longer need to argue whether the conduct of war is an art or a 
683. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 17
684. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 17.
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science – it is neither. The art or science is only in finding out, if you’re interested, 
what not to hit.”689 Indeed, Brodie adds that the “least this H-bomb would do, if 
and when it comes, is greatly reduce the force requirements for strategic bombing,” 
and “[t]he reduction of your requirements for strategic bombing coupled with the 
build-up of our stockpile inevitably makes large nuclear resources and the delivery 
capabilities available for tactical use. Notice that if we’re going to have the H-bomb, 
we will also at that time have a much large number of the conventional A-bombs than 
we have today.”690 He continued: “We seem to be destined or doomed, whichever 
word you prefer, to a permanent inferiority in numbers of men on the ground in 
Western Europe. Inferiority of numbers has always traditionally been compensated 
for by superior mobility, if available; superior cleverness, if you have it; and superior 
firepower, if available. It’s quite clear that weapons of this sort plus the conventional 
nuclear weapon introduce a fantastic augmentation of firepower. This would be an 
area weapon, large area, and with such a weapon the traditional arguments against 
the use of nuclear weapons against troops in the field fall to the ground.” 691 Indeed, 
Brodie reflects, in what we may describe as a seemingly Kahnian fashion, “Strategic 
bombing has been defined as that action which destroys the war-making capacity 
of the enemy, but I have the feeling that burning up his armies, if you accomplish 
it, does the same thing. One may be as easy as the other, and certainly we shouldn’t 
have to do both.”692 He adds that “this bombing business, strategic bombing and no 
doubt tactical as well, is not going to be a one-way affair. The chances of its being so 
are over for good.”693 And as a consequence, “The dilemma of our age is that in order 
to preserve the things we wish to preserve we must stand ready to meet a military 
challenge, and unless the ensuing business is handled most skillfully, the things we 
have moved to defend will surely perish.” 694
And it is from this that Brodie derives his first articulation of his “No Cities” strat-
egy, so described in his own handwriting on a declassified copy of his lecture notes as 
marked up for delivery, presented in Marc Trachtenberg’s edited anthology of original 
Cold War documents in his multi-volume Writings on Strategy: The Development of 
689. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 20.
690. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 20. Brodie’s original wording, in the typed draft of his lecture, 
was: “One thing this might do, if you’re interested, is to make large nuclear resources and the delivery capabilities available 
for tactical use. Notice that if we’re going to have this thing, when we have it we will also have a much large number of 
the conventional A-bombs than we have today.” It was later amended by hand for presentation to read as quoted above.
691. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 20. Originally he started this sentence with “You” but crossed 
it out by hand and replaced it with “We” as quoted above.
692. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 21. In the original typed draft, “if you accomplish it” was 
originally “if you can do it”.
693. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 21. In the original typed draft, “bombing business” was 
“bombing effect”.
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American Strategic Thought published in 1987 and 1988. Brodie contemplates the 
failure of deterrence, and asks what might happen “if through some misjudgment, 
some misconception, we get involved in what might be called a full dress war?”695 
He observes that he’s “been toying with an idea about that,” adding: “If I had heard 
it from anyone else I’d have called it a crackpot idea, but I offer it to you for what it 
may be worth. The atomic bomb thus far has achieved really great successes” add-
ing: “it helped end the Pacific War, and it has so far deterred the Soviet Union from 
aggression.”696 As he points out, “Notice that the deterrent value has resulted from the 
threat value. I submit that even the ending of the Pacific War resulted not from the 
two cities we destroyed, but rather from the threat value of the nonexistent additional 
bombs which the Japanese didn’t know we didn’t have -- from the threat of more to 
come.”697 But, “According to our present concepts, this threat value of the atomic 
bomb is the thing we plan to throw away the moment that hostilities open.”698 Brodie 
cautions that “[a] bomb which has been used no longer has threat value. A city which 
has been destroyed is no longer worth entering into negotiations with. I submit that 
if we decide through intensive study of the situation that our nuclear weapons would 
actually enable us to break and burn the Soviet armies on the ground wherever they 
might commit aggression, we might decide that it was possible to secure our objectives 
without bombing enemy cities. And provided we communicated that idea in advance 
and provided we retained a powerful and invulnerable SAC to lay down the ground 
rules and make sure that they were observed, we could say, ‘We will not bomb your 
cities except in retaliation.’ This, of course, would be sacrificing the prospect of total 
victory, but for the future that might be a small price to pay for the sake of avoid-
ing total war.”699 In his January 23, 1953 RAND working paper, “A Slightly Revised 
Proposal for the Underemployment of SAC in an H-Bomb Era,” Brodie reiterates 
his No Cities proposal, and strongly argues, “If it is possible to control the course of 
events in a possible future war by some sort of self-denying ordnance as that described 
above, that possibility must be pursued to the uttermost.”700
695. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 28.
696. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 28. Brodie scratched out the word “prowess” here in his original 
lecture and replaced it with “successes.”
697. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 28.
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699. Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” 28-29. Brodie further elaborates upon his No Cities proposal 
in his January 23, 1953 RAND working paper, “A Slightly Revised Proposal for the Underemployment of SAC in an 
H-Bomb Era.” 
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Unlimited Weapons and Limited War
One of Brodie’s first published analyses available to the public after America crossed 
the thermonuclear threshold came in his January 1954 Foreign Affairs article, “Nuclear 
Weapons: Strategic or Tactical,” which presented to the public many of his ideas as 
presented in recent RAND working papers and lectures to the service academies. He 
recalled Truman’s 1953 State of the Union, which “dwelt on the thermonuclear tests at 
Eniwetok in the preceding November,” in which he had explained that mankind had 
moved “into a new era of destructive power, capable of creating explosions of a new 
order of magnitude, dwarfing the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” and 
in which a future war “would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives 
at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements 
of the past – and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and 
painfully built up through hundreds of generations.”701 So destructive were these new 
weapons that what was deemed only a few years earlier to be the absolute weapon was 
now already relative, and this, Brodie notes, led President Eisenhower, later that year 
to differentiate “between ‘conventional’ types of atomic weapons and more advanced 
types,” that latter which could potentially induce “the possible doom of every nation 
and society.”702 Because of the veil of secrecy on nuclear matters, Brodie had little more 
in the way of detail other than that “we have been told quite explicitly that a new phase 
of nuclear weapons development has now opened, and that it points potentially to 
weapons of a power ‘far in excess’ of the type which even in its most primitive form 
was enough to cause the horror of Hiroshima. We are thus faced with the necessity 
of exploring the implications of the new type when we have not yet succeeded in 
comprehending the implications of the old.”703
Brodie concedes there are “extremely grave and far-reaching limitations” inherent in 
nuclear weapons, but these “lie not in the costliness of the weapons, in the difficulty 
of delivering them or in the finite boundaries of their destructive power,” but rather 
in their “excessive destructive power.”704 And as “stocks of thermo nuclear weapons 
increase, civil air defense as we now think about it will be almost meaningless, as will 
any active air defense which fails to achieve the very highest levels of enemy attrition. 
This may be the kind of war we have to fight if and when we have a major war, but 
it ought not be the kind which we make inevitable through our own military acts 
and policies.”705 This creates for Brodie a “dilemma of our age,” which is “in order to 
701. Bernard Brodie, “Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?” Foreign Affairs 32, No. 2 (January 1954), 217.
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preserve those things which we hold inviolable we must stand ready to meet a military 
challenge, and unless the ensuing business is handled most skillfully the things we 
have moved to defend will surely perish. It is self-evident that national objectives in 
war cannot be consonant with national suicide. But for the future there is no use talk-
ing about an unrestricted mutual exchange of nuclear weapons as involving anything 
other than national suicide for both sides.”706 
And, ironically, strategic bombing, only recently “deprecated on grounds of its pre-
sumed ineffectiveness, may in the future have to be restrained because it has become 
all too efficient. The ability to destroy the enemy’s economy and some 30,000,000 
or 40,000,000 of his people overnight might be inharmonious with our political 
objectives in war even if it could be done with impunity; but if we have to suffer such 
a blow the fact that we can also deliver one may be of small advantage and smaller 
solace.”707 That’s why Brodie concurs with Truman’s assessment that “[s]uch a war 
is not a possible policy for rational men.”708 Or as Brodie described it elsewhere the 
next year: strategy hits a dead end. Brodie is concerned that the very irrationality of 
nuclear war might induce a reaction reminiscent of the peaceful change advocates, 
who unwittingly fueled Hitler’s rise and thus the inevitability of general war in Eu-
rope, despite their best intentions: “The standard political answer to such a horrible 
issue is that war must at all costs be avoided. But this is not a sufficient answer. War 
may in the net be less likely as a result of the new atomic developments, but there 
is not a sufficient guarantee against its occurrence. We have not yet discovered any 
substitute for force as a means of controlling blatant aggressions by powerful states, 
whose rulers may conceivably find in the universal fear of atomic war a stimulus to 
evil acts rather than a restraint upon them. There must also be a military answer, a 
second line of insurance, one which maximizes the chances that even a resort to arms 
will not mean an immediate pulling of all the stops.”709 Because “[u]niversal atomic 
disarmament … is clearly not possible,” Brodie argues that we “need to maintain and 
develop further our strategic striking power, even if our only use of it in a war of the 
future is to command observance of the ground rules we lay down. And we should 
probably need to use nuclear weapons tactically in order to redress what is otherwise 
a hopelessly inferior position for the defense of Western Europe.”710 
Brodie suggests that if his “conception of unlimited atomic potential coupled with 
limited wartime use thereof appears fanciful, let us look again at what happened in 
Korea,” which despite the imposition by the UN of “greater restrictions upon both 
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its use of means and its strategic and political objectives than the circumstances de-
manded” resulting in what Brodie felt was a “deplorable stalemate,” he nonetheless 
found it “noteworthy that narrow limits were imposed, and that it was the obviously 
stronger Power which imposed them and made them stick,” evidence that war could 
remain limited in an era of unlimited weapons.711 “These facts alone render dubious 
some of the easy generalizations of our time concerning the inevitable totality of mod-
ern war, or for that matter of the inexorable necessity to achieve total victory rather 
than more limited and modest goals.”712 This leads Brodie to urge that we “proceed 
to rethink some of the basic principles (which have become hazy since Clausewitz) 
connecting the waging of war with the political ends thereof, and to reconsider some 
of the prevalent axioms governing the conduct of military operations,” so that “suitable 
political objectives” as well as “suitable military measures for bringing them about” 
are developed, in addition to “available instrumentalities for assuring that military ac-
tion does not proceed beyond the suitable.”713 As Brodie explains: “The time to begin 
such rethinking is right now, under urgency.”714 That’s because, even if we remain “far 
away from push-button war, as we are so often reminded,” Brodie found that we were 
nonetheless “living right now in a situation in which the flashing of certain signals, 
possibly ambiguous signals, would in effect push buttons starting the quick unwinding 
of a military force which has been tensed and coiled for total nuclear war.”715
Brodie synthesizes his thinking about the arrival of the H-bomb and its impact 
on war and strategy in a prescient article in the November 18, 1954 edition of The 
Reporter called “Unlimited Weapons and Limited War,” where he not only anticipated 
the forthcoming “era of plenty” for both H-bombs as well as A-bombs, but also the 
coming of the ICBM. At the start of “Unlimited Weapons and Limited War,” Brodie 
writes, quite engagingly, “Only day before yesterday the atomic bomb came along, and 
until yesterday we had a monopoly on it. Today we have lost the monopoly and we 
have in addition the inconceivably powerful H-bomb to reckon with. Tomorrow, we 
are told, the era of plenty will begin for hydrogen as well as atomic weapons. Perhaps 
day after tomorrow guided missiles with ·atomic warheads will be hurled from one 
continent to another. What changes in our strategy do these present facts and future 
probabilities entail?”716 Citing the recent observations of the U.S. President, Brodie 
believes that “War would present to us only the alternative in degrees of destruction. 
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There could be no truly successful outcome.”717 Brodie adds that the “conclusion seems 
inescapable that our government can use the threat of unlimited war to deter only the 
most outrageous kind of aggression,” and that “[m]oreover, the more appalling the 
power of the new weapons, the more extreme must the aggression be. If the deterrent 
fails to deter, one can foresee only mutual devastation, leaving each side far too weak 
to ‘impose its will’ upon the other.”718
Brodie revisits an earlier discussion of preventive war addressed in confidential 
RAND working papers in 1952 and 1953, but with less sympathy than he showed in 
his earlier writings where he at least appreciated the effort to inject a bona fide, if not 
necessarily logical or wise, national objective to nuclear strategy, noting that “[o]ne 
possible strategy has been urged sotto voce since the coming of the A-bomb: preven-
tive war,” and notes that “apart from the question of whether it would accomplish 
its designed objective, one simply cannot see our President adopting it,” adding that 
it was “fantastic to assume, as advocates of this ‘solution’ usually do that a program 
of ‘educating the public’ could ever generate enough popular pressure to have it 
adopted.”719 Even “its advocates insist” that preventive war “has a time limit” and that 
it can be waged “only as long as the Soviets do not have a powerful strategic air arm,” 
which “will shortly be passed, it is said,” though Brodie suspects that “there probably 
never was a time when preventive war would have been technically-not to say politi-
cally feasible. When we had the atomic monopoly, we did not have enough power; 
and when we developed the necessary power, we no longer had the monopoly.”720
And so he turns to a more viable strategy, that of the “blunting mission” as it is 
known, or “a blow aimed at the enemy’s strategic air force to prevent his striking at us,” 
on the premise that even if it was “unthinkable that we start an unrestricted nuclear 
war, it is conceivable that an enemy provocation might make us trigger-happy,” adding 
that “[t]here are conditions when it would make good sense to be trigger-happy, as 
well as conditions when it would be insane.”721 Brodie notes that a blunting mission 
is “sometimes spoken of as the primary mission of our own Strategic Air Command,” 
which he concedes “makes sense if we are to do strategic bombing, but let us beware 
of assuming that what rates top priority in planning will necessarily be easy or even 
feasible to carry out.”722 Brodie describes blunting as “air defense attained by taking 
the offensive” and explains that “[p]recisely because it stresses offensive action it is 
more congenial to a profession whose education always stresses the merits of the ‘of-
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fensive spirit.’”723 But the appeal is not limited to the American side. Brodie expects 
that, “[a]s the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons increases, we may be quite 
certain that a blunting mission must enjoy at least the same degree of priority among 
Soviet strategic planners that it does among ours. No conception could be more 
spontaneously congenial to the military in any country; and besides, knowing where 
our major and almost exclusive offensive strength lies, and knowing also how heavily 
we rely on it, the Soviets have every possible incentive to adopt the blunting attack 
idea. Thus, we undoubtedly have a situation where the strategic bombing forces of 
each side (which, incidentally, will not necessarily be confined to long-range bombers 
but may include also submarine-launched missiles) plan to eliminate each other at 
the first sign of war.”724 
Even though “[t]his symmetry in aspiration will not necessarily accompany a 
symmetry in actual power or in the success derived from it,”725 Brodie thinks that 
what’s “most likely” is that “neither side may be able to achieve a successful blunting 
mission even if it has all the initiative and surprise that it could reasonably hope for” 
and that “[c]ertainly thermonuclear weapons make it possible for whatever portion 
of a bombing force survives a surprise attack to wreak tremendous retaliation upon 
the aggressor.”726 Brodie likens the situation of the “blunting-mission game” to “a 
gunfighter duel, Western frontier style,” where the “one who leads on the draw and 
aims accurately achieves a good clean win. The other is dead,” but points out that in 
the “thermonuclear age,” it’s “going to require unheard-of recklessness on the part of 
a government to launch an attack in the expectation that the success thereby achieved 
will enable it to escape ‘massive retaliation’ or counter-retaliation.”727 He adds that 
in a “situation … that neither side can hope to eliminate the retaliatory power of 
the other, the restraint that was suicidal in one situation becomes prudence, and it is 
trigger-happiness that is suicidal.”728
Brodie looks with some sympathy to the British, who “stand ready to use atomic 
weapons with full force and without restraint from the first moment of hostilities,” 
knowing that “an atomic attack upon the United Kingdom would be utterly disastrous 
to the British,” because this remains the only way they can “avert war,” and thus their 
“position rests everything on deterrence.”729 Brodie notes this “at least has the merit of 
acknowledging the disastrous consequences of nuclear attack,” even if it seems “a little 
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bizarre, as well as novel, to see military leaders advocate a strategy which they agree 
will be suicidal if executed.”730 In contrast, Brodie writes, the Americans appear to be 
“ignoring Soviet nuclear capabilities as a reality to be contended with in planning,” 
with the presumption being that “it is we, not they, who will do the striking, and they, 
not we, who will do the suffering.”731 Brodie is troubled by the assumption that “a 
disaster of overwhelming proportions is something that simply ‘can’t happen here’,” 
and despite the existence of “loud whispered asides of alarm,” he notes that “unlike 
the stage whispers of Shakespeare, there do not seem to enter into the plot.”732 Brodie 
reflects on how the “ultimate argument in diplomacy has usually been the threat of 
force,” noting that “now the penalties for the use of total force have become too hor-
rible. This means that our present-day diplomacy based on the deterrent value of our 
great atomic power is in danger of being strait-jacketed by fear of the very power we 
hold.”733 And while there is “[n]o doubt the enemy himself is in a comparable strait 
jacket,” Brodie observes that “all in all the situation is one that puts a premium on 
nerves. Perhaps the Russians. as they conduct their tests, will become more frightened 
at their own bombs than they have thus far appeared to be at ours. But this is a rather 
insecure basis for what Churchill called ‘the balance of terror.’”734 
So while a “provision must still be made for that ‘massive retaliation’ which indis-
putably remains the only answer to direct massive assault,” Brodie observes that “it 
seems unarguable that a diplomacy that concerns itself with aggressions of consider-
ably less directness and magnitude will have to be backed by a more ‘conventional’ 
and diversified kind of force – a kind that the diplomat can invoke without bringing 
the world tumbling about his ears.”735 Rather than just a mutuality of fear, Brodie 
suggests that a “reciprocity of restraint, whether openly or tacitly recognized, will have 
to be on the basis of mutual self interest,” noting as “fanciful” as this may sound, that 
the “Korean War was fought that way, and inadvertently too,”736 illuminating a path 
toward stability that emphasizes not massive retaliations but more limited responses 
– much like he had earlier intimated in his nostalgia for limited war and his hope 
that the thermonuclear era would witness a recommitment to a similar mutuality of 
restraint. As Brodie puts it, “Rather than asking what, if anything, needs to be added 
to strategic air attack, we must consider what we can substitute for it.”737 Now, he 
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adds, “We must therefore explore ways of limiting those conflicts we may be unable 
entirely to avoid” even if the “difficulties in the way of limitation – on both sides – 
are immense.”738 Brodie invokes the Prussian strategist Clausewitz, and ponders that 
“these difficulties,” of restoring limits, “may be more in the minds of men than in the 
nature of things” and notes that “[w]e live in a generation that has identified itself 
with slogans Clausewitz would have regarded as preposterous – that every modern 
war must be a total war; that wars must be fought for total victory, ‘unconditional 
surrender,’ and the like – slogans that utterly negate the older conceptions of war as 
a “continuation of [presumably rational] policy.’”739 Thus Brodie concludes that “[e]
xisting national security policies cannot be justified on the grounds that the A-bomb 
and H-bomb may turn out to be less fearsome than is predicted by those who know 
these weapons best,” but instead “can be justified only on the grounds that there are 
important alternatives to unrestricted nuclear war,” and adds that if “total war is to 
be averted, we must be ready to fight limited wars with limited objectives – if for no 
other reason than that limited objectives are always better than unlimited disaster. A 
limited war does not necessarily mean war without victory: but the terms must be 
short of unconditional surrender and give the vanquished a chance to negotiate on 
a reasonable basis.”740 Brodie notes it was “amazing how we spontaneously acted on 
these propositions in Korea, and how our errors of comprehension because of the 
novelty of the problem caused us to show too much rather than too little restraint.”741
Brodie explores in more detail, in a sidebar to his article. “What Clausewitz Meant,” 
noting that the famed Prussia strategist is “to military strategy what Adam Smith is to 
economics or Isaac Newton to physics,” but despite his importance “has been rarely 
read, more rarely understood, but abundantly quoted,” a theme Brodie would echo 
for the next three decades even as he worked to introduce America to Clausewitz, and 
to bring an end to his being “rarely read.”742 Making Clausewitz less accessible even to 
those who endeavor to read him is that, “[u]nfortunately he was a follower of Hegel’s 
method of presenting thesis, then antithesis, followed by synthesis, where the balanced 
conclusions are put forward,” resulting in some confusion, especially if read in parts 
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and not the whole.743 “In his monumental work On War,” Brodie notes, Clausewitz 
“first describes war in theory as subject to no limitations of violence, only to develop 
immediately thereafter the opposite point that qualifications in practice must check the 
theoretical absolute.”744 And so Clausewitz writes such seeming justifications of total 
war as: “War is an act of force, and to the application of that force there is no limit,” 
and “In affairs so dangerous as war, false ideas proceeding from kindness of heart are 
precisely the worst. . . . He who uses force ruthlessly, shrinking from no amount of 
bloodshed, must gain an advantage if his adversary does not do the same.”745 As Brodie 
comments, “These and like remarks have been seized upon and quoted (and not by 
the Germans alone) as a justification for absolute violence in war.”746 
But if you read further, you will find that “Clausewitz takes pains to show that the 
above remarks apply only in a kind of theory which has no place in the real world. ‘War 
is never an isolated act’ is one of his subheadings. If war were followed to its logical 
but absurd extreme of absolute violence, ‘the result would be a futile expenditure of 
strength which would be bound to find a restriction in other principles of statesman-
ship.’ This leads him directly to his most famous and most misunderstood remark 
of all: ‘‘War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.’”747 Brodie explains 
Clausewitz’s “meaning of this famous statement becomes clear if we read the seldom-
quoted sentences that precede it: ‘Now if we reflect that war has its origin in a political 
object, we see that this first motive, .which called it into existence, naturally remains 
the first and highest consideration to be regarded in its conduct. … Policy, therefore, 
will permeate the whole action of war and exercise a continual influence upon it, so 
far as the nature of the explosive forces in it allow.’ This is in fact the leading idea of 
the whole work, and to it Clausewitz returns again and again. It is also the theme that 
governs the meaning of his famous definition of the object of war as being ‘to impose 
our will on the enemy.’ He indicated that the ‘will’ must have reasonable limits: ‘If 
our opponent is to do our will, we must put him in a position more disadvantageous 
to him than the sacrifice would be that we demand.’ In other words, according to 
Clausewitz, a defeated enemy, far from having unconditionally surrendered his will, 
must have a will of his own.”748 And it is recognition of this fact, a mutuality of will, 
that provides Brodie with a glimmer of hope, that should deterrence fail, that a mu-
tuality of restraint will set in – one rooted not only in fear, but also in hope that in 
the age of thermonuclear weapons, war can remain limited, as efforts are made on 
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both sides to balance the means of war with its ultimate ends – the political objective.
Brodie recalled that the “history and rationale of attempts to limit wars suggest 
that limitations on the character and use of weapons, wherever they have been at-
tempted, always stand up best in wars that are also limited regionally,” and that of the 
wars “limited regionally by deliberate intent of both parties there is a long catalogue 
in history.”749 Added Brodie, “Even wars within Europe have been geographically 
circumscribed by great-power participants, as for example the Spanish Civil War that 
preceded the Second World War, and the Greek Civil War that followed it. However, 
history suggests that Europe is a good place not to have a war if one wants to keep it 
reasonably manageable. We ought therefore to begin reconsidering some of the ideas 
we have thrown about lately concerning what we would do in the event of another 
peripheral challenge like that in Korea.”750 
Brodie recalls how on January 12, 1954, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles “presented 
before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York what was to be a famous pro-
nouncement on this subject,” with his famous Massive Retaliation speech; “We have 
since had a really fabulous spate of corrections, clarifications, counterassertions, and 
restatements, with the result that confusion has become worse confounded and the 
original declaration almost nullified.”751 Brodie explained that the “basic idea of the 
January 12 pronouncement was not new,” noting that “[o]n several occasions during 
the previous Administration, one of them a public one before the Committee for 
Economic Development in New York, Thomas K. Finletter, then Secretary of the Air 
Force, asserted that the next time we were presented with a Korean-type challenge we 
should meet it not by local military response but by what he called ‘diplomatic action.’ 
If he meant anything effective by that phrase, he could only have meant an ultimatum 
to the Soviet Union, or possibly to Communist China, or both. That, of course, must 
also have been the essence of Mr. Dulles’s reference to picking ‘places and means of 
our own choosing.’ Neither Finletter nor Dulles actually used the word ‘ultimatum,’ 
though we cannot doubt such a conception was present in their thoughts.”752 Brodie 
argued that “[w]hat made the Finletter-Dulles proposal weak was that it was based 
primarily on military rather than on political considerations – and on pseudo-military 
ones at that,” as “Finletter argued explicitly, as Mr. Dulles did by implication, that we 
simply could not afford to disperse our strength in meeting Koreas, but must keep it 
concentrated for the main event. Here we have another case of excessive deference to 
a classic strategic principle, in this instance the principle of concentration.”753 
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As Brodie explains, “Certainly one should not give up peripheral areas in order to 
keep concentrated for a central challenge that may not come for ten or twenty more 
years,” and even if one was tempted to keep one’s military capabilities concentrated, 
Brodie suggested that “one may doubt whether the forces we committed to Korea 
would have amounted to very much in a European war; and SAC, the chief deterrent 
to Soviet aggression in Europe, was not even committed,”754 staying out of that fight 
in anticipation of a Soviet move on the central front that never materialized. Brodie 
concedes that “Korea-type wars are individually disagreeable, inconvenient, and in 
comparison with tranquil peace,” much as America would again experience a decade 
later in Vietnam; as Brodie points out, “Americans are temperamentally and culturally 
indisposed to messing around” and it may thus appear to be “certainly tempting to 
short-circuit little wars by threatening big ones, especially if one does not expect to have 
to follow through.”755 Brodie suggests there are “at least two essential questions to ask 
about the Finletter-Dulles idea,” the first being, “Will our government have the courage 
to make the necessary ultimatum at the critical time, and will it have the necessary sup-
port at home and abroad?”756 Brodie suggests that “the history of the Korean War itself 
and of our more recent handling of the Indo-China affair, one feels disposed to doubt 
it,” and “[i]f our leaders and our Allies have not yet mustered the courage to be bold, 
then let us not ask them to have the stomach to be rash.”757 Brodie’s second question 
for them is, “If we do manage to screw our courage to the sticking place, are we quite 
sure the Russians or the Chinese will yield before our ultimatum and halt their local 
aggressions?”758 Brodie suggests that if this is the case, “then we are basing the argu-
ment not on the military needs of concentration and on the evils of dispersion, but on 
a forecast of Russian or Chinese behavior before our threats.”759 He posits that while 
“we may theoretically prefer having one big war to fighting a series of little ones” in fact 
“the chances are overwhelming that we will not be the ones who will choose to fight 
the one big war. If we were clear on that point, we should be better prepared to handle 
the peripheral challenges with adequate diplomacy and adequate strategy to avoid war 
if possible and to fight it if necessary,” much as America did, even without great enthu-
siasm, in Korea; indeed, Brodie notes that America’s “handling of the Korean War was 
vastly affected by the conviction of both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations 
that it was ‘the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place,’” and Brodie adds that 
“General Omar N. Bradley used those words concerning the possible extension of the 
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war against China, but by implication they applied to the whole affair. It was General 
James Van Fleet who insisted, on the contrary, that if there had to be a showdown with 
Communist China and Russia, Korea was for us the right war at the right place at the 
right time. If he was correct, we settled for far too little, thereby incidentally leaving in 
our own mouths a taste of futility and frustration that helped stop us altogether from 
seriously considering intervention in Indo-China.”760 It is ironic that America’s initially 
bitter foretaste of Indochina’s “futility and frustration” would erode, and that America 
would be drawn into another peripheral war that was limited both geographically and 
militarily, and like Korea would maintain these limits – but unlike Korea, would result 
in a humbling defeat for the reluctant superpower caught in a trap of its own creation, 
fighting a limited war with limited means only to experience a decline in commitment 
to that war, an echo of Korea but with a more tragic outcome. At least in Korea, the 
republic in the south was saved and became for coming generations a powerful beach-
head for American economic, diplomatic and military influence in Asia.
Brodie suggests that “perhaps we should be grateful to Mr. Dulles for his pronounce-
ment of January 12” since in making his bold speech, “[a]n idea that had been tossing 
around inside closed organizations for two or three years was suddenly exposed to public 
scrutiny and debate,” and “subsequent Administration statements that purported to 
clarify the originally proposed policy actually resulted in changing it,” since once “the 
wraps were finally taken off, and utter deflation followed,” the country was “treated to 
… a rare demonstration of the democratic process, in the best sense of the term, at work 
on essentially strategic ideas.”761 Brodie believes that “[i]f such a thing could happen” 
more often, “some remarkable results might follow,” as “[i]deas representing doctrines 
and orthodoxies of various kinds would be scrutinized by persons who were uncom-
mitted to those orthodoxies” and even if we “could not expect really novel strategic 
ideas from such a process,” Brodie holds out hope that “perhaps we could get reason-
able departures from doctrines that had outlived the circumstances to which they were 
adapted.”762 Importantly, Brodie speculates that we may even “get a new emphasis on 
having our strategy serve our diplomacy, and seeking to widen rather than restrict the 
area of choice of that diplomacy,” helping to reunite war and politics in the normative 
Clausewitzian fashion: “Too often history has seen the opposite happen.”763 Brodie 
concedes it is possible “the diplomatist may completely mess up the broad choice that 
a wise strategy makes available to him,” and as such he admits “[i]t is impossible to 
guarantee wisdom in high places at the critical time. But it is the business of the sol-
dier to be sure he is wise in his own sphere, which is today a sufficiently difficult task 
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to spare him the temptation of prescribing wise policies for other spheres.”764 Brodie 
thus invokes the esteemed Prussia strategist in his final paragraph, noting: “Of course 
strategy and diplomacy cannot be separated; the union between them should in fact 
be much closer than it is today. But if the old Clausewitzian idea of strategy being 
the handmaiden of diplomacy – that is, the subservient partner – can no longer be 
entertained in a world of such frightening military risks as we face today and shall face 
increasingly in the future, let us at least not rush to invert the old relationship.”765 As 
Brodie concludes, “It will perhaps be of some help to remember that the answers to 
our dilemmas, if there are any answers, cannot-be found in the area of military strategy 
alone. Strategy cannot determine the ultimate end that war is to pursue – particularly 
when strategy has at its disposal the ultimate weapon.”
Strategy Hits a Dead End: All Out War Now ‘Meaningless’
One of Brodie’s most widely read articles during the period that followed the successful 
tests of the H-bomb, in a special section on “How War Became Absurd” published by 
Harper’s magazine in October 1955, was “Strategy Hits a Dead End.” Harper’s editors 
introduced Brodie’s article by noting, “Behind President Eisenhower’s remark that ‘there 
is no alternative to peace’ lies the sober, cold-blooded estimate of professional strategists 
that warfare, as they have known it, is no longer practical.”766 They presented “three 
articles” that “suggest the reasons why. Written independently, each of them explores 
a different aspect of our military future.”767 Marc Trachtenberg starts off his seventh 
and final chapter of History and Strategy, “Making Sense of the Nuclear Age,” with a 
discussion of this seminal Brodie article, noting: “With the coming of the hydrogen 
bomb, he argued, the strategy of unrestricted warfare had become obsolete; indeed, 
‘most of the military ideas and axioms of the past’ no longer made sense in a world of 
thermonuclear weapons. But it was not enough to allow these ‘old concepts of strategy’ 
to ‘die a lingering death from occasional verbal rebukes.’ What was needed, he said, 
was a whole new set of ideas, a comprehensive and radically different framework for 
thinking about strategic issues. And over the next decade that was exactly what took 
shape. Strategy as an intellectual discipline came alive in America in the 1950s. A 
very distinctive, influential and conceptually powerful body of thought emerged.”768 
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As if dutifully handed the baton from Clausewitz in a relay against his long-time 
opponent, Brodie commences his Harper’s article with a quotation from Jomini that 
had enjoyed great endurance, but which had – as Brodie would point out on several 
occasions – at long last become, in the face of nuclear weapons, obsolete: “One of 
the commonest slogans in strategic literature is the one inherited from Jomini, that 
‘methods change but principles are unchanging’.”769 As Brodie explained, “Until yes-
terday that thesis had much to justify it, since methods changed on the whole not 
too abruptly and always within definite limits. Among the most important limits was 
the fact that the costs of a war, even a lost one, were somehow supportable. At worst 
only a minor portion, literally speaking, of a nation’s population and wealth would 
be destroyed. Even the two world wars did not go beyond this limit, despite their 
horrendous magnitude.”770 Prior to nuclear weapons, Brodie continued, “There could 
therefore be a reasonable choice between war and peace. There could also be a reason-
able choice among methods of fighting a war, or ‘strategies’. However unrestricted 
they were intended to be, wars were inevitably limited by the limited capabilities (as 
we now see it) of each belligerent for heaping destruction on the other. Indeed, there 
were even slogans insisting that the application of force in war must be unrestricted.”771
But all that began to change a decade earlier with the atomic devastation that befell 
both Hiroshima and Nagasaki by a single bomb. As Brodie put it, “If the time has not 
already arrived for saying good-by to all that, it will inevitably come soon – depend-
ing only on when the Soviets achieve and air-atomic capability comparable to the 
one we already have. For unless we can really count on using ours first and, what is 
more, count on our prior use eliminating the enemy’s ability to retaliate in kind – and 
surely the combination would deserve long betting odds – we can be quite certain 
that a major unrestricted war would begin with a disaster for us, as well as for them, 
of absolutely unprecedented and therefore unimaginable proportions.”772 For salva-
tion, Brodie ultimately turns to the wisdom of Clausewitz, which should come as no 
surprise to those familiar with Brodie’s lifelong interest in, and inspiration from, the 
famed Prussian strategic philosopher: “The key to the dilemma, if there is one, must be 
found in discovering the true sense for modern times of the old axiom of Clausewitz 
that ‘war is a continuation of policy’. War is rational, he argued, only insofar as it 
safeguards or carries forward the political interests of the state. Certainly no one can 
dispute that, but it also seems at times that no idea could be further from the minds 
of people who presume to discuss national policy and strategy. One trouble is that 
even ordinary politicians and journalists feel impelled to utter resounding through 
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meaningless platitudes when the phrase ‘national objectives’ is mentioned, so that 
almost everything said on the subject is likely to be unrepresentative of what really lies 
in the minds and hearts of people at large.”773 But as Brodie observes, “An unrestricted 
thermonuclear war is to the national interest of no nation. In view of the direction in 
which we are moving and the speed at which we are going, it seems absolutely beyond 
dispute that we and our opponents will have to adapt ourselves mutually to ways of 
using military power which are not orgiastic. The Great Deterrent will have to remain 
as the Constant Monitor, and its efficiency in that role should never be subject to 
doubt. But to argue that its efficiency requires it always to be straining at the leash 
is to uphold an argument today which – if we are actually intent on preserving the 
peace – we are bound to abandon tomorrow.”774
Brodie would continue to focus on the imperative of limiting warfare during the 
coming years and preventing what he would describe as the “meaningless” folly of 
total war in the thermonuclear era, with the now absolute destructive potential of the 
superbomb weighing heavily on his mind. Rather than dig in to defend his earlier 
views on the impossibility of war in the atomic age to retain its Clausewitzian balance, 
Brodie’s views would continue to evolve and adapt to the emergent thermonuclear 
realities, and Clausewitz would continue to guide him. Consider an article in The 
Dartmouth published on March 20, 1956 with the telling title, “Brodie Discusses 
‘Limited’ Conflicts, Says All-Out War is ‘Meaningless’” written by Bevan M. French, 
who later worked for many years at NASA and is currently with the National Museum 
of Natural History at the Smithsonian Institution.775 The article discussed Brodie’s visit 
to Dartmouth, where he had earlier taught, to present a lecture to the Great Issues 
course there; before the lecture, he was interviewed by French, and in the interview he 
discussed Clausewitz and his importance for helping us frame our strategic choices, and 
to balance the objectives of war with the new, and most menacing, means of waging 
war. As French cited Brodie, “With the development of thermonuclear weapons for use 
773. Brodie, “Strategy Hits a Dead End,” 37.
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in warfare, a limited war without their use is both possible and necessary.”776 French 
wrote that Brodie “spoke to a Great Issues course last night on ‘Nuclear Weapons 
and Changing Strategic Outlooks,’” the title of a speech he would deliver to several 
campuses that year including the Naval War College and the Army War College. As 
French recounts, “In an interview before his speech, Brodie cited the theories of Karl 
von Clausewitz, a Prussian general who wrote that war should be a continuation of 
diplomatic policy, and that the objectives of war should be political. ‘Some use of force 
seems to be necessary in modern diplomacy,’ Brodie continued, ‘but the presence of 
mass-destruction weapons makes it important that its use should not get out of hand.’” 
French adds that “[t]he 46-year-old University of Chicago graduate emphasized, 
however, than an all-out war is ‘meaningless’” as “[t]here would be no objectives in 
an all-out war,’ he continued slowly, ‘that would make it worth fighting.’”777 French 
noted that “Brodie went on to cite the Korean conflict as an example of a ‘limited’ 
war,” and that he commented, “We had objectives in the conflict and from that point 
of view, it made sense to do what we did in Korea.”778 Brodie would further develop his 
thoughts on the strategic implications of the new thermonuclear weapons on total war, 
and to reinforce his strengthening belief that total war was indeed now “meaningless” 
in any Clausewitzian sense, as evident in his discussion in his July 7, 1957 RAND 
paper, “Implications of Nuclear Weapons in Total War,” as prepared for publication 
in the Fall 1957 issue of the Royal Canadian Air Force Staff College Journal.779 Once 
the destructive power of the H-bomb was demonstrated, Brodie recalls that “AEC 
Chairman, Rear Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, stated on that occasion that the H-bombs 
that the United States could build and deliver would be individually capable of wiping 
out any city in the world!”780 In addition to the unprecedented explosive power of the 
new weapon, it also produced an “unexpectedly large amount of radioactive debris, 
which was deposited as ‘fallout’ of dangerous and even lethal intensity over thousands 
of square miles,” adding to the weapon’s Apocalyptic capabilities.781
With such a deadly weapon in the arsenal of modern states, Brodie writes that it 
now “became apparent that certain controversial military questions that had remained 
pertinent in the fission-bomb era were no longer worth tarrying over. Chief among 
these were the questions inherited from World War II concerning the appropriate 
776. French, “Brodie Discusses ‘Limited’ Conflicts, Says All-Out War is ‘Meaningless’,” 1.
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779. Bernard Brodie, “Implications of Nuclear Weapons in Total War,” RAND Paper (P-1118), July 8, 1957, ii, http://www.
dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD606443&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. This paper is a slightly revised version 
of RAND Research Memorandum RM-1842 of the same title “which differs from the original mainly in the deletion of 
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selection of industrial target-systems. Industrial concentrations are usually associated 
with cities and vice versa, and since a thermonuclear bomb exploded near the center of 
a city would as a rule effectively eliminate the industrial activities associated with that 
city, there is hardly much point in asking which industries should be hit and in what 
order, or which particular facilities within any industry.”782 The targeter’s dilemma, 
for the moment, was now resolved: “once we are embarked upon an unrestricted 
nuclear war, the question of what to hit is all too simple to answer. We simply select 
the enemy’s cities, which constitute the easiest targets to find anyway.”783 Moreover, 
Brodie suggests that “since many major enemy airfields are bound to be near cities, 
the distinction in priority” between counterforce and countervalue targets “is in such 
instances likely to be an academic one. It is idle to talk about strategies being counter-
force strategies, as distinct from counter-economy or counter-population strategies, 
unless we actually find ourselves taking deliberate measures to refrain from injuring 
cities,” which Brodie would in fact come to counsel as the one viable path to limiting 
warfare in this new, deadly thermonuclear age.784 As Brodie notes, “It can hardly matter 
much to the populations involved whether the destruction of cities is a by-product of 
the destruction of air fields or vice versa.”785
Brodie discussed the introduction, in the British Defence White Paper of 1954, of a 
new concept and “expressive phrase ‘broken-backed war’ to describe what presumably 
would happen after the first huge exchange of thermonuclear weapons, assuming the 
exchange itself failed to be decisive,”786 and in a footnote cites the document’s descrip-
tion of this scenario and how it would unfold: “In this event [global war], it seems 
likely that such a war would begin with a period of intense atomic attacks lasting a 
relatively short time but inflicting great destruction and damage. If no decisive result 
were reached in this opening phase, hostilities would decline in intensity, though 
perhaps less so at sea than elsewhere, and a period of broken- backed warfare would 
follow, during which the opposing sides would seek to recover their strength, car-
rying on the struggle in the meantime as best they might.”787 While the phrase was 
not widely embraced by Americans, many would embrace “the same conception,” 
as Brodie notes in another footnote citing Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of 
Naval Operations, in a February 21, 1955 Cincinnati speech: “Presumably massive 
blows would continue as long as either side retained the capability. … With the pass-
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ing of that initial phase, and if the issue is still unresolved, tough people would carry 
on across the radioactive ashes and water, with what weapons are left. Sea control will 
be an elemental consideration in accomplishing either the follow-through phase of 
atomic war or the better appreciated chores of a prolonged nonatomic war.”788 And 
while “the conception of ‘broken-backed war’ appeared to be entirely abandoned in 
the Defence White Paper for 1955, which tended instead to rest everything on ‘deter-
rence,’ it has nevertheless continued to underlie and to confuse the basic structure of 
American and Allied defense planning,”789 and Brodie questions the probability that 
a thermonuclear war would resemble the broken-back concept. 
Brodie agrees that one may “easily conceive of conditions in both contending camps 
so chaotic, following the opening reciprocal onslaughts, that the war issue will not be 
immediately resolved and hostilities not formally concluded,” and that one may also 
“picture surviving military units, including some possessing thermonuclear weapons 
and means of delivering them, continuing to hurl blows at the enemy to the utmost 
of their remaining though fast-ebbing capacity.”790 “But,” Brodie adds, “it is difficult 
to imagine such intensive continuing support from the home front as would enable 
‘conventional’ military operations to be conducted on a large scale and over a long 
enough time to effect any such large and positive purpose as ‘imposing the national 
will on the enemy.’”791 As Brodie explains: “The major premise of the ‘broken-backed 
war’ conception was that the result of the initial mutual nuclear violence would be 
something like a draw. Otherwise it could not fail to be decisive. The second premise 
(we cannot call it a minor one) was that the level of damage on both sides following 
the strategic nuclear bombing phase would be limited enough to permit each to equip 
and sustain air, ground, and naval forces of sufficient dimensions to be able to execute 
noteworthy military operations. These would, presumably, be conducted at some dis-
tance from home, and would therefore require facilities, such as ports and associated 
railway terminals, which are generally found only in those larger coastal cities which 
would certainly be among the first targets hit in the nuclear phase! Implicit also was 
the further dubious assumption that somehow the nuclear phase would end cleanly, 
or diminish to a trivial magnitude, early in the hostilities, and at about the same time 
for both sides!”792 But Brodie adds that “[a]nother and perhaps more practical reason 
for questioning the ‘broken-backed war’ conception is that no one seems to know how 
788. Brodie, “Implications of Nuclear Weapons in Total War,” 16, n.4 citing Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of 
Naval Operations, in a Cincinnati speech on February 21, 1955, as reported in the Washington Post and Times Herald on 
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to plan for such a war,” and notes “[t]here are special psychological reasons why official 
war planners have always in times past found it almost impossibly difficult to predicate 
a war plan on the assumption of national disaster at the outset. But in this case, even 
if the spirit was willing, the data and the imagination would be much too weak.”793
In a passage reminiscent of Herman Kahn’s later ultrarealist discussion of total war 
in the H-bomb era in his best-selling and controversial 1960 tome On Thermonuclear 
War, Brodie considers “The Problem of Survival,” and writes that: “There are, of course, 
numerous examples in recent history of magnificent improvisation following upon 
disaster, or rather upon what used to be called disaster. But in each of those cases the 
means of making war, including such vital intangibles as established governmental 
authority operating through accustomed channels of communication, remained intact. 
A few battleships sunk, a few armies defeated and lost, even large territories yielded, 
do not spell the kind of over-all disaster we have to think about for the future. There 
are limits to the burden that can be placed on improvisation. The improvisation which 
the survivors of thermonuclear attack may find it within their capacities to come up 
with will surely have to be largely occupied with restoring the bare means of life.”794 
By means of historical analogy, Brodie explains that the “differences in circumstance 
that accounted on the one hand for the French resistance in 1914 and, on the other, for 
the collapse in 1940 were of trivial magnitude compared with the differences between 
pre-atomic and present-day strategic bombing.”795 An illustrative description of this new 
thermonuclear reality is presented by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor, 
whom Brodie cites in other works including his forthcoming Strategy in the Missile 
Age, who in his 1954 Strategy for the West observed that he had “the perhaps somewhat 
unenviable advantage of an experience, which fortunately has been denied to most 
people, of being in a city which was literally wiped out, with most of its inhabitants, 
in fifty-five seconds by the great earthquake in Baluchistan in 1935, a far more effec-
tive blitz than anything laid on by either side in the late war, except Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. When people talk light-heartedly about that sort of thing on a widespread 
scale not being decisive, I have to tell them with respect that they do not know what 
they are talking about. No country could survive a month of Quetta earthquakes on all 
its main centres of population and remain capable of organized resistance.”796 And this, 
Brodie notes, describes “a catastrophe that is free of the additional terrible menace of 
lingering radioactivity,”797 which makes thermonuclear warfare even more unthinkable. 
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Sounding much like Herman Kahn would sound a few years later, and not entirely 
unlike the Dr. Strangelove character, Brodie writes, “from a sober appreciation of the 
possibilities in this field of dismal speculation, it seems quite safe to assume that the 
number of people and the kind and quantity of capital that may survive strategic at-
tack will be important far more for determining the character and degree of national 
recovery following the hostilities than for controlling the subsequent course of the 
hostilities themselves,” but diverging from the caricatured callousness of Strangelove 
(as well as the infamous ultrarealism of Herman Kahn), Brodie would conclude that 
the “minimum destruction and disorganization that one can reasonably expect from 
any unrestricted thermonuclear attack in the future must almost inevitably be too high 
to permit further meaningful mobilization of war-making capabilities, certainly over 
the short term, and may well prevent effective use of most surviving military units 
already in being.”798 Adds Brodie, “It should also be recognized once and for all that 
so far as predicting human casualties is concerned, we are talking about a catastrophe 
for which it is essentially impossible to set upper limits appreciably short of the entire 
population of a state. It is not only those in cities and in towns who will be exposed to 
risk, but, in view of the fallout effect, practically all. … What we are in effect saying 
is that although the uninjured survivors of attack may indeed be many, it is also all 
too easily conceivable that they may be relatively few. The latter contingency is the 
more likely one in the absence of large-scale protective measures such as neither we 
nor any other people have yet shown ourselves prepared to mount. But whether the 
survivors by many or few, in the midst of a land scarred and ruined beyond all present 
comprehension, they should not be expected to show much concern for the further 
pursuit of political-military objectives.”799
Brodie confronts what he describes as “Ambiguity in Policies,” noting that there 
is a “monumental ambiguity in public policy, which reflects in part the ambiguity in 
the public pronouncements of relevant officials of the highest rank. Even those who 
preach the catastrophic decisiveness of nuclear strategic bombing seem to find it almost 
impossibly difficult to grasp the full significance of what they preach,” an ambiguity 
that he sees in the often contradictory remarks of Sir John Slessor, who had so vividly 
described the horrific calamity of thermonuclear destruction but who “could also be 
abundantly quoted on the other side of the ‘decisiveness’ question from the very same 
book – a book that has a special importance as perhaps the most lucid and compre-
hensive presentation of the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine to be found anywhere.”800 
Brodie takes Slessor to task for in essence ignoring his own warnings on the unique 
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and unprecedented catastrophe that thermonuclear warfare would bring, and instead 
turning to the World War II experience for guidance, where Slessor came to realize: 
“When things are really bad the people’s morale is greatly sustained by the knowledge 
that we are giving back as good as we are getting, and it engenders a sort of combat-
ant pride, like that of the charlady in a government office who was asked during the 
London blitz where her husband was – ‘he’s in the Middle East, the bloody coward!’ 
We must ensure that defence, as adequate as we can reasonably make it, is afforded to 
those areas or installations which are really vital to our survival at the outset of a war, 
or to our ability to nourish our essential fighting strength.”801 Brodie responds that 
“[t]here is only one thing to be said about such language and imagery: it fits World 
War II, but it has nothing to do with thermonuclear bombs.”802 
Brodie is reassured to note that Slessor’s view would rapidly evolve, so in just two 
years he would be “seeing things in a quite different light,” as evident in his May 1956 
article in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “The Great Deterrent and Its Limitations,” 
for which Brodie wants to “give due credit to Sir John for a flexibility of mind that is 
no doubt among his special distinctions.”803 And with some sympathy, perhaps as a 
result of Brodie’s own editorship and contribution to The Absolute Weapon in 1946, 
which presented views that sharply contrasted with Brodie’s current thinking as a 
result of the thermonuclear revolution, Brodie suggests that “[p]erhaps there is also 
something about the experience of being an author, especially the author of a book, 
that brings one intimately into the rough-and-tumble of the marketplace so far as 
ideas are concerned” and credits Slessor for a “kind of drastic conversion that Sir John 
underwent within two years regarding some of his fundamental beliefs,” which “is 
not a common occurrence among his professional colleagues, especially among those 
still on active duty. As Sir John observes in the aforementioned article: ‘Not many 
people, even in the fighting services themselves, have really grasped the full tactical 
implications of an age in which nuclear power is the dominant strategic factor in war. 
There is a tendency almost subconsciously to shy away from those implications, which 
should not be ascribed merely to the influence of vested interest.’”804
Brodie closes his discussion of the new, pressing and dangerous thermonuclear 
realities and their challenge to strategy with a call for “The Need for Consistency,” 
noting the “sense of Emerson’s famous remark about consistency being the hobgoblin 
of little minds has on the whole enjoyed remarkable verification in military history. 
Trite historical examples of unintelligent rejection of the novel need not detain us, 
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except possibly to note that the catalog is long.”805 Brodie is more concerned herein 
with “the instances where eager acceptance of the new is coupled, not only within the 
same organizations but often within the same persons, with stubborn insistence upon 
retaining also much of the old. These are the people who on the whole have come off 
best when the scores were in. For their very inconsistency has often provided a hedge 
against wrong predictions.”806 Brodie has found that the “intensely conservative or 
reactionary are always proved wrong” as “changes in armaments over the past century 
have been much too rapid and drastic to offer any cover to those who will not adjust,” 
and yet, as Brodie himself would find over and again, “the occasional brilliant seers 
who have the courage of their convictions and the analytical skill to recognize and 
expose inconsistency when they see it have all too often been tripped up by one or 
more critical assumptions which turned out to be in error, and then their own consist-
ency worked only to make their whole logical construction dangerously wrong, as was 
certainly the case with Douhet,”807 and, one might argue, the early Brodie in 1946 
who saw the atomic bomb as an absolute weapon that made war irrational, if not yet 
obsolete, and which severed the fundamental Clausewitzian linkage connecting war to 
politics and with it any hope for rationality. Brodie suggests that, “No doubt a proper 
intuitive feeling for the hazards of prediction and for the terrible forfeits involved, in 
the military sphere, in finding oneself overcommitted to a wrong guess, is one of the 
reasons why military men at a group tend to put a rather modest value on analytical 
brilliance as an alternative to mature military judgment.”808 But he concludes, “Nev-
ertheless, there is a limit to the amount of inconsistency that is reasonable, especially 
since in the world of nuclear armaments it may become, to say the least, exceedingly 
expensive. And if any one thing is clear from all the foregoing, it is that the strategy 
of ‘massive retaliation’, as commonly understood, is, like the headman’s axe, rather 
too sharp a cure for ordinary ailments.”809
Toward a Strategic Balance: Strategy Meets the Missile Age
According to many students of strategy, Brodie’s seminal work is his 1959 treatise on 
the thermonuclear era, Strategy in the Missile Age; it has been described by Colonels Wil-
liam P. Snyder and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., in their 1981 article in Parameters, “Bernard 
Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” as “a landmark study that synthesized the 
central ideas on deterrence and limited war that had emerged during the 1950s,” and 
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which “provided an expanded and analytical examination of the themes discussed in his 
earlier book, incorporating many of the strategic concepts developed by his colleagues 
at RAND. Thus, Strategy in the Missile Age was a synthesis of the major strategic ideas 
that had emerged since the beginning of the atomic age.”810 They noted that that this 
book “was directed equally to military officers and to political leaders” and that “Brodie 
especially hoped to bridge the intellectual no man’s land between those who ‘decide 
how to wage war’ and those who ‘decide when and to what purpose’ wars should be 
waged.”811 They add that Strategy in the Missile Age “was the most important book on 
American national strategy to appear in the decade of the 1950s” and “provided the 
first detailed explanation of the advantages, indeed the necessity, of a deterrence strat-
egy and an equally thoughtful analysis of the forces required to achieve deterrence.” 812
As Ken Booth described in his chapter on Brodie in Makers of Nuclear Strategy, 
Brodie’s Strategy in the Missile Age “was a big book which brought together a discussion 
of many of the problems that had been troubling Brodie over the previous few years,” 
and “[i]n particular, he grappled with the interplay between old and new forces, when 
the latter were truly revolutionary.”813 The origins of Brodie’s widely read and lauded 
book are discussed by Marc Trachtenberg in his article, “Strategic Thought in America: 
1952-1966,” which appeared in the Summer 1989 edition of Political Science Quarterly 
as well as in the final volume, “Retrospectives,” of Trachtenberg’s six-volume anthology, 
Writings on Strategy: The Development of American Strategic Thought published that same 
year. Once the atomic monopoly ended, and robust nuclear forces became an undeni-
able fixture on both sides of the Iron Curtain, providing a strategic foundation for the 
emergence of a bipolar world system, strategy became more complex, less predictable, 
and more difficult to safely navigate. As Marc Trachtenberg describes in his article, the 
“question of deterrence could not be divorced from the question of use” and thus the 
“problem of target selection was, therefore, of fundamental importance.”814 As Tra-
chtenberg observes, “These problems were all very new, but already in 1952 one thing 
was clear: the targeting philosophy that had developed before and during World War 
II was becoming increasingly problematic. Indeed, the basic point about the absurd-
ity of all-out war when each side had developed the means of utterly devastating the 
other must have been tremendously disorienting for professional military officers.”815 
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He adds that it had become “clear, to the more discerning officers at any rate, that 
there were very basic and difficult problems here and that no one as yet had any re-
ally satisfactory answers,” and General John A. Samford, the U.S. Air Force’s director 
of intelligence, “wrote in 1952 that existing ideas on air power were inadequate and 
rested on ‘too narrow a base’” and “he therefore asked the president of RAND to allow 
Brodie, whose work he liked and with whom he had been in contact, to ‘produce a 
basic treatise on air power in war.’ Since RAND was under contract to the air force, 
this was in effect the authorization that enabled Brodie to do the work that culminated 
in his important 1959 book, Strategy in the Missile Age.”816 The book, while seminal 
and enjoying international translations and multiple printings that have continued 
into the post-Cold War era, was really little more than an anthology of Brodie’s papers, 
speeches, and articles during the decade that had passed since America lost its atomic 
monopoly, when the strategic environment Brodie had famously analyzed in 1946 in 
his contributions to The Absolute Weapon underwent a profound transformation to 
a true nuclear-strategic balance the effectively bifurcated the world system. Strategy 
in the Missile Age was thus a treatise on the new bipolar world and how to survive its 
unprecedented dangers. 
While the book was widely praised, Trachtenberg fairly criticizes Brodie for his 
lack of a clear prescription: “By 1959, when Strategy in the Missile Age was published, 
Brodie had been thinking about these issues full-time for many years. But again he 
failed to take a clear line. If all we sought was to maximize the pre-war deterrent ef-
fect, he wrote, we should ‘assign the hard-core elements in our retaliatory force to 
the enemy’s major cities, provide for the maximum automaticity as well as certainty 
of response, and lose no opportunity to let the enemy know that we have done these 
things.’ The problem was that ‘what looks like the most rational deterrence policy 
involves commitment to a strategy of response which, if we ever had to execute it, 
might then look very foolish.’ ‘For the sake of deterrence before hostilities,’ he argued, 
‘the enemy must expect us to be vindictive and irrational if he attacks us’ – even if 
his attack took care to spare our populations and successfully destroyed much of our 
retaliatory force; but ‘a reasonable opposing view’ was ‘that no matter how difficult it 
may be to retain control of events in nuclear total war, one should never deliberately 
abandon control.’”817 
Trachtenberg notes Brodie “understood that the basic issue in nuclear strategy was 
target selection,” and that “the central problem here was whether the attack should 
focus on destroying the enemy’s retaliatory force, sparing to the maximum extent 
possible the enemy’s population, in order to preserve its hostage value – or whether 
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the enemy’s strategic forces should not be targeted at all, since the ability to destroy 
them might lead the enemy to preempt and thus be destabilizing.”818 But much to 
Trachtenberg’s disappointment, “Brodie simply laid out both sets of arguments and 
made no serious attempt to resolve the issue. He had ‘given relatively little space,’ he 
said in his conclusion, ‘to the matter of how to fight a general war if it should come,’ 
because ‘the strategy of a total war is like an earthquake in that all the forces which 
determine its occurrence and its character have been building up over time, as have 
almost all the factors which determine how it runs its course.’ The implication here 
was that rational analysis could make no real difference. And similarly, on the basic 
issue of limited war strategy – the question of tactical nuclear weapons – Brodie again 
simply laid out the pros and cons and drew back in this book from taking a position 
on the issue himself.”819
Brodie’s ambition for Strategy in the Missile Age was to not only imagine the inter-
action of strategy and the new, and terribly destructive technologies of war – which 
thanks to the proliferation of intercontinental missiles tipped with thermonuclear 
weapons that handily reached beyond continents and oceans, now threatened the 
interior heartlands that had been long insulated from the full trauma of modern war 
– but to also christen this new and uniquely dangerous era. Having already authored a 
widely read and highly regarded text on the role of sea power in what he had dubbed, 
for posterity, “Machine Age,” Brodie hoped to not only comment on the new era 
of intercontinental missiles and their deadly thermonuclear payloads, but to define 
the new era as a distinct “age” on par with the “Machine Age.” In his numerous pa-
pers, articles and speeches written as these new weapons arrived, Brodie refers to the 
thermonuclear era as distinct from the atomic era, but he concludes that while the 
H-bomb magnified the destructive power and thereby rendered strategic bombing 
more efficient, its arrival did not mark as fundamental transformation in war as that 
which was introduced by the A-bomb itself. And so Brodie looked for a better title 
to name this new era. 
Much is revealed in Brodie’s correspondence with his editor at Princeton Univer-
sity Press as this new work gestated, and as its final title was determined, with much 
persistence from Brodie in his insistence that the term “Missile Age” define his work, 
and remain part of its title. But in the end, his preferred phrase did not stick, though 
his work was nonetheless warmly received, positively reviewed, and widely influential 
– as other phrases jockeyed for position, with the term “Nuclear Age” becoming more 
commonly applied to the post-Hiroshima period generally. On January 29, 1958, 
his editor at Princeton, Herbert S. Bailey wrote to Brodie to discuss a new edition of 
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Brodie’s best-selling Guide to Naval Strategy, and informing Brodie that Captain J.J. 
Vaughan, who served as Head of the Correspondence Courses Department at the 
Naval War College, might be interested in “purchasing 2000 or perhaps more cop-
ies of a revised edition of A Guide to Naval Strategy, for use in Navy correspondence 
courses,” with “an additional chapter on the lessons of the Korean War,” and with an 
updated chapter on “Tools of Sea Power.”820 Bailey suggested various courses of action 
were open: doing both, writing the new Korea chapter and welcoming revisions by 
them of the Tools of Sea Power chapter; welcoming from them both the Korea chapter 
and a revised Tools of Sea Power chapter; or telling them Brodie was too busy to do a 
revision but they could “simply have to take the book as it stands, supplying material 
on the Korean War and on the new weapons and ships by some other means.”821 He 
added, “I hope that some method can be found to satisfy the Navy without interfering 
too much with your own work, which is obviously more important currently. I had 
hoped that your book on Air Strategy would be finished by now, though I suppose 
these things always take more time than one expects, and I imagine also that the recent 
advances in rocketry and the like have made some changes necessary.”822 These advances 
in rocketry in fact transformed the work at its very core, so much so that the book 
would not be solely about air strategy, but would more broadly explore the strategic 
implications of a host of new technologies including the increased destructive yield 
of nuclear weapons as thermonuclear devices entered the arsenals of the superpowers, 
vastly augmenting the yields of the original atomic bombs; the advent of intercon-
tinental rockets capable of efficiently and rapidly delivering thermonuclear payloads 
anywhere worldwide without viable defensive countermeasures; and the increasing 
complexity of the nuclear force structure as the land-air-sea triad took shape, including 
the emergence of largely invulnerable strategic submarines. These technologies would 
overshadow traditional air forces, which achieved prominence during the early nuclear 
era which relied on large fleets of relatively vulnerable strategic bomber aircraft to less 
efficiently deliver their atomic payloads deep within enemy territory, bringing us into 
what Brodie hoped we would call the “Missile Age.”
On February 6, 1958, Brodie replied to Bailey, noting that his initial reaction to 
Captain Vaughan’s plans for a rewrite of Guide to Naval Strategy -- referred to as GNS 
– for use in naval courses was “negative,” since he “had the feeling that there was too 
much conservatism and orthodoxy in the course’s approach for me to want to have 
anything to do with providing the literature for it. Besides, I have for years looked 
upon GNS as a book which has served its purpose, nobly so far as my own interests 
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were concerned, and that it should now be permitted to rest in peace. In libraries 
it could be useful for informing the young on what naval war was like in the days 
before the H-bomb.”823 But he added that upon further “reconsideration, I think for 
favorably about the project. First of all, I think I could put some vital new stuff in 
the book without a great deal of additional writing. I am thinking of the first of the 
four alternative courses you suggested, secondly, if a correspondence course in naval 
strategy is going to be given at the Naval War College, one should really not expect 
that it would or could be anything very daring or imaginative. Where would they get 
the instructors for it if they were? Thirdly, if there is a reasonably nice piece of cash in 
it for me, I have a very good use for it.”824 
With that, he turned to his work in progress, which would become Strategy in the 
Missile Age. “Now, about my present work. I too was hoping it would be finished by 
now. The problem is simply that I have been suffering from, and desperately fighting, 
certain inhibitions amounting to what people loosely call ‘writer’s block.’ But I have 
been making progress despite it all. I am sending you separately a long chapter which 
you have not yet seen (nor have you yet seen the chapter called ‘Is There a Defense?’, 
which for the time being is classified but which I am sure we can easily get declassified 
at the appropriate time. It has been quite favorably received by those who have read 
it, including, I might say, the Gaither Committee.) I am at work on the latest chapter, 
and allowing for rewriting and all the rest. I think it is not altogether foolish to talk in 
terms of another two months of work.”825 In addition to “Is There a Defense”“ – which 
became chapter 6 of Strategy in the Missile Age with the same title – Brodie would note 
in the preface to his July 23, 1958 RAND Research Memorandum (RM-2218), “The 
Anatomy of Deterrence” (which would become, incidentally, chapter 8 in Strategy in the 
Missile Age as well as an article of the same title in the January 1959 edition of World 
Politics), that “this paper is one in a series in preparation by the author on the general 
theory of air strategy in the nuclear age. Although each of these papers is intended as 
a chapter in the larger study, a few are being released as separate publications in view 
of their particular relevance to current problems.”826 
The papers listed were – in addition to “The Anatomy of Deterrence” and the 
aforementioned “Is There a Defense?” which was published as a RAND Research 
Memorandum (RM-1781) on August 16, 1956 but classified as “Confidential” – his 
unclassified December 31, 1952 RAND Research Memorandum (RM-1013), “The 
Heritage of Douhet,” which became chapter 3 of Strategy in the Missile Age with the 
same title; his unclassified “The Implications of Nuclear Weapons in Total War,” RAND 
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Research Memorandum, RM-1842, from December 17, 1956, which became chapter 
5, “The Advent of Nuclear Weapons; and his unclassified “The Meaning of Limited 
War,” RAND Research Memorandum, RM-2224, from July 30, 1958, which would 
become chapter 9, “Limited War.”827 As well, much of Brodie’s May 14, 1957 speech 
to the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Utah, published by RAND on 
the same date as RAND Paper P-1111, “Some Strategic Implications of the Nuclear 
Revolution,” would also appear in chapter 5, with other portions appearing as well 
as in chapter 1, “Introduction” (namely, where Brodie discusses the metaphorical 
implications of the War in Heaven as presented in book VI of Milton’s Paradise Lost, 
as he earlier did in his first book, Sea Power in the Machine Age). Additionally, much 
of his June 11, 1953 RAND working paper, “A Commentary on the Preventive War 
Doctrine,” appeared in Chapter 7, “The Wish for Total Solutions: Preventive War, 
Pre-Emptive Attack, and Massive Retaliation;” and much of his November 18, 1958 
public Berkeley lecture, “Unlimited Weapons Choices and Limited Budgets,” appeared 
in chapter 10, “Strategy Wears a Dollar Sign.” Strategy in the Missile Age would become, 
in large measure, an anthology of Brodie’s strategic and theoretical reflections on the 
new thermonuclear weapon and its global delivery systems as reflected in his papers, 
articles, and lectures during the years that preceded its publication as a single work, 
and would described in his preface to the Princeton edition as a “one-man enterprise 
in which I was accorded full freedom to develop my thesis as I saw fit,” though he 
would acknowledge being “especially indebted” to ten of his RAND colleagues, among 
whom can be found Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Hans Speier, and Albert 
Wohlstetter, and thankful for the feedback from thirteen several others who had read 
the manuscript in whole or in part.828
As Brodie explained to Bailey in his February 6, 1958 letter, “I expect none of the 
internal problems in rewriting the naval strategy book that I have mentioned above, 
probably because the material is less novel and daring.”829 He noted that he had done 
some encyclopedia work during the past two years, and thus could safely promise to 
deliver a revised edition by the end of June. Brodie asked Bailey, “are you ready to 
do a new edition amounting physically to a new book, involving throwing away the 
present plates (if they exist) for what is after all going to be a pretty limited sale? If 
that question can be answered in the affirmative, the next question is whether the 
Navy will agree to a fee for my work which will make it all worth while. I am thinking 
in terms of a fee of at least $1,000 to $2,000 plus royalties.”830 On March 6, 1958, 
Bailey wrote to Captain Vaughan, presenting the path he and Brodie had outlined for 
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the revision of GNS: “Presumably Chapters II and II on ‘The Tools of Sea Power’ will 
have to be completely rewritten. Dr. Brodie is prepared to do this. He feels strongly 
that Chapter IX on the ‘Tactics of Fleet Action’ is the most outdated chapter in the 
book, and will have to be either entirely eliminated or replaced. In addition, it would 
probably be desirable to add a chapter on the lessons of the Korean War and later 
developments. Dr. Brodie has already written a good deal on this subject, and would 
be prepared to write a special new chapter for the Guide to Naval Strategy.”831 Bailey 
said Princeton University Press could guarantee “2000 copies for $8500 f.o.b. New 
York, a discount from the $6.00 cover price,” adding, “In view of the amount of work 
to be done, I think this is a very fair price, and I hope it will be possible to for you 
to get the necessary appropriations.”832 This was agreed to by Captain Vaughan, who 
phoned Bailey with the news, and on March 22, 1958, Bailey informed Brodie by 
letter of this: “I just had a telephone call from Captain Vaughan with the good news 
that they have been able to get the necessary appropriations immediately, so they are 
drawing up a contract which they will be sending me soon. In other words, we are all 
clear to go ahead with the revised edition of the Guide to Naval Strategy.”833 Brodie 
was pleased with the news and on March 28, 1958, he replied in writing to Bailey: “I 
am glad it is all arranged with the Navy. I expect to have no trouble at all writing the 
required new pages, and will give up my weekends if necessary to do the job without 
interfering with the new book. . . . The problem is utterly different from and easier 
than the new book.”834 Brodie added, “If what we were doing for the Navy was a new 
book, and they wanted to have a look at the manuscript before drawing a contract, I 
would tell them to go to Hell – as I am sure you would, too. Under the circumstances, 
however, I do not mind in the slightest.”835 
Brodie informed Bailey that he had nearly completed his new book, and on March 
31, 1958, Bailey replied to Brodie, writing: “What wonderful news that you have 
really come to the end of your new book on Strategy, except for a short summary! I 
am so glad that you finally got through the problems that were stumping you and 
got it finished. I shall be looking forward to seeing it.”836 Brodie had asked Bailey 
about re-using his recent presentation delivered to the University of Utah’s Institute 
of World Affairs, and a lengthy quotation from Paradise Lost that had appeared in the 
front matter of his first book. Bailey assented, writing “by all means go ahead and 
use them. The quotation in Sea Power in the Machine Age is very unobtrusive, not 
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even in the text, and I am sure that virtually no one will notice that you are using the 
same quotation again. Even if they do, the quotation is so obviously apt for the use 
to which you put it, that it wouldn’t be questioned. And it is so good that it would be 
a shame not to use it.”837 Over the next few weeks, Brodie would juggle his revisions 
to GNS with his effort to complete Strategy in the Missile Age, and one result was a 
delay on the printing of GNS. As noted in a letter for Brodie from Bailey on July 17, 
1958, required revisions from Captain Vaughan required bumping GNS’ printing to 
August: “I know that it has been hard for you to get the revision of GNS done when 
your heart is really in your new book, but I think it is worth while and I appreciate 
the efforts you have made to get it through quickly.”838 
And finally, on December 8, 1958, Bailey wrote to Brodie, “The new edition of GNS 
is in at last, and two copies are on their way to you separately. I have just been looking 
through it, and I think it came out quite well. I hope you will be pleased with it.”839 
Bailey added, “I have been hoping to hear from RAND that your new manuscript is 
on the way, but I haven’t heard anything yet. I shall be very glad to get it whenever 
they are ready to release it.”840 On December 16, 1958, Bailey again wrote to Brodie, 
telling him: “I was of course excited to hear that the new book is at last nearly finished. 
I am looking forward to reading that copy of the manuscript you are going to smuggle 
to me. And I certainly hope you won’t have any trouble with Hans Speier about the 
selection of a publisher; I think Speier is favorably inclined toward us . . . I do want 
to assure you that we are prepared to put the book through quickly.”841 On December 
29, 1958, Brodie replied to Bailey, reassuring him that Hans Speier and James (Jim) C. 
DeHaven would respect the author’s choice for a publisher, and as such, “That means 
P.U.P.”842 He added, “Of course, when you see the MS you may change your mind 
about wanting to publish it. However, I am really not worried. Excuse me for it.”843 As 
a P.S., Brodie added: “If the Navy has paid my fee for the revision of GNS, I can use 
the $1,500.00 as soon after the New Year as you can send it.”844 On January 2, 1959, 
Bailey wrote to Brodie, noting the Navy had not yet paid Princeton University Press, 
“but as soon as they do I shall send you our check for the special $1500 fee, and the 
regular royalties will be due and will be paid as usual in March.”845
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On January 26, 1959, DeHaven wrote to Bailey “regarding Bernard Brodie’s 
manuscript on ‘Air Strategy in the Missile Age,’” reaffirming RAND’s support of the 
author’s preference for a publisher, adding RAND was also “influenced by the inter-
est and enthusiasm of a competent publisher for a particular manuscript,” so “[b]y 
both of these criteria, the choice of a publisher in this case seems to converge rapidly 
on Princeton. We will therefore submit the final manuscript to you.”846 He added, 
“Some words of caution may be in order at this point. As you know, we can’t agree 
to publication until clearance has been obtained. There is no reason to believe that 
clearance will be withheld; on the other hand, it may be delayed, or, some changes in 
the text may be requested.”847 DeHaven concluded his letter by assuring, “You may 
be sure that we are all looking forward to this continued opportunity for association 
with Princeton University Press and Herb Bailey.”848
On January 30, 1959, Brodie wrote to Bailey, in which he discussed the tentative 
working title to his new work, which he originally dubbed Air Strategy Meets the Missile 
Age. Brodie wrote, “I have no particular commitment to the title I chose, other than 
the fact that titles are difficult for me to think up. I do think it would be improved by 
the omission of the word ‘Air,’ which would leave it simply ‘Strategy Meets the Missile 
Age.’ I like the word ‘Meets,’ because, unlike the word ‘Enters,’ it suggests that what 
has gone before it not really appropriate to the situation that now confronts us. By the 
way I had thought also of the word ‘Confronts.’”849 Brodie added, “I had thought also 
of having some other word qualifying ‘Strategy,’ like ‘Ancient’ or ‘Classic.’ However, 
the connotation in these words is not good. Anyway, let’s think about ‘Strategy Meets 
the Missile Age’ until we think of something better.”850 On February 3, 1959, Bailey 
replied to Brodie, “I just received your note of the 30th, about the title. I agree that 
the word ‘Air’ in the title is not necessary. Let’s use ‘Strategy Meets the Missile Age’ as 
a working title, but let’s also see if we can think of something equally descriptive and 
more striking.”851 And on February 10, 1959, Bailey again wrote to Brodie, explaining: 
“I have been thinking over the title, because I am not entirely satisfied with ‘Strategy 
Meets the Missile Age.’ We have had too many books about the atomic age, the mis-
sile age, the nuclear age, and other kinds of ‘ages.’ It seems to me that your book is a 
fundamental development of the whole basis of strategy, and ought to have a title that 
is simple and imposing. What would you think of simply ‘Modern Military Strategy’ 
or ‘Strategy for Peace and War’? I don’t think it’s presumptuous to remember that 
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Clausewitz wrote On War – not a bad title.”852 Such a Clausewitzian aspiration would 
re-assert itself with Brodie’s 1973 work, War and Politics, and incidentally, Bailey’s 
thoughts mirrored those of Herman Kahn’s editors, who had suggested a similarly 
Clausewitzian title for Kahn’s voluminous and controversial lectures on thermonuclear 
warfare, resulting in its neo-Clausewitzian title, On Thermonuclear War.
On February 16, 1959, Brodie wrote to Bailey, continuing their discussion of the 
title to his latest work: “About the title, I agree about the over use of the word ‘Age.’ 
However, one of my former books is, as you know, Sea Power in the Machine Age, so 
I have a certain proprietary commitment in that area. I should like to bring in some-
thing about missiles in order to show the newness of the thing, and I also want to 
have the word ‘strategy’ in the title. However, I am afraid I am not yet ready to go as 
far as you suggest in your own tentative recommendations. I want to hold on the few 
traces of modesty I still have left.”853 Brodie added, “By the way, the two paragraphs 
of my quotations from Milton on the first page contain a number of wonderful book 
titles, provided one is not too concerned with communication information. Almost 
every phrase makes a good title, e.g., ‘More Valid Armes,’ ‘Weapons More Violent,’ 
‘When Next We Meet,’ ‘And Worse Our Foes,’ etc. Milton seems just naturally to 
have breathed out titles.”854 On February 16, 1959, Bailey replied to Jim DeHaven at 
RAND, lauding Brodie’s newest work: “I am absolutely sincere when I say that I think 
the book is going to be the most important book of its kind in the decade. I would 
love to be the editor for the book and put it through the press myself, but I have so 
many other duties that I know I can’t do it. It’s going to be in good hands, though. 
Gordon Hubel, who I think did a wonderful job on The Berlin Blockade, will begin to 
edit the book this week.”855 He added that Princeton University Press planned to put 
Brodie’s new book “on an express production schedule, and I hope to have finished 
books in May for publication in June. At least that’s what I’m shooting at, and if we 
can get clearance soon, I don’t see why we can’t do it.”856 Bailey estimated the new 
book would be 432 pages long, and priced at $6.50. The first print run was expected 
to be 5,000, but Oxford University Press pre-ordered 1,000 copies so the first print 
order was increased to 6,000, a sizeable run for an academic work. 
While there was much hope for Brodie’s newest work, its title remain unsettled, and 
on March 13, 1959, Bailey wrote to Brodie, noting, “We’ve been struggling among 
ourselves over the title of your book, though of course in the long run you will have to 
decide. To me, and to several others here, ‘Strategy Meets the Missile Age’ is somehow 
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flat, perhaps because it is a sentence by itself and needs a period after it. Finally, I decided 
to take a poll of our publishing staff.”857 He added that his “own preferences are, in 
order, Strategy for Survival, The New Strategy, New Strategy for New Weapons. The more 
I think about it, the more I believe Strategy for Survival indicates and implies some of 
the chief points of the book – that you can’t win a thermonuclear war, but that you 
can hope to survive if your strategy is right. Also, that the best way of surviving is by 
devising a strategy to prevent war. The word ‘survival’ clearly implies thermonuclear 
weapons, since there has been so much talk about their devastating effect. Moreover, 
Strategy for Survival is brief and to the point, would look well on the cover of the 
book and in ads, and is easily memorable. Again, I think everybody knows only too 
well that a big war would mean missiles with thermonuclear warheads, so that doesn’t 
need to be said.”858 But he added, “If you don’t like Strategy for Survival, may I plead 
for The New Strategy? The word ‘new’ implies a radical change from earlier strategy, 
and also implies the new weapon. Also, it is short and memorable.” Bailey noted that 
Princeton University Press’ advertising department “apparently discussed the problem 
and settled together on Strategy for the Missile Age. Their judgment should be good, 
but I personally still don’t like ‘The Missile Age.’ It is not an accepted term like ‘the 
machine age,’ nor does it pervade the entire civilization in quite the same way. Still, 
it got four good votes.”859 Bailey closed by adding, “I hope we can settle on a title 
pretty soon. What do you think of all this?”860 On March 20, 1959, Brodie replied 
to Bailey, responding to his suggestions and concerns. “Now, about the title, which 
I too feel we ought to sew up. I have tried hard not to be stubborn or excessively-in-
love-with-own-words. Still, I like mine best.”861 As Brodie explained: “Also, the word 
‘Survive’ or ‘Survival’ has been used rather too much in titles about war, including, as 
I recall, the first and widely-read book on the atomic bomb, and the military would be 
allergic to it. They would consider it ‘pushing the panic button.’ ‘The New Strategy’ is 
much too pretentious for a relatively modest guy like me. . . . I rather like your third 
choice, ‘New Strategy for New Weapons,’ but, like the one which comes closest to 
my own, i.e., ‘Strategy for the Missile Age,’ it sounds like a prescription for a specific 
strategy, which my book does not offer, and also ignores the contribution of Part I of 
my book. I like the word ‘Meets’ rather than ‘for’ because it is much more dynamic, 
and also a closer approximation to what my book is about, which is the confrontation 
of the strategy inherited from the past by a completely new situation in which, by 
implication, the old ideas don’t fit. Also my title is easy to remember and to say. Your 
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comment that the ‘Missile Age’ is not an accepted term like ‘Machine Age’ does not 
sound to me like a demerit. The term ‘Absolute Weapon’ was not an accepted term 
either until my colleagues and I used it in that book edited by me.”862 Brodie added, 
“Naturally, I did not entirely trust my own judgment and tried out the title question 
on a few people here. It is certainly not possible to get consensus, but what does it 
matter? Two people liked my title very much, and no one came up with an alternative 
that anyone else liked.”863 
On the same day, Brodie wrote to Gordon Hubel, an editor at Princeton Univer-
sity Press, noting some problems with the clearance from the State Department for 
release of his new book: “You have by now heard the unfortunate news about the 
holdup on my clearance. It seems the people concerned in State simply cannot find 
the time to finish it. Moreover, I am still hopeful that we will get back in the swing of 
the original schedule.”864 He turned to the topic of the book’s title, adding, “I notice 
you are using the title ‘Strategy for Survival.’ Unfortunately, it cannot be that, the 
reason chiefly being that the military would be allergic to it. Also, the word ‘survival’ 
has been used too much in titles concerning matters of this sort. I am writing Herb 
a separate letter today in which I am explaining why I had to resolve on my original 
title ‘Strategy Meets the Missile Age.’”865 Brodie referred to Hubel’s earlier comment 
on how Brodie’s draft manuscript had proved very useful in helping Hubel understand 
Herman Kahn’s lectures, which would very soon become On Thermonuclear War: “I 
think your comments on how my manuscript enabled you to understand Herman 
Kahn’s lectures is both very complimentary and very important. This is the kind of 
function I want that book to fulfill.”866 Ironically, Kahn’s sprawling lectures would 
deeply penetrate the American psyche, bringing Kahn fame and notoriety, and even 
inspiring (at least in part) the Dr. Strangelove character and shaping his apocalyptic 
vocabulary. Hubel had written to Brodie on March 17, 1959, presenting a proposed 
advertising schedule for the book he was still calling “Strategy for Survival,” and in 
a P.S. he wrote, “Herb and I attended Herman Kahn’s lecturers (sic) at the Center 
of International Studies Friday and Saturday last, and we were both tremendously 
impressed with the sweep of his knowledge in this area and his ability to communi-
cate, but without having read your manuscript, I would not have been able to follow 
him at all.”867 Ironically, Brodie’s role, fostering greater understanding of the complex 
strategic issues of the Missile Age, contributed in his publisher’s ability to comprehend, 
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and assess the market potential of, Kahn’s lectures – which would soon become the 
voluminous tome, On Thermonuclear War, a much less elegant and theoretically less 
robust work of strategic analysis than Strategy in the Missile Age. But in terms of social 
influence and prestige, On Thermonuclear War would become a best-seller, and catapult 
Kahn to national prominence – so much so that Kahn would become a celebrity in 
his own time, in contrast to Brodie whose orbit remained peripheral to mainstream 
society, even as his intellectual influence peaked, no doubt a frustration that would 
enable Brodie to empathize with a similar frustration felt by Clausewitz in his own 
time, which itself mirrored the famously frustrating fall of Niccolo Machiavelli, who 
was not only exiled but was arrested and tortured as well.
On March 25, 1959, Bailey again wrote to Brodie on the topic of the title to what 
would at last be finalized as Strategy in the Missile Age. “We have been talking here 
again about the title, and much as we want to respect your wishes, we still aren’t happy 
with ‘Strategy Meets the Missile Age.’ It seems awkward to me, and several people have 
pointed out that the sense of ‘confronts’ didn’t come through to them immediately. 
They took ‘meets’ in the sense of ‘how-do-you-do.’ This seems absurd, and of course 
it is, but there is something illogical about first impressions, and the first impression 
a title makes is important.”868 Bailey suggested meeting Brodie half-way: “But can’t 
we compromise on ‘Strategy in the Missile Age’? This doesn’t get across the idea of 
‘confronts,’ but we can work on that ideas in our advertising blurbs. You can’t get 
everything into the title, and perhaps we have been trying too hard. I would be happy 
to settle for ‘Strategy in the Missile Age’ if you would. How about it? I hate to keep 
bringing this up, but the title is important to all of us.”869 Bailey closed by adding, “I 
hope we hear from the State Department before you get this letter.”870 On April 8, 
1959, Brodie wrote to Hubel, updating him on the slow-going clearance review at the 
State Department, noting “the State Department reader is (all too slowly) approaching 
the close, and has so far not challenged anything he has seen. I suppose it would be 
better if I waited until I receive final word, but my impatience needs some outlet, so 
I am sending you now the second round of galley-proof corrections.”871 
Brodie ultimately accepted Bailey’s compromise wording on the title, which was 
published soon thereafter as Strategy in the Missile Age. Bailey continued to radiate 
optimism as the first copies came off the press, and on August 21, 1959, he wrote to 
Brodie, reaffirming his belief that the book was destined for success: “I really think the 
book is going to be a hit. Everybody who has seen it likes it. Yesterday Charles Scrib-
ner, who receives a copy as President of our Board, called me up just to tell me how 
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excited he was about it. You can be sure that we are going to do everything we can to 
make it go.”872 A few days later, on August 25, 1959, Brodie replied to Bailey, writing, 
“The copies of the book arrived Thursday and I am delighted with their appearance. 
Everybody comments on how good the pages look, and the cover and dust jacket too. 
. . . I am going to keep one copy aside for entering minimum necessary changes, in 
case there is a second printing. Thus I will be able to shoot you such changes as soon 
as you indicate the need for them.”873 Brodie asked Bailey, when new dust jackets get 
printed, to swap in a new quote to replace one provided from a Herald Tribune review 
of GNS that was underwhelming in its support of Brodie: “I have always disliked that 
phrase ‘a really adequate guide.’ We have so many glowing comments to quote for 
that book. Excuse this one braying note when I am so pleased with everything else 
(including your spiel about the new book in your Fall Books announcement), but it 
has operational value.”874
But very soon after Strategy in the Missile Age’s release, controversy erupted over 
the publisher’s press release and its incendiary tone. In a September 15, 1959 letter 
to Brodie, Bailey discussed this unexpected situation: “Frankly, I was quite surprised 
that the people at RAND kicked up such a fuss, since the release was written [right] 
out of the book, and every sentence in it could be documented.”875 Brodie himself had 
thought the writer, John Criscitiello, Princeton University Press’ advertising manager, 
“did a good job,” and Bailey explained that “apparently the release, in emphasizing the 
controversial points of the book, put everything together in a way that flustered the 
authorities, and I agree with you that they are justifiably concerned.”876 Bailey agreed 
that “we wouldn’t send out any release at all. The book will attract plenty of attention 
anyway, and the reviewers will say what they think about it, no matter what we or the 
RAND Corporation say or do. I am looking forward eagerly to the reviews, and I am 
sure you are too.”877 Sales of the book were strong, and on January 20, 1960, Bailey 
wrote to Brodie, informing him that “about 13,000 copies of the book have already 
been distributed. I think this is pretty good. Incidentally, I happen to know that it 
is considerably more copies than Random House has managed to sell of Oscar Mor-
genstern’s book which came out at the same time. Since Oscar runs pretty wild and 
since I am convinced your book is the best on its subject, I am quite happy about that. 
Moreover, I am sure that your book will go on selling when Oscar’s is forgotten.”878 
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Bailey invited Brodie to become Princeton University Press’ “special advisor on books 
on military affairs”879 as part of a new editorial advisory committee. He also discussed 
Brodie’s concerns over some rejections of requests to send out free review copies; Bailey 
defended Princeton University Press’ policy, noting: “I want to defend our practice 
of not acceding to all requests for review copies. We do distribute review copies very 
generously, but I don’t think you realize how many journals and magazines there are, 
or how many requests we get from media of very limited circulation.”880 On Febru-
ary 4, 1960, Brodie wrote to Bailey, proposing publication of Strategy in the Missile 
Age in Japan, and noting his surprise that the UK publication of this work was not 
until February 4, “which happens to be this date. No wonder I have not seen British 
reviews of it!”881 Bailey liked the idea of a Japanese edition, and on February 11, 1960 
wrote to Brodie, telling him: “I would indeed be keenly interested in arranging for a 
Japanese edition of your book.”882 He also noted, “I was disturbed also at the delay in 
British publication,” and that it “appears that the book got caught in the end of the 
printers’ strike, and therefore was delayed.”883 
The book quickly went into a second printing, and Brodie sought to make some 
corrections to the manuscript. On February 18, 1960, he sent a telegram to Bailey 
noting with concern that a “major batch of corrections sent you October seventh 
was entirely ignored.”884 On February 22, 1960, Bailey wrote back, acknowledging 
Princeton University Press’ “failure to make some of the corrections requested in the 
second printing of Strategy in the Missile Age” and adding “my personal apologies,” 
noting “the only thing we can say is that something slipped. We were just as astonished 
as you were.”885 He promised to include them in the next printing. Bailey also noted 
approvingly Thomas Schelling’s positive review of Strategy in the Missile Age in the 
February 19th edition of Science. On February 22, 1960, Hubel also wrote to Brodie 
apologetically, noting after his initial disbelief, he checked the reprinted version and 
“found that you are entirely correct,” and offered up his “sincere apology.”886 The next 
day, on February 23, Bailey again wrote to Brodie, affirming his “embarrassment and 
chagrin again,” and reiterating his “profound apologies.”887 
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Despite this minor setback, Strategy in the Missile Age enjoyed a very healthy run, 
with multiple editions and numerous milestones – after its first hard cover printing 
in 1959, it would enjoy a second printing in 1960, international editions released in 
several languages including a Russian language edition published by Moscow’s Soviet 
Ministry of Defense in 1961; a Spanish language edition published that same year 
by Argentina’s Escuela de Guerra Naval in Spanish; and a Polish language edition 
published by Warsaw’s Ministry of National Defense in 1963; a fourth hard cover 
printing in 1963; a first paperback edition in 1965 with a new preface by Brodie; and 
a second soft cover printing in 1967 with subsequent paperback printings in 1970 and 
1972, the latter with a new preface by Brodie; a fifth hard cover printing in 1971, with 
subsequent printings by Princeton in 1984 and 1991, and more recently, a September 
2007 release by RAND nearly fifty years after its first printing at the dawn of the 
“missile age.” As of this writing, over half a century since it was published, Worldcat.
org shows Strategy in the Missile Age to be available in 1,116 libraries worldwide, in 
27 distinct editions. On August 29, 1969, Princeton University Press’ Reprint Edi-
tor, Roy E. Thomas, wrote to Brodie, telling him, “It is a pleasure to tell you that 
we have had to rush into a third printing of the paperback edition of Strategy in the 
Missile Age. As of 31 July 1969 this book has sold 6,340 copies in paperback. We have 
scheduled a reprinting of 3,000 copies, an estimated 2 ½ years’ supply. The price of 
the paperback remains $2.95.”888 He added, “I am sure you must be gratified, as we 
are, by the continuing success of Strategy in the Missile Age.”889 
Strategy’s New Beginning: Philosophical Foundations
The frontispiece to Princeton University Press’ editions of Brodie’s seminal Strategy in the 
Missile Age cites two key influences on his work – the latter from the start of his academic 
career and the former much more recent: Clausewitz, the philosopher of war; and Plato, 
an early architect of the modern state, and Socrates’ top pupil and chief biographer 
who has profoundly shaped our understanding of his teacher, and thus preserved his 
teachings for us through his interpretation. From Clausewitz’s On War, Brodie cites the 
following: “In these windings [of special interest] the logical conclusion is caught fast, and 
man, who in great things as well as in small usually acts more on particular prevailing 
ideas and emotions than according to strictly logical conclusions, is hardly conscious 
of his confusion, one-sidedness, and inconsistency.” And from Plato’s Republic, Brodie 
cites: “And is anything more important than that the work of the soldier should be well 
done?” From philosophy, Brodie quickly migrates to epic poetry.
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When reading the introduction to Brodie’s Strategy in the Missile Age, it is poetry that 
greets the reader, not math or science or even history – just as we saw in his opening 
sentences of his 1947 article, “The Atomic Dilemma” and again in his 1957 RAND 
Paper (P-1111), “Some Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Revolution,” which was 
the text of a speech Brodie presented to the Institute of World Affairs at the University 
of Utah on May 14, 1957 – with passages from Book VI of Paradise Lost cited, with 
Angle Raphael recounting to Adam the story of the epic war in Heaven that led to 
Satan’s fall, an allegory for the new nuclear age. As Brodie writes, “[a]fter the first day 
of fighting, Raphael relates, the issue was still in doubt, although the rebellious angels 
had received the more horrid injury. . . . Satan is persuaded that their inferiority is 
one of weapons alone, and he suggests: ‘perhaps more valid Armes, Weapons more 
violent, when next we meet, May serve to better us, and worse our foes, Or equal 
what between us made the odds, In Nature none,’” to which Nisroc, his lieutenant, 
enthusiastically agrees: “He who therefore can invent/ With what more forcible we may 
offend/ Our yet unwounded Enemies, or arme/ Ourselves with like defence, to mee 
deserve/ No less then for deliverance what we owe.”890 Satan announces the invention 
of a new and transformative weapon, a field gun that will alter the balance of power, 
which the next day is deployed with “dreadful execution,” but “the loyal angels, not 
to be surpassed in the application of science to war, in the fury of the moment seize 
upon the ‘absolute weapon’” and “[t]earing the seated hills of Heaven from their roots, 
they lift them by their shaggy tops and hurl them upon the rebel hosts. Those among 
the latter who are not immediately overwhelmed do likewise. In a moment the battle 
has become an exchange of hurtling hills, creating in their flight a dismal shade and 
infernal noise,” and “Heaven is threatened with imminent ruin.”891 
In case the point is missed, Brodie writes “The war in Heaven dramatizes the chief 
dilemma which confronts modern man, especially since the coming of the atom bomb, 
the dilemma of ever-widening disparity in accomplishment between man’s military 
inventions and his social adaptation to them.”892 Adds Brodie: “Until recently the 
deadliest weapon known to man represented only a modest refinement of the field 
gun which Milton describes in his poem. Now, however, we can come much closer 
to matching, in kinetic-energy equivalents, the hills hurtling through space; we have 
thermonuclear weapons and the planes and ballistic missiles to carry them.” Add to 
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man’s newfound destructive power was a worrisome trend in the nature of war itself, 
which until the twentieth century had managed to retain a “well-recognized function 
in diplomacy” with an “institutionalized quality” and an “overlay of antique customs, 
traditions, and observances” that “tended to limit further a destructiveness already 
bounded by a primitive military technology.”893 Modern war was now at risk of be-
coming “uncontrolled and purposeless,” with a “near-collapse of the factors previously 
serving to limit war.”894
As Brodie described, “Today, however, with truly cosmic forces harnessed to the 
machines of war, we have a situation for the first time in history where the opening 
event by which a great nation enters a war – an event which must reflect the prepara-
tions it has made or failed to make beforehand – can decide irretrievably whether or 
not it will continue to exist,” and this unprecedented fact demands that the pre-atomic 
world’s willingness to let decisions pertaining to the conduct of war be made “in a fairly 
undefiled world of ‘strictly military considerations’” no longer be tolerated: “Obvi-
ously, therefore, we cannot go on blithely letting one group of specialists decide how 
to wage war and another decide when and to what purpose, with only the most casual 
and spasmodic communication between them.” Brodie himself sought to intermediate 
this conversation between political leaders and the military commanders whose job 
it would be to fight the next great war, and found his efforts thwarted by those who 
resisted civilian interference in what had been traditionally military decisions on how 
to conduct war once hostilities commenced, or by those civilians who questioned his 
philosophical and historical interpretations. At RAND he found himself at a nexus 
where the two worlds more comfortably intertwined, but the problem nonetheless 
persisted, enough so that he felt compelled in 1959, nearly a decade after he was tossed 
by the Air Staff out of the Pentagon, to address the “Intellectual No-Man’s Land,” and 
to describe how “[t]here exists in America no tradition of intellectual concern with 
that border area where military problems and political ones meet,” noting that even 
the “civilian official in the State Department will rarely know much about current 
military problems and will therefore have no feeling for their relevance to the issues 
in his own jurisdiction,” and that even the “National Security Council is for that and 
other reasons mostly a monument to an aspiration,” and suggesting “whether any real 
enrichment of strategic thinking has proceeded from it is another question.”895 Thus, 
Brodie concludes, “Any real expansion of strategic thought to embrace the wholly 
new circumstances which nuclear weapons have produced will therefore have to be 
developed largely within the military guild itself,” as it is only “the professional military 
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officer” that is “dedicated to a career that requires him to brood on the problems of 
war, in which activity he finds himself with very little civilian company.”896 
But Brodie finds “the soldier has been handed a problem that extends far beyond 
the expertise of his own profession,” and though “[h]e had learned to collaborate well 
enough with the physical scientist, to the mutual profit of both and to the advantage 
of their nation,” this has not proven to be the case with regard to “military questions 
involving political environment, national objectives, and the vast array of value-
oriented propositions that might be made about national defense.”897 One reason why, 
Brodie learned from earlier experience, is “the barrier of secrecy,” which he finds now 
“conceals far more, relatively, than it ever has before,”898 but he argues that “we must 
not put too much blame on the security barrier for the general ignorance of defense 
problems,” since “[t]he amount of information available to the public on military and 
strategy affairs is very much greater than the casual observer would guess,” and Brodie 
believes that the real culprit is thus a lack of understanding of and appreciation for 
“the stakes involved and also the opportunities available to them to contribute their 
special insights and skills to a great common problem,” a challenge that Brodie takes 
upon himself to counter, with Strategy in the Missile Age “in part intended to help them 
make that contribution.”899 Once properly motivated to contribute to this common 
problem, however, Brodie acknowledges that the next challenge is getting through to 
the “military audience” and overcoming what he describes as the “Traditional Military 
Depreciation of Strategy,” and what we might describe as an inherently Jominian 
problem (the tendency to reduce strategy to stratagem in military circles), or as Brodie 
himself described as “the general conviction, implicit throughout the whole working 
structure and training program of the military system, that strategy poses no great 
problems which cannot be handled by the application of some well-known rules or 
‘principles’, and that compared with the complexity of tactical problems and the skills 
needed to deal with them, the whole field of strategy is relatively unimportant.”900 
Brodie’s view is inherently Clausewitzian, and reflects the continuity of a problem 
the Prussian himself had encountered, and from which he had even sought to insulate 
himself by shunning publicity, going so far as to publish anonymously and keeping his 
magnum opus locked away until after he had died, in contrast to Jomini’s enduring 
self-promotion, prolific publishing, and constant effort to generate fame and notoriety. 
Indeed, it is in the colorful personage of Herman Kahn, who would emerge to be 
Brodie’s principal rival in many ways, that we find our modern Jomini – not for any 
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wanting absence in his intellect or any shortfall in his strategic thinking, but in his 
showmanship and self-promotion, his willingness not to just think about the unthink-
able as Brodie had been doing from the moment Hiroshima lay in smoldering ruins, 
but to aspire to become renown as the man who dared to think about the unthinkable 
(as if this was something Brodie had somehow neglected!) Kahn’s bravado contrasted 
greatly with Brodie’s more mild-mannered approach to publicity, though both did 
publish widely, and both did seek to break down barriers in communication, Brodie 
hoping to break down barriers between civilian scholars and defense intellectuals and 
military professionals, and Kahn hoping to directly engage the public in the great 
nuclear doctrinal debates of the age. Kahn would gain wider notoriety, achieving a 
rare level of celebrity and entering into the consciousness of American pop-culture, 
for his effort – while Brodie would in many ways fade into the background of the 
very field that he can be credited with founding.
Learning from History
Brodie raises in his introduction to Strategy in the Missile Age the still recent strategic 
bombing campaigns of World War II, noting that it was “rarely criticized on tactical 
grounds,” and that there has been “no serious dissent from the general consensus that, 
for a new type of operation, the whole job was magnificently handled,”901 but rather 
that “[a]ll the important and voluminous criticisms of the effort center upon questions 
that are essentially strategic,” such as: “Were the basic military resources absorbed by 
strategic bombing too great in view of the returns? Could not these resources have 
been better used, even in the form of air power, for other military purposes? Were not 
the wrong target systems selected?”902 Pulling back somewhat from his earlier critical 
assessment of these issues, which led to his exile from the Pentagon to the distant think 
tank of the RAND Corporation, Brodie asserts: “Whatever views one may have about 
the answers to these questions, or to the spirit behind the questioning, the questions 
themselves are neither irrelevant nor unimportant.”903
But Brodie concedes that the reality of war limits commanders’ exposure to inde-
pendent strategic analysis, overwhelmed as they are by their daily need, especially in 
wartime, to respond to tactical and administrative demands. As Brodie explained: 
“There is no doubt that tactics and administration are the areas in which the soldier 
is most completely professional. The handling of battles by land, sea, or air, the ma-
neuvering of large forces, the leadership of men in the face of horror and death, and 
901. Brodie, “Introduction,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 14.
902. Brodie, “Introduction,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 14-15.
903. Brodie, “Introduction,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 15.
206 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
the development and administration of the organizations that effect these purposes are 
clearly not jobs for amateurs. In these tasks there is no substitute for the hard training 
and the experience which the services alone provide.”904 Brodie adds that, “During 
war the tests of command become far more exacting than in peacetime, and some 
officers turn out to be more talented than others. . . . But unless the officer attains 
some independent and important command, he may never in his career have to make 
a decision that tests his insight as a strategist. Small wonder, then, that the services on 
the whole have paid relatively scant attention to the development of strategic theory,” 
particularly since “[t]oday the basic conditions of war seem to change almost from 
month to month. It is therefore hard for the professional soldier to avoid being preoc-
cupied with means rather than ends. Also, his usefulness to his superior hangs upon 
his skill and devotion in the performance of his assigned duties, rather than upon any 
broader outlook, and if there is one thing that distinguishes the military profession 
from any other it is that the soldier always has a direct superior.”905
Brodie turns to history to provide us with the tools required to develop an independ-
ent capacity for strategic analysis and to break free from the constraints of dogma and 
maxims, so that we may respond to the challenges of the nuclear age not with incre-
mental tactical innovation but forward thinking strategic insight. Hence when he asks, 
“Why Look Back?” he has a ready answer: “if we examine the history of ideas” behind 
current strategic convictions, “we usually find that they have evolved in a definitely 
traceable way, often as the result of the contributions of gifted persons who addressed 
themselves to the needs of their own times on the basis of the experience available to 
them,”906 much the way Clausewitz threw himself into a lifelong process of digesting the 
Napoleonic experience, saving his conclusions for posterity to consider, and to apply 
to their ages. “Our own needs and our experience being different, we are enabled by 
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our study to glimpse the arbitrariness of views which we previously regarded as laws 
of nature, and our freedom to alter our thinking is thereby expanded.”907 Brodie notes 
some might think in our “age of missiles, thermonuclear warheads, atomic powered 
submarines capable of strategic bombing, and other comparably fantastic systems, it 
may seem atavistic to look back to strategic views which antedate World War I,” but 
he posits that “ideas about war and how to fight it are not,” to which he adds that 
“we should not deceive ourselves that we have the ability to start from scratch with 
completely fresh ideas and, guided merely by logic, to fashion a strategy according to 
the needs of our time,” as this is “too much to expect of human beings. For better or 
worse, we shall be applying our intellects, as presently furnished, to new and baffling 
problems.”908 
Hence the purpose of Strategy in the Missile Age, to “scan the earlier development of 
strategic theory . . . and then consider some of the strategic policy choices confront-
ing us today.”909 And so Brodie engages in a dialogue with earlier strategic thinkers, 
including Clausewitz, who himself engaged in his own dialogue as did so many earlier 
theorists, many of which have defined what political theorists and scholars of inter-
national relations call the realist tradition, and which unifies the study of politics with 
the study of war, hoping to find balance in not just means and ends, but to establish a 
firewall between order and chaos, maximizing the former while containing the spread 
of the former, or perhaps more accurately, maximizing the prevalence of order at home 
while either minimizing the intrusion of chaos across one’s frontiers, or when neces-
sary exporting one’s own vision of order to pacify those chaotic border lands, or when 
desperate to impose chaos upon a competing vision of order as would be accomplished 
by a nuclear retaliatory strike. Brodie thus looks back and joins a conversation that 
has carried forth since Herodotus first sought to decipher the events that transpired 
when Greece withstood the onslaught of their militarily superior Persian opponent, 
and Thucydides sought to grapple with the challenges faced by the Athenians as they 
clashed with their non-democratic opponents, the Spartans, losing in spite of their 
faith in the superiority of their democratic system, perhaps because of their ideological 
presumption of superiority which led then to commit international excesses, violat-
ing their democratic principles by committing atrocities abroad, and the students 
of Socrates sought to avenge his death by the manipulated demos, and to create a 
more enduring system that would at once enrich the world without imploding upon 
itself, through variations upon the philosopher-king model, ultimately unleashing 
Alexander upon the world, and who paved the way for Roman equilibrium to govern 
907. Brodie, “Introduction,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 19.
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for a millennium, a period that Machiavelli would later seek to resurrect, and later 
realists would attempt to modernize, giving birth to Hobbes’ Leviathan, a theoretical 
blueprint that others would seek to construct, from Napoleon and his interpreters to 
the wizards of Armageddon, where Bernard Brodie would reconnect with this long 
tradition, taking from it what guidance he could, as he struggled to prepare his world 
for the legacy of Hiroshima and the rise of the nuclear Leviathan.
In Brodie’s segue to his discussion of air power, at the start of his second chapter, 
“Prologue to Air Strategy,” he again addresses the challenge of strategic theory, and why 
it so often surrenders to the tide of simplification, emerging as maxims and stratagems: 
“Military strategy, while one of the most ancient of the human sciences, is at the same 
time one of the least developed. One could hardly expect it to be otherwise. Military 
leaders must be men of decision and action rather than of theory. Victory is the payoff, 
and therefore the confirmation of correct decision. There is no other science where 
judgments are tested in blood and answered in the servitude of the defeated, where the 
acknowledged authority is the leader who has won or who instills confidence that he 
will win.”910 Brodie adds, “Some modicum of theory there always had to be. But like 
much other military equipment, it had to be light in weight and easily packaged to 
be carried into the field. Thus, the ideas about strategy which have evolved from time 
to time no sooner gained acceptance than they were stripped to their barest essentials 
and converted into maxims or, as they have latterly come to be called, ‘principles.’ The 
baggage that was stripped normally contained the justifications, the qualifications, 
and the instances of historical application or mis-application.”911
Brodie notes that the “‘principles of war’ derive from the work of a handful of 
theorists, most of them long since dead,” and that “[t]heir specific contributions to 
living doctrine are not widely known, because their works are seldom read.”912 He 
adds that the “richness of their ideas is but poorly reflected in the axioms which have 
stemmed from those ideas,”913 tilting his hat toward the likes of Clausewitz, and not 
Jomini. When it comes to the new field of air power, Brodie adds there has been 
only time enough for “one distinguished name” to emerge, that of Douhet, whose 
“essential, correct, and enduring contribution lay in his turning upside down the 
old, trite military axiom, derived from Jomini, that ‘methods change but principles 
are unchanging,’” instead insisting “that a change in method so drastic as that forced 
by the airplane must revolutionize the whole strategy of war.”914 Brodie thus directly 
rebukes Jomini and the Jominian influence, and in his praise of Douhet carves out a 
910. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 21.
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function for strategic theory that more properly mimics the complex but insightful 
tradition of Clausewitz, who would emerge as the principal inspiration for Brodie. 
Before leaping into his discussion of air power and the legacy of Douhet, which reiter-
ates his December 31, 1952 RAND research memorandum, RM-1013, “The Heritage 
of Douhet,” RM-1013, Brodie presents a quick introduction to the field of “modern 
strategic thought,” including an examination of the dual (and dueling) influences of 
Clausewitz and Jomini. 
Brodie notes the emergence of some half dozen to a dozen enduring “principles 
of war” that are “supposed to be unchanging despite the fantastic changes that have 
occurred and continue to occur in almost all the factors with which they deal,”915 and 
points out that “[i]n a world of ideas such durability is usually characteristic either of 
divine revelation or of a level of generality too broad to be operationally interesting,”916 
making these “hallowed ‘principles’ . . . essentially common sense propositions,”917 
and though they contain obvious “utility,”918 “unreasoning devotion” to them can also 
prove to be “unfortunate” as happened when Admiral Halsey refused to divide his fleet 
in dogmatic obedience to “an antique slogan” only to “throw the whole of the great 
Third Fleet against a puny decoy force under Admiral Ozawa.”919
Brodie, much more the Clausewitzian than the Jominian, argues that “[i]f we 
wish to avail ourselves of whatever light the wisdom of the past can throw upon our 
present problems, we must go beyond the maxims which are its present abbreviated 
expression,” and while “[t]he maxim may be the final distillate of profound thought,” 
by the time “it becomes common currency it is likely to be counterfeit.”920 And so 
Brodie turns to a proper understanding of strategic thought, rejecting maxims and 
stratagems in favor of a more fundamental understanding of the essence of war and 
strategy. Brodie thus turns to Clausewitz, noting with curiosity that his famous maxim 
that “‘war is a continuation of policy by other means’ happens never to be included 
in the lists of ‘basic principles’ – an omission that is both curious and significant.”921 
Brodie notes “how small is the number of general treatises on strategy even over the 
span of centuries,” in contrast to the bountiful “richness of writings in military his-
tory” which “does not prepare us for the poverty in theoretical writings on the strategy 
of war,” with only a “few theorists (that) have enjoyed an exceptional scarcity value,” 
first and foremost among them being Clausewitz, whom Brodie calls “the first great 
915. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 23.
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creative figure in modern strategy” on a level comparable to Adam Smith in econom-
ics, but who in contrast to Smith, who turned out to mark the “headwaters of a large 
and still expanding river of thought to which many great talents have contributed,” 
poor Clausewitz “stands almost alone in his eminence,” and while “[o]thers may be 
worthy of honor, especially his contemporary Antoine Henri Jomini,” none “challenge 
his preeminence,” and only some “two-thirds of a century later” does there appear a 
figure of “comparable stature,” with the emergence of the naval strategist Mahan, and 
even later, the air power theorist Douhet.922 Brodie acknowledges “skipping over the 
names of some distinguished theorists,” but asserts “only a small number of men have 
left written judgments and precepts that influenced the thinking of soldiers in their 
own, and subsequent generations.”923 One reason for Clausewitz’s endurance, revival, 
and relevance to the contemporary world has to do with the transformation of war 
by Napoleon. While “we may have little to learn from the purely military strategy of 
pre-Napoleonic wars,” Brodie suggests that “we may have something to learn from 
the eighteenth century concerning the use of war in pursuit of political purposes,” 
and this is one of the centerpieces of Clausewitz’s analysis and the focus of his most 
well-known dictum.924 
Brodie credits Napoleon for introducing us to the “era of modern war on land,”925 
noting his “genius lay less in novel tactical and strategic combinations than in his ability 
to see basic changes in strategic conditions . . . and to exploit them.”926 Further, “[w]
ith national armies raised by conscription and supported by the whole people,” an 
able commander “could do what was not possible with mercenary forces maintained 
by the prince for strictly dynastic purposes,” and so armed, Napoleon was able to 
“bring superior forces to bear on successive portions of the opposing forces before 
the latter had a chance to unite,” applying “a dense mass of troops, without regard 
to losses,” against the opponent. Brodie was impressed with Napoleon’s recognition 
of the importance of history, writing: “Napoleon’s attitude towards the intellectual 
basis of his art is reflected in a number of his famous maxims, of which the following 
is representative: ‘Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, 
Gustavus Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Make them your models. This is the only 
way to become a great general and to master the secrets of war.’ What he was urging 
was a creative reading of history, not a sterile review of rules and principles, which 
then scarcely existed in any systematic form. Such also must have been the prescrip-
tion of his great predecessors. Frederick wrote his own treatises on strategy, but in his 
922. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 28-9.
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active years in the field there had been little of the sort for him to read.”927 Napoleon’s 
influence reached beyond the battlefield, into the very study of war, as his “startling 
innovations and even more startling achievements inspired the work of Clausewitz 
and Jomini,” of whom the former is elevated as “clearly the greater,” even though the 
latter “was much the more influential.” In this observation we find a similar parallel 
to the nuclear era strategists, Brodie included; after all, it was Herman Kahn whose 
influence reached beyond the insular world of strategic thinkers, permeating the public 
consciousness and even engaging pop culture, suggesting that even in our own time 
as during Clausewitz’s that the more influential strategic theorist is not necessarily the 
better theorist, which by most accounts remains none other than Brodie himself, as 
Schelling affirmed in his post-mortem tribute to his colleague and friend
Adding to Jomini’s influence was the fact his rival’s major work was not published 
until after Clausewitz’s death whereas “Jomini enjoyed a remarkably full literary career 
through a very long life,” and that he also “wrote in French, a much more international 
language than the German of Clausewitz.”928 Further, Jomini’s writings were “easier to 
comprehend” than his rival’s and also “more concrete and ‘practical,’ and more deter-
mined to provide guidance for action and to arrive at ‘fundamental principles,’”929 all 
giving Jomini an edge (and also mirrored by the more successfully marketed work of 
Herman Kahn, who also aimed more squarely at the world of action than the halls of 
higher thought and reflection. And so, observed Brodie, “Clausewitz’s appeal is limited, 
for he is much more given than Jomini to ‘undogmatic elasticity’ in his opinions, and 
he is more metaphysical in his approach,” and though “an active professional soldier, 
he wrote with competence on philosophical problems pertaining to the theory of 
knowledge,” and “his insights, like those of all great thinkers, can be fully appreciated 
only by readers who have already reflected independently on the same problems.”930 
And so Brodie naturally felt a greater affinity for the famed philosopher of war than his 
contemporary. Of course, Clausewitz’s influence among Prussian and German military 
professionals grew dramatically as the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth 
began, so by the time Schlieffen became chief of the General Staff, Clausewitz’s star 
had begun to shine brightly, so much so that he “had become a shade rather than 
a living spirit, quoted abundantly but not studied in any comprehending fashion,” 
and thus widely misunderstood, a situation the persisted well into the nuclear age, 
necessitating Brodie’s contribution to the 1976 translation of On War by means of a 
guide to understanding the intent of the master strategist, clarifying and explaining 
Clausewitz in order to prevent continued misperception.
927. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 33.
928. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 34.
929. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 34.
930. Brodie, “Prologue to Air Strategy,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 34.
212 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Brodie attributes the continued endurance of Clausewitz and Jomini into our era, 
making “large portions of their work come alive today, especially that of Clausewitz,” 
not to the “elucidation of principles but rather the wisdom which they brought to 
their discussion of them,” and “[i]n the case of Clausewitz this wisdom is reflected 
in a breadth of comprehension which makes him dwell as tellingly on the qualifica-
tions and exceptions to the basic ideas he is expounding as he does on those ideas 
themselves.”931 Brodie is further impressed by Clausewitz’s “not merely distinctive but 
very nearly unique” contribution to the study of war: that is, “[n]o other theorizer 
on military strategy has penetrated so incisively to the nature of the relationship 
between war and national policy.”932 But at the same time Brodie finds Clausewitz 
to be much misunderstood, in part because “the fruits of his brooding thought are 
transmitted by capsular quotations taken out of context,” such as his discussion of 
“total or ‘absolute’ war,”933 for which he is wrongly presumed to be an apostle when 
in fact he believed war to be constrained by political objectives and obscured by 
many elements of fog. As Brodie observes, Clausewitz’s “method,” borrowing rever-
ently from Hegel’s thesis and antithesis, combined with his “natural inclination of 
a searching mind to work all around a subject,” makes him “quotable on whichever 
side of an issue one desires,” and on top of this, “he is of all the noteworthy writers 
on strategy the one least susceptible to condensation.”934 But in spite of Clausewitz’s 
best efforts, and the promise his sophistication offered the field of strategic theory, 
“what developed from the groundwork which Clausewitz and Jomini so brilliantly 
laid down at the beginning of the century preceding the first World War” was an 
unfortunate “Decline of Strategic Theory,” as his next section is so labeled, and as 
such, “the study of strategy, which is in part historical but in larger part also analytical 
and speculative, has tended to fall between two stools, being neglected by the profes-
sions of arms and of scholarship alike.”935 While military values “are not incompatible 
with scholarly values,” Brodie has found that the “pursuit of normal duties” doesn’t 
“leave much time” for scholarly pursuits.936 He noted prior to the atomic age, most 
“writings in strategy were usually built upon critical study of the military history 
available to their authors,” often “incomplete,” sometimes “inaccurate,” and always 
“vicarious” to actual military experience.937 When the calamity of World War I came 
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to pass, Brodie believes the cause can be at least in part assigned to the failure of 
strategists to heed Clausewitz’s most famous point, that asserting the interconnected 
nature of policy and war. 
In the killing fields of World War I, total war erupted in a conflict that was ultimately 
about limited objectives. “Thus a war that was clearly not being fought for total objec-
tives, such as the political extirpation of the enemy state, was allowed to become total 
in its methods and intensity,”938 and citing the wisdom of Clausewitz, he adds: “Policy 
is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordina-
tion of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing that is 
rationally possible.”939 But as things unfolded across Europe, the first World War was 
a “purposeless war, which no one seemed to know how to prevent and which, once 
begun, no one seemed to know how to stop,” as Brodie explained,940 and was “also a 
war which, because of technological changes of much lesser degree than those which 
are new to us now, completely baffled the military leaders who had to fight it. They 
were not incompetent men, but they had been reared under a regime of maxims and 
precepts which bore no relation to the situation in which they found themselves,” and 
this “bafflement and confusion contributed enormously to the tragedy.”941 Ominously, 
Brodie suggested that “if the total war of the future is fated to be the one where victory 
is pursued blindly, and therefore at wholly incommensurate costs which destroy its 
meaning, it will be more akin to the first than to the second of the two world wars.”942 
Again citing Clausewitz, this time in response to the frenzied release of popular pas-
sions during the French Revolution, Brodie provides us with an explanation for the 
purposeless lethality that erupted in World War I: “The means available – the efforts 
which might be called forth – had no longer any definite limits; the energy with which 
the war itself could be conducted had no longer any counterpoise and consequently 
the danger for the adversary had risen to the extreme.”943 
Nuclear Weapons and Total War
This unlimited “purposeless lethality” as experienced during World War I serves as 
a compelling prelude to Brodie’s exploration of nuclear weapons, and their impact 
on war. His early conclusions, about the revolutionary impact of atomic weapons, as 
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articulated in The Absolute Weapon and in his early articles, are only reinforced by the 
next leap in destructive power when atomic weapons became dwarfed by thermonuclear 
weapons. Brodie recounts, in his 1959 work, the remarkable changes that had taken 
place since The Absolute Weapon, finding none challenged the “immediate and almost 
universal consensus” that formed after Hiroshima that “the atomic bomb was different 
and epochal.”944 Added Brodie, “On the contrary, the first decade of the atomic age 
saw the collapse of the American monopoly, of the myth of inevitable scarcity, and 
of reasonable hopes for international atomic disarmament. It saw the development 
of the thermonuclear weapon in both major camps. If at the end of that decade one 
looked back at the opinions expressed so voluminously at the beginning of it, one 
found almost none that had proved too extravagant.”945 
Brodie suggests, a decade into the atomic era, “we may first ask what difference, 
if any, the thermonuclear or fusion or hydrogen bomb must make for our strategic 
predictions,” and suggests, hypothetically, “We have been living with the fission bomb 
for more than a decade, and it may well be that the fusion type of introduces nothing 
essentially new other than a greater economy of destruction along patterns already 
established. Unfortunately, that is not the case.”946 With fusion bombs, we find an even 
greater split with the past than that caused by the advent of fission bombs. At least 
“fission bombs were sufficiently limited in power to make it appear necessary that a 
substantial number would have to be used to achieve decisive and certain results,” and 
this “made it possible to visualize a meaningful and even if not wholly satisfactory air 
defense,” thus sustaining our need “to think in terms of a struggle for command of the 
air in the old Douhet sense,” and to “apply, though in much modified form, the lore so 
painfully acquired in World War II concerning target selection for a strategic-bombing 
campaign,” as it was still “possible also to distinguish between attacks on population 
and attacks on the economy,” and lastly, “ground and naval forces, though clearly 
and markedly affected by the new weapons, still appeared vital.”947 All this changed 
with thermonuclear weapons, though Brodie acknowledges that it was possible that 
“the feeling that the H-bomb was distinctively new and significantly different from 
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the A-bomb argued in part an under-estimation of the A-bomb.”948 But with the de-
structive power of fusion weapons so much greater than fission bombs, Brodie noted 
“[o]ne immediate result of the new development was the realization that questions 
inherited from World War II concerning appropriate selection among industrial target 
systems were now irrelevant.”949 Brodie adds, “It is idle to talk about our strategies be-
ing counter-force strategies, as distinct from counter-economy or counter-population 
strategies, unless planners were actually to take deliberate restrictive measures to refrain 
from injuring cities.”950 
But Brodie takes care to emphasize the new scale of destructiveness, to dispel any 
illusions that we may comprehend the scale of destruction in a future thermonuclear 
exchange, as “never, even when the British-American strategic bombing forces were 
at the height of their power, were they able to inflict in six months or even a year of 
bombing the scale of destruction that would lie easily within the capability of the 
United States or the Soviet long-range bombing forces on Day One or even Hour One 
of a new war.”951 And Brodie firmly believes “No one can specify how many bombs 
it would take to ‘knock out’ . . . a country as large as the Soviet Union or the United 
States, since analytical studies of the problem can do little more than suggest broad 
limits to the reasonable range of figures,” and “cannot even touch the imponderables, 
such as popular panic and administrative disorganization, which might easily govern 
the end result.”952 Brodie adds that such “people who do such analyses are as a rule 
interested in the results from the offensive or targeting point of view,” so “therefore 
consider it a virtue to be conservative in their estimates of damage,” and even to 
“dismiss the imponderables as unmeasurable.”953 Brodie notes “the fantastic degree to 
which the coming of the A-bomb gave a lead to the offense over the defense,” and 
adds that “subsequent developments in nuclear weapons have tended to further that 
advantage.”954 Indeed, in even the best case scenario imagined by Brodie, the “mini-
mum destruction and disorganization that one should expect from an unrestricted 
thermonuclear attack in the future is likely to be too high to permit further meaning-
ful mobilization of war-making capabilities over the short term,” and “whether the 
survivors be many or few, in the midst of a land scarred and ruined beyond all present 
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comprehension they should not be expected to show much concern for the further 
pursuit of political-military objectives.”955 
In many ways the analytical heart of Strategy in the Missile Age is Brodie’s eighth 
chapter, “Anatomy of Deterrence” – which first appeared the year before as a RAND 
paper conceived from the outset as part of his ongoing project on strategy in the 
aviation age that took book form at Strategy in the Missile Age, and which was also 
published as an article with the same title in World Politics in January 1959 – where 
Brodie reasserts his fundamental belief in the strategy of deterrence, which has held 
steady since his first formal articulation of the theory earlier in the atomic era, and 
which presupposes America’s unlikelihood to “ever deliberately initiate a total war for 
the sake of securing to ourselves the military advantage of the first blow”956as he had 
argued in his prior chapter where he reiterated his rejection of preventive war, and 
“the complementary principle of limiting to tolerable proportions whatever conflicts 
become inevitable”957 as he had long argued and which would form the heart of his next 
chapter on limited war; as a consequence, America settled upon a strategy of deter-
rence largely by default, rooted ultimately in the “rejection of the idea of ‘preventive 
war.’”958 This leads inevitably to a serious consideration of such concepts as limited 
war, flexible response, and the dynamics of intra-war escalation, which are considered 
by Brodie along with the entire brotherhood of nuclear wizards for the remainder of 
the Cold War era, sometimes quite fractiously. 
Brodie noted deterrence had long been part of both “national strategy or diplomacy” 
and in and of itself was “nothing new,”959 and even speculates that deterrence may 
have played a more active role in the unfolding of history than historians recognize. 
As Brodie observed deterrence is as old as the art of war and that “the threat of war, 
open or implied, has always been an instrument of diplomacy,” but that since the 
advent of nuclear weapons, “the term has acquired not only a special emphasis but also 
a distinctive connotation.”960 Indeed, the recurrent outbreak of war suggests that “the 
threat to use force, even what sometimes looked like superior force, has often failed to 
deter,” suggesting the need for there to be “credibility inherent in any threat,” and for 
deterrence to be dynamic, acquiring “relevance and strength from its failures as well 
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as its successes.”961 Brodie suggests that deterrence may be something of a recurring 
hidden secret, an untold story underlying much of human history, hidden behind all 
those battles that were never fought – “because avoidance not only of wars but even 
of crises hardly makes good copy for historians, we may infer that past successes of 
some nations deterring unwanted action by other nations add up to much more than 
one would ever gather from a casual reading of history.”962 
But prior to the nuclear age, deterrence could afford to be “dynamic” as it “acquired 
relevance and strength from its failures as well as its successes,” whereas post-Hiroshima 
the risks of failure had become too great, using “a kind of threat which we feel must 
be absolutely effective, allowing for no breakdowns ever.”963 A feature of deterrence that 
strikes Brodie as “unreal” is our hope and expectation that “the retaliatory instrument 
upon which it relies will not be called upon to function at all,” and yet must “be 
maintained at a high pitch of efficiency and readiness and constantly improved . . . at 
high cost to the community.”964 Or as Brodie similarly described in his World Politics 
article that served as the foundation of this chapter, deterrence in the nuclear age is 
different in that “it uses a kind of threat which we feel must be absolutely effective, 
allowing no breakdowns whatsoever,” since one failure would be “fatally too many.”965 
This reveals an underlying contradiction inherent in this so-called absolute weapon: 
“We thus have the anomaly that deterrence is meaningful as a strategic policy only 
when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies will 
not be called upon to function at all,” and as a consequence, we will be continuously 
“expecting the system to be constantly perfected while going permanently unused.”966 
As Brodie suggests, “Surely, we must concede that there is something unreal about 
it all.”967 
Such an unreality can be seen in the doctrine of “Massive Retaliation” that was 
adopted by the Eisenhower administration after the frustrating and strategically 
ambiguous conclusion to the Korean War, in spite of the fact that it had remained a 
non-nuclear conflict, and thus was waged in a manner that was definitively limited. 
Consider the strategic enunciations of John Foster Dulles, who presented the new 
doctrine of Massive Retaliation in 1954, a doctrine that appears cut from the same 
philosophical cloth as Brodie’s very first theoretical impulses when articulating the 
961. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 272; World Politics, 174; RAND (RM-2218), 4.
962. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 271; World Politics, 174-175; RAND (RM-2218), 4.
963. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 272; RAND (RM-2218), 4-5.
964. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 272-73; RAND (RM-2218), 5. 
965. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 175; RAND (RM-2218), 5. 
966. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 175; RAND (RM-2218), 5.
967. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 175; RAND (RM-2218), 5. In Strategy in the Missile Age, Brodie 
modifies this slightly to be, “Surely, there is something almost unreal about all this,” 273.
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principles of nuclear deterrence in 1945.968 The logic of massive retaliation or what has 
been called “assured destruction” clashes with its emotional credibility. Would a massive 
escalatory response follow a limited attack? Would the center risk its own existence 
to secure an ally on its distant periphery, or might this violate the essential wisdom of 
Clausewitz, and those who came before him, for balanced reciprocity? The economic 
logic, and political logic in the wake of the Korean War, was indeed attractive. But the 
emotional unreality of massive retaliation became its Achilles’ heel: since deterrence 
was designed to preserve the security of the West and to protect its basic liberties, that 
it at once seemed unreal raised some troubling questions that the warfighters later 
sought to correct: not trusting in the system to correct itself by self-balancing, and 
fearing that a failure in credibility would undermine the viability of the system, the 
warfighters were prepared to take things into their own hands. In a way, their efforts 
were a reflection of the system’s need to correct itself, as the strategists and targeters 
were part of the system, rooted in the Waltzian first image, raised and nurtured in the 
bosom of its second to conduct foreign and defense policy, all in an effort to augment 
the weakness they perceived in the third. This interconnectedness of all three “levels 
of analysis” or “Waltzian images,” at once suggests the continued relevance of classi-
cal realism, the overriding imperatives of neorealism, and the intermediating impacts 
of what some observers would later call neoclassical realism. Adding to the muddle 
of labels, the individual actors on Level 1 sought to construct weapons systems and 
decision-making structures at Level 2 in the hope of increasing order at Level 3, and as 
such suggest that the constructivists, who emphasize the primacy of social construction 
to both theory and action in international affairs, may also be correct. 
Brodie tackles this thorny problem of credibility, and argues that for “basic deter-
rence,” credibility is a non-issue since “the enemy has little reason to doubt that if he 
strikes us, we will certainly try to hit back.”969 But to back up the threat with deeds, 
Brodie says we must meet the challenge of “fitting this power into a reasonable concep-
968. John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin 30 (January 25, 1962): 107-10. 
As Dulles proclaimed: “We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less 
costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power. This 
is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed 
guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and 
steal that, in fact, would be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a 
bearable cost. What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves 
and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. Local defense will always be important. But there is no 
local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced 
by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe 
battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be 
tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places 
where his superiority was decisive. The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond 
vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.”
969. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” World Politics, 175-176; RAND (RM-2218), 5. In Strategy in the Missile Age, 
Brodie puts it nearly the same way: “the enemy has little reason to doubt that if he strikes us, we will try to hit back,” 273.
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tion of its utility,” placing a “considerable strain” upon us as we seek to harness that 
“almost embarrassing availability of huge power,” leading us, during our early nuclear 
adolescence, to espouse the doctrine of massive retaliation, which we later “rejected 
in theory but not entirely in practice,” even while it lacked credibility as a response 
to “less than massive aggression.”970 To close the gap, Brodie chronicles the evolution 
of “win-the-war strategies” along “the sliding scale of deterrence,” which follows an 
asymptotic curve of declining deterrent effect as the nuclear force multiplies: just cross-
ing the nuclear chasm contributes the maximum effect, hence the race by so many 
states to join the nuclear club, particularly now when nuclearization is one of only 
two known methods to avoid pre-emptive strike by the newly assertive United States, 
the other being nuclear disarmament or, to some, surrendering without a fight to the 
West – as witnessed at the Cold War’s end by poor nuclear states Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and South Africa, each surrendering their nuclear status for a combina-
tion of incentives including money and diplomatic recognition by the victorious 
post-Cold War West.971 For the bankrupt states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
this was a no-brainer since they lacked the indigenous technological capability and 
financial resources necessary to sustain their nuclear arsenals, which were developed 
with Soviet intellectual property; and for South Africa, the absolute weapon had been 
developed as a doomsday weapon to prevent the ouster of the Apartheid oligarchs by 
the black African majority, but with the peaceful resolution of South Africa’s internal, 
ethno-political dialectic and the constitutional integration of black and white into the 
newly democratic South Africa, there was no need for an internal deterrent to create 
a firewall between the races any longer, and the Apartheid scientists hardly desired 
to see the bomb transforming the military power of sub-Saharan Africa, giving their 
former enemies an absolute weapon to wield.
Brodie considers the requirements for deterrence to succeed in the nuclear age – and 
points out that what matters more than “the size and efficiency of one’s striking force 
before it is hit as the size and condition to which the enemy thinks he can reduce it 
by a surprise attack – as well as his confidence in the correctness of his predictions,” 
a kind of logic Brodie finds traditional military planners uncomfortable embracing, 
being “unused to thinking in terms of the enemy having the initiative” and inclined 
by reasons of “training, tradition, and often temperament” to be “interested only in 
strategies that can win,” which is often more than needed for successful deterrence.972 
Brodie concludes that “diversification for the hard-core survival forces” will improve 
the probability of surviving a surprise attack, and this leads Brodie to prescribe a triad 
970. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” World Politics, 176; RAND (RM-2218), 6. In Strategy in the Missile Age, Brodie 
uses the words “linking this power to” in lieu of “fitting this power into,” 273.
971. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 274; World Politics, 176; RAND (RM-2218), 7.
972. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 281; World Politics, 180; RAND (RM-2218), 14.
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of ballistic submarines, land-based missiles and strategic bombers, each with its vari-
ous pros and cons, that together helps to offset the others’ weaknesses.973 But having 
a survivable force structure capable of unleashing God’s fury is just the beginning; 
the end is having a targeting strategy that contributes to the deterrent effect: Brodie 
argues that we must have, as primary retaliatory targets, targets dear to the heart of 
the enemy – his cities: “The rub comes from the fact that what appears like the most 
rational deterrence policy involves commitment to a strategy of response which, if we 
ever had to execute it, might then look very foolish. And the strategy of deterrence 
ought always to envisage the possibility of deterrence failing.”974 Because, presumably, 
the enemy “cares intrinsically more [for] those cities than he does for his airfields, 
especially after the latter have already done their offensive work,” we have little choice 
but to focus our retaliatory wrath upon them. But what if the enemy, in his surprise 
attack, takes great caution to protect our cities, and leaves us with “a severely truncated 
retaliatory force while his force remained relatively intact?”975 Won’t such a counter-city 
retaliation be an act of “suicidal vindictiveness?”976 
As such, Brodie deduces that “it is easy to imagine a situation where it is useless to 
attack the enemy’s airfields and disastrous as well as futile to attack his cities.”977 Would 
our capacity “in our rage and helplessness” to “strike blindly at enemy cities” thus 
deter him from attacking us in the first place?978 Just as Clausewitz sought to tame the 
Napoleonic genie, Brodie seeks to tame the nuclear genie, and suggests that perhaps, 
“for the sake of maximizing deterrence it is wise deliberately to reject the Napoleonic 
maxim, ‘On s’engage, puis on voit.’”979 Brodie thus concludes that for deterrence to 
succeed, a retaliatory response “ought to be not only automatic but sensibly so.”980 Yet 
contradictorily, Brodie also realizes that “a reasonable opposing view is that, however 
difficult it may be to retain control of events in nuclear total war, one ought never 
973. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 285; World Politics, 182; RAND (RM-2218), 17.
974. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 292; World Politics, 185; RAND (RM-2218), 22.
975. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 293; World Politics, 185; RAND (RM-2218), 23.
976. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 293; World Politics, 185; RAND (RM-2218), 23.
977. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 185; RAND (RM-2218), 23. In Strategy in the Missile Age, Brodie 
adjusts “useless to attack the enemy’s airfields” to “of little use to hit the enemy’s airfields,” 293.
978. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 185; RAND (RM-2218), 23. In Strategy in the Missile Age, Brodie 
writes “in our rage and recklessness” instead of “in our rage and helplessness,” and instead of “strike blindly at enemy cities” 
he clarifies this to “strike at something,” 293.
979. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 293; “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 185; RAND (RM-2218), 23. In 
the book Brodie starts the phrase with, “One view might be that,” while in his article and RAND research memorandum 
he starts with just the word, “Perhaps.”
980. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 186; RAND (RM-2218), 24. Brodie rewrites the end of this 
paragraph entirely in the book, though this author’s views is that it was elegantly stated in the article and in the RAND 
research memorandum. In Strategy in the Missile Age, he writes: “For the sake of deterrence before hostilities, the enemy 
must expect us to be vindictive and irrational if he attacks us. We must give him every reason to feel that that portion of 
our retaliatory force which survives his attack will surely be directed against his major centers of population,” 293.
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to abandon control deliberately,” and as such, we must be prepared to cope with “an 
enemy offensive which exercised the kind of discriminating restraint” as he described, 
since it is plausible that “men who have been reared in the tradition which holds that 
extra damage from a delivered bomb is always a ‘bonus’ – a tradition which is prob-
ably as strong on the Soviet side of the military fence as it is on our own,” would be 
inclined to think that way.981 Indeed, Brodie contemplates the benefits of developing a 
“clean” bomb with minimal nuclear fallout to prevent radioactive blowback on neutral 
or friendly soil “and even to drift back to the territories of the users of the bomb,” 
which would satisfy most nuclear warfighters; and at the same time, he contemplates 
the opposite, the development of a “super-dirty” weapon capable of releasing “a 
much greater amount of radioactive fallout” – which, “when we consider the special 
requirements of deterrence in the minimal or basic sense of deterring a direct attack 
upon oneself, it is possible that one can see some utility in the super-dirty bomb,” as 
deterrence demands that the “emphasis has to be on making certain that the enemy 
fears even the smallest number of bombs that might be sent in retaliation,” and con-
sequently, “one wants these bombs to be . . . as horrendous as possible.”982 Thus the 
logic of deterrence nudges us to make “super-dirty, as well as large” bombs that don’t 
require accurate delivery due to their powerful (and messy) effect.983 
Thus the goals of successfully waging nuclear war and preventing war through suc-
cessful nuclear deterrence dictate the development of opposing tools, the warfighter 
seeking cleaner weapons than the deterrer. As such, would the deployment of super-
dirty weapons be, of itself, a less credible deterrent? Does preparing to deter, as opposed 
to preparing for a fightable, winnable nuclear war, create a greater risk, because it erodes 
the credibility of use? Brodie expands his reasoning, briefly, from basic deterrence to 
a “somewhat bolder” manifestation of deterrence that came to define the showdown 
between West and East, extending deterrence to “territories beyond our shores,” and 
he speculates that perhaps, if we protect our mainland population with shelters, this 
might make us bolder, and possibly reckless in our willingness to entertain the thought 
of retaliation if an ally is attacked.984 However, Brodie suggests that “an adequate civil 
981. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 186; RAND (RM-2218), 24. In the book, Brodie tweaks the first 
sentence and its word order, but the meaning is nearly identical: “A reasonable opposing view, however, is that no matter 
how difficult it may be to retain control of events in nuclear total war, one should never deliberately abandon control,” 293.
982. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 186-187; RAND (RM-2218), 25-26. Again, the wording in 
Strategy in the Missile Age is modified but the meaning remains the same, with a slight change in tone toward greater pes-
simism with Brodie writing, “we may find a need even for super-dirty bombs,” 295, from the more hypothetical original 
wording, “it is possible that one can see some utility in the super-dirty bomb.”
983. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 187; RAND (RM-2218), 26. In Strategy in the Missile Age, the 
wording is changed to: “very large and also intensively contaminating,” 295.
984. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics, 187-188; RAND (RM-2218), 27. In Strategy in the Missile Age, 
Brodie drops the words “somewhat bolder” when discussing extended deterrence, but replaces the words “all-important: 
with the word “critical” when describing the need to protect the populace, 296.
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defense program may prove an indispensable factor in keeping wars limited,” by fos-
tering in the enemy “the necessary credibility” that comes with having “some cover 
for our population.”985 But some cover is not necessarily the same secure cover required 
to preserve a “secure retaliatory force,” which is for Brodie the “sine qua non of deter-
rence” and the “one instrument which could conceivably make all other instruments 
designed for defense unnecessary.”986 Prudence suggests the need to go beyond this 
basic sine qua non, and to develop “some backstops” such as “a well-designed shelter 
program for civil defense.”987 And beyond that, Brodie notes some believe it prudent 
to also protect “the tools and materials required for national economic recovery within 
a reasonable period after the war,” suggesting that “a nuclear war is not necessarily the 
end of the world for us, let alone humanity;” hence the notion of preparing “caves and 
unused mines” for the “storage or actual operation of essential production capital,” so 
that there can indeed be a day after.988
Thus Brodie’s preliminary thoughts on nuclear deterrence lead him down the road 
of nuclear ambiguity, as he comes to grips with the contradictions inherent in a nuclear 
warfighting posture and a deterrent posture. The most menacing of threats, such as a 
thermonuclear super-dirty bomb, may not be a practical weapon of warfighting, and 
as such, raises the question: could deterrence remain credible without pursuing clean 
nuclear weapons? Obviously it would not; nor would deterrence remain credible if the 
population was not provided with some cover, and a recovery capability to kick-start 
the economy after nuclear war not developed. Thus, for deterrence to work, for the 
system to remain credible, it must evolve beyond the simple, basic threat of a hor-
rific massive retaliation, to a more graduated, calibrated series of potential strategic 
responses. Deterrence compels us to consider nuclear warfighting, simply for the sake 
of deterrence. And that’s music to the ears of the nuclear warfighters, who did not like 
being left with only super-dirty bombs to wage a shooting war.
One essential requirement of deterrence is that the threats upon which its successful 
operation depends must remain credible, an issue less pertinent for basic deterrence of 
the American homeland, but which begin to lose credibility when applied to less vital 
interests, as Brodie’s discussion of massive retaliation suggested. Brodie’s discussion of 
credibility and in particular the credible survival of the retaliatory force leads him to 
contemplate a “sliding scale of protection” that enables a portion of each component 
of America’s second strike arsenal remains intact and capable of striking back, such 
as through keeping some portion of the strategic bomber fleet “at a very advanced 
985. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 297; World Politics, 188; RAND (RM-2218), 28.
986. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 298; World Politics, 188; RAND (RM-2218), 29.
987. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 298; World Politics, 189; RAND (RM-2218), 29.
988. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 298; World Politics, 189; RAND (RM-2218), 29.
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state of readiness”989 or even airborne, while keeping another portion onboard nuclear 
submarines, and yet another portion in hardened ballistic missile silos, with each 
component enjoying relative and varying strengths and weaknesses and the overall 
mix ensuring the survival of the deterrent force. Thus Brodie concludes that it is 
“unavoidable that for some time in the future the ideal strategic bombing force will 
be a mixed missile and manned-aircraft force,” though Brodie expects that “the missile 
would be favored over the aircraft” for the second strike force.990 As for the targeting 
of the second strike force, Brodie believes that for the purpose of maximizing the 
deterrent effect prior to hostilities, we should “assign the hard-core elements in our 
retaliatory force to the enemy’s major cities, provide for the maximum automaticity 
as well as certainty of response, and lose no opportunity to let the enemy know that 
we have done these things”991 so they know, even in the event of a surprise attack, he 
will pay a high price for his aggression. And yet, as compelling as this logic is, Brodie 
suggests that in the event deterrence fails, it “might look very foolish” to execute.992 For 
instance, Brodie supposes, what if the attacker “took scrupulous care to avoid major 
injury to our cities,” and we retaliated against his cities; then, he would retaliate in 
kind, so “[o]ur hitting at enemy cities would simply force the destruction of our own, 
and in substantially greater degree.”993 Brodie contemplates this ambiguity, trying to 
balance the benefits of the Napoleonic maxim, “on s’engage, puis on voit,” and thus 
responding vindictively and emotionally to the primary attack, versus a more moder-
ated and rational response, based upon the notion that “no matter how difficult it 
may be to retain control of events in nuclear total war, one should never deliberately 
abandon control.”994 The matter remains unresolved, but Brodie suggests the need for 
us to recognize that “wartime decisions may be very different from those we presently 
like to imagine ourselves making,”995 as has been demonstrated throughout history.
When contemplating the maximization of deterrence, Brodie considers some seem-
ingly fanciful and inherently horrific solutions, such as “super-dirty bombs” that are 
designed to inflict a maximum of toxicity and radioactivity, and thus become a weapon 
989. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 284; RAND (RM-2218), 16.
990. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 288; RAND (RM-2218), 19.
991. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 291-92; RAND (RM-2218), 22.
992. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 292; RAND (RM-2218), 22.
993. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 293; the second sentence is not in the original 
RAND research memorandum or article, but was added to the paragraph in the book.
994. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 293; the second phrase is slightly reworded in the 
earlier RAND research memorandum and article but retains the original meaning.
995. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 294. This sentence is a substantial rewrite from the 
earlier paper and article which stated more clearly Brodie’s concern with the ability to recognize “discriminating restraint,” 
and to react appropriately: “The question is whether men who have been reared on the tradition which holds that extra 
damage from a delivered bomb is always a ‘bonus’ … are likely to approach the problem in so dangerously fresh a manner,” 
RAND RM-2218, 24.
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of terror aimed at inducing fear amongst the enemy that “even the smallest number 
of bombs that might be sent in retaliation” would inflict results that are “as horren-
dous as possible,” a weapon of limited battlefield use, in contrast to cleaner weapons 
designed to limit the lethality of their side effects.996 Brodie also considers the role of 
fallout shelters, noting while we may not predict with any accuracy how big a different 
they will make, and that “[w]e could be supine with shelters and brave, even reckless, 
without them,” he nonetheless believes that “if they existed at the moment of crisis, 
they would tend to sustain and fortify an attitude in favor of courageous decision.”997 
As well, credibility itself is uplifted by the existence of shelters, since the enemy must, 
as we must, believe we possess “the requisite willingness” to follow through upon the 
threat of retaliation, even if the sort of crisis that might precipitate a nuclear exchange 
“may seem to be utterly improbable.”998 With regard to the “billions we are spending 
on the total-war aspect of national defense,” Brodie notes “most” is being spent on 
“situations which are, we hope, at least equally improbable,” and that “[a]ll our efforts 
are in fact directed . . . towards making such situations still more improbable. That is 
what national defense is all about in the thermonuclear age.”999 That being the case, 
the risks are so great and the worst case so frightful that Brodie embraces arms control 
efforts, but not necessarily because of any sentimental endorsement of disarmament 
as a goal, as the compelling logic of deterrence makes it “abundantly clear that total 
nuclear disarmament is not a reasonable objective,” and “[v]iolation would be too 
easy for the Communists, and the risks to the nonviolator would be enormous.”1000 
But at the same time, Brodie acknowledges it has become “obvious that the kind of 
bitter, relentless race in nuclear weapons and missiles that has been going on since the 
end of World War II has its own intrinsic dangers,” and in the post-Hiroshima world 
that became so “abundantly supplied with multi-megaton weapons and therefore 
destined hence-forward to be living always on the edge of total disaster,” Brodie came 
to believe “military thinking has to move beyond its traditional fixation on immediate 
advantage.”1001 Consequently, Brodie embraces arms control efforts that promise to 
“seriously reduce on all sides the dangers of surprise attack,” and thus to “reduce on all 
996. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 295. While using different wording, the point is 
nearly identical in RAND RM-2218, 26. The word “some” replaces “even the smallest number of,” but “as horrendous as 
possible” remains the same.
997. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 297. Brodie again adjusts his language but the point 
remains the same as argued in RM-2218, 27-28: “We could be cowardly with shelters and bold (or reckless?) without them; 
but surely if they existed at the moment of crisis, their effect would tend to favor courageous rather than craven decision.”
998. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 297; RAND RM-2218, 28.
999. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 298; RAND RM-2218, 28-29.
1000. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 300; RAND RM-2218, 31.
1001. Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” Strategy in the Missile Age, 300; the first quoted phrase is nearly identical 
with the wording in RM-2218, 31 with slightly different word order, but the second phrase appears to have been added 
by Brodie to the 1959 manuscript.
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sides the incentives to such attack, an end which is furthered by promoting measures 
that enhance deterrent rather than aggressive posture.”1002 Breaking a cycle of hypo-
thetical and Apocalyptic violence, arms control can, in the words of theorist Thomas 
Schelling (whom Brodie salutes for providing “one of the most incisive contributions 
to the literature on disarmament”), “‘Self-Defense’ becomes peculiarly compounded if 
we have to worry about his striking us to keep us from striking him to keep him from 
striking us. . . .”1003 As Brodie explains, any “measures which reduce the probability 
of accidental outbreak of war also reduce the probability of planned or ‘preventive’ 
war,”1004 and in the end, that’s precisely why Brodie concludes that “Nothing which 
has any promise of obviating or alleviating the tensions of such situations should be 
overlooked.”1005
But just as arms control efforts can, by reducing the risk of surprise attack, strengthen 
deterrence while at the same time mitigating the risk of preventive war – thereby 
contributing greatly to international stability, and thus being worthy of pursuit not 
as an end unto itself, but rather a means toward enhancing the viability of deterrence 
strategy – Brodie also considers the logic of limited war, which likewise becomes more 
compelling in the era of thermonuclear weapons when the cost of deterrence’s failure 
is so high that any “large-scale mutual exchange of nuclear weapons on cities reduces 
war to a suicidal absurdity.”1006 Thus Brodie becomes a skeptic on the suicidal impli-
cations of massive retaliation and its “‘all or nothing’ attitude to the use of force.”1007 
Brodie notes “the total-war idea, which seemed so overwhelming in its simplicity, was 
a fairly novel one historically,” and “[f ]ollowing World War I it became axiomatic that 
modern war means total war,” with was again “confirmed and reinforced by World 
War II” and during the subsequent period of America’s atomic monopoly, “there was 
no great incentive for Americans to think otherwise.”1008 
Brodie credits the stalemate of the Korean War for re-introducing the concept of 
limited war, and which “proved anew that great-power rivals occasionally prefer to test 
each other’s strength and resolution with limited rather than unlimited commitments 
to violence, and it demonstrated also some of the major constraints necessary to keep a 
war limited. Most important among these was a willingness to settle for goals represent-
ing a considerable degree of compromise with the enemy, and thus readiness to keep 
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contact and to enter and maintain negotiations with him.”1009 Because “unrestricted 
thermonuclear war seems to be at once much too destructive and too unpredictable 
to be invoked in any but the most dire straits,” this can “explain why serious think-
ing about limited war had to await the coming of the large thermonuclear bomb – 
besides the obvious reason that basic patterns of thinking, and certainly of political 
and diplomatic behavior, always change slowly.”1010 In contrast to total war, limited 
war “involves an important kind and degree of restraint – deliberate restraint,”1011 and 
though great powers are involved, sometimes directly, more often it is waged “through 
proxies on one or both sides,” as would continue to be the case until the Cold War’s 
own conclusion forty years later.1012 Brodie describes the restraint involved as “massive,” 
in that “strategic bombing of cities with nuclear weapons must be avoided,”1013 and 
it is the scale of this restraint that differentiates contemporary limited warfare “from 
anything that has happened in the past.”1014 Limited war thus “connotes a deliberate 
hobbling of a tremendous power that is already mobilized and that must in any case 
be maintained at a very high pitch of effectiveness for the sake only of inducing the 
enemy to hobble himself to like degree.”1015 As Brodie adds, “No conduct like this has 
ever been known before.”1016 While total war in the nuclear age would involve massive 
destruction of urban centers, limited war would be defined by its absence, though “[l]
imited war might conceivably include strategic bombing carried on in a selective or 
otherwise limited manner.”1017 Brodie takes to task those who perceive limited warfare 
to be fought only for “a limited objective,” as such a view “diverts attention from the 
crucial fact that the restraint necessary to keep wars limited is primarily a restraint on 
means, not ends.”1018 It’s not that the ends are unimportant; indeed, quite the contrary. 
The ends could prove to be very important; but we must nonetheless “keep the war 
limited simply because total war as it would be fought today and in the future against 
a well-armed enemy is simply too unthinkable, too irrational to be borne.”1019 And 
there we have it: Bernard Brodie, one of the earliest and by far the most analytically 
sophisticated theorist of deterrence strategy, finds the prospect of fighting a total war 
in the nuclear age to be unthinkable.
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While Brodie in fact does think a great deal about the unthinkable, so much so that 
nuclear warfare is clearly not an unthinkable event, just an unpalatable one, and one 
that he is convinced is mutually suicidal, and thus not in the interest of any major 
power, because he suggests, indeed explicitly states, that total war in the nuclear age is 
“unthinkable,” he exposes himself to criticism from those who find this most insightful 
analyst, and intellectual courageous analyst, is something of a nuclear coward, afraid to 
peer into the nuclear abyss and thus confront the resultant specter of nuclear horror. 
Brodie is anything but. He has peered into the nuclear abyss and emerges somehow 
changed, his realism intact but his ends-means assessment rebalanced. He is not afraid 
of war – indeed, in the coming decade he would counsel tactical nuclear warfare in 
Europe as both logical in the face of Soviet conventional superiority, and de-escalatory 
in the clarity of resolve tactical nuclear use would signal -- he not only fully understands 
the fundamental role war plays in history, but is not afraid to consider the waging of 
limited nuclear warfare when necessary. And, Brodie is not at all afraid of embracing 
the logic of nuclear deterrence, which in fact operates upon a threat so horrible, of 
total war in an age of unlimited destructive potential, that it dwarfs the very power 
of the Leviathan as imagined by Thomas Hobbes and would result in a chaos as dark 
as the very state of nature Hobbes so feared. Brodie thus accepts the efficacy of the 
nuclear leviathan to impose a peace, and to ensure a steadiness to the international 
equilibrium, maintained by the very same foundation of fear that Machiavelli and 
Hobbes embraced, and which both Clausewitz and Jomini struggled to interpret in 
the wake of Napoleon’s brief triumph. Brodie was prepared to tolerate a permanence of 
fear, so long as it was a stable system maintained by reciprocity, and so long as efforts 
were made to enhance its stability. So it’s not that Brodie is frightened into pacifism; 
indeed, he sees in limited war our salvation from the suicidal logic of massive retaliation 
and the all or nothing premise of mutual assured destruction, appropriately known 
as MAD. Later theorists like Herman Kahn, who appropriated from Brodie the no-
tion of the unthinkability of nuclear war, authoring his own popular tome, Thinking 
About the Unthinkable, as if a knowing affront to Brodie’s timidity, and later his On 
Thermonuclear War, suggesting a Clausewitzian realism binding war and politics for 
the nuclear age, as much an affront to Brodie who seemed to more suitably fit the bill 
as the Clausewitz of the nuclear age. In fact, Kahn could be better thought of as the 
Jomini of the nuclear age, not in that his work was any less worthy than Brodie’s but 
rather that Kahn was as much a man of action as Jomini, who fought at Napoleon’s 
side, and was thus able to maintain the enduring embrace of the military leadership 
with his unblinking fearlessness and bravado, while Brodie, the veritable intellectual of 
the bomb, was largely overshadowed by less nuanced men for his thoughtful question-
ing of the effects of strategic bombing, and his skeptical response to SAC’s early war 
plans that, under the influence of LeMay’s pre-nuclear thinking, sought to perpetuate 
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so many of the World War II strategic bombing’s falsehoods and to disregard so many 
of its important lessons.
While thinking about something less unthinkable, such as limited war in the era 
of unlimited weapons, Brodie revisits Clausewitz, and to adapt him for the new era. 
He does not do so lightly, and proceeds with a deep appreciation of the Prussian’s 
theoretical and philosophical contributions to the study of war. As Brodie writes: “It 
is of course true and important that we cannot have limited war without settling for 
limited objectives, which in practice is likely to mean a negotiated peace based on 
compromise. Clausewitz’s classic definition, that the object of war is to impose one’s 
will on the enemy, must be modified, at least for any opponent who has a substantial 
nuclear capability behind him. Against such an opponent one’s terms must be modest 
enough to permit him to accept them, without his being pushed by desperation into 
rejecting both those terms and the limitations on the fighting. . . . We must be clear, 
however, that the curtailing of our taste for unequivocal victory is one of the prices 
we pay to keep the physical violence, and thus the costs and penalties, from going 
beyond the level of the tolerable. It is not the other way around.”1020
Brodie noted there was “Resistance to Limited War Thinking,” and that while “[a]
ll of us assume almost without question that peace is better than war,” that it was 
“curious and interesting that we do not have the same consensus that limited war is 
preferable to total war,” and he attributes this in part to the persistence of “some people 
apparently [who] still entertain fantasies of total war which have the United States 
doing all the hitting while receiving few if any nuclear bombs in return.”1021 Brodie 
comments with dismay, “How these fantasies can exist is a matter of much wonder,” 
particular in that “we have rejected preventive war.”1022 Brodie also attributes what he 
describes as “fantasies of total war” to an underlying psychological cause related to 
the “repressed rages harbored in so many breasts,” a hint of the Freudian influences 
on his own personal thinking about life, death, and conflict.1023 
But Brodie quickly moves on to “important institutional reasons as well” which he 
finds to be “more pertinent to our inquiry.”1024 This is epitomized by “General Douglas 
McArthur’s remark following his dismissal,” that there “can be no substitute for vic-
tory,” which Brodie found to be “endemic in all the armed services” and which “works 
strongly against any restraint upon the use of force in wartime.”1025 Brodie again cites 
Clausewitz, noting the philosopher of war was “ambivalent in this as in many other 
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respects” and thus “can be and has often been quoted out of context to demonstrate 
his vehement rejection of restraint in war.”1026 As for the resistance to restraint, Brodie 
found it to be uneven across the services, with the Air Force in particular “reared 
on the doctrine of the predominance of strategic bombing,” noting that “Airmen, 
however, have always felt, with special justice since the atomic bomb arrived, that a 
total war would be primarily theirs to fight,” and that a “limited war, on the contrary, 
seems to throw the Air Force back into the unpalatable role of providing support to 
the ground forces.”1027 Also contributing to the resistance to restraint was the “adverse 
effects of the Korean War on limited-war thinking,”1028 and while Brodie had found 
the experience of Korea largely positive in that it “made it possible to think of limited 
war in its peculiarly modern form, and on something other than a trivial scale,” that 
during the war and “for sometime afterward, the spontaneous national reaction to it 
was generally one of distaste and rejection,” as it had been both “costly” and “hum-
bling,” and as a direct result, Brodie writes that the “most conspicuous result of the 
war in the field of American diplomacy was the Dulles ‘Massive Retaliation’ speech 
of January 1954.”1029 While Korea was extremely helpful for doctrinal and theoretical 
development, Brodie concedes that America’s “handling of the Korean War does not 
stand as a model for shrewd limited-war strategies,” particular in light of General 
Omar Bradley’s widely shared view that it was “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at 
the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”1030
Brodie argues that it’s “precisely because the chance for total war is finite and real 
that we must think earnestly about limited war,”1031 but that we must nonetheless 
proceed with caution and avoid presuming either that limited wars must inevitably 
escalate into total ones, which Brodie found “to be the vice of intellectuals,” or that 
total war has somehow “now been abolished,” a view held primarily by “practical men,” 
thus enabling all of our military resources to be redirected to the execution of limited 
wars.1032 Brodie believes the latter is “even more dangerous” than the former danger, as 
“it encourages a neglect of the basic precautions enjoined by the danger of total war,” 
and could result in a “recklessness about the handling of limited wars that will make 
it more likely they will erupt into unlimited ones.”1033 Indeed, this very eventuality 
would dominate much of Brodie’s attention, as reflected in the large percentage of 
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his writing devoted to this rising danger, throughout the 1960s, especially after the 
Kennedy-Johnson era commenced and the strategy of Massive Retaliation was firmly 
rejected in favor a new limited war ethos that Brodie came to believe over-emphasized 
fighting conventional wars in its effort to reduce the chance of stumbling into even 
more dangerous nuclear wars – but which would, Brodie later came to believe, not 
only place the security of Western Europe at greater risk, but which would lead to 
unnecessary conventional wars – such as that which ultimately took place in Vietnam.
Brodie’s penultimate chapter addresses economic matters, and is titled “Strategy 
Wears a Dollar Sign,” which reiterates his argument presented at a public lecture at 
Berkeley on November 18, 1954 with the title, “Unlimited Weapons Choices and 
Limited Budgets,” and examines the parallels between economics and strategy, which 
both “are concerned with the most efficient use of limited resources to achieve certain 
ends set by society,” and whose propositions would be familiar to practitioners of either 
craft.1034 In Brodie’s economic discussion, he notes it “is obviously true that national 
military security over the long term requires a healthy economy, for the economy 
must carry the burden,”1035 and how such military leaders as post-World War II army 
chief of staff Eisenhower, and his successor Bradley, both were concerned that military 
spending remain at a level that could be economically sustained1036 He also observes 
how for most of America’s history, it enjoyed great security for a markedly low cost, 
but now, for the first time, its peacetime military expenditures must be sufficient to 
sustain the nuclear peace. Nonetheless, Brodie argues while “[i]f there is no end to 
our insecurity, there does have to be an end to our military expenditures,”1037 but even 
so, with only a modest increase in defense expenditure, he felt “we could provide an 
impressive amount of useful passive defense over a few years, both for our retaliatory 
force and for civil defense, and also a strong force specialized for non-nuclear limited 
war.”1038 And while there remained much uncertainty, Brodie noted that we did know 
with certainty that “we can afford to do much more for our security without giving 
up much more than a certain rate of growth in our very high standard of living; that 
a great deal remains to be done; that if it is done the horrors which a general war 
would bring would be much alleviated; and that the chances of general war would 
be to some real even if unmeasurable extent diminished by our doing it.”1039 To help 
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assess our defense needs, Brodie notes, the fields of systems analysis and war gam-
ing have emerged, but he cautions that despite being “marvelous ways of bringing 
informed, scientifically-trained minds intensively to bear on baffling problems,”1040 
they each present “imperfections and limitations,”1041 including the fact they are both 
based upon “assumptions” derived “with great care” and with the “use all kinds of 
special knowledge” that are “nevertheless estimates untested in war,”1042 and “use not 
one but many such factors, compounding the chances the model will show significant 
departures from reality.”1043 Further while “[t]he element of chance is recognized and 
provided for,” the “turns of the dice which often govern the war game may not give 
us a good clue to that one turn which will govern the real thing.”1044 As well, sounding 
again Clausewitzian, but without mentioning the philosopher of war, Brodie notes 
“[m]any considerations which we know to be extremely important in real life often 
cannot be introduced into an analysis because we lack a means for measurement. 
These involve especially psychological and other imponderable factors.”1045 Ultimately, 
Brodie concludes that: “The truth, unfortunately, is that the profound issues in strat-
egy, those likely to affect most deeply the fates of nations and even of mankind, are 
precisely those which do not lend themselves to scientific analysis, usually because 
they are so laden with value judgments. They therefore tend to escape any kind of 
searching thought altogether. They are the issues on which official judgments usually 
reflect simply traditional service thinking.”1046
Brodie’s discussion of the relationship of economics to strategy, and of the paral-
lels found between economic and strategic thinking, reinforce Brodie’s adherence to 
Clausewitz’s most fundamental dictum wedding war to policy (and not just politics, 
as economic policy and broader issues of economic security are important contextu-
ally to both the formulation of strategic policy, as well as to the pre-war preparations 
through weapons development and deployment programs.) As well, Brodie’s intuitive 
interconnection of strategy and economics proved in some ways prophetic. As Brodie 
died in 1978, he did not live to see the widely unexpected collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion – not under the pressing duress of a preventive or retaliatory nuclear attack, but 
more under the cumulative economic strain of its Cold War military expenditures, 
suggesting the strategy of deterrence, while never tested by force of arms with the ex-
ception of several limited wars fought entirely with conventional weapons, delivered 
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its fatal blow through the slow-motion but inexorably economic impact of the arms 
race itself. So the Soviet Union was not crushed by an external blow, but fell to a 
combination of internal economic collapse and consequent popular uprising, whose 
end result was the complete collapse of the Soviet Union as a sovereign entity, and 
the subsequent re-emergence of the nation-states that had been incorporated into the 
Soviet entity, often by force. 
Thus the relationship of economics and strategy, framed broadly by the Clausewitz-
ian ecosystem of war and policy, experienced what was likely thought of by most war 
planners as an unintended consequence, though from Brodie’s discussion of the eco-
nomic context as well as consequences of strategic planning, one can deduce that he 
would not have been entirely surprised by the Soviet Union’s ultimate end. He full well 
understood that our strategic programs and policies, and the Soviets’ own respective 
programs and policies, each asserted their own economic pressures on the two nations. 
Our funding levels turned out to have been at a level that proved to be sustainable, 
much as Brodie himself predicted, whereas the Soviet economy proved less able to 
sustain such a continuous output, as its GDP was substantially lower while its require-
ments for military expenditure remained comparable, and its security environment 
was considerably more complex, with costs associated with maintaining its empire of 
internal republics and satellite states, and a wide diversity of neighbors ranging from 
NATO opponents to emerging rivals such as China, in addition to direct contiguity 
to the restive Islamic world. So in the end, preparations for the long nuclear peace and 
their sustained economic commitments led to a show-down, but not one defined by 
direct hostilities, at least not total war. Rather, a series of limited wars, proxy engage-
ments, and continued economic commitments to the complex systems required for 
maintaining deterrence – with the final strain that many consider to be the decisive 
blow emanating from the move, rhetorical if not entirely strategical, away from the 
logic of assured destruction and toward strategic defense, as the very expensive Strategic 
Defense Initiative, really from the moment of inception and long before any substantial 
investment had been required, ultimately bankrupted the Soviet economy, resulting 
in its internal collapse and fracture into constituent nation-states. Brodie’s reflections 
are especially interesting in light of this final chapter of the Cold War, and how in the 
end it was not escalation to total war that brought America’s principle opponent to its 
end, but the quiet economic collapse of the Soviet Union, its economy strained to the 
breaking point by its strategic competition with the United States. Brodie would have 
been proud to see the complex, and potentially lethal, system of deterrence held steady 
right up until the end, right to the very eve of the Soviet collapse, proving more stable 
than the underlying political and economic fabric of the USSR
Brodie’s concluding thoughts in Strategy in the Missile Age resonate his fundamentally 
Clausewitzian outlook on war in the nuclear age, and are reminiscent of the ideas that 
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permeated the philosopher of war’s famous work. Just as Clausewitz had struggled with 
his interpretation of Napoleon’s impact on war, learning how to mimic Napoleonic 
methods in his effort to slow and then reverse his march across the continent, and in 
the process grappled with complexity, and contradiction, finding dualities and asserting 
causal linkages such as those connecting war and policy, Brodie similarly grapples with 
the complexities and contradictions of the nuclear age, accepting ambiguities where 
they arise and repeatedly rebuking those whose quest for certainty and simplicity, as 
he found in the military services, led them away from the very complicated truths 
of the nuclear era. Brodie’s journey really starts with a close look at the theorists of 
airpower, but quickly moves on to a consideration of “the utility of these ideas in 
a world shaken by the tremendous revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons, now 
combined with various novel vehicles of delivery including intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.”1047 He further “probed the complexities of the present strategic situation, for 
which our historical experience with war offers so little guidance,” joining Clause-
witz in a similarly complex undertaking.1048 Having found the path of preventive war 
rejected with “quite remarkable unanimity,”1049 and concluding that “it is something 
approaching idiocy to invite total war on any other basis” since “we no longer have 
assurance of getting in the first blow,”1050 there emerges “a special ‘it-must-not-fail’ ur-
gency about deterrence,” even though history presents “little in the experience of our 
own or any other nation” to shape a “purposeful strategy of deterrence.”1051 And yet 
“the fact is that deterrence can fail,” especially so long as there is “great advantage of 
striking first,”1052 thus America must “devote much of its military energies to cutting 
down drastically” this advantage, which “means above all guaranteeing through various 
forms of protection the survival of the retaliatory force under attack,”1053 through its 
“hardening,” something “especially true for the missile age now dawning,”1054 though 
in the “not so distant future, mobility may have to replace hardening as the main prop 
of security to the retaliatory force,” whether utilizing America’s vast and underused 
rail system or its internal water ways.1055 Brodie identifies as the “second principle of 
action” the provision of “a real and substantial capability for coping with limited and 
local aggression by local application of force,” which will require a spirit of compro-
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mise, including the “possible abjuration of nuclear weapons in limited war.”1056 His 
third principle of deterrence emerges “simply from taking seriously the fact that the 
danger of total war is real and finite,” which dictates to us that “[p]rovision must be 
made for the saving of live on a vast scale,” and that “[a]t minimum there is a need 
for a considerable program of fallout shelters outside cities” in order to offset the long 
neglected “military risks we seem daily willing to take.”1057
Brodie also considers the “Problem of Stability” that is unique to deterrence, in-
cluding the seemingly paradoxical “need to limit or control the unsettling effects of 
our deterrent posture.”1058 On this Brodie elaborates: “Deterrence after all depends on 
a subjective feeling which we are trying to create in the opponent’s mind, a feeling 
compounded of respect and fear, and we have to ask ourselves whether it is not pos-
sible to overshoot the mark. It is possible to make him fear us too much, especially 
if what we make him fear is our over-readiness to react, whether or not he translates 
it into clear evidence of our aggressive intent. The effective operation of deterrence 
over the long term requires that the other party be willing to live with our possession 
of the capability upon which it rests.”1059 This subjective dimension of deterrence is 
one aspect of Brodie’s strategic theorizing that brings him closest to Clausewitz, since 
Clausewitz embraced the “moral” and intangible dimensions of warfare, and all the 
ambiguities that entailed. Brodie explains that “we can hardly be too strong for our 
security, but we can easily be too forward and menacing in our manipulation of that 
strength,” so he cautions that we must no longer be so “lacking in awareness that 
deterrence is supposed to last a very long time.”1060 Compounding our challenge, and 
further imbuing deterrence with ambiguity, is the probabilistic murkiness of the en-
deavor, as if it were cloaked in an impenetrable Clausewitzian fog. As Brodie explains, 
“These considerations would have no merit if we knew that the probability of total 
war was in any case infinitesimal, or if on the contrary we had reason to regard it as 
being . . . almost inevitable.”1061 But “because we have no basis for placing the prob-
ability in either the very low or the very high category,” Brodie concludes that “we 
have to take earnest account of the fact that our behavior with the new armaments 
may critically affect it.”1062 
Brodie notes both sides in the deterrence relationship have “reasons for being care-
ful,” and he dismisses the “almost paranoiac fears which have often been voiced in this 
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country of an ‘atomic blackmail’ before which we would be bound to retreat because of 
our presumed greater sense of responsibility or caution.”1063 Instead Brodie believes “we 
have got too accustomed to an attitude which has become increasingly discordant with 
the facts – the attitude that our government, trusting in the continuity of its superior 
strength, is really prepared to use our nuclear total-war capability aggressively over a 
wide array of issues,” and that “[t]his is the kind of ‘bluff’ which results from a failure 
of self-examination.”1064 And while the “complex relationships between military power 
and foreign policy have by no means been adequately explored,” Brodie believes “what 
we have learned or could learn from history on the subject needs to be reappraised 
in the light of the totally new circumstances produced by the new armaments.”1065 As 
easy as this sounds, Brodie notes “experience has nevertheless indicated how difficult 
it is” to in essence change paradigms, as “they appear to run counter to most of the 
standard axioms inherited from an earlier day concerning the attitudes as well as the 
methods by which we should fight.”1066 Before the nuclear age, there was some logic 
to military aggressiveness since that was “an age when it was the same force which 
took the offensive or stayed on the defensive,” and when “an offensive failed, an 
impromptu redeployment usually achieved a defensive posture.”1067 In such a world, 
Brodie writes, “[t]he accent was therefore appropriately on boldness,” because “[e]
ven when boldness proved improvident and costly, it rarely sacrificed the life of the 
nation.” After Hiroshima, this was no longer the case, so if deterrence failed, it could 
be “nearly impossible to avoid total war,”1068 and this might mean ultimately sacrificing 
the life of the very nation itself.
Brodie acknowledges that he has “given relatively little space to the matter of how 
to fight a general war,”1069 something his colleague Herman Kahn would later redress 
with his own work exploring in graphic detail just such a matter. Brodie’s reasons for 
this omission is his belief that “the strategy of a total war is like an earthquake in that 
all the forces which determine its occurrence and its character have been building up 
over time, as have almost all the factors which determine how it runs its course.”1070 
In one manner, Brodie expects the strategy of total war to be simpler than that of the 
second World War, namely the “dominance of strategic air power,” and the primacy 
of the “opponent’s strategic bombardment power” as a target. And, Brodie adds, “[t]
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he strategic air ascendancy which determines the outcome is itself decided by” deter-
mining who strikes first, with what degree of surprise, and against what protective 
preparations of the opponent’s retaliatory force. Brodie believes what will result will 
be “an extraordinarily destructive yet quick contest to determine who retains exclusive 
capability for yet further nuclear destruction,” presumably followed rapidly by armi-
stice negotiations, lest the conflict degenerate into “grandiose, wanton destruction.”1071 
But it is here that Brodie finds simplicity gives way to “difficulty and complexity,” as 
the “unsolved problem of modern total war is that of how to stop it, quickly, once it 
is decided.”1072 And this great “unsolved” challenge makes it ever more likely that “a 
future total war, if it comes, will be enormously more destructive than it needs to be 
to fulfill anyone’s military purpose.”1073
Brodie introduces the historian and icon of realist thought, Thucydides, in his clos-
ing pages as he examines “The Unpredictability of the Outcome,” noting the famous 
historian of ancient Greece once wrote, “Consider the vast influence of accident in 
war before you are engaged in it. . . . It is a common mistake in going to war to begin 
at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter.”1074 Brodie 
finds this wisdom especially relevant to the nuclear age, since “[i]n wars throughout 
history, events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations of both sides, 
victor as well as loser, to have been seriously wrong,” as “[e]ach generation of military 
planners is certain it will not make the same kinds of mistakes as its forebears, not 
least because it feels it has profited from their example.”1075 On top of this, Brodie 
notes the current generation is especially confident because it is “more scientific than 
its predecessors,” but even so, he points out that “[t]he universe of data out of which 
reasonable military decisions have to be made is a vast, chaotic mass of technological, 
economic, and political facts and predictions,” and “[t]o bring order out of the chaos 
demands the use of scientific method in systematically exploring and comparing 
alternative courses of action.”1076 But Brodie cautions that experience “thus far with 
scientific preparation for military decision-making warns us to appreciate how imper-
fect is even the best we can do,” and that “[t]hose of us who do this work are beset by 
all kinds of limitations, including limitations in talent and in available knowledge,” 
with a further complicating factor: “we are dealing always with large admixtures of 
pure chance.”1077 Add to this the ambiguities inherent in determining the opponent’s 
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capabilities and intentions, and the ubiquity of human bias, despite “our strong efforts 
to be objective.”1078 Adding fuel to this combustible fire of complexity is “the utterly 
unprecedented rate of change that has marked the weapons revolution since the com-
ing of the first atomic bomb,”1079 transporting “us far beyond any historical experience 
with war,” and “much too fast to be fully comprehended even by the most agile and 
fully-informed minds among us.”1080 In what one might consider a potential critique 
of the emergent school of warfighters who waded calmly into a sea of presumed cer-
tainty and simplicity, Brodie writes “[o]nly someone very foolish could believe he had 
mastered the unknowns and uncertainties which becloud our picture of future war.”1081 
To these more Jominian thinkers prone to move more quickly from thought to action, 
and thus avoid becoming ensnared by the doubt that seems to have ensnared Brodie, 
he cautions that “[w]e know from even the most casual study of military history how 
fallible man is in matters concerning war and how difficult it has been for him . . . to 
adjust to new weapons. Yet compared to the changes we have to consider now, those 
of the past, when measured from one war to the next, were almost trivial. And almost 
always in the past there was time even after hostilities began for the significance of 
the technological changes to be learned and appreciated. Such time will not again be 
available in any unrestricted war of the future.”1082
Brodie tries to emerge through the fog and uncertainty unscathed, knowing from 
his study of wars past that great commanders overcome systemic chaos, applying their 
genius as Napoleon did, and in the manner prescribed by Machiavelli, augmenting 
their virtu with the blessing of fortuna. And so Brodie observes that, “[d]espite all 
this uncertainty, decisions have to be made,” and the “military establishment has to 
be provided and equipped, and it must develop and refine plans for its possible com-
mitment to action,” but in Brodie’s language, his insertion of the qualifier “possible” 
rendering action into a possibility, not even a probability, he reinforces his hope that 
military action is forever displaced by the permanence of threat. Thus he counsels, 
“We have been forced to revise our thinking about weapons; but unfortunately there 
is not a comparable urgency about rethinking the basic postulates upon which we 
have erected our current military structure,” which remains rooted to “large meas-
ure” in an “ongoing commitment to judgments and decisions of the past.”1083 Brodie 
admits he has in the previous pages “tried to do some of that kind of rethinking,” but 
again it seems vague, unsatisfied or incomplete, clinging to hope that his logic, his 
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confrontation with the all but certain abyss that total war represents “must convince 
us that Thucydides was right, that peace is better than war not only in being more 
agreeable but also in being very much more predictable.” And so Brodie closes his 
treatise on nuclear strategy with a reaffirmation of hope that his strategy, his plan of 
war avoidance rather than warfighting, “offers a good promise of deterring war,” and 
as a result is “by orders of magnitude better in every way than one which depreciates 
the objective of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chances of winning,” 
since even if it is true that “winning is likely to be less ghastly than losing, whether it 
be by much or by little we cannot know.” And this pressing uncertainty, Brodie hopes, 
remains forever shrouded by the fog of unfought future war. 
He places some hope that limited wars fulfill the “function of keeping the world 
from getting worse,” not unlike the limited wars fought during the balance of power 
era, enabling a restoration of equilibrium and preventing a descent into the chaos of 
total war. Oddly, Brodie, a self-admitted adherent of Freudian psychoanalysis, closes 
his masterful work of strategic theory with a comparison of two distinct portions of 
the world, the developing world which faces a self-inflicted chain reaction of its own 
in its runaway population growth, which he believes perpetuates poverty endemic to 
the region, surrendering to an “almost unrestrained procreation which keeps people 
desperately poor;” and the developed world, which “seems to have escaped that danger 
entirely by increasing its productivity much faster than it increases its population,” 
but which now faces “the greatest danger of destruction from nuclear bombs.” These 
two very different parts of our world, Brodie believes, share in “common the fact that 
the chief menace facing each of them is man-made,” and his final words to his read-
ers – who have traveled through the ages, examining the impacts of new technologies 
on the underlying nature of war, and in particular the affirmation in the nuclear age 
of the ascendancy of air power as predicted earlier in the century by Douhet, present-
ing man with the new and haunting riddle of nuclear weaponry, and the risk forever 
with man that whether through malice, aggressiveness, or accident, a sudden onset 
of total war could destroy all that he has built – aims to draw a parallel, between the 
reckless irresponsibility he finds in one, and the potential for wanton self-destruction 
he is afraid might engulf the other, asking, “Do they also share in common a bemused 
helplessness before the fate which each of them seems to be facing?”1084 And so he 
closes, leaving us to mull over his question, and to apply this closing riddle to his 
earlier treatise on deterrence. 
As conclusions go, it seems to be displaced, and discontinuous, with his earlier 
arguments, that suggest the need for us to keep focused on the dangers and the risks 
of total war, so that with each decision that we make, each weapons system imagined 
1084. “Recapitulation and Conclusions,” Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 409.
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or deployed, each response or non-response to aggression, no matter how local or 
peripheral to world affairs, never be divorced from the permanence of danger, and 
the systematization of risk, inherent in our new nuclear-armed world. The connection 
between the population bomb, and the nuclear bomb, was more obvious a generation 
earlier, before the rapid industrialization of the southern hemisphere and the global 
integration of the world’s economies narrowed the poverty-gap between the developed 
and developing worlds. But even so, it reads as if an opportunity has been missed, 
to close his argument artfully, to reassert his central thesis so rigorously developed in 
earlier pages, by instead introducing a new referent, and to make a fundamentally new 
argument about the choice we make. Of course, other futurists including his colleague 
Herman Kahn would address the issue of population growth and Third World poverty, 
as a compelling strategic threat, and would even in his Jominian approach to nuclear 
strategy and his more willing embrace of nuclear warfighting at all levels, consider the 
Malthusian implications of war in the nuclear age; but nonetheless, Brodie’s conclu-
sion to Strategy in the Missile Age seems to almost miss the point, as if he is trying to 
shame the architects of the nuclear world order into showing greater control than their 
counterparts in the developing world, a parochial, indeed condescending, perspective 
on a part of the world that would, in just a few years, command America’s full strategic 
attention as the next limited war, even more so than the war fought to a standstill in 
Korea, greatly taxed and ultimately shook the foundations of American military power.
Missile Age Revisited: Reflections Five Years On
Brodie’s continued thinking about limited war would be reflected in the new preface he 
authored in December 1964 for the paperback edition of Strategy in the Missile Age that 
was published in 1965. That occasion, he writes, served as a reminder that “some time 
has elapsed since the original publication” in 1959, “and that in the field of modern 
strategy time tends to deal severely with concepts as well as facts.”1085 Brodie found 
that “[o]n the whole this book has fared very well,” but nonetheless the passage of a 
half decade did “warrant a statement about what one would do differently if one were 
writing the book today,” and first among these was the coming to power in 1960 of 
President Kennedy, and his – and his successor, President Johnson’s – administrations 
“pursued an ideology in defense matters markedly different from that which infused the 
previous administration,” while Brodie’s 1959 treatise “turned out to be a projection of 
the intellectual structure within which the defense doctrines and distinctive military 
postures of the Kennedy administration were to take shape,” albeit in a “descriptive 
1085. Bernard Brodie, “New Preface for Paperback Edition of ‘Strategy in the Missile Age’,” December 30, 1964, 1.
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rather than a causative sense.”1086 Brodie thus qualifies his “later criticisms of certain 
administration defense policies that seemed superficially to be entirely in line with 
ideas advocated in the original volume.”1087 Brodie thus hopes this explains how he 
could have, in his May 23, 1963 article in The Reporter, “What Price Conventional 
Capabilities in Europe?”, “systematically criticized what I held to be excessive devotion 
to the idea of resisting possible Soviet aggression in Europe mostly by conventional 
means” after he “had apparently advocated comparable ideas” in Chapter 9 of Strategy 
in the Missile Age. 1088Brodie explains that “[o]ne relevant fact and partial explanation 
is that when the book was written (some parts of it were first composed long before 
1959), those sections that deal with limited war, and especially with conventional 
capabilities for fighting a limited war, had to be advanced against much intellectual 
opposition” – so much so that Brodie’s “own writings, then classified, urging that more 
study and resources be devoted to limited-war capabilities date from the beginning 
of 1952 (when I first heard of the thermonuclear weapon to be tested the following 
November), and at that time the views I was expressing met in some quarters not only 
opposition but amazed disbelief.”1089 Brodie adds that it was “difficult to recall now 
that at that time it was a completely accepted axiom – despite the ongoing Korean 
experience, which was regarded as entirely aberrational – that all modern war must 
be total war. This idea had been by no means completely dissipated at the time of the 
publication of the book in 1959.”1090 And it is in “that respect the situation” Brodie 
found as 1964 drew to a close “today is vastly different,” and that the “present frame 
of mind on relevant issues within the defense community … would make unneces-
sary today the tone of advocacy sometimes manifested in the book,” and had it been 
written a half-decade later, “it would be more appropriate to point out (as I tried to 
do in the above-mentioned article and other papers) the limitations and drawbacks 
attending possible over-emphasis of what is basically a good and necessary idea.”1091
In the five years since Strategy in the Missile Age first came to press, Brodie notes with 
much approval the “revolution in the degree of security built into the strategic retali-
atory forces of the two major nuclear powers, especially those in the United States,” 
and while Brodie did “indeed stress in the book the importance of such a chance” in 
1959, he found that the “degree to which it has in fact taken place has outrun my 
expectations,” thanks in large measure to the commitments made by Defense Sec-
retary McNamara and his colleagues in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 
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who “were quick to recognize the importance of this vulnerability problem, and to 
push programs designed to cope with it,” among the most important of which were 
the Polaris submarine and Minuteman missile programs, and whose development 
meant that in a crisis, “the pressure for ‘going first’ with our strategic forces is not only 
reduced but well-nigh eliminated,” bringing “immeasurably more stability into any 
crisis situation,” as a result of which “‘escalation’ to general war is far less to be feared 
from any commitment to limited war than was formerly the case – even, I would 
hold, if nuclear weapons should be used.”1092 
Brodie also considers the lessons of the October 1962 Cuban crisis, noting that 
“its most successful resolution for the United States” resulted from the fortuitous fact 
that Moscow’s leaders proved to be “determined to avoid hostilities with the United 
States – perhaps due in part to the fact that they were less given than our own leaders 
to distinguishing between local and general war and less ready to think of the pos-
sibility of keeping the former from graduating to the latter.”1093 And he briefly notes 
the virtually nil progress made in the area of civil defense since 1959, suggesting that 
the “reason seems mainly to be that while offensive missiles and devices for their pro-
tection promise to deter war, fallout shelters and the like appear to have minimum 
utility for deterrence and are urged mostly for the sake of saving lives if general war 
does in fact occur,” though he found it was “not really surprising that many people 
derive an additional sense of security from attacking what could be of use only if the 
unthinkable happens.”1094 Ultimately, Brodie attributes the endurance of his book, 
and its relevance, across such a tumultuous and fast-changing half decade, to the 
“considerable orientation of the book towards developing the historical origins of 
contemporary situations” as much as to his “lucky guesses concerning the future.”1095
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Chapter Five
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists:  
At the Nexus of War and Policy
To help us live through the new dangers of the nuclear age – and to hopefully avoid 
the very sorts of strategic blunders that led, both ironically and tragically, to America’s 
Vietnam debacle – a new corps of civilian strategists would emerge who dedicated 
themselves to the new and in so many ways unprecedented challenges of the post-
Hiroshima world – an era created by the very wizardry of civilian scientists serving 
the higher purpose of a nation at war, and one that would require a new wizardry of 
civilian strategic theorists to ensure there would be a lasting peace. And Brodie can 
be found at this corps’ very forefront, indeed – among its founders. Among his fel-
low nuclear strategists, Bernard Brodie stood unique in that he was equally adept as a 
theorist and strategist, and was as aware of the historical uniqueness and importance 
of the new field that he was pioneering as he was of the particular strategic challenges 
it was grappling with. In this vein, he was much like Clausewitz, the great philosopher 
of war who was himself a sophisticated philosopher and strategist – and as some have 
argued, a pioneer in the still not yet invented field of complexity theory, anticipating 
a method of analysis that would not emerge until the next century.1096 Brodie would 
ask, over the years, whether strategy was more art or science, concluding as the years 
passed that it should contain elements of both. But early on in his work, he intuited 
the profound need for strategic theory to become more properly scientific, and in so 
doing to gain an analytical capacity that had generally been eluded in the long march 
of time since Clausewitz. Brodie would in fact would be celebrated later on as the 
father of civilian-scientific strategy. In his graduate work, Brodie had looked primar-
ily to America’s “Clausewitz of the Sea,” the naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, for 
inspiration, but before long he was expanding his historical lens to include the more 
recent theorist of air power, Giulio Douhet, as well as the earlier Prussian theorist of 
war from the Napoleonic era, Clausewitz. Brodie would put pen to paper on multiple 
occasions as he probed the lessons that these past thinkers could bring to the chal-
lenges of the nuclear age. 
One of his most illuminating efforts was in his July 1949 World Politics article, 
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“Strategy as a Science,” which appeared just one month before the Soviet Union 
joined the nuclear club with its first successful atomic test on August 29, 1949. Brodie 
started off this article by noting a series of resignations from high ranking positions in 
the U.S. government by top military officials, which he thought, with relief, would 
“no doubt allay somewhat the suspicions current a year or more ago that the military 
were ‘moving in’ where they did not belong,” though he noted that their “original ap-
pointment to civil posts … was hardly due to design on the part of the armed services, 
being quite easily and plausibly explained on other and quite innocuous grounds.”1097 
Nonetheless, Brodie pointed out that “the military departments unquestionably do 
have a greater influence upon high policy decisions than was true before the recent 
war” and that it was “therefore time to express concern not so much that that military 
will move in where they do not belong, but rather that in the process of moving in 
where in part, at least, they do belong, their advice will reflect their imperfections not 
as diplomatists but as soldiers.”1098 Brodie therefore reiterated his view, oft-made, that 
we must never forget the “immortal expression in the famous apothegm of Clemenceau 
that war was too important to be left to the generals” and that “the waging of war or 
the preparation for it requires many skills to which the soldier makes no pretensions,” 
including, Brodie contends, “the skill which is peculiarly his own” which “is in all but 
the rarest instances incomplete with respect to one of its fundamentals – a genuine 
understanding of military strategy.”1099 
Yes, Brodie has come to believe that strategy itself, the very science of generalship, 
has become too complex and requires too much theoretical rigor for the military man 
to fully grasp; as he explain, it “is hardly surprising, since the understanding would 
have to follow the development of a theoretical framework which as yet can scarcely be 
said to exist” and “[c]reating the mere foundations of such a framework would require 
a huge enterprise of scholarship, and the military profession is not a scholarly calling 
– as its members would be the first to insist,”1100 and even the “scholar who on rare 
occasions appears within its ranks can expect but scant reward for the special talents he 
demonstrates,” something Brodie experienced firsthand. Brodie notes that it’s “for quite 
different accomplishments that the silver stars which are the final accolade of success 
are bestowed,” and that the “soldier’s rejection of the contemplative life would be of 
no concern to him or to us if the universally enduring maxims of war – the so-called 
‘classical principles of strategy’ – which are quite simply elucidated and easily under-
stood, really did provide an adequate foundation upon which to erect precise strategic 
1097. Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics 1, No. 4 (July 1949), 467.
1098. Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 467.
1099. Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 467.
1100. Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 467-68.
244 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
plans,” as soldiers have “been trained to believe.”1101 But Brodie believes otherwise 
and in his article he aims “to demonstrate that on the contrary the theory contained 
in those maxims is far too insubstantial to enable one even to begin organizing the 
pressing problems in the field, that the bare core of theory which they do embody is 
capable of and demands meaningful elaboration, and that that elaboration and the 
mastery of it by military practitioners must require intensive, rigorous, and therefore 
prolonged intellectual application.”1102 In short, Brodie’s conception of strategy bears 
a greater similarity to Clausewitz’s complex, at time convoluted, and intellectually 
rigorous conception of the military art, than it does to Clausewitz’s counterpart and 
in many ways antithesis, Jomini, who clearly elucidated maxims warmly embraced by 
military practitioners in the wake of Napoleon’s revolutionary transformation of war, 
including American civil war generals on both sides of that bloody conflict.
Brodie’s effort, if successful, will thereby “demonstrat[e] that strategy is not receiving 
the scientific treatment it deserves either in the armed services or, certainly, outside 
of them” and also “show that our failure to train our military leaders in the scientific 
study of strategy has been costly in war, and is therefore presumptively – perhaps even 
demonstrably – being costly also in our present security efforts.”1103 Brodie considers 
the endurance of “certain basic ideas about fighting a war which over the centuries have 
been proved valid” and which “have been exalted by various writers to the status of 
‘principles,’ and have been distinguished from other elements in the art of generalship 
chiefly by their presumptive character of being unchanging,” such as Jomini himself 
had argued in his famed and “often-quoted dictum,” in which he argued “Methods 
change, but principles are unchanging,” but while unchanging Brodie notes they’re 
“certainly not esoteric” and thus “many generals, from Napoleon to Eisenhower, have 
stressed their essential simplicity.”1104 Brodie further noted that these so-called prin-
ciples “are skeletal in the extreme” and “not only contain within themselves no hints 
on how they may be implemented in practice, but their very expression is usually in 
terms which are either ambiguous or question-begging in their implications – a trait 
which has grown more marked since Jomini’s day under the effort to preserve for them 
the characteristic of being un-changing.”1105 Case in point, the principle of “Economy 
of Force,” or as dubbed by the Canadians, “Economy of Effort,” an idea that is “thus 
reduced to a truism” but whose very “violation has often been advocated during war 
and sometimes practiced.”1106 Brodie finds similar fault with related conceptions like 
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“Principle of Concentration” and “Principle of Aim,” whose most noted commonality, 
to Brodie, is the “barrenness of the concepts.”1107 Unchanging principles may have had 
their use in “a day when the techniques of war changed but little from one genera-
tion to the next,” a time when “they were more than adequate,” but a time that as of 
the nuclear era had clearly passed.1108 Brodie is more sympathetic to Napoleon, who 
embraced a simplicity of precepts but who rightly cautioned those who would try to 
follow too literally in his footsteps: “Napoleon, who often mentioned the simplicity 
of the principles by which he was guided, nevertheless admonished those who would 
emulate him: “Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, 
Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Make them your models. This is 
the only way to become a great general and to master the secrets of war.” It is still a 
good rule. … In the present day, with the techniques of war changing radically not 
only from generation to generation but from decade to decade, a list of theorems in-
herited almost intact from the early nineteenth century, however much embroidered 
by examples even from recent military history, can hardly serve the function generally 
reposed upon it.”1109
As Brodie concludes, “Principles may still survive those changes intact, but if they 
do it will be because they have little applicability or meaning for the questions that 
really matter. The rules fathered by Jomini and Clausewitz may still be fundamental, 
but they will not tell one how to prepare for or fight a war.”1110 The only reason these 
“‘enduring principles’ have endured so long as a substitution for a body of live and 
flexible theory is due mainly to their exceptional convenience,” and that they “lend 
themselves so readily to ‘indoctrination,’” making them “peculiarly well adapted to 
the traditional patterns of military education.”1111 Brodie is as dismissive of the value 
of these enduring principles as he is of military slogans and maxims, noting that the 
“maxim may indeed be the supreme distillate of profound thought, but only at its first 
use – that is, when it is still an apt expression and not yet a slogan. No sooner does 
it become currency than it is counterfeit.”1112 Brodie points out that the “function of 
a slogan is to induce rigidity of thought and behavior in a particular direction,” and 
that the “progress of strategy as a science will be roughly measurable by the degree 
to which it frees itself from addiction to the slogan.”1113 Noting Eisenhower’s effort 
after World War II to “set up a commission under General L. T. Gerow to study the 
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lessons of the European theatre in World War II,” Brodie suggests that “[w]ith their 
traditional reverence for what they term the ‘practical,’ the military are inclined to 
dignify by the name of ‘battle experience’ what is in fact an excessively narrow prag-
matism,” and while “[t]here is of course no substitute for the test of battle or experi-
ence in war,” Brodie suggests that “there are at least three reasons why such experience 
is of limited usefulness and may even be positively misleading.”1114 The first is that 
“since great changes occur from one war to the next, military planners are obliged to 
make far-reaching decisions on issues concerning which there is little or no directly 
applicable experience.”1115 The second is no matter what the merits or detractions 
of a particular decision made in war, “since the enemy’s responses have a good deal 
to do with” the end results, those very “results often fail to provide a basis for judg-
ment upon those decisions,” making it all but impossible to know with any certainty 
whether “a decision which turned out well rather than ill [was] a good decision.”1116 
And, the third is that “even within the scope of what our experience does illuminate, 
the lessons it affords are rarely obvious in the sense of being self-evident,” and we must 
therefore remain “on the alert for rigidities of thought and action in the actors which 
vitiated the results of even repeated experiment” and at the same time “look for the 
hidden jokers in a situation, the vagaries of circumstance which profoundly affected 
the outcome, and … clearly distinguish between the unique and the representative. 
In short, [we] must engage in a refined analytical operation involving a large element 
of disciplined speculation. The task requires a mind trained for analysis and for the 
rigorous scrutiny of evidence.”1117
Brodie notes, in contrast to the field of economics, which “has produced a tre-
mendous body of literature of impressive quality,” the “far older profession of arms, 
content with mere reiteration of its wholly elementary postulates, which change not 
with the changing years, has yet to round out a five-foot book- shelf of significant 
works on strategy. The purpose of soldiers is obviously not to produce books, but 
one must assume that any real ferment of thought could not have so completely 
avoided breaking into print.”1118 In a footnote that follows, Brodie observes, “I am 
trying desperately here to restrain the bias of the academician that the effort of writ-
ing is an almost indispensable catalyst to the production of original thoughts. On 
the other hand, too many people have found that it is so to enable us quite to reject 
the idea.”1119 The upshot, to Brodie, is the dearth of truly worthy strategic theoreti-
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cal literature when compared to the younger but more bountiful field of economics: 
“The comparison drawn above between economics and strategy is especially telling 
in view of the similarity of objectives between the two fields. Although the economist 
sometimes disclaims responsibility for those community values which determine 
economic objectives, it is quite clear that historically he has been devoted mainly to 
discovering how the resources of a nation, material and human, can be developed and 
utilized for the end of maximizing the total real wealth of the nation. … Strategy, by 
comparison, is devoted to discovering how the resources of the nation, material and 
human, can be developed and utilized for the end of maximizing the total effective-
ness of the nation in war.”1120 
In both cases, Brodie notes, “we are dealing primarily with problems of efficiency 
in the allocation of limited resources and with measuring means against policies and 
vice versa.”1121 Therefore, Brodie observes, “One might expect to find, therefore, that 
a substantial part of classical economic theory is directly applicable to the analysis of 
problems in military strategy. One might further expect that if the highly developed 
conceptual framework which lies ready at hand in the field of economics were in fact 
so applied, or at least examined for the suggestive analogies which it offers, some very 
positive results would follow.”1122 It is interesting to note that this is precisely what 
theorists of international politics endeavored to do with their application of systems 
theory to the problems of war and peace, starting with Morton Kaplan, then refined 
by Kenneth Waltz; as they likewise did with the application of game and bargaining 
theory to these very same thorny problems, as illustrated by the work of Thomas 
Schelling. As Brodie reflects, “It might of course be aesthetically abhorrent to discover 
gallant admirals and airmen discussing their common problems, or the occasional 
amiable debates between them, in terms like ‘marginal utility,’ ‘diminishing returns,’ 
or ‘opportunity costs.’ It happens, incidentally, to be quite abhorrent to this writer 
to find himself inadvertently pleading for a jargon in any discipline, though in this 
instance there is no danger of corrupting the pure; the military already have a quite 
substantial jargon of their own. But the advantage of using symbols which are tied to 
well-thought-out formulations has at least two advantages besides the obvious one of 
providing a short-hand for intra-discipline communication: first, it may help to assure 
that the fundamentals of a problem will not be overlooked, and secondly, it may offer 
economies in the process of thinking the problem through.”1123
Brodie concedes there remains a “great hurdle between clear understanding of the 
principles applicable to a problem and the practical resolution of that problem,” but he 
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firmly believes there’s “a great practical difference between that rule of thumb which is 
recognized to be the optimum feasible realization of correct theory and that much more 
common species of rule of thumb which simply replaces the effort of theorizing.”1124 
he adds that “some of the more glaring errors of our recent military history could not 
have been perpetrated by intelligent men who were equipped with even a modicum 
of theory,”1125 so many in fact that “examples could be piled on indefinitely.”1126 And 
“[w]hether this or that concept can be applied with profit is something which interests 
us only in passing,” Brodie’s main point and one he reiterates in later works is that 
it’s “in the field of methodology that a science like economics has most to contribute, 
and the point which it is the whole purpose of this article to bring home is that what 
is needed in the approach to strategic problems is genuine analytical method.”1127 
Especially after Hiroshima; as Brodie notes, “Formerly the need for it was not great, 
but, apart from the rapidly increasing complexity of the problem, the magnitude of 
disaster which might result from military error today bears no relation to situations 
of the past.”1128 
From the prenuclear world, Brodie takes inspiration from Mahan, who despite rep-
resenting “evidence of the primitive development of strategic theory,”1129 nonetheless 
wielded great influence, filling; Brodie notes Mahan most “[c]ertainly … could not 
be called systematic,”1130 and, with his backward-looking naval observations, was “in 
some essential respects behind his own times.”1131 Despite such faults of analysis, and 
evidence of the primitive state of strategic theory in the prior century, Brodie observes 
that Mahan nonetheless “stood before his colleagues as one who seemed to know the 
purpose for which warships were built, and he carried all before him,” and while his 
contribution sets him apart, Brodie notes that “Mahan has remained, for the United 
States Navy at least, an isolated phenomenon” and any “groundwork which he laid for 
what might have become a science of naval strategy was never systematically developed 
by the profession,” and in the decades that followed, “years of overwhelming techno-
logical and political change – the service from which he sprang has not produced his 
successor.”1132 A similar absence of strategic and analytical achievement, Brodie notes, 
was not unique to the Navy: “Air power is still young, but it is certainly not new. 
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Yet it is not possible to find in any language a treatise which explores in discerning 
and relatively objective fashion the role of air power in war, the factors governing its 
potentialities and limitations, its relation to other arms, and the chief considerations 
affecting its mode of operation. Sea power has at least had its Mahan; the literature 
of air power is all fragments and polemics.”1133 
Brodie struggles to identify “available remedies,” explaining that the problem is 
that we’re “dealing fundamentally with a conflict in value systems,” as the “profession 
of arms requires inevitably a subordination of rational to romantic value,” and where 
“[a]ction, decisiveness, and boldness are idealized,” resulting, unfortunately, in an 
“anti- theoretical bias which is in fact anti-intellectual” and where the “emphasis is 
on the so-called ‘practical’” – and “in his eagerness to be doing, he does throughout 
his career a fantastically large amount of work of a sort which contributes nothing to 
his greater understanding of his art even on the technical level.”1134 Even the “training 
at one of the various war colleges – which he reaches at about the age of thirty-five 
to forty – is looked upon as an interlude in the more active phases of his career,” and 
Brodie argues that we “need to make of our war colleges genuine graduate schools in 
method and duration of training,” and that “military staffs should be chosen for the 
special attainments of their members in the several fields of strategic analysis” and 
that students at the war colleges “should be selected according to standards which 
give due weight to the intellectual purpose of the institution.”1135 Brodie expects that 
the “military will object that it is not their purpose to train scholars, that there are 
other besides intellectual qualities necessary in a military leader, and that their needs 
in strategic planners are after all very limited. They are of course right.”1136 
He concedes that a “successful military leader must have something besides a good 
mind and a good education in strategy” but explains that this means only that “the 
military calling is more exacting than others,” and that it carries a unique burden: “In 
what other profession does the individual affect or control directly not only the lives 
of thousands of his fellow citizens but also the destiny of the national community 
and perhaps also of western civilization as we know it? Analytical acumen need not 
be emphasized to the exclusion of those other qualities (i.e., ‘leadership,’ et al.), but it 
has a long way to go to gain consideration even comparable to the latter.”1137 Brodie 
believed that no matter “how limited was the actual need in such special skills as 
strategic analysis, we should have to have a respectably broad base for selecting those 
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called to the task and an adequate means of training them.”1138 In a short time, as the 
dangers of the nuclear-armed world spiraled upward, first on August 29, 1949 with 
the Soviet ascension to the nuclear club, and then, only three years later with the first 
successful thermonuclear test on November 1, 1952 during Operation Ivy Mike at 
Enewetak Atoll, the burden of command would increase in tandem, and with it the 
need for capable strategic analysis to ensure that war and policy maintained their 
inherently, and in Brodie’s mind normatively, Clausewitzian balance.
Crossing the Civil-Military Chasm
In an internal debate at RAND over Brodie’s views on the strategic theoretical capa-
bilities of the military versus the rising corpus of civilian defense intellectuals, Brodie 
is taken to task for articulating with too little subtlety a condescending outlook on 
his military counterparts, during which Brodie clarifies his views on the fundamental 
differences in strategic thinking of these two distinct groups of strategic thinkers. The 
squabble emerged in late 1954 after Brodie sent his young colleague Nathan Leites 
some glowing feedback on Leites’ latest article, “If War Were to Break Out Tomor-
row,” in which he made comments perceived by RAND’s then-director Hans Speier 
as dismissive of their military colleagues and, importantly, funders, whose continued 
largesse RAND depended upon. On November 5, 1954, Brodie wrote to Leites, 
lauding his article, describing it as “brilliantly incisive, sensitive, and novel. This is the 
sort of analysis we need, but I have seen nothing like it before.”1139 Brodie noted he 
had made a “very small number” of critical remarks in the margins and in his letter 
to Leites said these were “of much too trivial a nature to be mentioned here.”1140 As 
for the “general organization” of Leites’ article, Brodie made some recommendations, 
writing: “I have a feeling that your leading points or ideas could be made to stand 
out more clearly and crisply than they do. Your writing in this paper tends sometimes 
to give one the feeling that you are musing out loud, rather than that you are com-
municating some ideas which are already well developed in your mind. This is an 
intangible sort of thing, and it is hard for me to put my finger on it. But I do believe 
it is organizational rather than stylistic.”1141 What got Brodie into trouble were his 
remarks concerning the military, and Leites’ obligations to present his entire article 
to them: “Of course much depends on what you plan to do with this paper. I do 
not expect that our Pentagon friends will be able to make anything of it, so its being 
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put into an ‘R’ or ‘RM’ would be largely a matter of form and of courtesy. On the 
other hand, a simplified summary which more or less outlined the basic points might 
indeed be useful. But I am thinking more about publication for scholars.”1142 Brodie 
suggested “it has the substance now for an excellent World Politics article,” though in 
need of some abbreviation.1143
On November 19, 1954, in a personal memo to Brodie, Hans Speier made reference 
to these comments from Brodie: “I do not think the impression of entertaining, the 
opinion that the people who are intelligent enough to finance RAND lack the ability 
to understand its research results; or that we fulfill our obligation toward RAND and 
the Air Force if we publish something in scholarly or popular magazines. I believe 
your letter to Nathan can easily be misunderstood to the effect that you regard the 
RAND audience as less important than other audiences which RAND and the Air 
Force permit us to reach. World Politics would indeed be a suitable place for publishing 
Nathan’s excellent piece, but it will be desirable first to put it into a form which might 
raise your hope that our governmental readers will understand it.”1144 
A few days later, on November 23, 1954, Brodie responded to Speier’s memo 
with his own lengthy and detailed personal memo, in which he noted that he had 
been “erroneously of the opinion that I was commenting on some RAND-sponsored 
research, in which the Air Force presumably has no proprietary interest,” but adding 
that “Victor Hunt corrected me on that.”1145 Brodie also explained: “I grant you that 
contemptuous feelings where they exist are in danger of being ultimately betrayed to 
the object of those feelings, and are therefore legitimately a matter of concern with 
respect to the relationship between RAND and its clients. On the other hand, in this 
instance I feel that ‘contemptuous feelings’ are not involved but that simple realism 
is. I earnestly believe that the substance of the remark of mine to Nathan which you 
quoted is something with which you yourself, upon reflection, would fully concur.”1146 
Brodie further defends his remark, explaining: “More important in your own mind, I 
think, was your statement: ‘I do not think we should permit ourselves ever to develop, 
or give the impression of entertaining, the opinion that the people who are intelligent 
enough to finance RAND lack the ability to understand its research results. . . .’ I do 
not see how it is possible for you to mean that literally.”1147 Brodie observed “RAND 
hires, among other things, nuclear physicists, mathematicians, and social scientists 
whose training includes a measure of psychoanalysis,” adding “I certainly would not 
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expect Air Force officers to feel, and it would be extremely naïve of them to feel, that 
all the written products of such specialists should be interesting or intelligible to them. 
. . . Neither the statement I have just made nor the one I made to Nathan carries the 
implication that our clients are unintelligent – only that they are not intellectuals 
trained in our special brand of intellectualism. Nathan’s paper as I read it would not 
make much sense to any Air Force officer I have met, some of whom I regard as having 
high intelligence, but I do think, as I said to Nathan, that ‘a simplified summary which 
more or less outlined the basic points might indeed be useful.’ If this is a contemptu-
ous or ungracious thought, then you and I must either have read different versions of 
Nathan’s paper or have known entirely different kinds of military officers.”1148 Brodie 
further explained, “This would not be worth going into at such length if we were 
dealing with an isolated incident. But you have several times chided me gently on my 
attitude on the intellectual endowment of the military, and I think there is a possibly 
important misunderstanding between us on that score. Let me first of all point out 
that my own best and most careful work has always been done for military audiences, 
including the recent Reporter article, which was originally worked up as a lecture to the 
Army War College. . . . Also, if my remarks or bearing really exuded contempt for the 
intelligence of the military generally, I should hardly have been welcomed over many 
years at the various war colleges, to which I have devoted a great deal of earnest and 
careful work; and I should hardly number, as I do, so many military officers among 
my close friends.”1149 Brodie conceded that it was “certainly true that [some]1150 of the 
things I have written and said have called attention to the conceptual and intellectual 
shortcomings of the military gild. I have hear you privately do likewise, as for example 
when you were describing to me a year or so ago a conversation or briefing you had 
with a group of general officers which included General Doolittle. You were at that 
time profoundly shocked, as I think you had every right to be. Now, we ought to be 
clear, is this question generally a forbidden area, even for private discussion (e.g., a fairly 
personal letter to Nathan), or do you simply feel I am wrong and am exaggerating? 
Maybe the difference between us is that you feel the Doolittle episode you described 
was atypical, whereas I would regard it as typical.”1151
Brodie listed his views “about the intelligence of the military,” noting “They compare 
favorably in average I.Q., and in the range of intelligence of individual members, with 
any profession I know of other than those specifically involved with learning. In other 
words, they compare favorably (i.e., about on par) with MD’s, but not with scientists 
or university professors at leading universities. How could they, since the latter are 
1148. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1149. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1150. Note that the word “some” is written by hand, scratching out the word “many” that was originally typed.
1151. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists: At the Nexus of War and Policy 253
selected for their intellectual attainments, while the military are and must be selected 
for quite different skills and talents.”1152 Further, Brodie notes “Their training, by and 
large, is certainly not comparable in intensity or in manipulation of abstract ideas 
with that of the usual Ph.D. candidate at one of our graduate schools. They are not 
‘intellectuals,’ and certainly don’t regard themselves as such.”1153 And, he added, “There 
is also a certain endemic anti-intellectualism in the gild, which I regard as entirely 
natural to a profession which must stress action rather than subtleties of thought in 
according both deference and preferment. The degree of anti-intellectualism varies 
considerably, however, from person to person within the profession.”1154 Brodie also 
observes that “Each military service tends to be a closed corporation, and also a tightly-
knit hierarchical one. These conditions further a traditionalism and conservatism 
which is already fostered by the conditions of non- or anti-intellectualism referred to 
above.”1155 Brodie finds that “The record show unequivocally that in the past, with 
technological changes of far lesser moment and degree than those we are witnessing 
now, the military have usually proved themselves conceptually behind-handed at the 
onset of each major war. Because of the nature of the enterprise, the national cost has 
often been hideous and tremendous. These thoughts are so far hardly novel, being 
shared and more or less forcefully argued by almost all major students of war, includ-
ing the professional officers among them.”1156 And lastly, Brodie adds that “Because 
of the nature of the technological changes occurring today, the lag between concept 
and reality is bound to be both far greater in degree and far costlier in effects than 
any similar lag in the past.”1157
While noting he “could go on,” Brodie closes his memo by stating “these are in 
general the ideas that inform so much of my work. Naturally one must always exercise 
due tact in expressing them. I am grateful for correction where I slip from due tact or 
from avoidance of gratuitous references to military shortcomings. But that is another 
matter entirely from saying either that this comprises a forbidden area of discourse, or 
that in certain specific respects my views are wholly wrong. I should very much appreci-
ate your remarks on these points, which are obviously of great importance to me.”1158
On November 30, 1954, Speier sends Brodie another long personal memo stamped 
quibbling over whether Leites’ paper was “Rand-sponsored rather than Project RAND,” 
the former not requiring presentation to the government and the latter being required 
1152. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1153. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1154. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1155. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1156. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1157. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1158. Brodie, Letter to Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
254 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
to in “a more detailed fashion.”1159 Speier notes Brodie still believes he had given Leites 
“good advice,” while Speier counters, “I still think you did not,” and that the memo 
Brodie sent to Leites on this matter “embarrasses me in two ways,” the first being 
Speier believes Leites “should not follow your advice, but I find it is difficult to tell 
him so myself, because your advice was given to him in a personal letter. Next, I think 
in your reply to me you built up a straw man that suffered the fate awaiting all straw 
men.”1160 Speier believes strongly that Leites study “should be given a form suitable for 
presentation to our sponsors,” and while Brodie views “a simplified summary to be a 
matter of courtesy to our sponsors,” Speier regards “the preparation of the whole study 
in suitable form as an obligation on our part.”1161 He adds Brodie is “less interested in 
the preparation of a simplified summary than in the publication of the study in World 
Politics. I think, in the case of Project RAND studies, that Nathan’s study will even-
tually reach wider audiences as well,” or to “put it differently, there is no reason why 
Nathan’s brilliant study, ‘If War Were to Break Out Tomorrow,’ should be regarded as 
intellectually less intelligible to our sponsors than his Study of Bolshevism. The new 
small study needs the kind of rewriting and editing from which the earlier and fuller 
work profited. You were helpful to Nathan and to RAND at the time by suggesting 
ways of improving the form of the larger study. Why do you think that the smaller 
one cannot be understood by our sponsors if it is suitably revised?1162
Recalling remarks Speier had made regarding the issue of the “intellectual endow-
ment of the military profession,” Speier explained he had told Brodie, “‘I do not think 
we should permit ourselves ever to develop, or give the impression of entertaining, the 
opinion that people who are intelligent enough to finance RAND lack the ability to 
understand its research results.’ You gave me the impression, perhaps inadvertently, 
of entertaining just such an opinion in the quoted passage of your letter. . . . This 
impression has in part been corrected by your declaration that you do not consider 
our clients to be unintelligent.”1163 Speier further explained, “I do not advocate that 
you suppress any of your thoughts on the ability of the military, either in general or 
specifically with regard to their ability, to understand a given RAND study. I do suggest 
that in case of an unfavorable opinion in this regard you should ask yourself whether 
such inability is our fault or theirs. If ours, I think we should try to correct it, instead 
of saying let’s be quick and courteous with our sponsors and think of publication 
elsewhere.”1164 He added that the “larger question at issue in this correspondence, 
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however, is not what you and I think of the intellectual endowment of the military. 
We are free to think what we like as long as we believe that they are able to stick to the 
good and change toward the better, and as long as we, on our part, are able to meet 
our obligations in RAND without compromising truthfulness and accuracy in our 
work for the sake of popularization.”1165 He further reflected, “I am not sure that the 
major question is really one of tact. . . . Possibly the real question has to do less with 
tact than with stylistic predilection. In the past I have tried whenever an occasion arose 
to convey my impression to you that you delight in pejorative statements about men 
of power. In your condemnations I hear faint echoes of the Jewish Prophets or the 
Puritan preachers: like them you speak with the righteousness of your cause and you 
are harsh if others don’t serve it. I am glad to acknowledge that you are keeping good 
company, as it were, but is it the company you, as a scientist, really want to keep?”1166 
Speier concluded, “I suspect that these predilections sometimes distract you from an 
effort to render your studies scientifically even more rewarding than they are. I know 
that I can learn much from you. You disappoint me whenever I seem to learn less than 
expected merely because you are engrossed in scolding some uninteresting people with 
well-known names. It is only natural, I suppose, that I should expect your influence 
on your military audience as well to be even greater than it is if you chided them less 
often. The response to stern and frequent chiding by an outsider will depend not only 
upon their intelligence but also upon their pride.”1167
Speier proposed a memo to Leites reaffirming the need to “first consider revising 
the study for distribution as a RAND publication to our government sponsors,” 
and also explaining that Brodie was not aware the study was “undertaken for Project 
RAND.”1168 This put the matter to rest, while allowing for an illuminating discussion 
about the strategic thinking of the military and the unique role of RANDites in prob-
ing military complexities, often with such detailed expertise that their analysis might 
prove of limited understanding and potentially limited practicable utility to the men 
of arms who created RAND, helping to thus give birth to a new generation of nuclear 
wizards to grapple with the world’s unprecedented strategic challenges.
Military Strategy: ‘Most Ancient and Least Developed’
Brodie revisits his discussion of the need for a more scientific and analytically rigorous 
approach to strategy, further extending his observations on sea power to the equally 
analytically-challenged field of air power, in his April 1955 World Politics article, 
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“Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,”1169 where, he reiterates his views that 
military strategy is “of all the human sciences at once the most ancient and the least 
developed,” adding, “It could hardly be otherwise. Its votaries must be men of decision 
and action rather than of theory. Victory is the payoff, and is regarded as the most 
telling confirmation of correct judgment. There is no other science where judgments 
are tested in blood and answered in the servitude of the defeated, where the supreme 
authority is the leader who has won or can instill confidence that he will win.”1170 
But that notwithstanding, Brodie points out that “[s]ome modicum of theory 
there always had to be. But like much other military equipment, it had to be light 
in weight and easily packaged to be carried into the field. Thus, the strategic ideas 
which have from time to time evolved have no sooner gained acceptance than they 
have been stripped to their barest essentials and converted into maxims. Because the 
baggage that was stripped normally contained the justifications, the qualifications, 
and the instances of historical application or misapplication, the surviving maxim 
had to be accorded a substitute dignity and authority by treating it as an axiom, or, 
in latter-day parlance, a ‘principle.’”1171 As Brodie had noted six years earlier, these 
“so-called ‘principles of war’ have been derived from the work of a handful of theorists, 
most of them long since dead,” and “[t]heir specific contributions to living doctrine 
may not be widely known, because their works are seldom read, and the dimensions 
of the original thought may find but the dimmest reflection in the axiom which has 
stemmed from it. Nevertheless, by their ideas, however much those ideas have suffered 
in the transmission, these theorists have enjoyed in the most pragmatic and ‘practical’ 
of professions a profound and awful authority.”1172 
But that’s not the case with air power, since it was still “too young to have among 
the theorists of its strategy more than one distinguished name, and he has carried all 
before him”1173 much the way Mahan did for sea power, as he discussed in his 1949 
article: “The views of General Giulio Douhet would be worth study today even if air 
force thinking had progressed considerably beyond him and away from him, because 
he would still remain the first to have presented an integrated, coherent philosophy 
for the employment of air power,” Brodie observed,1174 adding that “the fact is that air 
strategists have moved very little beyond or away from him. American air strategists 
today may or may not acknowledge in Douhet’s philosophy the origin of their present 
1169. Bernard Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” World Politics 7, No. 3 (April 1955), 349-370.
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1171. Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” 349.
1172. Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” 349.
1173. Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” 349.
1174. Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” 349-50.
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists: At the Nexus of War and Policy 257
doctrine, but there can be no doubt about the resemblance between the two.”1175 Bro-
die, who would go on to discuss Douhet again in much detail in a his 1959 Strategy 
in the Missile Age, argues that the “contribution of Douhet which commands great-
est respect is that he turned upside down the old trite military axiom, derived from 
Jomini, that ‘methods change but principles are unchanging,’” and “insisted instead 
that a change in method so drastic as that forced by the introduction of the airplane 
must revolutionize all the so-called principles of war.”1176 Brodie suggests that it “took a 
bold and original mind to conceive that the sacrosanct principles might be outmoded, 
and a strong and independent will to assert it,”1177 a comment that we in hindsight 
can apply to Brodie as well, who very likely was of the same opinion. Brodie noted 
that Douhet “not only asserted it but supported his arguments with remarkably firm 
and consistent logic,” adding that it “would be well if we were capable today of the 
same kind of originality and boldness with respect to the new nuclear weapons.”1178 
Like Brodie: “Douhet himself refused to justify his ideas according to whether they 
did or did not accord with some inherited gospel. He was much more interested in 
whether they accorded with the facts of life as he saw them,” and was “too proud of 
his intellectual independence to appeal to the authority of the old principles where 
they happened to implement his own views.”1179 Nonetheless, despite Douhet’s own 
best efforts and intentions, Brodie observes “the controversy over the proper role of air 
power has often, on its more intellectual fringes, revolved around the question whether 
the Douhet thesis, or, more loosely, the emphasis on strategic bombing, does or does 
not conform to the tried-and-true, ‘enduring’ principles of war,”1180 so much so that air 
power theorists have turned to such “venerated authorities like Clausewitz, who after 
all has been dead for a century and a quarter,” such as Captain Robert H. McDonnell, 
who in his article, “Clausewitz and Strategic Bombing,” in the Air University Quarterly 
Review1181 is cited by Brodie for countering critics of strategic bombing who believed 
it was a violation of Clausewitzian principles, suggesting “what is needed is ‘a closer 
examination of Clausewitz’ principles’!”1182
And so Brodie turns his attention to Clausewitz, the grand master of strategic 
theory, who asserts an enduring, and compelling, presence throughout Brodie’s career. 
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Brodie asks, “What then are these ancient teachings to which appeals are so constantly 
made,” and even “[m]ore important, from whence do they derive such commanding 
authority?”1183 Brodie expects much from these so-called principles of war, since they 
are “a body of ideas or axioms to which in our own time literally millions of lives 
have been sacrificed, and on the basis of which within the last decade great battles 
have been organized and fought. More to the point, we are concerned with a herit-
age of thought which even today dominates decisions on which the life or death of 
our nation may well hinge.”1184 He finds that, “[i]n the main, the maxims or axioms 
which we call ‘principles of war’ are simply common-sense propositions, most of 
which apply to all sorts of pursuits besides war,” and sounding much like Ovid, the 
master Roman strategist who turned his attention to the challenges of courtship and 
seduction, “If a man wants to win a fair and virtuous maiden, he must first make up 
his mind what he wants of the girl, that is, the principle of the objective, and must 
then practice the principles of concentration, of pursuit, of economy of force, and 
certainly of deception.”1185 Brodie agrees that “common-sense principles are valuable 
precisely because they represent common sense, and are valuable only so long as they 
are compatible with common sense,” but unfortunately he’s found “too many examples 
in recent war of a slavish devotion to the so-called principles of war offending against 
common sense,” which he attributes to a “slavish devotion” and a “low intellectual 
estate to which these maxims have fallen today” that obscures their more noble and 
intellectually enlightened origins. To wit, Brodie recalls that Clausewitz was “the first 
great figure in what might be called modern strategy, just as Adam Smith is the first 
great figure in modern economics,” which – continuing his line of thought articu-
lated in his aforementioned 1949 article; indeed in note 7, he cites his earlier article, 
writing, “For a more extended discussion of the relevance and irrelevance of strategic 
principles, see my ‘Strategy as a Science,’” article – reflects a “science which is in many 
respects remarkably analogous. But unlike Smith, whose Wealth of Nations proved 
to be only the headwaters of a mighty and still expanding river of thought to which 
many great talents have contributed, Clausewitz is also, except for his lesser though 
impressive contemporary, Antoine Henri Jomini, almost the last great figure in his 
field,”1186 and while “[o]thers may also be worthy of honors and of notice, but they 
do not challenge his preeminence.”1187
Indeed, Clausewitz stands on so high a pedestal in the pantheon of strategic theo-
rists that “it was very difficult to be original in this field after Clausewitz,” and “[n]
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ot until two-thirds of a century later does anyone appear of anything like comparable 
stature, and Alfred T. Mahan, by confining himself to naval strategy, put himself 
into a rather more limited context than did Clausewitz.”1188 It is only “[a]fter Mahan 
[that] we come to the unique name of Douhet, that is, unique in a separate and new 
field of strategy,” though Brodie concedes that he was “of course skipping over the 
names of some writers, not many, who would have to be considered in any history of 
strategic thought,” some of whom “showed real originality” while others were “more 
important for their influence on their times than for originality or incisiveness,” such 
as Ferdinand Foch.1189
Brodie found it “interesting to note that Clausewitz, who was certainly the most 
profound as well as systematic thinker on war who has yet appeared, specifically rejected 
the idea that there could be such things as principles or rules,” even though we can 
“find discussed at considerable length in Clausewitz, as in Jomini, most of the basic 
ideas later to be exalted to the status of principles. But what makes large portions of 
Jomini and especially of Clausewitz come alive today in the reading is not the eluci-
dation of basic ideas or principles but rather the wisdom that these two thinkers, one 
profound and the other incisive and eminently practical, brought to their discussion 
of these ideas. This wisdom is reflected in a flexibility and breadth of comprehension 
that makes Clausewitz dwell as tellingly on the qualifications and historical exceptions 
to the basic ideas he is promulgating as he does on those ideas themselves, though 
of course at lesser length.”1190 Adds Brodie: “Another respect in which the wisdom of 
Clausewitz is manifested concerns a subject in which his contribution is not merely 
distinctive but unique. No other theorizer on military strategy, with the possible 
exception of Mahan, has devoted anything like comparable attention and careful 
thought to the relationship between war strategy and national policy. Clausewitz’ 
contemporaries, notably Jomini, took the dependence of strategy upon policy so 
completely for granted that they thought it worth little mention, whereas those who 
are more nearly our own contemporaries, notably Douhet, lost the point entirely or 
denied it.”1191 And so it’s in “this regard more than in any other, Clausewitz has had 
not only the first word, but also practically the last,” but it was “in this respect as in 
all others,” Brodie observes, that “the fruits of his brooding intelligence have been 
not transmitted, but rather catalogued in the form of capsular quotations taken out 
of context,” which Brodie found to be “especially ironical,” particularly that “some 
of the very quotations which are often cited to prove that he was the prophet of total 
or absolute war are wrenched from a chapter in which he specifically insists that ‘war 
1188. Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” 355.
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is never an isolated act’ and that military aim and method must always defer to the 
political object.”1192 
Brodie himself would be misunderstood during his own time, his earlier thoughts 
held up against his later re-assessments, with the former often overshadowing the 
nuances of the latter. As Brodie explains, “Clausewitz is especially subject to such 
misinterpretation because of his subservience to the method of the contemporary 
German philosopher Hegel, whom he apparently studied with great reverence. Thus, 
after vigorously building up a case for war being in theory subject to no limitations of 
violence, he goes on to develop with equal vigor the point that in practice there must 
be many qualifications to the theoretical absolute, which of course reflects Hegel’s 
well-known method of presenting the thesis, the antithesis, and then the synthesis. 
This method, plus the natural inclination of a searching mind to feel all round the 
subject, makes Clausewitz amenable to being quoted on whatever side of an issue 
one desires, and he has been amply abused in this fashion. Moreover, he is of all the 
noteworthy writers on strategy the least susceptible to condensation.”1193
Political Science and Strategic Studies: A Call to Arms
In his December 1957 article in The Scientific Monthly, “Scientific Progress and Political 
Science” – based on his paper presented to the joint session of the National Academy of 
Economics and Political Science, the American Political Science Association, and Section 
K (Social and Economic Sciences) of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science at the New York meeting of the AAAS in December 1956 – Brodie presented 
something of an update to his 1949 World Politics article, “Strategy as a Science,” sug-
gesting there was still a long way to go toward completing the bridge he hoped would 
span the civil and military sides of the strategic community, and thereby stimulate 
the emergence of a robust and active civilian-scientific strategic community. Part of 
the problem was resistance within the field of political science to the new discipline 
of strategic studies, even though it – on the surface – looked to be a natural incubator 
of civilian-scientific strategists, especially with its long tradition and interest in world 
affairs and international politics. There were many explanations for this resistance, 
many inherent to the field of political science and its traditions. In a discussion of 
“Politico-Military Problems,” Brodie observes that “a weakness exists which is not at 
all necessary and which demands a remedy,” a “weakness that is pervasive in American 
intellectual life” and that is America has “no tradition of intellectual concern with that 
increasingly wide border area where military problems meet political ones. Political 
1192. Brodie, “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” 356.
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science has a greater obligation in this respect than has any other single discipline. Few 
scholars consider it their primary business to inquire about the effects that current and 
projected military developments must have upon politics, and vice versa.”1194 
Brodie adds that “[t]his particular poverty in the intellectual life of the country is 
bound to be reflected in the world of affairs,” and even though “the military approach 
to strategic problems needs to be extended and leavened by the relevant insights of the 
statesman, such insights are likely to be undeveloped among those real-life civilians 
with whom the military actually have to deal. There has been much advocacy of closer 
communion between politicians and soldiers in matters relating to foreign policy. This 
closer communion, unquestionably desirable, has been much less often urged on the 
ground that civilians might have a beneficial influence upon military policy – a fact 
which reflects an almost universal consensus, presumably erroneous, that military 
affairs are inaccessible to the layman in a way different from that in which foreign 
affairs are.”1195 Brodie explains that the “problem is not simply one of achieving closer 
communion between two groups of men of markedly different training and orienta-
tion. It is, rather, that of developing a real competence on each side to penetrate and 
comprehend the issues with which the other side is currently seized.”1196 He points to 
the National Security Council as “a monument to an aspiration, and the aspiration 
is undeniably sound. But whether any real enrichment of strategic thinking has pro-
ceeded from it is another question.”1197 Brodie suggests it in fact “works much better 
as a medium by which the military can impress their views on the civilians than the 
reverse – always excepting the matter of imposing budget ceilings on military expendi-
tures, where arbitrariness generally rules.”1198 Brodie believes “[t]here cannot be a real 
enrichment of strategic thinking unless and until considerable numbers of scholars in 
germane fields begin to concern themselves with the relevant issues.”1199 Brodie writes 
that “[t]here are a number of reasons why the contribution of political scientists could 
be crucial,” one being “political scientists, especially that group of them who special-
ize in international affairs, are concerned with the context of military operations in a 
way that the military themselves are not,” as a “military officer is forced by the heavy 
professional demands of his craft to be preoccupied with tactical, as against strategic, 
matters, and to the relatively small degree that he concerns himself with the latter, his 
interpretation of strategy is likely to be a restricted one.”1200 
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Brodie recalls how Clausewitz, “himself a general, pointed out 125 years ago that 
the object of a war, which is always political and therefore appropriately determined 
by the politicians, must govern the whole conduct of that war; but this idea has never 
really been absorbed and digested by the military profession. To the military, the means 
available, rather than the object, are what determine the character of a war, and they 
have usually resisted any ‘interference’ from their civilian chiefs with respect to their 
choice of means.”1201 This has become increasingly apparent in the Cold War, and Brodie 
recounts how “the Korean war uncovered a deep and pervasive confusion on the matter 
of ends and means. The politicians restrained the soldiers’ use of means because they 
spontaneously recognized that the true objects of American intervention required such 
restraints. On the other hand, largely because of the novelty of the situation, the politi-
cal leaders were so inept at formulating and explicating those objectives that they made 
basic and even elementary errors of direction,” as he had noted in earlier critiques of 
American strategic policy in Korea.1202 Brodie noted that “Americans do not understand 
a kind of war in which relatively heavy sacrifices are made, yet in which they appear 
to be committed to something less than a clear victory. Yet ‘limited’ or ‘peripheral’ 
wars are by all odds the kind most likely to engage us within the next decade or two if 
we become involved in military actions at all,” since limited war presents what in fact 
may be the only viable military option – “[n]oninvolvement may mean surrender of 
important positions, and certainly the only other alternative, all-out thermonuclear 
war, is an infinitely more grim and forbidding prospect than any kind of local war.”1203 
Furthermore, Brodie notes “the posture that deters the enemy from all-out attack does 
little, if anything, to deter him from making peripheral challenges.”1204
And while less likely, the far graver consequences of general war demand attention 
be paid to the risks and challenges of nuclear warfare; as Brodie observes, “[o]ne of the 
most critical changes wrought by the atomic bomb is almost universally overlooked 
and at great peril,” and that is the “extent and character of military capabilities for any 
future crisis tend to be predetermined by peacetime preparations made long before the 
event. … Decisions have been made and are being made now which will determine 
whether limited wars can be pursued at all and, if so, under what circumstances and 
with what constraints. The manner in which the character of any total war of the 
future is being predetermined by current preparations is even more striking, though 
less interesting from a political point of view, both because it is less likely and also 
because it is potentially annihilative.”1205
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Brodie notes how in recent years, the “Soviet retaliatory air capability continues to 
grow” and with its growth, “the conditions under which we can hint at a possible use 
of our strategic air force against the U.S.S.R. become vastly more circumscribed” and 
will likely “be confined to use only against the threat of a direct strategic air attack 
upon this country, which means that it will cease to be of much significance for a host 
of lesser contingencies. Yet there is no evidence that there has been any fundamental 
reorientation of politico-military outlook on the world since the days when America 
enjoyed undisputed monopoly of the atomic bomb.”1206 Brodie turns back to the 
challenges – and opportunities – facing political science, observing: “Clearly, these are 
great problems on which political scientists could have much of value to say, if more 
of them could interest themselves.”1207 One inhibiting factor Brodie notes is the need 
for secrecy and the limitations in access to classified information, though Brodie has 
come to the conclusion that “the information in the public domain is so immeasur-
ably greater in volume and significance than what is kept secret that the latter may 
well be ignored except for quite special problems,” and that “in most instances, the 
secrets are of relevance to technicians and not to political policy specialists” and that 
overall “secrecy is much less important than other factors.”1208 A “second inhibiting 
factor is that the esoteric nature of the military art is commonly exaggerated,” and even 
though “one does not learn how to be a general by reading books,” Brodie points out 
that “no general becomes really outstanding without absorbing a kind of knowledge 
available in books – and there is nothing to keep civilians from reading the same 
books. In other words, one can learn from books what is consequential (the strategic 
as distinct from the tactical) about the military art, though very few people attempt to 
do so.” 1209And a “third factor in this context is that technological change is rampant 
everywhere in society but nowhere more so than in the military art,” but even here 
the civilian is no more disadvantaged than the military professional, who “tends to 
develop an inferiority complex toward the scientist and the engineer, though he has 
good defenses against letting his attitude of deference spread.”1210 The last inhibiting 
factor, Brodie notes, is “that tradition determines, to some degree, scope and method 
in political science,” where “the favored fixations tend to be too enduring even to be 
called fads, often lasting for a generation or more,” slowing the pace of change and 
adaptation, and thus far preventing a full embrace of strategic studies as a bona fide 
subfield: “One of the most enduring attitudes of all has been that which exempts the 
study of war itself from a field in which scholars are intensely (and quite properly) 
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concerned with the matters that tend to produce or to prevent war,” and in addition 
to the issues he has thus far discussed Brodie observes “there is also some redolence 
of an attitude that was much more prominent during the interwar period than it is 
now – namely, that the preoccupation with matters military is somehow immoral in a 
scholar, or at least not wholly respectable. In the 1920’s and 1930’s one was expected, 
instead, to be interested in the finer points of the League of Nations Covenant, which 
was designed to prevent war. And although that attitude has itself largely disintegrated, 
its consequences linger on. The military profession is often charged with being unduly 
staid, but it cannot begin to compete in that respect with the curriculum designers in 
American colleges.”1211 Brodie cautions that “[n]either an indictment nor a justification 
of political science is called for, but rather an explanation of some of its peculiarities 
of scope and method,” and in particular “the failure of political science to cope with 
the many political problems associated with the nature of modern war, especially in its 
more novel aspects, should be emphasized.”1212 After all, Brodie writes, “the H-bomb 
does raise some oppressively important issues.”1213 
Rethinking the Unthinkable: Escalation and Limited War
Just a year after Brodie’s Strategy and the Missile Age came to press with consistently 
positive reviews from civilian scholars and military practitioners alike, his long-time 
colleague Herman Kahn would publish his very own treatise on the new dangerous 
era – a massive tome titled On Thermonuclear War that was also published by Princeton 
University Press but which would breakout as a runaway best-seller, generating wide-
spread criticism for its callous insensitivities and ruthless realism while at the same time, 
perhaps because of the whiff of controversy and consequent curiosity thereby generated, 
would make its author a household name. Brodie would later reflect on Kahn’s 1960 
treatise, noting that thus far in the nuclear age, “we have had some experiences that 
were entirely predictable and some that would have been previously unbelievable,” 
and that there has been “much additional thinking about nuclear weapons and about 
what they would mean in war and therefore in the basic affairs of mankind” – some 
of which “has taken strange twists and turns and led down weird byways.”1214 And 
while it “would not be correct to say that today our confusion is worse confounded,” 
there has nonetheless “been a good deal of confusion along the way.”1215 Brodie reflects 
on how, in “the minds of the great majority of people, nuclear weapons are objects 
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of unmitigated horror, and so they are – in use.”1216 But not all nuclear strategists had 
accepted this – and perhaps most famous among these doubters was Herman Kahn, 
who rose to fame for his seeming rejection of the inevitability of such “terrible poten-
tialities,” much as Henry Kissinger had gained notoriety for his willingness to consider 
in detail the potentiality for tactical nuclear warfare a few years earlier. 
Brodie discusses – and rebuts – Kahn’s thesis as put forth in On Thermonuclear 
War, which struck Brodie as particularly un-Clausewitzian, and which seems to more 
closely align with the Jominian school in its linearity and purely mathematical logic 
in discussing escalation toward total war than to the more philosophically complex 
and less self-consciously scientific inquiry of Clausewitz. As Brodie writes: “Herman 
Kahn, in the book that made his name a byword, set out to prove that, provided certain 
precautions were taken . . . the United States could survive a strategic thermonuclear 
war. By that he meant that the fatalities and other casualties, though very large, could 
be kept within limits that he considered tolerable, and that within a term of years that 
others might consider astonishingly short, say five to ten years, the country could be 
back to the GNP that it had enjoyed before the war. The special condition to which he 
attached such supreme importance was the provision in good time of adequate fallout 
shelters and other forms of civil defense . . . and also the storage in caves or man-made 
shelters of certain well-selected machine tools, the preservation of which would greatly 
assist in the reconstruction.”1217 Brodie noted Kahn had commented in a footnote that, 
“It is the hallmark of the expert professional that he doesn’t care where he is going as 
long as he proceeds competently,” and that Kahn had felt this was “a reasonable charge 
against his book,” something with which Brodie “fully agrees, especially concerning 
the competence.”1218 Brodie seems to salute Kahn for his unique “courage to explore as 
thoroughly as his exceptional ability and knowledge permitted the character of a ‘general 
war’ with thermonuclear weapons,” something that distinguished Kahn from “other 
writers in the field of strategy, including myself.”1219 And yet, Brodie added, “having 
expressed this tribute I must take part of it back by declaring that while Kahn cared 
well enough where he was going, he was helped along by an optimism that has in some 
critical respects turned out to be unwarranted.”1220 Brodie noted that “the precautions 
that Kahn deemed absolutely essential before his somewhat roseate conclusions could 
be warranted have not been taken and it is now abundantly clear that they will not 
be,” as America had “reacted violently against the fallout shelter program studied and 
proposed by Kahn,” and that program had thus “collapsed and was never thereafter 
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revived.”1221 Further, Kahn “assumed a situation in nuclear weapons that was fast chang-
ing for the worse,” and he himself conceded his arguments “would no longer be valid 
a decade hence” without “significant and far-reaching” disarmament; but “that decade 
has passed, and with MIRV and other developments,” the “great increase in the sheer 
quantity of destructiveness” rendered his assumptions obsolete.”1222 
Brodie also chastised Kahn for “being neither by training nor temperament sensitive 
to the vast psychological and emotional damage that a society like ours would suffer 
along with the physical devastation of a thermonuclear war,” and as such believed 
Kahn had “undoubtedly underestimated the problems of recovery even from a war 
taking place under the premises he postulated.”1223 Brodie noted “[p]ast wars and other 
disasters have proved the human being and his societal structure remarkably resilient, 
but there are limits,” and one pitfall of thinking about the unthinkable is that “one 
cannot find any real parallels in history.”1224 Brodie speculated that we could “intuit 
with some assurance . . . that democracy as we know it could hardly survive.”1225 Ul-
timately, Brodie rebukes Kahn for not being properly Clausewitzian, observing while 
“Kahn could see reasons why this unspeakable sum of destruction might nevertheless 
have to be accepted rather than yield one’s position on an important political dis-
pute,” Brodie himself could “imagine no such issue that is at all likely to arise.”1226 As 
Brodie further explains: “On the simple Clausewitzian premise that we have repeated 
throughout this book – that a war must have a reasonable political objective with 
which the military operations must be reasonably consonant – we have to work back 
from the assumption that ‘general war’ with thermonuclear weapons must never be 
permitted to begin, however much we find it necessary to make physical preparations 
as though it might begin.”1227 So while Kahn “was obsessed with the notion that na-
tions might habitually play the game of ‘chicken,’ which is to keep rigidly to collision 
course waiting for the other side to yield,” Brodie believes while this may sometimes 
be true, we must nonetheless “not give up the search for all possible preventives that 
might be effective against such collision,” and furthermore, that the “leaders of no 
nation will wish to risk the total destruction of their country, and one of the things 
we have been learning over the past twenty-five years is that there are indeed many 
stopping points between friction, even some measure of combat, and all-out war.”1228
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Brodie remains confident that “we have ample reason to feel now that nuclear 
weapons do act critically to deter wars between the major powers, and not nuclear 
wars alone but any wars,” and he finds this to be “really a very great gain,” one “we 
should no doubt be hesitant about relinquishing.”1229 And, Brodie adds: “We should 
not complain too much because the guarantee is not ironclad,” since it’s “the curious 
paradox of our time that one of the foremost factors making deterrence really work 
and work well is the lurking fear that in some massive confrontation crisis it might 
fail. Under these circumstances one does not tempt fate.”1230 
Kahn’s lengthy, and unapologetically optimistic treatise, On Thermonuclear War, and 
also his sequel Thinking About the Unthinkable, reveal Kahn to be much less afraid of 
the dangers of war in the nuclear age, including thermonuclear war, and thus much 
more comfortable imagining the world after deterrence had failed than Brodie – though 
Brodie and Kahn were more alike, and their thinking evolved in a far more parallel 
fashion, than their reputations. On Thermonuclear War largely dismisses the many real 
dangers of general war and post-deterrence hostilities that Brodie so greatly feared, 
generating controversy while at the same time generating great interest in the subject, 
though Kahn’s levity was not nearly to the extent parodied by Kubrick in his dark 
comedy of the nuclear era. To Kahn, the greater danger lay in not preparing to fight 
and win such a conflict, and not being prepared to think about such potentialities. 
It is interesting to note that Brodie was critical of Kahn’s approach, and in particular 
his levity, as evident in their correspondence prior to publication of Thinking About 
the Unthinkable. On January 19, 1962, Brodie wrote to Kahn, noting he had received 
a copy of Kahn’s Thinking About the Unthinkable, which he would comment on in 
subsequent dispatches. In this first letter on the subject, Brodie noted, “I have just 
received your manuscript, “Thinking About the Unthinkable,” and will try to get it 
read over the weekend. It looks like it will be pleasant and easy reading.”1231 While he 
had not yet had time to immerse in it, he did observe right from the get go an issue of 
historical accuracy he felt required attention: “Incidentally, I think I detect an error in 
the very first paragraph of Chapter 1, relative to your clause: ‘No level of English society 
was immune from having its daughters seized and used.’ I find it simply impossible to 
believe that upper-class or even middle-class English society was not immune to this 
hazard, at the end of the Nineteenth Century or at any other time. It seems a pretty 
late date even for the lower classes to have suffered large scale abduction ‘by force’ of 
their daughters. By fraud, perhaps yes, but by force – show me.”1232
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The next week, on January 25, 1962, having begun to review Kahn’s manuscript, 
Brodie wrote again to explain, “Your manuscript is taking me longer to read than I 
had bargained on. I did not have a whole week-end to devote to it, but I am reading a 
portion of it each evening. However, it reads very easily. You write immeasurably more 
lucidly and smoothly than you did when I first began reading manuscripts by you some 
years ago. There is no problem with style editing.”1233 Brodie took issue with the bulk 
of Kahn’s manuscript, as well as its style, suggesting new readers might take offense:
In view of the apparent haste on your side, however, let me anticipate at least two comments 
that I know I should want to make in my final summation. First and most important, I think 
that parts of the book could be greatly condensed to benefit the whole. This is particularly 
true of the non-substantive, self-justifying chapters, like the first chapter, where you are in 
fact making a single, simple point: i.e., events which are greatly evil but also possible must not 
escape intelligent investigation and discussion. Some amount of blowing up and repetition is 
necessary to drive home even a simple and “obvious” point, but it can too easily be over-done. 
Anyway, since even your substantive chapters (at any rate, those I have read thus far) tend to 
repeat what you have written in OTW, you should aim at putting out a quite small, easily read 
book. Secondly, you have a personal style which your friends know and accept but which new 
readers are likely to find offensive. I am referring especially to your very frequent use of the first 
person, singular. I think you could very easily slice out some 60 to 80 per cent of phrases like “I 
think,” “I believe,” “I feel,” etc. Frequently you even use such phrases in a way to suggest that 
your thinking thus and so settles the matter. Regardless of whether or not I agree with you (I 
usually do), I cannot avoid that feeling that you are giving too much credit to your intuitions. 
Hostile reviewers will charge you with intellectual immodesty. Thus, where reference to yourself 
is easily avoidable (I grant it is not always so), it should be avoided.1234
Brodie’s comments were presented in a manner that seems both supportive and en-
couraging, noting Brodie generally agrees with Kahn, but also cautioning Kahn that his 
style exposed him to the risk of being charged with intellectual immodesty. History shows 
that it was just this immodesty that bought Kahn notoriety. But there is at this point 
no suggestion in Brodie’s comments of an underlying tension or envy as would be more 
apparent in Brodie’s very public rebuke of Kahn’s work in his introduction to On War 
in 1976. Brodie closed his letter kindly, noting “I am looking forward to seeing you and 
Jane on March 13,” and in preparation for his upcoming visit, added, “And oh yes, please 
have someone send me instructions on how to get from New York to White Plains.”1235
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The next week, on January 31, 1962, Brodie wrote again to Kahn, this time hav-
ing completed his reading of Thinking About the Unthinkable but this time delivering 
a more critical and pessimistic assessment of it. As Brodie noted, “Since writing my 
last letter I have finished reading your manuscript; ‘Thinking about the Unthinkable.’ 
In view of the fact that you are pushing through this manuscript in a hurry, I could 
not take the time to read as slowly and as carefully as I could otherwise have done. 
However, I did form some fairly solid impressions.”1236 And these impressions, Brodie 
explains, were not nearly as positive as in his prior letter. But while more critical, Brodie 
aims to soften the blow by couching his criticisms within an apologetic tone, and also 
explaining that Brodie’s intention is to be constructive, and to prevent Kahn’s tone, 
and what Brodie feels to be an inappropriate levity for such a somber subject matter, 
from eroding Kahn’s “presently considerable reputation.”1237 As Brodie writes: “I am, 
I regret to say, less optimistic about this book than I was at my previous writing. It 
seems to me to show, in its organization and its writing, that it is thrown together in 
haste. The writing is lucid enough, as I said it was in my previous letter, but it lacks 
the exciting formulations which one frequently encountered in your OTW and which 
reflected real brooding on your part … I must also repeat with emphasis my remarks 
I made in my previous letter about the merits of condensation and of greatly cutting 
down the references to yourself. Forgive me for the very negative tone of this letter, 
but it seems to me you are rushing into print unnecessarily with a second manuscript 
which will do nothing to enhance your presently considerable reputation. If you want 
to write an essay justifying your thinking about the unthinkable, why not publish a 
long article in a magazine of wide circulation? Or if you think you have enough to 
say on that subject to warrant a small book, by all means write such a book but don’t 
load it down with all sorts of other materials.”1238
Brodie closes his letter with some comments on Kahn’s style, and in particular his 
tendency to “lapse into levity,”1239 something the topic being addressed must, in Brodie’s 
estimation, always be avoided. Kahn, of course, disagreed, and in his effort to shat-
ter the nuclear taboos and generate a wider debate on the role of nuclear weapons in 
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foreign policy and military doctrine, counted on his style to spark the very passionate 
debate that more scholarly writing like Brodie’s tended not to spark. One can sense, in 
Brodie’s comments, a widening of the gap between these two pivotal nuclear wizards, 
as one found wisdom and solace in the highest of philosophy and theory while the 
latter brought his wisdom deep into the cave, and to the masses there enchained. One 
can also get a glimpse of the incipient rivalry between these two friends and colleagues, 
and sense its parallel to that which came to mark the relationship between Clausewitz 
and Jomini a century before: “Let me please with you also that on the subject on which 
you write the slightest lapse into levity must be avoided. You are discussing a serious 
and terrible subject, and you do nothing to enhance the acceptability of your work 
by being occasionally (even if most infrequently) flippant. Avoid also terms like ‘tit 
for tat’ when you are talking about destruction of cities, and ‘bonus’ when you are 
talking about destruction of population. I think that tendencies of this sort on your 
part account for much of the hostility aroused by OTW. There is no use making pious 
protestations in some places when your phraseology in other places effectively nullifies 
them. So grim a subject does not exclude an appropriate kind of humor used very 
sparingly; but levity is never legitimate.”1240 Brodie nonetheless, at this stage anyway, 
meant his comments to be constructive, and not disparaging, and added in closing, 
“I still look forward to seeing you on March 13.”1241 
Before commencing his review of Kahn’s draft of Thinking About the Unthinkable, 
Brodie had been in discussion with Kahn about a visit to the Hudson Institute, at 
Kahn’s invitation, and also about Brodie’s potential membership at Hudson, also at 
Kahn’s invitation. On January 4, 1962, Brodie wrote to Kahn after having been invited 
to join Kahn’s institute, to which Brodie responded appreciatively, but also cautiously. 
As Brodie explained, “I am touched by your very warm letter, with its invitation to 
become a fellow member of the Hudson Institute. It is a privilege to be associated 
with you in any way, especially in one which increases the likelihood of being able to 
see you and talk with you from time to time.”1242 Brodie explained that he could only 
“tentatively” accept membership owing to his need to review the bylaws concerning 
the duties and obligations of members, and also to notify his “RAND superiors with 
the fact that I am accepting some kind of office in your institute.”1243 Brodie sought 
clarification on these issues from Kahn prior to January 12, and though he thought 
it unlikely he’d have to withdraw his tentative acceptance, he nonetheless wanted to 
proceed with cautiously, noting: “You see, I am getting to think like a politician, or, 
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even worse, an operator!”1244 With regard to a visit, Brodie was also cautious: “Con-
cerning the matter of making a trip East to see you, I should like to do so very much. 
However, mostly for the reasons I mentioned in our last telephone conversation, I 
should like to make the trip contingent upon your having something fairly specific 
to talk over with me. The visit would, of course, have to be made on my own time, 
which is to say on annual leave from RAND.”1245 That being said, however, Brodie 
closed his letter warmly, writing: “Meanwhile give my warm thanks to Jane for the 
offer of the guest room, which I shall certainly take up when I make the trip. Give her 
also my love and best wishes (and to you as well) for the New Year.”1246
In his January 19th letter acknowledging receipt of Kahn’s draft of Thinking About 
the Unthinkable, Brodie noted that he had received “an invitation from Bill Fox of 
Columbia to come and lead a discussion which will take place somewhere around 
March 10 – though it will be a working day rather than a weekend,” adding that 
“This is one trip I should like to combine with a visit to your place, taking up what 
I presume is your standing invitation. Will you be around at that time? Would your 
Institute be able to pay my freight? I should like to make the whole trip on private 
rather than RAND time.”1247 Brodie followed up on this matter in his January 25, 
1962 which was largely devoted to his critical feedback on Kahn’s manuscript. He 
noted Columbia would be providing an honorarium, so he would only have to charge 
half his LA to NY airfare to the Hudson Institute. On February 9, 1962, Brodie was 
officially admitted as a member of Hudson, and as his letter of acceptance noted, 
he was “duly admitted as a Fellow Member of Hudson Institute Inc.,” commencing 
March 1, 1962, and his acceptance letter was signed and dated on February 9, 1962 
by Kahn himself.1248 As things turned out, however, Brodie’s membership proved to be 
problematic owing to RAND policies. In a February 16, 1962 letter to Kahn explain-
ing the situation, Brodie said he had to reluctantly withdraw owing to a “change of 
policy” at RAND, which also required his colleague Albert Wohlstetter to withdraw 
his membership.1249 As Brodie explained, “You are of course aware that the Hudson 
Institute is not being subject to any unusual or discriminating treatment,” and added 
that a “ruckus in Congress is causing people to be sensitive about possible charges 
of ‘conflict of interest.’ Whatever we may think of the sense of such charges, it is a 
simple and non-corrupting matter to trim some sail in that kind of wind.”1250 And 
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so, Brodie concluded, “Please forgive me for any possible inconvenience caused by 
my about face. I trust I am still invited to visit you on March 13.”1251 On February 
22, Kahn’s colleague, Max Singer, confirmed receipt of Brodie’s letter and Singer’s 
removal of Brodie’s name from the Hudson membership roster. Singer wrote, “I 
have your letter of 16 February 1962,” and “In accordance with your request I have 
removed your name from our official roster of Fellow Members. Since this action was 
taken before March 1st the Certificate you have can be treated as if it were void from 
its inception, and our records will reflect the fact that you never became a Member 
of the Hudson Institute, Inc.”1252 Kahn also penned a letter to Brodie on February 
22, writing “I was sorry to hear that you will not be able to become a member of the 
Institute. However, I both empathize and sympathize with your reasons; in fact they 
are pretty overwhelming.”1253 He added that “Your changing your mind has caused us 
no inconvenience, only a sense of great loss. I am still looking forward to seeing you 
on March 13, and I have asked my secretary to enclose with this letter the instructions 
for getting here.”1254 Owing to a clerical error, however, those instructions did not 
get enclosed with Kahn’s letter to Brodie, so on February 28, 1962, Susan Hirsch, a 
research secretary for Herman Kahn, wrote to Brodie, explaining that there was “some 
slip-up regarding your request for directions,” and with Kahn out of the office, she 
took it upon herself to include a new set of directions to ensure Brodie could navigate 
his way from Columbia to the Hudson Institute.1255 Upon completion of his trip, on 
March 13, 1962 Brodie sent a letter to Max Singer with a tally of his travel expenses, 
with half being charged to the Hudson Institute and half to Columbia University. 
The total air cost was $411.18, and Brodie’s taxis to and from LAX came to $11.00, 
with air travel insurance costing an additional $10.00. Brodie’s total travel cost came 
to $432.18, with $216.09 sought for reimbursement from Hudson.
The next year, on September 18, 1963, Brodie wrote to Kahn asking for a copy 
of Kahn’s recent pamphlet, “Escalation and its Strategic Context;” he also asked for 
information on the book it was included in, and about the book’s author: “Are we to 
assume it is Herman Kahn?”1256 That Brodie did not know could be indicative of the 
absence of communication between these old friends and colleagues. It is not clear if 
Brodie’s critical response to Kahn’s Thinking About the Unthinkable and his concurrent 
withdrawal from membership in the Hudson Institute contributed to the cooling of 
their relationship. In his letter, Brodie added, “How are you anyway? And, how are 
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things going? People sometimes ask me, as though I ought to know, which I think 
I should.”1257 From Brodie’s comments, one can sense that communication between 
Brodie and Kahn was not a frequent affair, and that Brodie was perhaps falling out of 
touch with his old friend and colleague. Brodie’s wording seems to also suggest that 
Brodie was feeling somewhat snubbed, finding himself out of the loop with regard to 
one of the most widely regarded, and clearly one of the most controversial, members 
of strategic community. In his letter, Brodie wrote, “I know you must have read my 
article, ‘What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?’ in the May 23rd Reporter, 
reprinted in the current issue of Survival. You must have thoughts about it, and I 
would like to hear them. Alex, Nathan, and I are planning to do further work on the 
subject.”1258 He closed his letter by noting, “I am leaving for a six-weeks trip to Europe 
tomorrow, but a reply from you will be preserved nicely until my return. Best wishes, 
As ever, Bernard Brodie.”1259 Kahn responded promptly upon his return from traveling. 
On October 3, 1963, he wrote: “Dear Bernie, I just came back from a trip and found 
your letter waiting for me. I did, indeed, read your article in the Reporter magazine 
and found it, as usual, impressive, creative, and mostly sensible. I did note a certain 
strain of acidness in it which I do not usually associate with your writings. This sort of 
startled me but, later, when I checked the reaction of some of our colleagues to your 
article, I conjectured the reasons for it. To many of the analysts raising such questions 
of crossing the nuclear threshold, diminishing the role of the NATO alliance, or the 
relative sanity or sense of de Gaulle, or even the value of current proposals (which I, 
myself, favor) such as controlled response, is worse than heresy – it’s a sign of senil-
ity. Yours for more penetrating senilities. My best regards to you and Fran, Herman 
Kahn.”1260 Kahn’s observation of a “certain strain of acidness” in Brodie’s article, and 
which he did “not usually associate” with Brodie’s work, is intriguing, though Kahn 
attributes it more to the passion of the doctrinal debate over flexible response strategies, 
and the belief among some deterrence theorists that issues like “crossing the nuclear 
threshold” were “worse than heresy,” suggesting that doctrinal and theoretical split 
taking shape within the strategic community was hardening, furthering the distance 
between these two pivotal strategic thinkers. 
Brodie’s views on the matter, and his concern with the proposals being advocated 
by some of the warfighters, escalation dominators, and flexible responders, becomes 
clearer in an exchange of letters with Max Singer at the Hudson Institute the next 
year, in November 1964. On November 4, Singer wrote to Brodie, commenting on 
Brodie’s June 1964 paper, “The Communists Reach for Empire” (P2916), which 
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Singer said he read “with pleasure and profit.”1261 And, “Because so much of it seems 
to be right to me I wanted to send you the following comments,” of which he felt 
his “most important comment,” his fourth, was: “You say, ‘I see no reason why we 
should let them (the Chinese) have the idea that they could fight such a war without 
being exposed to tactical nuclear weapons.’ I believe that we have a very large interest 
in trying to shape the world in a way in which nuclear weapons have as small a role 
as possible. While this does not necessarily contradict your statement, I believe that 
statement is the clearest example of the lack of consideration in your paper of this 
fundamental policy objective of the United States.”1262 On November 9, Brodie replied 
to Singer, “I cannot understand why people seem always to be displacing upward the 
place at which deterrence becomes really important. I am all for the concept of carry-
ing the deterrence concept all the way up the ladder of hostilities levels, but we should 
avoid derogating from its special importance at low levels, above all at the hostilities 
threshold.”1263 Two days later, on November 11, Brodie wrote a lengthy reply to all 
of Singer’s comments on November 11, 1964, and in response to his fourth point, 
Brodie wrote: “I wish I could agree, but I am not sure that I can. We can pretend that 
nuclear weapons don’t exist but we cannot make them not exist, and since they do exist 
we might as well recognize that we are deriving from their existence enormous benefits. 
War between the Russians and ourselves, and I think also between the Chinese and 
ourselves, is far, far less likely because they exist than it would be in their absence. 
(Emphasis added.)”1264 This singular point presents what might in fact be the most 
precise and efficient statement of nuclear realism borne of the Cold War period.
Brodie referenced the wider doctrinal debate under way as flexible thinking infused 
the strategic discourse, noting, “I hope you do not feel I am too sharp in my replies but, 
as was especially true in my previous letter, some of your points are similar to points 
made by others, with whom I have been jousting for some time. I have also learned 
that in this debate no one seems ever to succeed in convincing any opponent.”1265 He 
also noted the enclosed copy of a May 1, 1964 letter Singer had sent to Dr. Melvin 
Harrison of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, outlining Singer’s 
views of the “nuclear shape of the world,” which included several elements includ-
ing: the distribution of nuclear weapons and materials around the world; the state of 
weapon technology and its distribution; legal and institutional mechanisms, if any, for 
controlling distribution and use of nuclear weapons; precedents about and attitudes 
toward nuclear weapons and nuclear war (“how we get to 1975 may be as important 
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as static description of the world at that time)”; and the general state of international 
relations.1266 Singer had written: “The trick of course is to decide what we think we 
want. Then we can ask how we can point towards getting it, either by direct action 
or – probably more important – by letting our objectives in this area influence other 
policy choices.”1267 
Brodie responded as follows: “I have no special comment on your letter to Dr. Melvin 
Harrison. I agree it would be a nice thing to be able to prevent, or at least slow down, 
what we call nuclear proliferation. I should be interested, however, in hearing some 
good ideas about how to do it.”1268 On November 12, Singer replied to Brodie, thank-
ing him for his “prompt and thoughtful response to our paper,” and noting he “would 
agree with most of your comments,” but reiterating his belief in the value of a “clear 
breathing space in which it was accepted and understood and agreed we would not use 
nuclear weapons would seem to me to remove much of the poison from the system” 
and thus detoxify the “running argument” between civilian/military and American/
European “on whether we would introduce nuclear weapons.”1269 Singer conceded, 
“One can argue whether this would help or hurt deterrence of Soviet attack. I would 
like to think it helps, but I think we would agree that a marginal rational factor on that 
scale probably is not relatively important, at least today.”1270 He closed his letter, while 
standing firm on the non-use of tactical nuclear weapons and the preservation of the 
nuclear threshold, with the kind words, “Thanks again for your quick response.”1271
Herman Kahn, in his own voluminous writing on nuclear war and strategy, and 
his distinctive response to the very same transformation of war that defined Brodie’s 
work and which led Brodie to articulate the logic of deterrence so cogently, would 
logically advocate the necessity to look beyond the failure of deterrence, and to imagine 
how to navigate the new, complex, and fog-obscured strategic landscape in the event 
deterrence failed, and nuclear war broke out. For instance, consider Kahn’s rebuke 
of “some finite-deterrence advocates” (in the company of, curiously, both “moralists” 
and “some extreme ‘militarists’”) that would seem to include Brodie, in his discussion 
of the 44th and final rung of his famous escalation ladder in On Escalation: Metaphors 
and Scenarios, that of “Spasm or insensate war.” As Kahn observes:  “It has come as 
a distinct shock to me that many people not only accept, in effect, the concept of 
spasm or insensate war, but assign a humanitarian value to it, arguing that if this is 
the only conception of war a country has (or discusses), war becomes ‘unthinkable’ 
1266. Brodie, letter to Singer, November 11, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1267. Brodie, letter to Singer, November 11, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1268. Brodie, letter to Singer, November 11, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1269. Singer, letter to Brodie, November 12, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1270. Singer, letter to Brodie, November 12, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1271. Singer, letter to Brodie, November 12, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
276 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
or ‘impossible’ – or that deterrence is improved. Thus, there is a curious area of agree-
ment between some extreme “militarists,” some arms-controllers, and some members 
of the peace movement, although they arrive at their agreement from quite different 
assumptions and moral positions.”1272
Of course, as we have seen, Brodie did not entirely neglect the topic of limited 
war and when it came to the defense of Western Europe was a strong proponent of 
escalation, particular with regard to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to blunt a 
Soviet conventional attack – and in his correspondence takes great pains to remind 
his peers and colleagues of this fact. Indeed, his written work looks well beyond ba-
sic deterrence, with the advent of thermonuclear weaponry as well as the continued 
vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons forcing him to recalibrate 
the “absolute” nature of atomic weapons, and to recognize their increasingly relative 
nature, so much so that Brodie and Kahn dived into the topic of escalation across the 
nuclear threshold at around the same time. But it was Kahn that we would remem-
ber as becoming the voice of the warfighter, the thinker of the unthinkable, and not 
Brodie, much to Brodie’s own frustration. 
Brodie felt a similar frustration a decade earlier as Kissinger rose to prominence, 
to some degree fueled by the unacknowledged theoretical and doctrinal influence of 
Brodie, whose early ideas on limited war anticipated the issues that would later come 
to dominate the strategic nuclear discourse. As revealed in a September 6, 1957 memo 
to his editor, Max Ascoli, the publisher of The Reporter: “Dear Max: In all the current 
hoopla about ‘limited war,’ especially in connection with the Kissinger Book, there 
has been an under-current of attitude that the idea is new. I wonder if you remember 
the article I wrote for you and which you published in your issue of November 18, 
1954 It was entitled ‘Unlimited Weapons and Limited War,’ and if you can find the 
time to scan it, you will find that it anticipated all the basic issues which are being so 
much discussed now. Oddly enough, I have never seen any reference to that article 
anywhere else. It is even omitted from the bibliography of Kissinger’s book, though 
in his case I suspect the omission is deliberate and for petty motives. So far as I know, 
it was the first article directly on the subject in any journal, American or British. I 
thought you might be interested in knowing that. My own Foreign Affairs article of 
1272. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), 195. Also reprinted as an excerpted 
chapter in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), 332-333. Kahn further observes: “Some moralists and some finite-deterrence advocates are against study-
ing limitations and restraint in central wars for fear that it might cause it to be too ready to resort to war. Some militarists 
(and many Europeans) are against the study of limitation and restraint in central war because they feel that by appearing 
to reduce the consequences of deterrence-failing, such studies also decrease the reliability of deterrence; and they may fear, 
too, that these studies might simultaneously erode U.S. or Allied determination and will. Thus, there are those who believe 
that this ultimate escalation option should not only be available, but that it should, either by default or deliberately, be 
the only option – no others being planned for. Hence the rung is included in the escalation ladder; although the original 
purpose for its inclusion, to dramatize – perhaps unfairly – a lack in official thinking, has been fulfilled.”
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the January preceding came somewhat close to anticipating the subject; I had also 
been writing classified memoranda on limited war for at least two years preceding the 
Foreign Affairs article; but my first published treatment of the subject was in the article 
in your journal.”1273 Brodie was correct to point out his contribution to the limited 
war literature, both classified internal documents as well as public articles. But history 
often is myopic, responding less to the substance of historical dialogue and more to 
its style. Brodie’s style, and Kahn’s, were widely divergent, much like Brodie’s and 
Kissinger’s had differed, with Kissinger becoming a very powerful statesman shaping 
and guiding American foreign and military policy, and Brodie remaining an outsider, 
like the frustrated Machiavelli in an unending exile from power and influence. Both 
Brodie and Kahn thought about the unthinkable, the former with greater theoretical 
sophistication than the latter. But it is the latter whom most will remember for not 
only thinking about the unthinkable, but for planning the unthinkable – and for 
boldly imagining the world the day after deterrence failed.
Brodie had also discussed limited war in his February 1956 Naval War College 
presentation, when he suggested that we needed to experience a revolution in the 
way we think about war and peace in the nuclear age, to mirror the revolution in 
military technology that had been fostered by the splitting of the atom: “Today we 
speak of limited war in a sense that connotes a deliberate hobbling of a tremendous 
power that is already mobilized – for the sake only of inducing the enemy to hobble 
himself to comparable degree. We have to admit that it offends against some of the 
most cherished ideas and doctrines of what we consider to be classic strategy. …  There 
has to be a revolution in ways of thinking about war and peace, among civilians and 
military alike, before we can even undertake to deal with the many technical problems 
of limited or peripheral war. That revolution will not be easy to accomplish.”1274 
Brodie’s closing words present a snapshot of his most enduring contribution to 
the study of total war, a lesson that Clausewitz had sought to articulate but which 
also largely went unheard by those moved by more practical, less nuanced, Jominian 
thought: “Anyway, we must get away from thinking about war and peace in terms of 
all or nothing. Such is the sweet voice of reason. But what we come up against im-
mediately is the fact that passion and fear have also been inseparable from war, that 
the resort to arms is itself enough to stimulate in those who do so a powerful flow of 
adrenaline, which promotes the forceful handling of those arms. War, in other words, 
1273. Brodie, memo to Max Ascoli, September 6, 1957, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
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does have an inherent and almost necessary tendency to be orgiastic. But that does 
not argue that we can afford to surrender to that tendency, or that we must use our 
reasonable moments during peace to concoct doctrines and strategies that imply lack 
of reason in war.”1275 And so counseled Brodie, once the high priest of the dangerous 
dark art of nuclear war and the founding father of America’s deterrence strategy. 
As recounted by Newell Bringhurst, Brodie felt “disappointed at not having been 
asked to join the New Frontier defense analysts in Washington following John F. Ken-
nedy’s 1960 election. His expectations had been raised as the new secretary of defense, 
Robert S. McNamara, recruited a number of Brodie’s colleagues at RAND. Brodie 
himself seemed destined for appointment, given his well-known Democratic leanings 
– and the fact that John F. Kennedy himself had personally expressed his favorable 
reaction to Bernard’s recently published Strategy in the Missile Age.”1276 But working 
against this ambition, “Brodie’s views on tactical nuclear warfare were at variance 
with those of important officials in the Kennedy administration. His reputation as a 
loner – not a team player – also worked against his appointment. He was, according 
to at least two close RAND associates, outspoken and unwilling to ‘adapt his views 
to … conventional wisdom.’ Brodie himself blamed his longtime nemesis at RAND, 
Albert Wohlstetter” who “had been able to ‘gather round himself a veritable court’ of 
individuals at RAND, including Alain Enthoven, Henry Rowen, William Kaufmann 
and Daniel Ellsberg – individuals who, according to Brodie, were ‘not quite of the first 
rank intellectually, but nevertheless very able.’ Yet Wohlstetter had an inside track that 
enabled to get his people appointed. ‘All of the so-called ‘whiz kids’ around McNa-
mara were either members of [Wohlstetter’s] original RAND following … or people 
who were intellectually beholden to them,’ Brodie claimed, whereas he himself, not 
being one of Wohlstetter’s favored persons, was passed over.”1277Brodie “was active in 
his own research and writing” and “continued to be outspoken and blunt regarding 
American foreign policy, and his views reflected the deep division of opinion among 
RAND people.” His May 1963 article in The Reporter (“What Price Conventional 
Capabilities in Europe”) “further isolated him various RAND colleagues. According 
to one observer, Bernard ‘occasionally displayed a savage temper and a bristling ego, 
especially if he thought others were robbing his ideas.’”1278 
Then, in 1966 Brodie “published Escalation and the Nuclear Option,” and this 
“controversial study called for deployment in Europe of tactical nuclear weapons, with 
the threat of using them, if need be. In arguing his position, Brodie took issue with 
strategists promoting the deployment of large conventional forces, which he thought 
1275. Brodie, “Influence of Mass Destruction Weapons on Strategy,” 21-22.
1276. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life, 162.
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a waste of hundreds of billions of dollars. He discounted the threat of war posed by 
nuclear deployment, arguing that the very existence of such weapons – and the adop-
tion of an unequivocal poli[c]y to use them – were prime guarantees of preventing 
war in the first place. This thesis opposed the conventional-war position of the then 
secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, and the stance of many of Brodie’s RAND 
colleagues.”1279 
And so, Brodie would soon find himself eclipsed by theoretically less rigorous minds, 
pragmatists and politicos better suited to the formation of doctrine than the high art 
of theory, men like Henry Kissinger who would wield the bomb as a diplomatic tool, 
a saber to be rattled, and like Herman Kahn, who more readily embraced the orgiastic 
nature of atomic destruction with a “What, me worry?” attitude that helped propel 
him to pop-stardom as the living embodiment of Dr. Strangelove. Brodie, meanwhile, 
ever the theoretical purist, would see his intellectual influence wane. But his canon 
of work, his richly textured theory infused with historical knowledge and his unique 
philosophical inquiries into the nature of war, its all-important connection to poli-
tics, and its inherent dangers, would remain his legacy – to be unearthed for a new 
generation that would continue to face the same worrisome intermixture of nuclear 
proliferation amidst the persistence of war.
Escalation: Some Preliminary Observations
In a September 13, 1962 working paper prepared for U.S. Army Major General 
Harold K. Johnson, who was “chairman of a special study group on the staff of the 
Joint Chiefs,”1280 Brodie incisively outlines many of the salient issues associated with 
“escalation” – one of the new terms that Brodie would later describe as being in “wide 
use of late,” part of a new wave of “fashionable jargon” that emerged once deterrence 
had stabilized with the unprecedented “degree of security built into the strategic retali-
atory forces of the two major nuclear powers” in the early 1960s.1281 
While in later years Brodie would lament being perceived as something of an op-
ponent to the “limited war” school, he was in fact one of the first to recognize the need 
for limited war in thermonuclear era when his earlier description of atomic weapons 
as absolute weapons proved premature, just as the dangers of general war increased 
so dramatically that the tactical use of nuclear weapons, even the new superbombs, 
became a necessary tool to prevent escalation to general war and to signal the West’s 
determination to defend its interests from the specter of Soviet attack. This was evident 
1279. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life, 183.
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in his entire chapter devoted to the subject of limited war (titled appropriately, “Lim-
ited War”) in Strategy in the Missile Age, not to mention the many papers, articles and 
speeches that he authored in the years preceding that work’s publication that reflected 
this self-same recognition of necessity to fight limited wars. The topic of escalation 
was thus a topic of interest to Brodie early on; and while his published monograph 
on the topic would follow that of Herman Kahn by several months, and his lengthy 
internal RAND report on the same topic (and with nearly the same identical content) 
would appear the same year as Kahn’s widely read work, Brodie actually first put pen 
to paper several years earlier with an introductory paper dated September 13, 1962 
that outlined his thoughts and which to a large degree mapped out his argument that 
would be elaborated in the longer report, and ultimately published as a book four 
years later by Princeton University Press.
Like many classic works of strategy, dating as far back as Sun Tzu’s famous thirteen 
chapters, Brodie’s preliminary work on escalation was tidy and succinct, just fourteen 
pages long and presented into 23 specific points. These digestible, bite-sized points 
were tailor-made for the professional military audience, and its pressing need to boil 
down complex analyses into actionable maxims suitable for the demanding realities 
of war. A marked departure for Brodie, whose style of theorizing tended to reflect the 
bulkier literary style of philosophers of war like Clausewitz more than the precisely 
calibrated style of theorists like Jomini who boiled down the principles of war into 
similarly bite-sized units as Brodie now presented, “Some Preliminary Observations 
on Escalation” demonstrated that behind the veil of secrecy that obscured his clas-
sified work from public sight, Brodie was nonetheless able to digest war’s awesome 
complexity and boiled down its complicated essence for practitioners of the art of 
war to handily apply. 
While not as well known for this art, and quite the critic of those whose works 
favored boiling down over elaboration, it is intriguing that in the contest to define 
the challenges of escalation and its solutions, Brodie was among the very first out of 
the gate, even if in the end he was not recognized for firing the first – and potentially 
most succinct – shot fired in the escalation battles. Moreover, while later critics would 
over-emphasize Brodie’s early belief that the bomb was so absolute that it could only 
be used to deter war and not to fight one (lest it court national suicide and thus break 
ranks with Clausewitz’s impassioned prescription that war remain linked to its politi-
cal objectives and that the means thereby remain consistent with the ends sought), 
and some would thus attack Brodie for emphasizing one Clausewitzian dictum while 
ignoring another, the confounding importance of the frictional dimensions of war, 
which prevented war from attaining its absolute potential, Brodie explores in great 
detail the many frictional components of escalation, including the emotional dynam-
ics as well as the inherent uncertainties and relativisms of intuition. So while later, 
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theorists like Herman Kahn would elucidate the many granular levels of escalation 
ladders, Brodie would instead shine a light on all the frictional dynamics unleashed 
that would obscure, and thereby invalidate, the simple, machine-like, mathematically 
deterministic elegance of linear, logical, rational steps up or down that ladder, when 
in realist all escalations would be shrouded in many layers of obscuring fog.
In his first point Brodie observes that the “subject of escalation has been much 
talked about, but very little thought about,” and that a “quick survey of the relevant 
literature reveals little systematic exploration of the meaning of escalation and of the 
factors bearing upon it” with “many stated assumptions concerning probabilities of 
escalation under particular contingencies, but the relevant factual or logical bases for 
these assumptions are rarely made explicit.”1282 Moreover, Brodie notes that “[m]ost of 
the meager writing on escalation is concerned with one factor bearing on the subject 
--the use or non-use of tactical nuclear weapons” while “many other factors are ignored.” 
He aims to remedy this shortfall.1283 His second point is that “[a]ssertions concern-
ing the chances of escalation under particular contingencies are usually derived from 
intuition,” a danger of which is the inescapable fact thar “one man’s intuition is not 
another’s … who brings a different body of experience and different sets of conscious 
premises and unconscious biases to bear.”1284 Brodie ties this relativism of intuition 
to the recent debate on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, noting that “it 
seems to some perfectly clear that even in Europe the introduction of tactical nuclear 
weapons would be a much more shocking and disequilibrating event in a limited war 
than, say, the outbreak of hostilities in the first place or the sharp increase of the level 
of conflict from a few battalions to something comprising the whole of the ground 
forces on both sides” while others instead may “remember vividly the shock effect 
of numerous events in World War II besides the introduction of nuclear weapons 
such as the German breakthrough in France in May, 1940, the German attack on 
the Soviet Union in June, 1941, or the Pearl Harbor attack” and thus “question the 
above-mentioned assumption.”1285 And while it would certainly “be difficult to .prove 
either point of view” Brodie nonetheless concludes that it “would help if on the major 
issues we could make all grounds for holding certain beliefs as explicit as possible.”1286 
And so he thus proceeds; first by elaborating upon “The Difficulty of Quantifying 
Probability Estimates,” noting in his fourth point that, “Even a great deal of thought 
and examination is unlikely to produce usable formulations expressed in specific values 
of probability,” with only a few scenarios so high or low in likelihood that they can be 
1282. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 1.
1283. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 1.
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presented as either a “virtual certainty” or a probability that’s “almost zero,” while the 
rest find themselves along a “great range where we are obliged to use terms no more 
specific than ‘highly probable,’ ‘rather probable,’ or ‘rather improbable,’”1287 and thus 
offering little practical value. His fifth point adds that “[t]oo many available adjectives 
are worn out from overuse, and there is therefore a common tendency to use terms 
more extreme than one might be willing to defend,” so much so that “when a distin-
guished writer of more than usual insight and reliability (who has also contributed 
more than anyone else to our understanding of escalation),” and who is revealed in 
a footnote to be none other than Thomas Schelling, “asserts that the tactical use of 
nuclear weapons in limited war increases the chances of escalation to general war ‘by 
an order of magnitude,’ he is using that phrase in a rhetorical sense and not at all in 
the mathematical sense signifying ‘by a factor of ten.’ He is merely stating forcefully 
that, in his intuitive judgment, introducing nuclear weapons … greatly increases the 
chances of escalation.”1288 Brodie adds in the footnote revealing this “distinguished 
writer” to be Schelling that he did “not present this remark as a reason for being opposed 
to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war” but instead “argues, 
on the contrary, that the demonstration might be necessary, so long as we know what 
we are doing, which in his opinion is threatening the imminence of general war.”1289
Brodie next turns to “The Emotionally Charged Environment of Limited War,” 
similarly embedding his analysis in an important element of Clausewitzian friction. In 
his sixth point, Brodie points out how the “usual discussion of escalation ignores the 
fact that not only nuclear weapons but war itself invariably and deeply involves the 
emotions, especially those emotions loosely described as anger and fear,”1290 and this 
recognition of the importance of the emotional reality of escalation (and war more 
generally) is made a full three years before Herman Kahn’s On Escalation: Metaphors 
and Scenarios helped to strip escalation of its emotional core (contributing, as part of a 
broader literature that sanitized escalation into a mathematical exercise divorced from 
emotional and political realities that included works of such pre-eminent theorists 
as Thomas Schelling, to the blind logic that fueled the Vietnam War’s continual but 
ultimately fruitless, but ever so lethal, escalations which somehow turned a series of 
battlefield victories into a tragic political and strategic failure.) Brodie explains that 
“[w]ars simply cannot be fought without such involvement” and while “[s]trong 
emotion does not negate rationality” he points out that “it powerfully affects it.”1291 
Foreshadowing the tragedy of Vietnam, Brodie noted that the emotional dimensions 
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of escalation are reflected in the “difficulty of ending wars, because the losing side usu-
ally postpones as long as possible acceptance of the fact of defeat.”1292 In his seventh 
point Brodie further notes that, “when one asserts that in a postulated limited war the 
Russians would not do thus-and-so (e.g., use nuclear weapons if we did not) because 
it would be ‘contrary to their interests,’ one seems to overlook the fact that the very 
outbreak of hostilities generally argues some strong irrationality somewhere,” and that 
the “Russians are bound to see their interests and to appraise the factors which bear 
upon the military and political situation in a quite different way from us. Certainly 
the Japanese did so at the time of Pearl Harbor.”1293 Brodie cautions that we must 
therefore “try to understand the opponent’s views of his interests, because we have 
to be ready to bargain with him both by act and by word. But in the highly charged 
atmosphere of conflict we should be ready for surprises, including some surprises 
concerning our own reactions.”1294 Emotional reactions are part of the political and 
strategic landscape and must not be overlooked; Brodie notes in his eighth point that 
“[w]hen President Truman made the decision to resist by force communist aggression 
in Korea in June, 1950, his response was an emotional one” but “it was also, so far as 
we could see then or now a highly rational one.”1295 And while “[t]here were probably 
several quite different kinds of rational action conceivable,” Brodie observes that “the 
particular one chosen was largely determined by emotion.”1296 Other emotions came 
into play, as America’s Korean “involvement was later to engender dismay, alarm, and 
anger over our defeats at the hands of the Communist Chinese, and present from 
the first was fear that the Russians were using Korea as a diversion while preparing 
an attack in Europe.”1297 Brodie’s next point adds that this “latter fear, which turned 
out to be entirely unwarranted, was felt strongly even on the level of the Joint Chiefs, 
and it exercised a predisposing force on policy decision” and “helped us keep under 
tight control the emotions aroused by the Korean involvement,” which contributed 
to America’s ability to “demonstrate in that conflict several historically unprecedented 
restraints”1298 and demonstrate both the military and emotional viability of keeping 
wars limited.
Brodie next considers the many “Meanings of the Term “Escalation,” noting that 
the term’s “most common use … refers to a change from limited to general war,” and 
that “the term itself connotes the idea that the progress from-one condition to the 
1292. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 3.
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other can be by-stages, which may, however, be traversed rapidly.”1299 Brodie adds that 
“[s]ome further refinement has lately crept into the discussion and the term may now 
refer to changes: (a) in yields (from non-nuclear weapons to small nuclear weapons, 
and from small nuclear weapons to large ones), (b) in types of target (with a regress-
ing order of relevance respecting army operations; or one may speak of tactical targets 
with minimum civilian damage as against tactical targets with large civilian damage), 
and (c) in zones of targetting (leading from the. theater where contact exists between 
the opposing armies to the ZIs of both sides, which is general war). Another kind of 
escalation, which might be fitted under (b) or (c) above but which is also somewhat 
distinctive. is the change from observance to non-observance of certain tacitly-
accepted sanctuaries.”1300 And, point eleven, Brodie suggests that “another and most 
important kind of change. which is rarely considered as escalation but which clearly 
ought to be so considered, is that of rapid increase in the sizes of the tactical forces com-
mitted to action, even if they confine themselves to using conventional weapons,”1301 
a point Brodie had been arguing for the better part of a decade against an increasing 
chorus of conventional war in Europe (CWE) advocates (known to some as firebreak 
theorists), as he pointed out, “It is interesting that the standard argument in favor of 
larger conventional forces in Europe not only tends to assume considerable ease of 
escalation in the size of forces committed but, even more, seems on examination to 
be willing to make it easy for this kind of escalation to take place … by attempting 
to suppress the threat that increase in scale of commitment will trip use of nuclear 
weapons.”1302 History suggests caution when increasing conventional force levels in 
Europe, and Brodie speculates that “[i]f escalation in size of forces is in fact (especially 
in Europe) a very dangerous as well as intrinsically destructive kind of escalation, it 
might be well to seek means for inhibiting rather than encouraging it; one way to 
discourage it would be to threaten to bring in nuclear weapons relatively early, or 
actually to do so. In this respect the threat or actual use of tactical nuclear weapons 
may be counter-escalatory.”1303
Ultimately, escalation is at heart part of a process that calibrates the amount of, type 
of, and location of force used with the political objectives in an inherently Clausewitz-
ian fashion, and so Brodie turns his attention next to “A Contest of Will over Political 
Objectives” that defines and contextualized escalation. In his twelfth point, Brodie 
observes that a “limited war between powerful opponents is not merely a matter of 
military capabilities” but is in fact “a contest of will over political objectives which 
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is influenced by existing military action and the threat of introducing additional 
force.”1304 Brodie explains that “[t]his follows from the fact that the sources of military 
strength of both major opponents are not immediately at risk in a limited war; both 
have important ,even dominant, military capabilities that are not yet committed to 
the local struggle,” and as a consequence, “military capabilities can be used to dem-
onstrate that one has the political resolution and determination to exact a high price 
of the opponent for his actions, and to test the latter’s willingness to pay it,” and this 
“may serve to keep a local war from growing rapidly and perhaps unnecessarily.”1305 
In his thirteenth point Brodie introduces two propositions “concerning escalation” 
that “can be accorded very high probability,” the first being a “new and higher level 
of violence introduced by one side in a conflict is highly likely to be at least met by 
the other side, so long as the latter possesses the appropriate capabilities and is not 
ready to relinquish its position,”1306 and the second that “[i]n war, levels of violence 
tend almost always to move upwards, rarely downward, until the actual ending of the 
conflict by armistice or capitulation.”1307 Both are highly probably because “they show 
a high degree of historical persistence” and “the psychological and other reasons for 
that persistence are relatively easily observed or intuited.”1308
Brodie next looks to “What Constraints Do We Have on the Russians?” in which his 
fourteenth point is presented, in which Brodie notes while “we can assume that if we 
use tactical nuclear weapons in a European limited war, it is highly likely the Russians 
will do likewise” but it remains unclear if the opposite is true – that is, “whether the 
Russians will be likely to refrain from using them if we refrain and have promised in 
advance to do so.”1309 While Brodie suspects that “[s]ome constraint in that direction 
we would undoubtedly be exercising,” he asks: “but is it a strong constraint?”1310 The 
answer depends in large measure on “the Russian view of what is ‘natural’ or ‘bizarre’ 
with respect to the use in the field of modern weapons.”1311 Brodie notes how, “[u]ntil 
very recently a proposal to avoid use of nuclear weapons in any substantial hostilities 
with the Soviet Union, especially hostilities taking place in Europe, would have struck 
most informed Americans as bizarre” but “now it seems to strike some Americans as 
quite natural,” but it still remains quite unclear whether there is “good reason for sup-
posing that the Russians have made a similar transition in their thinking, or that they 
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1306. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 7.
1307. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 8.
1308. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 8.
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are highly likely to do so.”1312 While Brodie cannot determine with any measurable 
degree of probability whether the Russians would “conceive it to be in their interest 
to launch an aggression with conventional weapons alone if we convinced them we 
were (1) committed not to accept a significant loss of territory and (2) had nuclear 
weapons available for tactical support of our forces, even if these were reserved to the 
control of higher command levels,” Brodie does believe it to be probable that the Rus-
sians would “(as has been true thus far) choose to refrain from aggression under those 
circumstances, but if so the thanks are due to something other than our promises to 
refrain for a while from using nuclear weapons”1313 and can be attributed more likely 
to the workings of deterrence and the implicit threat of escalation by means of retali-
ation should they pursue aggression Europe. 
Brodie’s final section considers possible “Methods of Investigation” and thus outlines 
the research agenda necessary to address the many unmeasured probabilities associated 
with escalation that currently rest only on imperfect intuition. As Brodie describes in 
his fifteenth point, “Most of the above observations indicate the value of investigating 
problems of escalation through the examination of numerous scenarios, positing cir-
cumstances as varied as the disciplined imaginations of the participants can make them,” 
but despite this appeal Brodie notes that the “pursuit of scenarios is not a panacea,” and 
even though “unplanned or accidental issues which can dominate the outbreak of politi-
cal and military crises are indeed frequently inserted into scenarios,” Brodie points out 
that “accidents are by definition atypical, and the whole range of significantly different 
possible accidents is beyond imagination.”1314 Moreover, just as accident is by nature an 
unpredictable element, “the constraint imposed by emotion in a diplomatic or military 
crisis is hard to capture under scenario writing or gaming conditions,”1315 leaving its 
impact as much to chance and fortune as earlier theorists like Clausewitz and Machi-
avelli posited long ago. And, Brodie adds, “it is easier to vary accidental events than basic 
assumptions about the behavior of the enemy and even ourselves, and these can easily 
be too rigid. All this being said, it remains to add that any single scenario which tends 
to become standard and all too familiar is almost bound to be wrong as an approxima-
tion of future reality: as the “significant variations that reality may take in the future are 
too abundant for that.”1316 While several years before Herman Kahn’s widely read On 
Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios would be published, Brodie not only anticipates the 
approach that will continue to gain traction in the emergent field of escalation studies, 
but soundly deflates what would become the principal approach to the problem. 
1312. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 8.
1313. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 9.
1314. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 9.
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As for the specific issue of accidental war, dramatically portrayed in Sidney Lumet’s 
1962 novel Fail Safe the very year of Brodie’s first effort to flesh out his thoughts on 
escalation, Brodie writes in his sixteenth point that that “we should distinguish sharply 
between accidents of circumstance by which and within which crises are developed, and 
the so-called ‘accidental war,’ which connotes an outbreak of conflict that neither side 
has desired or really wants to press” such as “local bluffs being unexpectedly called.”1317 
Thus, “To say that accidental war is a possibility worth a good deal of thought is not 
the same as saying that a conflict breaking out in Europe is more likely than not to 
be of the accidental variety. The latter proposition, which is made frequently, deserves 
to be very carefully examined, because the whole concept of limitation and escalation 
is greatly affected by it.”1318
In his seventeenth point Brodie addresses the most likely scenarios of escalation, 
writing that it “seems clear that under many different kinds of scenario conditions, two 
general considerations will dominate the probabilities of total escalation to general war,” 
the first being “the importance of the outcome of the local action on the global position 
of each contestant,” and the second being “the relative vulnerability or invulnerability 
of the major strategic striking forces.”1319 He further develops these considerations in 
his eighteenth point, noting that the relative importance “of the outcome of the local 
action on the global position” of the superpowers has “long been felt intuitively, ac-
counting for the fact that limited war has generally been considered a more practical 
and likely contingency for the Far East and the Middle· East than for Europe”1320 
where extended deterrence has sought to closely bind the fate of America to that of 
its European allies, raising the stakes and the risks of escalation to general war more so 
than in peripheral areas where America more freely engaged in conventional combat 
with an intuitive expectation of a lower risk of general war. Though Brodie observes 
“[o]nly recently have there been proposals for confining wars in Europe to limited 
wars, and to large-scale though conventional limited wars at that,1321“ proposals that 
Brodie has strenuously opposed in his many papers, articles and speeches. As for the 
“relative vulnerability or invulnerability of the major strategic striking forces,” Brodie 
notes “the prevalence of a feeling that if there does not yet exist a mutual standoff with 
respect to nuclear strategic striking forces, there will be such a condition soon,”1322 a 
situation that in fact emerged with the relentless modernization of the nuclear forces 
of both superpowers and their concerted efforts to secure their retaliatory forces; with 
1317. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 10.
1318. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 10.
1319. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 10.
1320. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 10.
1321. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 11.
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the then current asymmetry, with American retaliatory forces more secure than their 
Soviet counterparts, Brodie notes that “it is sometimes argued that the Russians could 
probably reply devastatingly against targets in Western Europe even if they would 
not reply in comparable degree to a strategic first strike by us” and Brodie suggests 
that the “deterrence value for us in this kind of position – which presents us with a 
clear advantage and which has already lasted much longer than anyone would have 
predicted – needs to be examined anew, or rather continuously.”1323 Brodie finds that 
it “remarkable how far we have gone, and how quickly, in discarding a stance (i.e., 
massive retaliation) upon which until recently (and, no doubt, mistakenly) we were 
ready to hang everything” but as “we still have an unquestioned strategic superiority,” 
Brodie adds, “issues of escalation are directly affected. Some of these same effects will 
hold good even in that long-promised but not-yet-arrived situation when the standoff 
in strategic nuclear response between the two major contestants is really mutual.”1324 
It is the dynamics of a more balanced, mutual nuclear-strategic standoff that Brodie 
next addresses in his nineteenth point, noting in such “a standoff situation we can 
see some marked inhibitions operating against the escalation from limited war to 
general war,” leading Brodie to wonder, “how would such a situation affect escalation 
of violence within the framework of limited war? Do strong mutually-shared inhibi-
tions against going to general war inhibit also the introduction of nuclear weapons in 
limited war?”1325 Brodie observes that “[w]e can see one constraint operating in that 
direction, namely the conviction, or at least strong feeling, that use of nuclear weapons 
may prompt escalation even to a mutually disastrous general war” while “[o]n the 
other hand, insofar as the standoff were genuinely and deeply felt to be such, it could 
easily have the opposite effect with respect to escalation from non-nuclear to nuclear 
weapons on the tactical level” as Brodie had long argued in response to the CWE 
advocates: “In other words, if one side or the other deems itself to be advantaged by 
the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, it has the bracing assurance that both 
sides recognize it to be clearly and deeply in their interests to refrain from going to 
strategic nuclears. In short, stability at the top works to some extent against stability 
at lower and intermediate levels.”1326
As Brodie approaches the conclusion of his preliminary sketch on escalation, he 
notes in his twentieth point that his “above remarks … deliberately avoided certain 
important issues that are tangential to the question of escalation,” including “the 
feasibility of tactical nuclear war, that is, whether troops as presently trained and 
equipped could really live in a nuclear environment, or, if not, whether they could be 
1323. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 11.
1324. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 11.
1325. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 12.
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so trained and equipped;” and in addition “the question whether the incorporation 
of small nuclear weapons in the armament of forward echelons makes the ultimate 
escalation to high levels of violence more likely than keeping tactical nuclear weapons 
to larger sizes which can be controlled by the most senior commanders.”1327 Brodie 
suggests that for “a region like Europe, the most dangerous eruption is probably the 
one that commits the first battalion, and any deployment that helps to deter that 
kind of eruption – if it really does so – has much in its favor,” and thus re-asserts his 
confidence that deterrence remains not only the best policy but the wisest strategy, 
threatening escalation in order to dissuade one’s opponent, by deterrence, from taking 
the sorts of risks that would court escalation.1328 
Thus Brodie questions the currently in-vogue CWE strategy, and argues in his 
twenty-first point that such a “view holds that forward troops armed with small 
nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than troops not so armed because they invite 
nuclear attack, and hence have lower net fighting power,” while Brodie suggests that 
“it might be equally plausible to say that a force so armed has a greater effect in de-
terring attack – since its implicit threat to use (or to prompt surviving units to use) 
nuclear weapons at tactical levels fairly promptly, hardly strains credibility.”1329 And 
credibility is the sine qua non required for deterrence to succeed; as Brodie observes, 
“It was after all the credibility issue on which the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine was 
most effectively attacked, though it is worth recalling that credibility was considered 
especially in question for areas outside Europe.”1330 
Brodie reiterates his earlier argument that “while our use of nuc1ears may guarantee 
enemy use, our non-use of these weapons falls far short of comparably guaranteeing 
enemy non-use.”1331 Because enemy non-use is far from certain, Brodie reminds us that 
we have to be prepared to in essence think about the unthinkable, a point that would 
later help make Herman Kahn famous even though Brodie made this very same argu-
ment; in his twenty-second point he thus asks the hard question: “are we advantaged 
by a mutual use of nuclear weapons as compared with a mutual non-use? Surely the 
primary answer would have to be: ‘Not necessarily.’ It might even be: ‘Usually not.’ 
But surely too the answer would depend on circumstances and places, and perhaps 
an overriding consideration is that the choice may not be ours to make. A searching 
inquiry would perhaps come up with something like the following answer: unless we 
could have high confidence that non-use by us tactically would enjoin non-use on the 
enemy, we have to be both prepared physically to use them and also accustomed to the 
1327. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 12.
1328. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 12-13.
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idea of using them.”1332 In short, we have to be prepared to not only think about the 
unthinkable, but to also, as Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz would argues 
four decades later, plan the unthinkable. In a footnote, Brodie adds: “The question 
whether one can and should distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons 
is, however, quite distinct from the question whether or not they should be used,” and 
noting that at the time he published Strategy in the Missile Age in 1959, “the tide of 
military opinion was flowing overwhelmingly in the direction of advocating free and 
easy use of tactical nuclears,” and so Brodie was “therefore inclined to sound cautionary 
notes. The situation is quite different today.”1333 Brodie closes his preliminary reflections 
on escalation with an eye to future conflicts, perhaps engaged in succession, each one 
affected by its predecessor: “Another thought requiring mention is that so long as we 
are thinking about limited war, we are thinking not about a single conflict (which is 
all we do think about with general war) but possibly a succession of conflicts. Thus, 
it should be borne in mind that each case will have a great effect on expectations 
concerning the next outbreak of hostilities. One cannot expect to play each military 
episode as though it were historically unique.”1334
In the Shadow of Total War
In the Fall 1962 edition of Daedalus, Brodie revisited the specter of total war, written 
while on a “Reflective Year fellowship” sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation while 
on leave from RAND. It is interesting that Brodie notes that the “RAND Corporation 
and its sponsors are more than usually dissociated from the views expressed by the 
author,” suggesting a widening gulf between his views, and those of his colleagues.1335 
Brodie starts out his article by noting that the United States, “the original home of 
the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation,’ is also the country with a national compulsion to 
deny the possibility of total war,” evident in the recent “shocked rejection provoked 
in the latter part of 1961 and the beginning of 1962 by some serious talk and a slight 
amount of activity concerning fallout shelters.”1336 As well Brodie recalls “in the same 
connection the bitter denunciation by some reviewers, and by many others who may 
or may not have seen the book of Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War,” and notes 
“the passionate and also the discriminate nature of the outcry against” shelters greatly 
contrasted the “remark ably passive public acceptance of a national-security budget 
1332. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 13-14.
1333. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 13, n. 5.
1334. Brodie, “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” 14.
1335. Bernard Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” Daedalus 91, No. 4, American Foreign Policy: 
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1336. Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” 733.
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recently raised to fifty billion dollars and covering an array of conspicuously offensive 
and therefore presumably more ‘provocative’ weapons,” a vast sum of which the con-
troversial shelter program would have accounted for just one percent.1337 “Why,” asks 
Brodie, “has this program – especially the private efforts which were quite independent 
of the government al locations – been singled out for such special reprobation?”1338 
Brodie suggests that shelters, “like the Kahn book,” became “objectionable because, 
unlike ballistic missiles, they cannot be written off to ‘deterrence’ – a useful and im-
portant word that has by now acquired some of the qualities of magic,” and while 
they “may help somewhat in deterrence,” the curse of fallout shelters was their “most 
obvious utility is for saving life in the event of total war. Thus to accept shelters is 
to accept the possibility of the unthinkable. The thought frightens, and fright hides 
behind moralistic indignation.”1339 
Brodie found that the “most interesting argument urged against shelters is that they 
would make war more likely,” and this was because they’d make “the citizenry and 
the politicians more complacent or more bellicose and by detracting from the more 
‘positive’ kind of efforts for peace – that is, proposals for disarmament and the like, 
where the appeal to the opponent gains its force only indirectly or in veiled fashion 
from military power.”1340 Brodie suggests that even if this complaint that shelters would 
increase the likelihood of war had merit, “it would still be important to know: By how 
much?”1341 Brodie believes that “[e]ven if the probability of war were originally either 
very low or very high, we might still want to go ahead with our shelter program so 
long as shelters (a) added only marginally to the risk, and (b) had a good chance of 
being considerably useful in war; for a low probability is not the same as a zero prob-
ability where so much is at stake, and a high probability puts a certain urgency on 
getting ahead with anything that promises to reduce substantially the loss in lives.”1342 
But Brodie’s discussion of the fallout shelter backlash is meant primarily to illustrate 
“that it is often useful or necessary to think quantitatively, at least in terms of ‘more’ 
or ‘less,’ of ‘much’ or ‘little,’ even where we cannot discover the true values for the 
relevant quantities or probabilities.”1343 Further, Brodie adds that policymaker “should 
respond in their planning to an array of possible contingencies, and not merely to the 
single most expected event,”1344 and it is this broad approach to the question of total 
1337. Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” 733.
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war, and the estimation of its probability, that Brodie now turns: “How, then, shall we 
appraise, if not measure, the probability of total war, or “general” war, as the military 
prefer to call it? It is certainly more than merely conceivable, for it is frequently being 
explicitly or implicitly threatened by one side or the other in the cold war. The prob-
ability of such war is also clearly affected by our policies, so that by acts of omission or 
commission we can make it much more or much less probable. On the other hand, it 
is not always easy to know what actions, or omissions, have what effect on the degree 
of probability. Also, we suspect that the best behavior on our part would still leave 
a residual possibility of we know not what dimensions. Uncertainty concerning the 
degree of probability of general war is the problem most basic to our national defense 
policies, and it has equally great consequences for our military commitments with our 
allies in NATO and elsewhere.”1345 
But just as Americans responded viscerally to the reality of fallout shelters, which 
forced them to consider the uncomfortable prospect of fighting a nuclear war, Brodie 
found that people on both sides of the Atlantic – and not just the lay public, but 
also “people who are deeply interested and well informed, and whose views are often 
reflected in governmental policy” – were “reluctant to accept seriously the threat of 
general war,” particularly the Europeans. Brodie cites the “retired head of the Royal 
Air Force” who wrote “of total war having been ‘abolished’ by nuclear weapons” as 
well as “the well-known book by General Pierre Gallois, formerly of the French Air 
Force, Strategie de l’age nucleaire,” which “advances the view that not only total war 
but all war will be abolished by nuclear weapons when enough countries have such 
weapons.”1346 Noting a wide current of “direct or implied criticism of American 
‘overspending’ on total war,” Brodie explained that total and limited war capabilities 
“indeed compete for funds, but President Kennedy’s administration is apparently 
determined to build up both,” and pointing out that “since the ability to retaliate to 
a strategic nuclear strike is basic to our security – and to that of the whole Western 
alliance – its requirements must have first priority.”1347 But that doesn’t resolve the 
“heated controversy within the American military services, much of it inevitably in 
public, concerning the minimum and maximum needs for the retaliatory forces,” 
which pitted advocates of “finite retaliation” that believed “saved resources … should 
go into limited-war capabilities,” in contrast to proponents of “a general-war fighting 
capability which, although certainly not infinite, is nevertheless much larger” and 
who thereby are “willing to cut back on limited war, and certainly on conventional 
war capabilities” in order to maximize their punch.1348 
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Brodie sees in their debate an underlying disagreement over the probability of total 
war: “The interesting thing about this argument is not the precise levels sought by each 
side but the fact that the ‘finite retaliation’ advocates put the chances of total war at 
an extremely low level – though they concede that it is the existence of the retaliatory 
force that makes the risk so small,” and they believe “a relatively modest retaliatory 
force, especially if it is secure (like a few squadrons of submarines of a Polaris type) is 
enough to deter.”1349 This is in contrast to “the other side [which] argues first that it 
is very difficult to know how much is enough to deter, given different kinds of crisis 
and given especially the fact that techniques are constantly changing,” and that “total 
war may break out despite deterrence, in which case it will then have to be fought to a 
favorable conclusion, or anyway to the least disastrous one possible. There is an impor-
tant difference, they insist, between winning and losing even a nuclear war, and there 
are vastly different degrees of damage to be suffered in either winning or losing.”1350 
Since the atomic era began, Brodie observes, the “degree of probability low enough 
to have warranted a quite relaxed attitude before the advent of nuclear weapons may 
well be alarming,” caused both by “the enormously greater destructiveness of war 
under nuclear conditions” as well as “the fact that in nuclear general war virtually all 
significant preparations must be completely ready in advance. The latter consideration 
is in some respects more overwhelming than the former, certainly in its requirements 
on the peacetime thinking of the citizenry concerning war.”1351 So “even if we estimate 
the probability of a general war within any given time span as very low, say one percent, 
the implications for policy of our taking seriously that degree of probability might be 
very great.”1352 Brodie suggests that “[a]ny specific estimate of the probability of an 
event must also be fitted into a time dimension if it is to have meaning,” noting: “Over 
a long enough run, almost anything can happen. But our decisions, especially in the 
fields of military and political policy, are not concerned with the state of the world 
over the next two hundred years, nor even the next fifty. Our military policy decisions 
do have to be concerned with lead time in the development and production of new 
weapon systems, and such lead times are generally longer than the layman expects them 
to be. Even so, ten to fifteen years is about as long a time as we can meaningfully plan 
ahead with respect to specific hardware systems. The last ten years, incidentally, have 
been long enough to see two distinct and basic revolutions in weaponry: the advent 
and quick development of both the thermonuclear bomb and the long-range missile, 
each developing the potency of the other.”1353 
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In addition to the weapons systems required, Brodie points out that there is also 
the “political structure of the world to be considered too, and that happens also to be 
subject to swift and often unpredictable shifts,” and this contributes to the limited 
time horizon for “making estimates of the probability of war,” and “something between 
a decade and a score of years is as long a span as one should reasonably attempt to 
handle.”1354 And even it became “possible to arrive at some kind of estimate of the 
probability of war for the next ten or fifteen years,” Brodie notes that we’d “have a figure 
which has meaning only as a statistical norm.”1355 Making matters more complicated, 
Brodie adds that a phenomenon like general war is “a unique event” that is “almost 
by definition an aberration from any statistical estimate of probability,” so “even if 
we could be assured that the probability of general war is low, we should nevertheless 
have to be guided in many of our policies by the realization that it could happen.”1356
Brodie comes to the realization that, “[a]bove all, the probability of total war is af-
fected by what we do about it,” noting that it’s “possible to imagine a world in which 
general war could be produced only by madmen,” and while this “would not relieve 
us of all our worries,” it would at least “be a different and safer world from the one 
we live in now.”1357 While controlling the behavior of a nuclear-armed madman may 
not be viable, he notes that “[m]uch remains to be done in the military field, and no 
doubt in other fields as well, to reduce the chances that sane men could resort to total 
war,” and “[a]mong the various military actions likely to have that effect, the most 
important by far are those which reduce the vulnerability of the retaliatory forces – 
thereby reducing or even nullifying the advantage of striking first, or the necessity of 
quick reaction or of anticipating enemy action.”1358
With the goal of “reducing the vulnerability of our own retaliatory forces,” and 
thereby “assuring ourselves of the ability to retaliate if hit,” Brodie points out that 
“we are not comparably desirous of denying the enemy a similar posture,” since if 
the “object is to reduce the probability of general war, it is not necessarily true that 
whatever is his gain is our loss, or vice versa. It is a very good thing to be able to hit 
the enemy hard if we go first, and certainly it may be useful to be able to make that 
threat; but against that consideration we have to weigh first the fact that we are not 
likely to go first, and second, the compensating advantages to us of his feeling secure 
in his retaliatory force, which should make him less trigger-happy in a crisis.”1359 As 
Brodie describes: “The Russians will not ask us to decide for them how they should 
1354. Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” 739.
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handle their vulnerability problem, but by our example we will certainly influence 
their relevant decisions. If making our retaliatory forces more secure causes them to 
make theirs more secure, the net result appears clearly more advantageous to both 
sides (in terms of reducing the probability of general war) than a condition of mutual 
vulnerability. One must be clear, however, that a condition of mutually decreased 
vulnerability tends to shift the burden for supporting policy to limited-war forces.”1360
Noting Albert Wohlstetter’s influential 1959 Foreign Affairs article, “The Delicate 
Balance of Terror,” which “called attention to the likelihood that if the enemy struck 
first in an all-out war, most of our retaliatory forces might never get into the air against 
him, and those that did might never arrive over their targets,’ so “in a showdown the 
enemy might see a chance to eliminate our power with something like impunity,”1361 
Brodie points out that the question to address “now is whether adequate measures 
are being taken to reduce progressively and rapidly any continuing danger,” noting 
“[w]e have Polaris submarines, and programs are under way to ‘harden’ or shelter 
the launching sites of long-range land-based missiles,” and that “[o]ther things have 
been done or are planned to make an enemy surprise attack less likely to succeed in 
destroying our retaliatory forces.”1362 
Brodie suggests that “we ought to think in terms of moods during a sharp and 
bitter crisis, in which mutual intransigence is compounded with fear of each other’s 
next move,” noting that when “designing an edifice, the architect does not consider 
merely the wind load of a summer’s breeze; he takes into account the worst gales the 
region has known, and adds some safety factor for that still worse gale yet to come. The 
same must be true of a retaliatory force, which has to deter not merely those attacks 
which might be based on quiet calculations of advantage but also those which spring 
from the sharp conviction that untold danger lies in waiting.”1363 But this “takes us 
outside the realm of the rational,” where “we find a great part if not the greater part 
of political as well as personal behavior.”1364 
By considering the psychological dimensions, a realm of moods and passions, Brodie 
notes what he’s “saying here is certainly not new. Plato lamented the fact that kings 
were not philosophers, and that they acted out of passion rather than reason. So have 
many other writers since his time.”1365 Brodie believes that in “periods of intense crisis, 
we are probably as capable as the Russians of acting out what may seem to be the 
imperatives of the moment. Our conceptions of what we are compelled to do will be 
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molded, like theirs, by a range of rational, semirational, and non rational judgments 
or impressions, all coming out of human beings charged with emotion, including 
emotions of which the possessors are not even conscious.”1366 As well, Brodie notes 
“we have commitments which may force us to take intransigent and even menacing 
positions,” with American diplomacy continuing to “place heavy reliance on threats 
of force, implicit or explicit, to maintain existing positions, or to change them in 
one’s favor,” so even though the “world’s statesmen feel far greater fear and horror of 
what wars bring than they did before the nuclear revolution, or for that matter before 
1914, that fact has not yet been enough to bring into being adequate substitutes for 
the age-old reliance upon force.”1367 New ideas for waging limited war have emerged 
to counter the overstated and thus largely empty threat of massive retaliation, and 
these were “causing the present administration to take vigorous steps to revive forces 
equipped to fight with nonnuclear weapons” and to further “impress our new ideas as 
to the value of conventional forces on our allies in NATO and elsewhere,” but Brodie 
questions “who can ever know what will come of a limited response to a limited ag-
gression” and is concerned that were we to “guarantee in advance that our response 
would remain in each case within nonnuclear bounds, we would only stimulate the 
enemy to try to outmatch us in the localized application of force – which in many 
areas he will be able to do, secure in the knowledge that he runs no exceptional risks 
in doing so.”1368 The best we can do, Brodie comments, is to remain “[c]onscious of 
our great over-all strength” and to “to act in the expectation that our determination 
will induce the other side to refrain from carrying out his threats. But there can be 
no guarantee that determination, even if judged by the other side to be genuine, will 
have so benign an effect. … It is largely this kind of ambiguity concerning what needs 
to be done that makes international politics so serious and so full of risk.”1369 
Brodie remains convinced that “there is no real basis for the relaxed assumption that 
total war has now been abolished by nuclear weapons” and that as a consequence, we 
“must take seriously the fact that total war can happen, and to take that fact seriously 
is to do certain things which we have thus far almost entirely omitted to do (such as 
building fallout shelters) or to do adequately (such as increasing the protection of our 
retaliatory force),” even though these “are things which must certainly add to the net 
burden of our defense costs, because there is no other area of our defense expenditures 
which can be appropriately shrunk enough to offset the difference.”1370 But at the same 
time, Brodie does not believe “expenditures for ‘conventional’ or limited-war capabili-
1366. Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” 745.
1367. Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” 745.
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ties should be reduced,” as they’ve “been too long neglected; the more effectively we 
do our job in the area of total war capabilities, the greater the range of possible cases 
for the application of limited force,” which means “we probably have to spend more 
on total war in order to have sound reasons for spending more on limited war.”1371
Further Thoughts on Escalation
Brodie would revisit the increasingly “hot topic” of escalation in a longer treatise 
on the subject whose first version was a June 1965 RAND Research Memorandum, 
and which with minor changes a year later was published in book form by Princeton 
University Press. As Brodie had noted in his preliminary 1962 discussion of escala-
tion, attitudes in the United States continue to change with regard to limited war, 
and the climate of fear and anxiety that had contributed to what Brodie felt to be a 
dangerous persistence of massive retaliation as strategic doctrine continued to soften 
as deterrence continued to hold along the central front, and as the principal Cold 
War adversaries continued to grow accustomed to each other’s destructive capabili-
ties, separating those to some degree from their intentions and from that separation 
forging ahead with new relationships designed to last. 
With this continuing reduction of anxiety, Brodie found that the earlier resistance 
to limited war thinking in official circles also began to soften; and so in this context 
he authored his relatively lengthy RAND Research Memorandum (RM-4544-PR), 
Escalation and the Nuclear Option, that became the next year an uncharacteristically 
short book for Brodie – whose earlier works were considerably more voluminous, 
from his 786 page doctoral thesis to his 432 page Strategy in the Missile Age – just 
over 150 pages in length including its index, with the same title as his RAND report. 
While Brodie’s classic text Strategy in the Missile Age, authored in 1959, was followed 
quickly the next year by Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War, which took a then-
contrarian view on nuclear warfighting and directly challenged Brodie’s impassioned 
advocacy of deterrence and more cautionary approach to the dangers of escalation, 
Brodie’s later volume on escalation came to press a year after Kahn’s own relatively 
thin work – at 300 pages, less than half the length of his On Thermonuclear War tome 
but still twice the length of Brodie’s treatment of this subject – published in 1965: 
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. But this publishing sequence does not suggest 
Brodie’s volume was a direct response to Kahn’s, since as he notes in his introduction 
to the published version of his treatise on escalation, “I should mention Mr. Kahn’s 
most recent work,” but it “unfortunately, was published too late to be of assistance to 
me in writing the essay which follows, especially since the latter had to spend some 
1371. Brodie, “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” 747.
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time in going through clearance. Otherwise I should have had more than one occa-
sion to mention it.”1372 That his RAND report was published midway through 1965 
also contributed to the absence of full discussion of Kahn’s work, since a juxtaposition 
of the text of the two versions of this work shows only minor, cosmetic changes to 
the RAND report by the editors at Princeton, who elected to leave its content alone 
(with the exception of the appendix added to the work, a very brief September 1964 
RAND paper by Brodie, “The Intractability of States.”) 
Escalation and the Nuclear Option paid a revisit to the question of nuclear use dur-
ing limited war, and his earlier reluctance to cross the nuclear threshold, and thereby 
risk the danger of uncontrolled escalation. With deterrence now showing signs of 
both stability and endurance, Brodie felt compelled to reconsider some of his earlier 
ideas that had been formulated during times of greater international anxiety and see if 
they had withstood not just the passage of time but the increased survivability of the 
great powers’ nuclear arsenals. Brodie starts out the published edition of his treatise 
on escalation with something of a confession; first, that he had expected to further 
“develop and expand” his manuscript prior to publication so it would be “a substan-
tially larger book,” but it took so long to gain the necessary clearances that he ended 
up only adding the “present Introduction” to the work, and including as an appendix 
the paper he presented to a panel at the 1964 American Psychological Association 
conference on “Pacifism, Martyrdom, and Appeasement: Dealing with Intractable State 
by Non-Violent Means,” which provided Brodie with a chance to rebuke the pacifist’s 
perspective and at the same time reinforce his belief that psychology and strategy are 
somehow bound, perhaps by the same intangible threat that Clausewitz noted joined 
the physical and moral in war.1373 While the “reader is perhaps advantaged thereby,” as 
the “book has less weight, can be read faster, and is cheaper to buy,” it does seem that 
Brodie himself was disappointed by the book’s relatively light nature, even though he 
acknowledged that “[t]o expand is not always to improve.”1374
His preface to the RAND Memorandum of the same title issued the year before (and 
largely the same substance, less the introduction crafted for the Princeton edition), 
Brodie further notes that his effort “represents a tentative effort to introduce some 
fresh thoughts into the discussion of escalation and its relation to the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons,” and “stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies, 
including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons, of gauging the 
intent behind the opponent’s military moves,” which Brodie contends “should not 
be difficult,” particularly when it comes to differentiating between “a probe or a 
1372. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 21. 
n. 14.
1373. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), Preface 1 (not numbered).
1374. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), Preface 1 (not numbered).
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determined aggression.”1375 Brodie’s study “also suggests that the use or threat of use 
of tactical nuclear weapons may often be counterescalatory” and thus “may check 
rather than promote the expansion of hostilities.”1376 As in the Princeton volume, in 
his RAND Memorandum Brodie seems self-conscious with regard to the light nature 
of the work, and explains that in his belief that “the study of escalation needs more 
systematic study than it has yet received,” he thus “hopes to develop a larger and more 
comprehensive analysis” of the topic as well as “an intensive survey of the literature.”1377 
In his “Introduction” crafted for the 1966 Princeton edition of Escalation and the 
Nuclear Option, Brodie also starts off by noting he “presents an argument,” albeit one 
he hopes is “respectably analytical and even objective,” as he has “tried to be fair to op-
posing arguments.”1378 His opponents, he admits, have enjoyed “an astonishing success 
both among students of strategic affairs and among those responsible for determining 
. . . official defense policies,” and with publication of this work Brodie expresses his 
hope “to take my leave” of the debate, though he expects “the subject is bound to 
continue to be important for a long time to come.”1379 Brodie sounds a regretful tone 
in writing “[m]y in this controversy can hardly be one to give me great satisfaction,” 
as he had found himself “obliged to defend the idea of using or threatening to use 
tactically what J. Robert Oppenheimer has recently called ‘that miserable bomb.’ 
Who can enjoy finding himself in a position which, besides being somewhat lonely 
intellectually, seems by contrast with that of the opposition to be more than a little 
insensitive, heartless, and even wicked?”1380 Add to this the “irony” that “I have been 
opposing a position which – as the record shows – I played a special part in helping to 
create,”1381 and since the dawn of the thermonuclear era, he “began to urge” that “we 
must seek means of limiting war, even between the superpowers, and also of avoiding 
too exclusive a dependence on nuclear means of fighting,” a view that may even have 
seemed “trite” at the time of Escalation and the Nuclear Option but which at the time 
he first articulated it required “the fortitude to be willing to appear something of a 
crackpot – even within the RAND organization itself.”1382 
Indeed, Brodie recalls that “[e]ven as late as the Quemoy crisis of 1958, few of our 
combat aircraft had bomb-racks suitable for carrying ‘conventional’ or non-nuclear 
1375. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, RAND Memorandum RM-4544-PR (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
June 1965), Preface, iii.
1376. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), Preface, iii.
1377. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), Preface, iii.
1378. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 3.
1379. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 3.
1380. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 3.
1381. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 3-4.
1382. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 4.
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bombs,”1383 so any armed intervention would have required “nuclear means” owing to 
our seeming “insufficient conventional capability.”1384 Brodie recalls being “consistently 
critical of the official views and policies of the time, which I held to be excessively 
obsessed with general nuclear war.”1385 But now, midway through the 1960s, Brodie 
found that “times have changed,” with “ideas of limited war and of non-nuclear fight-
ing . . . very much in the air.”1386
While Brodie credits the “nuclear genie” with “some useful service,” namely by 
“critically reducing the probability of war” between the superpowers, he understands 
why “all civilized persons must share in greater or less degree a desire to put the 
nuclear genie back in the bottle,” but he nonetheless feels compelled to “plead for 
keeping and indeed expanding the benefits that have come to us from that same 
‘miserable bomb’,” and thereby avoiding “the cost and possibly even danger of car-
rying an intrinsically good idea much too far, and with so much excess of fervor and 
religiosity, that it becomes a crippling obsession,” and thus allow for the continued 
“self-denial” of a limited, tactical nuclear option. Brodie thus hopes to counter those 
views, official and otherwise, that “inhibit unduly our capacity to use – or much 
more important, our capacity effectively to threaten to use – nuclear weapons on 
the tactical level.”1387 He thus takes aim at the “allegedly self-propelling escalatory 
effect of any use of nuclear weapons,”1388 a fear he had once held during the prior era 
of heightened nuclear risk.
Though Brodie had admitted from the outset of his introductory chapter that he 
had “been engaged in this debate,”1389 he later modified this somewhat by explaining it 
was only a “debate” in the academic sense of the word, “as a sort of intellectual cour-
tesy,” but that in fact he found there has “in fact been a conspicuous lack of any real 
debate,” in part because only a “very small”1390 number of people were “responsible for 
developing the leading ideas in the strategic thinking of our time,”1391 making it easy 
for an idea to “win what looks like overwhelming acceptance” and thus for the small 
brotherhood of strategic thinkers to come to “apparent consensus,” as “has certainly 
been the case with the ‘conventional war’ idea,” leaving important questions on the 
1383. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 4.
1384. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 5.
1385. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 5.
1386. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 6.
1387. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 7.
1388. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 8.
1389. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 3.
1390. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 9.
1391. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 8-9.
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists: At the Nexus of War and Policy 301
use of tactical weapons “hardly at all discussed publicly,”1392 presumably reflecting “a 
lack of real rumination . . . within classified studies.”1393 
While Brodie’s work was written concurrently with Kahn’s On Escalation and thus 
does not address his contemporary’s current thoughts on escalation, he does reference 
Kahn’s earlier On Thermonuclear War, mildly rebuking Kahn for what could describe 
as strategic shallowness, or perhaps not thinking hard enough about the unthinkable. 
Brodie cites the way Kahn described “when an engineer puts up a structure designed 
to last twenty years or so, ‘he does not ask, ‘Will it stand up on a pleasant June day?’ 
He asks how it performs under stress, under hurricane, earthquake, snow load, fire, 
flood, thieves, fools, and vandals.’”1394 To this Brodie adds, “One should add, however, 
that the warranted strength of the structure also depends on its purpose, on the an-
ticipation of the probability of some of the catastrophes above mentioned during the 
use span envisioned, and in many cases on the choice between having a structure able 
to cope with the worst possible catastrophes and not having one at all. Few dwellings 
are built to withstand tornadoes, and few architects would suggest that they should 
be. All but a minute fraction of these structures last out their natural lives without 
suffering such visitations or various other of the catastrophes that Kahn mentions.”1395 
And these probabilities, when specifically applied to the risk of nuclear war and not 
to the metaphorical examples of catastrophes mentioned by Kahn, have considerably 
declined, and Brodie notes “one of the striking changes in the climate of the times 
since Kahn published the above-quoted lines,” is that “the same bomb that caused the 
fears of fifties to which Kahn was giving expression at the end of that decade has caused 
also the more relaxed attitude of the sixties,” and thus a “remarkable change” in the 
“prevailing climate of expectation concerning the probability of future catastrophe.”1396
Brodie closes his introductory chapter with one further apology, noting he has 
“been taxed by some of my colleagues with the reminder that I had in the past asserted 
in print that there was no essential difference between tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons to warrant the distinction in terminology,” to which he admits, adding his 
view has now changed “on the grounds that technology has indeed moved on to the 
point where there are already very marked distinctions and where there could be even 
sharper ones if we exploited more of the possibilities for specialized bombs.”1397 So in 
addition to his admitted “past error,” Brodie notes the emergence of a “large family of 
weapons which are specifically intended for possible tactical use and would rarely if ever 
1392. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 9.
1393. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 10.
1394. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 20.
1395. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 20.
1396. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 21.
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be considered for strategic use.”1398 But when it comes to the “much more important 
point of criticism” that Brodie has put himself “in the position of arguing for the use 
or threat of use, when appropriate, of specific types of weapons in a limited and es-
sentially tightly controlled manner, even though existing arrangements may make it 
quite difficult or even impossible to exercise such control,” Brodie concedes the latter 
point “is probably true,” but he finds this “criticism irrelevant over the long term,” 
since “whatever tactical nuclear doctrine we have is obsolete and ought to be altered,” 
and that the neglect of “small-scale, controlled use” of tactical nuclear weapons “should 
be corrected, and with some urgency,” so that they may play their role “primarily as a 
deterrent and, if they fail in that function, as a de-escalating device.” Hence Brodie’s 
determination to counter the belief that tactical weapons are “in fact the opposite,” a 
tool not of de-escalation but of escalation itself.1399 This becomes his thesis, which he 
presents in greater detail in subsequent chapters of his work.
In his next chapter, “Escalatory Fears and the Effectiveness of Local Resistance,” 
which marked the first chapter of his RAND Memorandum on escalation, Brodie 
revisits his observation on the profound shift in international anxiety, and how “[n]ot 
long ago it was only the sudden surprise onset” of nuclear war “that was considered a 
real possibility,” with an “overwhelming” temptation to strike first in the event hostili-
ties commence. But by the mid-sixties, “the conviction has spread and deepened that 
in the future, so long as we keep something like our present posture, general war can 
hardly occur except through escalation from lesser conflicts.”1400 Now, added Brodie, 
“the constraints to refrain from strategic nuclear attack . . . have become great and 
also obvious,”1401 driven by both physical and psychological changes, the former being 
“the enormous and continuing improvement in the security of our retaliatory forces 
. . . against attack through the well-known devices of hardening, concealment, and 
mobility,” and the latter because “[o]ur confidence is further increased by the fact 
that this physical change has served to buttress a comparably profound psychological 
change” borne of “improved understanding . . . of the motivations and psychology 
of the opponent.”1402 Recalling Dulles’ speech on massive retaliation, Brodie writes 
“[t]he time for insisting mainly on such strategies, or rather threats, is clearly past,” 
and American policy had “for some time been committing us to the principle that 
local aggressions on the part of our major opponents must at least initially be resisted 
locally,” and this means, Brodie unhesitatingly affirms, “[t]he possibility of further 
escalation will, to be sure, be unavoidably but also usefully present,” as it will “tend 
1398. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 22.
1399. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 23.
1400. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 1.
1401. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 1.
1402. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 2.
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to induce caution on both sides” and “more especially tend to dissuade the aggressor 
from testing very far the efficacy of a resolute local defense.”1403
An irony of the strategic relaxation Brodie has observed is that the “very easement 
of the danger of surprise strategic attack has stimulated a special fear of what in quite 
recent times has come to be called escalation,” which now appears to be “the only 
way, or at any rate much the least unlikely way, in which general war can occur.”1404 
In earlier years when the fear was that “any outbreak of unambiguous hostilities . . . 
would escalate almost immediately to general war,” Brodie explains, strategic think-
ers “therefore concentrated our concern on avoiding the outbreak of war, rather than 
on the escalation that we feared must surely follow such an outbreak.”1405 Once the 
prospect of limit war was imagined, “escalation, which is to say the erosion or collapse 
of limitations, became quite appropriately the object of special attention,” and Brodie 
found that “the abhorrence that most civilized people feel towards nuclear weapons” 
shifted to “the tactical use of such weapons in limited war,” driven in part by a widely 
held presumption “that use of them in limited war would be critical in tripping off 
uncontrolled escalation.”1406
And while avoidance of any use of nuclear weapons might be politically desirable, 
Brodie questions the automaticity, even if he cannot disprove the possibility, that 
“resort to such weapons could be the critical factor in provoking uncontrolled escala-
tion,” he suggests the opposite may also be true, that “a weapon which is feared and 
abhorred is so much the less likely to be use automatically in response to any kind of 
signal.”1407 But even this fundamental ambiguity cannot change the fact that “views 
attributing a powerful and automatic escalatory stimulus to nuclear weapons – views 
not the less firmly advanced for being based entirely on intuition – have been of 
critical importance in molding attitudes toward appropriate strategies in the event of 
limited war,” and “thereby greatly affected force postures” and the “whole gamut of 
national defense policies.”1408
Brodie next considers “The Methodological Problem” (he changed the title of this 
chapter to “The Analytical Problem” in his next year’s Princeton release), a very brief 
chapter of just five pages that considers the challenges inherent in realistically estimat-
ing “the risks of escalation,” in which he explains that “we are dealing … with issues 
of human behavior under great emotional stress in circumstances that have never been 
1403. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 3-4.
1404. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 7-8.
1405. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 8.
1406. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 8-9.
1407. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 9.
1408. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 9-10.
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experienced,”1409 and as a consequence, “the appropriate degree of fear or dread on 
both sides is thus only dimly imagined.”1410 He argues that there are thus “no special 
tools, devices, or gimmicks by which we may drastically improve our predictions 
concerning the chances of escalation in any crisis,” and while using “such techniques 
as war or crisis gaming helps importantly to enlarge the perspectives of the players 
… it does not provide them, or those who read their reports, with answers to the 
crucial questions,” nor with “the kind and degree of emotional tension and feeling 
of high responsibility bound to be present among decision-makers in real life crises 
in the nuclear era.”1411 War gaming and crisis simulation may nonetheless provide us 
with a useful analytical tool, albeit one which, Brodie notes, for “present purposes the 
improvement of the players’ ‘conceptions and understandings’ of the world they live 
in is much more essential to our ends than the use of the game technique itself.”1412
Brodie next considers “The Relevant Image of the Opponent,” since “[e]stimat-
ing probabilities of escalation is essentially an exercise in predicting the behavior” of 
both our opponent’s and our own leaders “under various kinds of crisis situations.”1413 
Brodie believes that Soviet leaders, as well as those in Communist China, were fully 
aware of the “terrible hazards of general nuclear war,”1414 as evidenced by not only the 
statements of Soviet leaders but also their relatively restrained behavior during various 
crises including the 1948 and 1961 Berlin crises, and during the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, where Khrushchev’s ultimate decision to remove the missiles must “surely modify 
one’s estimate of his boldness in putting the missiles in,” leading Brodie to comment: 
“Khrushchev may have been foolish, but was he really being foolhardy?”1415 (In the 
Princeton volume published the next year, Brodie adds the following sentence, further 
clarifying his view on Khrushchev’s relatively moderate behavior: “Clearly he not only 
did not want war, but he thought he was taking no real risk of it.”1416) Brodie in fact 
chides the United States for “having made a bad prediction” about Soviet behavior, 
adding this “does not itself justify our calling the Russian ‘unpredictable.’”1417 Indeed, 
Brodie finds Soviet behavior during the Cold War period to have been impressively 
restrained, with “no infringement of frontiers and not the slightest skirmish between 
1409. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 11.
1410. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 11-12.
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their troops and ours,”1418 suggesting that arguments made by the United States to 
justify a buildup of NATO’s conventional forces fostered “an image of the Soviet 
Union which inflates Soviet military aggressiveness” (in Brodie’s Princeton revision 
the next year, he changed “inflates” to “grossly inflated.”) 1419
Brodie’s reading of history suggests that concerns about accidental escalation are 
also overblown, with events ranging from Hitler’s invasion of Poland to China’s 
intervention in the Korean War, upon closer analysis appear not to be evidence of 
“accidental” wars, even if there was indeed some “miscalculation” involved in the 
decision-making; indeed, Brodie sees in Korea evidence not of the dangers of accidental 
escalation but “the degree to which escalation was in fact controlled and stopped.”1420 
As earlier discussed in our philosophical examination of realism, which has at times 
been juxtaposed to idealism when in fact the two philosophies have more in common 
than many appreciate, the core difference in world views can be attributed to contrary 
dispositions, one toward optimism and the other toward pessimism. Those alarmed 
by the prospects of uncontrolled escalation can be described as pessimists, in contrast 
to Brodie who looks to history and concludes such concerns are overstated, finding 
in history enough solace to emerge an optimist on this matter.
Thus Brodie asks, “What should now cause accidental war . . . to become more 
probable in a nuclear age than it has been in the past?”1421 He considers and dis-
misses “the possibility of gadgetry malfunctioning,” noting “extensive and elaborate 
precautionary measures” have been taken; and he also considers and dismisses the 
likelihood that unintended clashes between opposing units would tend to escalate, 
not finding evidence of the necessary “limitless concern with saving face” nor the suf-
ficient “ground-in automaticity of response and counterresponse” to ensure “a swiftly 
accelerating ascent in scale of violence.”1422 Brodie admits that it “would be foolish and 
irresponsible to insist that accidental war is impossible” or even that “efforts to picture 
its occurrence in scenarios,” which is part of the subtitle of Kahn’s own work on the 
topic, “are misguided,” and adds that “No doubt the capability for dreaming up ‘far 
out’ events is to be cultivated and cherished, but so is the capability for applying a 
disciplined judgment about the probability of those events.”1423 Indeed, grappling with 
the interplay of chance and probability, Brodie acknowledges that “important things 
happen that few had previously thought probable – occasionally things that no one 
1418. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 21.
1419. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 21.
1420. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 23.
1421. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 25.
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had conceived of.”1424 But he adds “[t]hat does not, however, establish that we must 
consequently abandon the notion that some things are very much more probable 
than others, and that with appropriate study we can have a good deal to say about 
which is which.”1425 It is Brodie’s belief that “[t]hough it is good to be imaginative and 
important to keep an open mind, it is imperative to avoid basing far-reaching policy 
decisions on contingencies which can be called conceivable only because someone 
has conceived of them.”1426 
Brodie’s next chapter, also very brief at just over four pages, addresses “The Attenu-
ation of Incentives For ‘Going First’,” in which he further develops his view that the 
“rapidly diminishing . . . advantage and thus incentive of going first in any strategic 
exchange” . . . “must have a great and possibly decisive influence in reducing the danger 
of uncontrolled escalation following from any local outbreak.”1427 Brodie cites a 1963 
statement from Defense Secretary McNamara that illustrates American recognition 
that “the degree of advantage that was until recently thought to accrue to the side 
making a surprise strategic attack – where it could hope to wipe out the retaliatory 
force of the opponent with near impunity – is gone and not likely to return.”1428 Or, as 
Brodie explained in a new paragraph added to the end of this chapter in the Princeton 
release the next year, “the opportunities for a ‘first strike’ are rapidly diminishing if 
not already gone.”1429
In “What Is the Enemy Up To?” Brodie starts off by commenting that “much of the 
public discussion concerning the appropriate time for introducing nuclear weapons 
in tactical operations has neglected to consider the enemy’s intention,” and instead 
has concerned the “mechanical phenomena, like the scale of hostilities reached or 
the rate at which territory is being yielded,” rather than what Brodie believes “the 
first consideration” should be: “What is the enemy up to?”1430 (In the revised edition 
released by Princeton the next year, Brodie strengthens his opening remark to: “It is 
amazing but true that practically all public discussion,” from “much of the public 
discussion.”1431) Brodie is confident that “upon the outbreak of any real hostilities,” 
our opponent’s intentions are “likely … to be fairly obvious,” and no longer cloaked 
by such a “probable obscurity.”1432 Indeed, Brodie points out that a “deliberate major 
1424. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 29.
1425. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 29.
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aggression will look very different from a probing action,” and in his 1966 revision 
augmented this by adding to this, “out of which ‘accidental’ wars are supposed to 
grow.”1433) This means, Brodie contends, that “[f ]or the sake of deterrence, and also to 
reassure our allies, it would seem appropriate to relate flexibility of response mainly to 
discrimination of enemy intent. That would make more sense than saying, as we have 
in effect said in the past: ‘We will use conventional weapons until we find ourselves 
losing.’”1434 Brodie suggests instead that since “the possibility of a deliberate massive 
Soviet attack against western Europe is exceedingly remote, so much the more reason 
for avoiding ambiguity concerning our response to it.”1435
Brodie observes that even as “the idea that sudden general or strategic war between 
the great nuclear powers has become extremely improbable,” many observers “seem to 
find unsettling the effects of that conclusion upon their estimate of the probabilities 
of war on any lesser scale,” and “seem to be tacitly . . . assuming that the probability 
of some kind of war occurring has remained basically fixed,” implying that with the 
risk of general war lessened, “that limited war (including quite large-scale limited war) 
has become more so!”1436 Brodie considers the risk of general war in Europe, finding 
it to be highly implausible; he notes a Soviet attack upon Western Europe “would be 
the kind of operation that would come closest to triggering the general war that they 
are, with good reason, desperately anxious to avoid,” leading him to speculate that if 
it does occur, it “must come about through escalation from Soviet probing actions,” 
or barring that, from “an attack by us upon them,” as Soviet ideology long expected 
to be the more likely scenario.1437 Brodie believes that “the most fruitful question we 
could ask about the use of nuclear weapons in tactical operations . . . would be: How 
could their use, or non-use, or threat of use affect the prospects for the occurrence of 
escalation from small-scale to large-scale combat.”1438 Added Brodie: “We should not 
to be talking, at least not initially, about using a great many nuclear weapons; that is a 
possibility that occurs only after a conflict has already graduated to large proportions. 
We are interested mainly in seeing how it can be prevented from ever reaching such 
proportions. We are interested, in other words, in the deterrence of escalation – though 
not for a moment are we less interested in the deterrence of initial hostilities.”1439
Brodie found that “the phrase ‘if deterrence fails’ rolls rather too readily off the 
tongue among those many defense specialists whose work requires them to think 
1433. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 34 and (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 69.
1434. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 34.
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about what happens in actual combat,” but he believes we should also ponder “some 
all-important intermediate questions, like: Why should deterrence fail? How could it 
fail? How can we keep it from failing?”1440 With the exception of facing “utter mad-
men,” Brodie believes “there is no conceivable reason why in any showdown with 
the Soviet Union, appropriate manipulations of force and threats of force . . . cannot 
prevent deterrence from failing.”1441
Brodie next turns to “The Status Quo as a Standard,” in which he argues avoiding 
“major war without politically disastrous retreats implies . . . that we have preferably 
a commanding superiority in our overall force posture” or “at least a position that we 
cannot be induced to recognize as inferior” and “that there be some standard in the 
world by which both sides can . . . simultaneously distinguish acceptable behavior 
from the intolerably deviant kind.”1442 On the former, Brodie recalls from history that 
assessing superiority “has always had more complications than appeared on the surface,” 
but that “[i]n our own time the problem has become enormously more complicated 
as a result of the special intolerability of nuclear devastation.”1443 Brodie places great 
import on maintaining the status quo, since “things-as-they-happen-to-be,” in strategic 
affairs, are “conspicuously inseparable from peace,”1444 with an added plus being its 
maintenance is “usually also supported by international law.”1445 Even in Europe, with 
its division into East and West and the formal division of Germany into two states, 
however temporary that arrangement was envisioned to be, Brodie observed that the 
“territorial status quo has gained markedly in sanctity in the nuclear era,”1446 as “both 
sides . . . definitely prefer a not too unhappy peace to any kind of war,” and thus “ap-
pear reconciled to continuing indefinitely what was once recognized by both to be a 
temporary state of affairs,” an “indispensable consensus” that “does not exclude what 
we used to call ‘peaceful change’.”1447 Even those who advocated German reunification 
came to believe such change had to occur “ohne Krieg – without war.”1448
It is within this context, of preserving the status quo, and thus maintaining the 
peace, that Brodie puts forth hiss argument for the tactical use of nuclear weapons. 
They no longer become a tool of escalation so much as the means by which aggression 
can be withstood. His intention is to thus restore to the discussion a proper balancing 
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of ends and means, which had become disentangled as opponents of nuclear use, in 
their horror at the thought of risking escalation, in effect deflated aggression, even 
massive aggression, from its proper scale. As Brodie explains: “However, the debate 
on nuclear versus conventional strategies or ‘options’ has so sharply focused men’s 
minds on the dread consequences of using nuclear weapons tactically that the very 
act of aggression that might invoke these possibilities has been excessively deflated by 
comparison. In many discussions of the issue, the fact of aggression is given about the 
emotional loading of an enemy prank. It is supposed to be contained in a manner that 
is effective but at the same time tolerant and wise. The argument . . . that we should 
be unambiguous at least about opposing with nuclear arms any deliberate and massive 
Soviet attack in Europe is in one sense only a plea to resume treating such aggression 
with the seriousness it deserves.”1449
In his next chapter, “On Enemy Capabilities Versus Intentions,” Brodie takes up 
the riddle of “whether our defense preparations and planning must be responsive to 
enemy capabilities or to enemy intentions,” and concludes the “answer has to be, and is 
inevitably, to ‘both’.”1450 The former presents a necessary measure for comparing “their 
strength and ours,”1451 but it’s only one factor to keep in mind. The latter helps us to 
determine “not only the magnitude but also the character of our preparations,” even 
though such assessments are “generally considered to be more subjective, tenuous, 
and faulty” than measurements of capabilities.1452 When contemplating the potential 
response by an opponent to a crisis, Brodie finds, “[i]n our spontaneous, entirely 
intuited, ambivalent, and highly uncertain answers . . . are wrapped up all our fears 
and doubts about escalation,” and he thus concludes that “The control of escalation 
is an exercise in deterrence,” and that means, at “inducing the enemy to confine his 
actions to levels far below those delimited by his capabilities.”1453 (In a parenthetical 
note Brodie added just before press time to the close of his next chapter, “The New 
and Different Europe,” in the 1966 Princeton release of Escalation and the Nuclear 
Option on this very dynamic nature of deterrence, which requires efforts to induce 
restraint by pushing back against the probing efforts of the opponent in an effort 
to hold violence to sustainably low levels, Brodie lauds the efforts and the courage 
displayed by President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and rebukes the 
critical remarks of reviewer I.F. Stone in his review of Elie Abel’s 1966 The Missile 
Crisis for suggesting that Kennedy’s audacity was of itself dangerous, with Stone plac-
ing his fears of escalation before what Brodie believes to be the greater risk of Soviet 
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aggression. As Brodie explains: “with respect to the Cuban missile crisis . . . when 
this book first went to press I thought it quite unnecessary to point out that against 
an opponent given to probing an occasional confrontation was an essential ingredient 
of deterrence. However, a review-article by I.F. Stone . . . was one long expression of 
horror that President Kennedy had had the audacity to make this confrontation. Mr. 
Stone did not hesitate to attribute the late President’s action to his vanity. In view of 
the extremely favorable outcome of that confrontation, one would have thought it 
incumbent upon Mr. Stone at least to speculate on what might have been the conse-
quences had Kennedy lacked the courage to make it.”1454
In the next chapter, “How Big an Attack?,” Brodie again takes up his earlier proposi-
tion that a massive Soviet attack against NATO across the central front “ought to be 
put among the lowest levels of probability,” despite the fact it “happens to be the kind 
of war outbreak in Europe that has been most discussed in official circles.”1455 (In his 
1966 revision for Princeton, Brodie notes this need not be “necessarily paradoxical” 
since “it is the existence of NATO that makes, or helps to make, the probability of 
Soviet attack so low.”1456) But while such massive attacks defined modern European 
warfare prior to the nuclear era, Brodie believes the splitting of the atom forever 
changed things, and in the post-Hiroshima world, “it is virtually impossible to discover 
in the real world the considerations that could make the Soviet leaders undertake to 
do such a thing in the face of minimum gains and the enormous risks they would be 
incurring.”1457 This leads him to “assign a far higher probability to the breaking out 
of conflicts on a small scale initially rather than on a grand scale,” and to predict that 
“neither side will be able seriously and convincingly to use for political ends threats of 
strategic nuclear attack, or anything that in scale is even close to it.”1458 Instead, Brodie 
asserts, “What one can threaten are lesser actions that could start events moving in 
that direction,” and as the “opponent cannot at any stage be deprived of the choice 
. . . of making the situation more dangerous or less so; but we can reasonably hope 
and expect to influence his choices appropriately. This is what we must henceforth 
mean by containing aggression militarily.”1459 (In his 1966 revision, Brodie added 
the word deterrence to this sentence for clarity: “what we must henceforth mean by 
deterrence, or by containing aggression militarily.”1460) In Brodie’s formulation, deter-
rence itself becomes a more dynamic enterprise, whose aim shifts in emphasis from 
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preventing total war to containing escalation by restraining the military aggression of 
the opponent, which of itself means by threatening, and engaging in, limited wars to 
prevent aggression from increasing toward totality. Brodie presents his new thinking 
as follows, explaining that “[o]ur military measures ought, so far as possible, (a) to be 
effective enough initially to prevent extensive deterioration of the military situation, 
especially such deterioration as basically alters the character of that situation; (b) to 
be limited enough to leave unused, at least temporarily, such higher levels of violence 
as are not likely to be immediately necessary to accomplish the objective stated under 
(a) – levels which must be most unattractive for the enemy to enter; and (c) to be 
determined enough to show that we are not more unwilling than he to move toward 
those higher levels.”1461
Brodie further points out that “(b) simply defines limited war” while “(c) establishes 
what is essential to effective containment through limited means,”1462 and thus “[w]
ithout (c) we either lose outright, or we encourage the enemy to move to higher levels 
of violence in which we avoid losing only by following him,”1463 hence Brodie’s support 
of Kennedy’s courage during the Cuban Missile Crisis showdown, and his determina-
tion to persuade the Soviet Union that he was certainly no more unwilling than they 
to move higher on what would later become popularly known as the escalation ladder.
Brodie next continues his exploration of the nuclear threshold, or what he calls “The 
‘Firebreak’ Theory,” with the “firebreak” signifying “at the tactical level the distinction 
between the use and non-use of nuclear weapons,” a term he attributes to Alain C. 
Enthoven that had come to prominence, usurping Brodie’s own less elegant phrase, 
“vast watershed of difference” between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.1464 The notion 
of such a firebreak had gained so wide a following that Brodie found “almost everyone 
must now subscribe to the firebreak idea,” even if the “notion that the atomic bomb 
is ‘just another weapon’ was … not wholly illogical,” even if it was “insensitive to the 
importance of a distinction, however arbitrary, that most of the world was obviously 
going to insist upon.”1465 (In his 1966 revisions, Brodie strengthened his comment 
on the near universal acceptance of the firebreak theory to: “almost every thinking 
person must now subscribe to the firebreak idea.”1466) While America’s non-use of 
atomic weapons in Korea reflected that war’s “certain special circumstances not likely 
to be repeated in the future,”1467 Brodie does find relevant to the future the high level 
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of anxiety “mere mention of nuclear weapons by the President” generated in British 
Prime Minister Atlee, which illustrated how “since the beginning of the nuclear era 
there has been in the minds of men a strong tendency to distinguish between nuclear 
and non-nuclear weapons, combined with a widespread fear of and aversion to the 
former” which has grown “stronger with time rather than weaker.”1468 While Brodie takes 
care to differentiate between “[r]ecognition of that important fact” and its advocacy, 
he does note that as of his writing in the mid-sixties and in contrast to the previous 
decade that “a nearly universal consensus exists within the ranks of professional mili-
tary people that small military operations are simply out of bounds so far as concerns 
the use of nuclear weapons,”1469 and that this “consensus unquestionably extends over 
a fairly considerable and quite important zone of contingencies.”1470 Further, Brodie 
notes the United States now “possesses a substantial non-nuclear capability” suf-
ficient to redress a “quasi-accidental outbreak of fighting or small foray” of the sort 
that confronted America during the 1958 Quemoy crisis, so much so that it was now 
“most doubtful that any voices would be raised, as some then were, to insist that we 
ought to intervene with nuclear weapons or not at all.”1471 Indeed, in Brodie’s 1966 
revisions, he added that America’s “large conventional commitment to Vietnam” was 
“proof of that.”1472 And while the “more enthusiastic advocates” of firebreak theory 
advocate “building up our conventional capabilities” to enable postponing “introduc-
ing nuclear weapons until a very high level of military operations is reached,” Brodie 
cautions that their logic may be flawed, as “the standard argument for rejecting as 
a useful firebreak any discrimination according to size of nuclear weapons is that it 
gives the enemy too much opportunity to mistake or deliberately exaggerate the size 
of the bombs one has used, and thus to proceed to larger ones. One never senses in 
connection with this argument any inclination to question whether the enemy will 
want to do so, an issue that would surely predominate over the question of his capacity 
to discriminate.”1473 In his 1966 revisions, Brodie adds to this, “He might very well 
want to do the opposite.”1474
Further, Brodie suspects the formal introduction of a firebreak would contribute to 
an unhesitating escalation up to that level of violence so determined, and his analy-
sis of the Cuban Missile Crisis suggests to him that the United States was likely the 
beneficiary of the absence of such a notion, as the Soviets “clearly wanted no fighting 
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at all” given their fear that “any fighting was extremely dangerous,” a viewpoint they 
may not have had if a firebreak had been established or asserted.1475 Brodie suspects 
it was the absence of a firebreak that resulted in “the immediate amelioration in the 
tension over Berlin”1476 that followed the crisis in Cuba, even though “the Russians 
enjoy local conventional superiority.”1477 Brodie finds that the “firebreak proponents 
seem to feel that the present anti-firebreak Soviet attitude may help deterrence but is 
much more dangerous to us if deterrence fails. For that reason they want to speed up 
Soviet acceptance of the idea, which they regard as anyway inevitable. One might in 
passing notice in this reasoning the interesting differentiation between what are al-
leged to be deterrence interests and what are alleged to be war-fighting interests.”1478 It 
is this bifurcation of deterrence and warfighting interests that came to define a major 
cleavage within the field of strategic theory, and which carried over to doctrinal and 
policy debates through to the end of the Cold War, without ever truly being resolved. 
Partly why, of course, is the artificial nature of this bifurcation, when the fundamental 
ambiguity inherent in deterrence suggests the absence of a clear boundary separating 
deterrence from warfighting, which thrives in the absence of such clarity. Hence clear 
assertions of nuclear non-use, whether the firebreak concept discussed by Brodie in 
this chapter, or the later notion of no-first-use that became popular toward the end of 
the Cold War period, may in fact increase the likelihood of war, which of itself could 
increase the probability of escalation to nuclear war, thus clashing with the original 
intent of the declarations.
Brodie observes that when the Chinese intervened in the Korean War it came 
only after “five months of watching us fight, sometimes desperately, without nuclear 
weapons – a fact which could be relevant,” a view supported by the work of Allen S. 
Whiting in his 1960 China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War.1479 
Brodie strengthened this speculation in his 1966 revisions with more affirmative word-
ing: “a fact which was unquestionably relevant and could have been important.”1480 
Brodie suggests that quite contrary to the firebreak theorists, it may in fact be more in 
America’s interest to “soften” and not “promote further . . . those distinctions between 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapons,” as had been done by many American officials in 
their efforts, largely unsuccessful, to “induce our European allies to build up their 
conventional forces.”1481 At the very least, Brodie believes “we cannot avoid debating on 
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its merit a question as important as this one,”1482 and hence turns in his next and final 
chapter to “Predicting the Probabilities of Escalation: Some Sample Cases,” which at 
twenty-seven pages (twenty-two as the pages were laid out in the 1966 revision pub-
lished by Princeton University Press) is one of the longest in his book. Brodie starts 
out be reiterating his belief that “wherever deterrence-of-war objectives diverge from 
either war-fighting or anti-escalation objectives, as they inevitably do in important 
ways, it would be seriously wrong to sell the former short.”1483 
While he finds most defense experts then believed America’s system of deterrence, in 
particular its “powerful and low-vulnerability strategic bombing system,” faced “little 
danger, at least in the near-term, of being challenged,” Brodie remained concerned 
with the consequences of deterrence failing, and believed we must “consider what to do 
militarily if it does,” and this means “considering how and under what circumstances it 
will have failed.”1484 He thus considers a scenario relating to a show-down over a Berlin 
convoy that risks escalating toward accidental war, which leads Brodie to ponder “the 
circumstances that can really make such a situation . . . go out of control,”1485 which 
he finds “boil down basically to two categories of factors,”1486: “the prevalence of rigid 
mechanisms of military response such as do tend or at least have tended in the past 
to pervade war-initiation concepts and also to get written into war plans,” and “that 
bundle of psychological factors summed up by (a) concern with loss of face and (b) 
tendencies to yield to feelings of hatred and rage.”1487 He noted with both interest and 
alarm that after the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a “tendency to think or at least to 
talk in such simplistic but absolute terms” as conveyed by such “common expressions 
about ‘pushing the button’ or ‘the balloon going up,’” in spite of the “sophistication 
they had presumably been accumulating in the preceding months concerning the 
appropriateness of flexible response and the feasibility of limited operations.”1488 But 
on the other hand, Brodie, ever the deterrence theorist, finds such a “crisis-induced 
regression to older patterns of thinking about war and peace” to be complementary 
to deterrence objectives since “the fear of precisely such semi-automatic escalatory 
reactions on the part of the opponent acts as a powerful deterrent to both sides,”1489 
and the “present intensity of such fears among all the major powers” shows how much 
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Europe in the Cold War differed from “what it was before 1914 or even 1939.”1490 
Brodie finds these fears to be “counterescalatory at lower levels of violence, and that the 
levels at which automatic or spontaneous escalation may tend to take over are being 
pushed critically higher,” strengthening deterrence by “moving towards much higher 
levels of tolerance for types of behavior that previously would have been considered 
impossibly offensive.”1491
As for saving face, Brodie suggests “[a]n imputed universal preoccupation with 
saving face” undergirds “why most people so readily assume that resort to nuclear 
weapons must make for spontaneous escalation.”1492 But history shows when it comes to 
choosing between saving face, or saving your country from destruction, nations, even 
superpowers, will choose the latter, hence the reason “the Soviet Union backed down 
in Cuba,” and why the United States “to a considerable degree back down in Korea 
… when it quite clearly modified its objectives as a result of Chinese intervention.”1493 
Whether it’s rage or humiliation, Brodie found that “governments, even Communist 
dictatorships, tend today to be corporate entities in which emotional feelings of indi-
viduals, regardless of how highly placed, are likely to be moderated and contained by 
the counsels of their advisers.”1494 When turning back to his scenario of an escalating 
conflict over the convoy supplying Berlin, Brodie argues that “one of the great draw-
backs of following the so-called firebreak theory is that the more that confidence is built 
up in the firebreak, the less is each side restrained from committing larger and larger 
conventional forces within the limits of its capabilities. In other words, the effect is to 
stimulate escalation on the conventional side of the barrier.”1495 If for any reason NATO 
forces had not achieved conventional parity with the Soviet side, Brodie explains, this 
would leave NATO with an uncomfortable choice between a conventional rout, or 
to escalate with a nuclear threat to counter the strategic imbalance on the ground. 
Brodie fully expects such a nuclear threat would de-escalate the crisis, rather than 
contribute to an escalatory cycle past the nuclear threshold, since in this scenario the 
conflict has been largely accidental, and not reflective of the desire of either party for 
war. Hence the Soviet Union, when faced with a nuclear risk, would have no reason 
to counter, much as it had no reason to challenge the American threat in Cuba. And 
even if the Russian do not back down, and show an uncharacteristic recklessness, 
Brodie believes American resolve, if demonstrated “by using the weapons rather more 
abruptly than the Russians seem to have bargained for,” might well be “the best way, 
1490. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 76.
1491. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 76-77.
1492. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 77.
1493. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 78.
1494. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 79.
1495. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 79-80.
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perhaps the only way, for us to avert not only defeat but unnecessary escalation.”1496 
Of course, Brodie recognizes it remains an open question “whether our own leaders 
could marshal the necessary psychological resources to introduce the use of nuclear 
weapon and to outbid any Soviet use,” but while “it is one thing to say we could not,” 
he finds that it’s “quite another to say we should not,”1497 which advocates of both a 
conventional build-up in Europe and of the firebreak theory were strongly suggesting 
if not outright counseling. Brodie notes his speculative scenarios “encompassed only 
cases in which a relatively small number of nuclear weapons are used more or less in 
demonstrations”1498 (and in his 1966 revisions adds that he recognizes “[t]here could 
be variations on this theme, including fairly wide use of small and highly specialized 
weapons – but the essential issue is maintaining tight control.”)1499 Lacking that, Bro-
die explains, would mean that it would no longer be the case that “both sides share 
a common determination to avoid going into an exchange that is many, many times 
more costly than any imaginable political goal could be justify,” and this would mean 
“we are inevitably back in the world of massive retaliation.”1500 
Brodie considers the situation in Asia, noting our prior non-use of nuclear weapons 
in the Korean War, and he speculates that for various reasons, whether “some romantic 
. . . spirit of fair play” or our being “restrained by the firebreak idea,” it remained “quite 
possible that we could fight another war in the Far East as large as the Korean War 
without using nuclear weapons.”1501 But this would mean “going about the job in the 
hard way,” while at the same time causing “repercussions for the future that would in 
the net be not to our liking,” as “we will have fixed for [our opponent] a pattern” of 
our non-use of nuclear weapons that “they have every further incentive to exploit.”1502 
America’s “gigantic nuclear capabilities” had “already been appreciably cut down in 
their effectiveness for deterring aggression by what might be called established world 
opinion opposed to their use,”1503 and Brodie cautions that “it behooves us to exam-
ine much more carefully than we have thus far some of the main propositions and 
arguments commonly made in support of our own drive to push even further toward 
what is in effect the psychological self-neutralization of our nuclear capabilities.”1504 
Brodie counter charges that “we have not really faced up to the awful risks inherent 
1496. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 83.
1497. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 85.
1498. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 85.
1499. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: PUP, 1966), 131.
1500. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 86.
1501. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 86-87.
1502. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 87.
1503. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 87.
1504. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 88.
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in miscalculation” by arguing that such “risks are something that we have to measure 
as best we can,” and his discussion of escalation in the above pages reflected his “ef-
fort to contribute to such measurement,” on his realist assessment that “[w]e cannot 
forfeit the task simply by allowing in advance such gross exaggeration of the risks as 
to ‘play it safe’” particularly as a ‘second look quickly tells us that we do not really add 
to our safety by doing so.”1505
Dueling Views on Escalation
International relations scholar Fred Charles Iklé would review the back-to-back works 
on escalation by both Brodie and Kahn, juxtaposing their ideas in an interesting side-
by-side comparison of their two nearly simultaneous treatises on escalation: Kahn’s 
1965 On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios published by Frederick A. Praeger, and 
Brodie’s 1966 Escalation and the Nuclear Option, published by Princeton University 
Press, which had published his 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age. In his July 1967 review 
in World Politics, Iklé observes that what became known as escalation since 1950, 
when the era of limited war began in earnest on the Korean peninsula, was really just 
a new label to describe an old process, one dating back to at least the Middle Ages, 
in which “one or both of the belligerents could have done significantly more to fight 
his enemy but chose not to do so” and instead limited the escalatory dynamic of war, 
preventing it from becoming total.1506 He notes that there are “many ways in which a 
limited war can become less limited and many reasons why, during a war, governments 
change the level of effort that they devote to bargaining, fighting, and deterrence,” and 
each of these is “tucked under the label ‘escalation’” today.1507 Iklé adds that the word 
escalation “makes us think of stepwise increments, each of which confronts the enemy 
with a noticeable challenge” and “suggests that such steps succeed each other up or 
down a ‘ladder’.”1508 It’s precisely this image of a ladder the absorbs the attention of 
Herman Kahn, who Iklé notes was “aware that the metaphor of an ‘escalation ladder’ 
has serious shortcomings (to which he devotes a full chapter)” and “that the level of 
military effort (or violence) need not change in discrete steps;” Kahn thus “invented 
his forty-four steps precisely to remind us ‘that there are many relatively continuous 
paths between a low-level crisis and an all-out war,” and that in the fog of battle, “Both 
the distinct quality of a rung [on the ladder] and the distance between rungs can be 
blurred, particularly if a participant in the escalation wishes to blur them,” and Iklé 
1505. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (RAND RM-4544-PR, 1965), 88.
1506. Fred Charles Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” World Politics 19, No. 4 
(July 1967), 692.
1507. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 692.
1508. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 692.
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adds that “Kahn also makes the important point that the participants in a war will 
have different perceptions of these various levels or intensities of military power.”1509 
Iklé suggests that “if we think in terms of a single ladder descending from here to hell, 
we are likely to overlook important trade-offs between an increment in one dimension 
and a decrement in another,”1510 but he notes “a sophisticated author like Kahn would 
be the first to recognize these trade-offs, and he begins his book by stressing that there 
are several ways to ‘escalate’ a conflict,” whether heading vertically up or down the 
ladder or expanding geographically at the same rung (whether to an adjacent theater 
or to an altogether different region, in what he dubs “compound escalation.”1511 Kahn’s 
taxonomy of escalatory steps include not just increments of hard power, but includes 
“economic sanctions and verbal or symbolic acts (hostile propaganda, declarations 
of war, and such).1512 While Kahn’s book is “largely analytical in that it deals with a 
wide range of possibilities and takes up many aspects of escalation,” Brodie’s book is 
instead “essentially a plea for a change in U.S. policy, a plea that the United States 
give tactical nuclear weapons a greater role in NATO (to deter large-scale aggression) 
and cease to press for stronger conventional forces.”1513 Iklé finds that what makes 
Brodie’s book “somewhat frustrating to an exacting reader” is that the “various motives 
for and against nuclear escalation are inextricably intermingled in his easy-flowing 
prose.”1514 As Iklé further describes: “On the one hand, he seems to argue that our use 
(or threatened use) of nuclear weapons would give us an advantage on the battlefield 
(or would threaten to do so),” while “[o]n the other hand, he seems to be uninter-
ested in affecting the local military situation and instead wants to use tactical nuclear 
weapons merely to introduce ‘the threat that leaves something to chance.’ What we 
can threaten, Brodie argues, is some action that ‘could escalate,’ but we ‘have to leave 
to the opponent in his next move the choice of making the situation more dangerous 
or less so . . .’ In the event of large-scale Russian aggression, Brodie writes, ‘the best 
way, perhaps the only way, for us to avert not only defeat but unnecessary escalation 
is to demonstrate clearly that our readiness to take risks is not less than theirs. How 
can we do that except by using [nuclear] weapons – demonstratively, few rather than 
many, and in as controlled a manner as possible, but nevertheless rather more abruptly 
than the Russians seem to have bargained for in launching their aggression?’ But if it 
is Brodie’s objective to increase the shared risk of nuclear war and to demonstrate our 
willingness to compete in this risk-taking, it is not at all clear why we need “tactical” 
1509. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 692.
1510. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 693.
1511. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 693.
1512. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 693.
1513. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 694.
1514. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 697.
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nuclear weapons. A single “strategic” bomb against a military target might be just as 
effective, perhaps more controllable, and would certainly belong to a less vulnerable 
category of weapons.”1515 
Iklé speculates that “[p]erhaps the fairest interpretation of Brodie’s book is that he 
wants us to rely more on tactical nuclear weapons for both reasons: the better to defeat 
aggression locally, and to scare the enemy into retreat by raising the risk of further 
escalation. After the mid-1950’s, the possibility of such a dual effect of our tactical 
nuclear weapons might indeed have helped to deter the Russians from military ag-
gression against NATO or against Berlin, assuming the Russians had to be deterred 
at all. But the proposal that, in the future, NATO should rely more rather than less 
on this effect is a bit like walking over thin ice and then saying, ‘Let’s do it again – it 
was so nice and smooth!’ 1516 Iklé cautions that to “demonstrate our ‘readiness to take 
risks’ by exploding nuclear weapons that we call ‘tactical’ is not an appealing strategy 
for an alliance, particularly if this demonstration is to occur so close to our allies’ 
heartland.”1517 
Iklé is concerned that “once fighting has started and we then do introduce tactical 
nuclears, will the enemy know when the fighting has to stop? That is, will he know 
that he should stop instantly? Brodie’s point is well taken, that the enemy would 
have a strong incentive to recognize our con- trolled, small-scale use of nuclears as 
such and that he would contemplate his option of responding in kind with utter 
dismay. But Brodie skips over the difficulties of war termination in suggesting that 
the enemy would be less ‘willing to accept defeat (or even stalemate) in a battle that 
has remained conventional than in one that has gone nuclear’,”1518 and this raises for 
Iklé an important element in escalation overlooked by both Brodie and Kahn: that of 
the time dimension: “Even if the enemy did not respond in kind to our introduction 
of nuclears, he need not stop the advance of his conventional forces. His superior 
conventional forces might overcome our ‘demonstration’ use of tactical nuclears, if-
as Brodie seems to recommend – our conventional forces were kept small relative to 
his and our use of nuclear weapons remained very limited. Should we then step up 
the use of nuclear weapons? Doing so might finally bring us success on the battle-
field (assuming the enemy still withheld his nuclears), but it would confront us with 
the ‘tactical’ vulnerability problem: the fact that in the realm of ‘tactical’ nuclears, a 
large-scale first strike does pay. And if we therefore decided on a ‘tactical preemption’ 
instead of leaving this option to the enemy, could we rely on the firebreak between 
tactical and strategic weapons? Or should we go all the way? My point here is that 
1515. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 697-99.
1516. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 699.
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1518. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 703.
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we cannot separate the introduction of tactical nuclears from a certain willingness to 
threaten strategic nuclear war, or at least a willingness to move into some of Herman 
Kahn’s ‘bizarre’ crises of ‘limited strategic war.’”1519 
And while we “have some idea about how conventional wars are fought, what 
havoc they might cause, how they might become larger, and how the fighting can be 
stopped,” Iklé is concerned that “[o]ur image of nuclear wars is a house of cards with 
one untested hypothesis piled upon another. The only thing we know fairly certainly 
are the physical effects of nuclear detonations. It is one of Brodie’s themes that since 
conventional war can be so awful (and conventional preparations so costly), we should 
bring the nuclear deterrent up closer on the heels of conventional fighting.”1520 Iklé 
agrees that “[t]his is a valid motive,” but cautions that “we must not become smug about 
the reliability of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence, in the long run, is dangerous.”1521 But 
despite the inherent dangers of deterrence, Iklé concedes that “[a]gainst the threat of 
strategic nuclear attack we may have no other choice-for decades to come – but to rely 
on deterrence.”1522 But he disagrees with Brodie’s recommendation that we counter 
Soviet conventional superiority with our tactical nuclear edge; “in view of the long-
term danger just alluded to, it would seem prudent to choose strategies that will help 
to curtail the implements and role of nuclear deterrence.”1523 
Iklé is aware that Brodie and Kahn are, in essence, debating, and that their dueling 
treatises are point and counterpoint in this debate; but he observes that “we cannot 
have a useful debate – much less intellectual progress – unless we make it clear where 
we agree and disagree,”1524 and he finds that this has been the case in these two works. 
“I would have found it useful if Bernard Brodie had related his themes more to the 
existing body of thought. He never mentions Schelling’s ‘threat that leaves something 
to chance,’ and yet this is what he primarily seems to have in mind (if he does not, all 
the more important to say so). And, in a footnote, Brodie writes that Kahn’s present 
book came too late for him to consider. Yet one wishes Brodie had added some linkages 
with Kahn’s work (after all, he did have time to add an appendix after Kahn’s book 
had come off the press). For instance, some of the points that seem to be missing in 
Brodie’s criticism of the ‘firebreak theory’ can be found in Kahn’s rich chapter on the 
nuclear threshold.”1525 On the other hand, Iklé acknowledges that “Brodie meant to 
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write one coherent essay, not a lexicon of cross-references.”1526 In contrast, Kahn “is 
less willing to make sacrifices for the harmony of his prose” and “enjoys sticking in 
little asides” even if that affects his narrative flow, though at times his lucidity shines 
through, particularly, Iklé believes, in Kahn’s Appendix, “Relevant Concepts and 
Language for the Discussion of Escalation,” which he describes as “a masterpiece in 
comprehensiveness and lucid categorization” and which can serve as the foundation 
that “could become a truly definitive synopsis of the subject” with additional refine-
ment, and believes that “one of the merits of Kahn’s book that it deals with so many 
aspects of escalation,” including important observations on the often-overlooked 
topic of war termination and de-escalation, as well as the complicated question of 
escalation dominance.1527 
The American Scientific Strategists
In his October 1964 RAND paper, “The American Scientific Strategists” – which 
appeared that same year in shorter form and with slightly abbreviated title as “The 
Scientific Strategists,” a chapter in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Sci-
entists and National Policy-Making – Brodie dives headlong back into the discussion 
he started in his seminal 1949 article, “Strategy as a Science” and which erupted in a 
series of heated memos a few years later at RAND, and recalled that “[p]ublications 
on military strategy” had until recently “been rather rare” and that “[m]ost of the few 
people who wrote them were career military officers.”1528 He speculated that this was 
possibly “one reason why the publications were so few,” as the “specific qualifications 
and virtues required of a military officer have always left little room for what is es-
sentially a scholarly, analytical, and preferably also a literary activity.”1529 But all that 
was now changing; indeed during “the last dozen years the situation has been vastly 
changed, at least within the United States” and “[a]rticles and books on strategy or 
strategic problems have become relatively abundant, not as compared with other intel-
lectual fields but certainly as compared with former times.”1530 And, Brodie adds, “the 
writers of these publications are almost always civilians, and of a particular type. They 
are highly trained in the formal academic sense, and their training is basically scientific,” 
and particularly “since the coming into office in January, 1961 of the Kennedy-Johnson 
1526. Iklé, “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” 707.
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Administration, they have risen spectacularly in importance.”1531 And while the new 
breed of civilian strategists have “little military experience themselves or occasionally 
none,” with some being “too young to have served in World War II,” Brodie notes that 
“the special abilities of these ‘scientific strategists’ have been recognized and fully used 
by the military services, often even with enthusiasm, and the relations between these 
civilians and the military officers whom they have served is on the whole quite close,” 
Brodie, “The American Scientific Strategists,” 2.) though a Brodie would discover, 
this is not always the case. As these new scientific-strategists rose to the complex and 
dangerous challenges of the nuclear era, Brodie found that it was “no exaggeration to 
say that all the distinctively modern concepts of military strategy, most of which have 
been embraced by the military services themselves, have evolved out of their ranks,”1532 
including the cornerstone of America’s Cold War strategy, deterrence. Brodie added 
that “[d]espite the still relatively small number of these specialists, the contrast between 
the situation today and that existing before 1950, or at least before World War II, is 
spectacular.”1533 While the landscape of strategic theory had been punctuated by the 
occasional prophetic voice, whether a Mahan or Corbett of the sea, or a Douhet or 
Mitchell of the air, or a Clausewitz or Jomini of the land, but their voices were few 
and preciously infrequent; with regard to land warfare, Brodie noted “[t]here had been 
no really great writer on strategy since the towering Karl von Clausewitz, who died in 
1831, and the very influential though lesser figure of the Swiss mercenary, Antoine 
Henri Jomini, both career staff officers of the Napoleonic period.”1534 The approach 
of these more classical strategic theorists, Brodie points out that the “method of these 
men was mainly the scrutiny of military history to see what abiding lessons could be 
derived from the experience of the past,” and that “[s]ome, like Du Picq and Mahan, 
had been careful and mostly objective historians” while “others, like Foch, were not 
averse to distorting history, with which they had little enough familiarity, to serve their 
pre-existing convictions.”1535 But Brodie added that “none of these figures, including 
the most recent, had been at all interested in applying quantitative measures to their 
data,” adding that “[p]erhaps the modern school of strategists contrasts most sharply 
with the old in precisely this difference of attitude about numbers.”1536
Before the renaissance in strategic thinking fostered by this new generation of civil-
ian scientific-strategists, Brodie noted that “if we were to include the names of all the 
lesser figures whose writings on strategy make them worth mentioning at all, the total 
1531. Brodie, “The American Scientific Strategists,” 2.
1532. Brodie, “The American Scientific Strategists,” 2.
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number in this field in the hundred years preceding 1950 would still be remarkably 
small,” and all said, “the theoretical study of military strategy, has been until now the 
most sparsely-populated of intellectual pursuits, despite the periodic recurrence of 
important wars.”1537 But despite the small size of the strategic-theoretical community, 
it was nonetheless an influential group, but not necessarily benign in its influence. As 
Brodie commented, the “important military decisions were in the past the work of 
men who, though professional soldiers, were rarely specialists in strategy” and while 
“[t]he generals or admirals in top command were usually older men who had spent 
their lives in those varied pursuits that we call military,” Brodie notes “much of it had 
to do with drill and very little of it with the conduct of war.”1538 In Brodie’s view, “by 
any pragmatic standard we have to concede that the system worked very badly for 
those whom it was supposed to serve. The tactical and strategic ‘lessons’ presented by 
the experience of successive wars often had to be learned over and over again, always 
at great cost and frequently at the risk of defeat.”1539 Asks Brodie, “Why had not the 
most obvious lessons of combat experience been absorbed by commanders who were 
to send great new armies into battle? Because for the most part experience not personal 
to him was not communicated to the leader of new forces, who was likely to pride 
himself more on being a man of action than on being a student of history, even of 
military history.”1540 Brodie also cautioned that “[o]ne must remember too – and the 
military are not the only ones of whom this is true – that people wedded to dogmas 
will often continue to cherish them undiminished after direct personal experiences 
which should prove them wrong,” and “[i]n a profession where rank means so much, 
and where promotion is so much at the mercy of one’s seniors, who will question or 
challenge the dogmas of his elders?”1541
But with the series of sweeping technological transformations of war that took place 
during World War II, the traditional approach to strategic theorizing came under new 
pressures, and required “a different and more flexible kind of military leader,” and 
“among the more conspicuous factors of change, two deserve special mention. The 
first was the introduction at the very end of the conflict of the atomic bomb, which 
not only presented in itself a basic strategic change of totally unprecedented impor-
tance but also signalled the beginning of an era of extremely rapid and also extremely 
costly technological development. The second was the heavy reliance upon scientists 
to assist not only top military commanders but even heads of government to reach 
1537. Brodie, “The American Scientific Strategists, 6.
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critical tactical and strategic decisions.”1542 as Brodie explained, the “tremendous nov-
elty of the new military conditions was naturally bound to throw some doubt on the 
pertinence of the professional soldier’s military experience,” just as the unprecedented 
“destructiveness of nuclear weapons meant that total or ‘general’ war (which for the 
first decade of the atomic age was practically the only kind one thought about) would 
have to be fought with forces in being at the outset – a change that effectively pushed 
all the major strategic decisions, including choice of weapon systems, of deployments, 
and of targets, into the pre-war period, when the military man has not yet ‘taken 
over’ from the civilian.”1543 Added Brodie: “Furthermore, the rapidity of change that 
resulted from the development of a wide range of nuclear weapons, combined with 
the development of fabulous new vehicles for carrying them, diminished greatly the 
utility of simple professional judgment in selecting the appropriate systems, especially 
in view of the tremendous sums of money involved in the choices. The military man 
had all he could do to keep abreast of current technological developments pertinent 
to his work.”1544 While it “was not altogether a new problem for the military to have 
to think ahead technologically,” Brodie observed that “certainly the dimensions and 
complexity of the problem was totally new,” and this meant that the military would 
increasingly depend upon “technicians who could be counted on to maintain an alert 
understanding of the evolving ‘state of the art’ in any one technological field.”1545
Fueled by this growing need, as well as by “the new prestige of scientists as a result 
of the nuclear developments,” Brodie describes how “a development took place in the 
United States that was to have consequences far beyond those expected by the spon-
sors. This was the founding of a number of institutions closely associated with but 
outside the military services, where people with various kinds of scientific training 
and access to classified information would devote themselves on a full-time basis to 
the consideration of military problems,” organizations like the RAND Corporation, 
both the “prototype of these organizations and the best known among them.”1546 As 
Brodie recounts, “those who were given the task of organizing RAND included in it 
almost from the outset divisions of mathematics, economics, and social science, as 
well as the more-to-be-expected engineering and physics divisions,” adding that their 
“inclusion of an economics division turned out to be of especially critical importance, 
and the inclusion of a social science division made it possible to undertake, among 
other things, a thoroughgoing study of the Communist enemy or enemies of a kind 
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that had too long been lacking from the strategic studies.”1547 Indeed, Brodie describes 
numerous “conceptual parallels between strategy and economics,” recalling that in his 
1949 article, “Strategy as a Science,” he “called attention to the remarkable similari-
ties in both method and objectives between the science of economics and what could 
become a science of strategy.”1548 
Indeed, he observed that a “majority of those who have made their mark today 
as theorists in strategy have been trained as economists, or at least have more than a 
bowing acquaintance with the concepts and principles in that field,” including Her-
man Kahn, who in addition to being a physicists, “trained himself quite seriously as 
an economist, and was once even offered a professorial post in economics in a leading 
American university,” as well as Thomas Schelling and Albert Wohlstetter, who “were 
intensively trained as economists,” among many others – including several economists 
“who were formerly of RAND but now hold important posts in the Department of 
Defense.”1549 So while “[e]arlier generations of strategic writers used practically no 
tools other than history,” Brodie found that “few of the present writers in the field 
ever trouble to read history” – which would itself become problematic in the years 
to come as historical insight all but lost out to the new scientific logic.1550 As Brodie 
observed, “One is sometimes amazed at how little some of the best-known strategic 
analysts of our times may know about conflicts no more remote in time than World 
War I, let alone earlier wars (the same is, however, true of professional military offic-
ers). It is not that they have no time for history but rather that the devotees of any 
highly developed science – and economics is clearly the most highly developed of 
the social sciences –tend to develop a certain disdain and even arrogance concern-
ing other fields. It is a grave intellectual fault, but a very common one.”1551 Brodie 
found that the “modern training of economists, with its heavy emphasis on math-
ematics and other tools of quantitative analysis, tends to fit one peculiarly well for 
grappling with certain characteristic problems of strategy, especially in what we call 
‘cost-effectiveness’ analysis.”1552 But other analytical tools would be required, as the 
“importance of being sensitive to the political issues that are omnipresent in strategic 
questions would be hard to overestimate,”1553 and as “some of the most important 
factors relevant to determining the performance of a system are not finally reducible 
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to dollar comparisons.”1554 Nonetheless, “at every stage decisions are made which 
are difficult at best and impossible to make wisely without utilizing all the tools that 
modern concepts of economic and strategic analysis have made available to us. This is 
a new and now permanent condition, a state of the world undreamed of in 1939.”1555 
Indeed, Brodie can’t understate the complexity of the challenge confronted by strategic 
analysts: “As we move to a larger context we see that we have hardly begun to measure 
the complexity of the major issues of strategy. We observe that a nation makes its 
strategic dispositions not against a more or less predictable state of nature but against 
an opponent or group of opponents whose present intentions and capabilities have 
to be analyzed to the best limits of our information and their future course predicted. 
These opponents are cunning and have objectives in direct conflict with our own. … 
Moreover, one has to adjust to a range of possible situations – the single most likely 
situation does not necessarily have a high degree of likelihood. And, obviously, one’s 
defensive preparations when detected will affect the offensive designs of the opponent 
and vice versa.”1556 But as Brodie observes, “As the ‘scientific strategists’ have become 
more at home in their work, their greater maturity has resulted in important changes 
in basic approach. Where their tendency used to be to try to find the optimum method 
of dealing with a single most-expected contingency, the realization that the enemy 
might play the game differently from the way in which we think we ought to play 
it has prompted us instead to seek that mixture of solutions which does rather well 
over a complex of contingencies.”1557 Brodie discusses both the use and limitations of 
gaming techniques, noting that game theory “as developed mostly by the late math-
ematician John von Neumann” was “generally of little importance to the strategist” 
and that in fact “many strategic analysts do important and excellent work in their 
field without having much understanding of game theory. What matters is the spirit 
of the gaming principle, the constant reminder that in war we shall be dealing with 
an opponent who will react to our moves and to whom we must react. It is amazing 
how little this simple conception has characterized war plans in the past.”1558 Brodie 
explains that “the greatest value of the gaming technique is in conditioning the analyst 
or decision-maker to ask himself spontaneously: ‘How is the enemy likely to respond 
if I carry out (or refrain from) this proposed action, and what new problems will that 
response create for me.’”1559
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While the scientific approach to strategy is not without its faults, Brodie found that 
its “greatest limitation” was that decisionmakers “often fail to use scientific method 
when they should or when they pretend to” and in “[s]uch lapses” reveal that “they are 
human, and thus disposed to sharing the infirmities of humanity.”1560 But, he points 
out, “Even in the areas in which strictly scientific analysis is appropriate, the complex-
ity of the field, the impossibility of really testing conclusively one’s suppositions or 
deductions, and the fact that one is constantly running up against value judgments 
or simply against the mysteries of the future mean that temptations always exist both 
to shortcut some of the analytical difficulties and to pretend to analytic objectivity 
where it has ceased to operate.”1561 A more scientific approach was thus “not what we 
have too much of but what we too often fail to achieve,” but despite its faults, Brodie 
believed that the “great merit of the scientifically trained analyst is that he tries more 
persistently than others, and he can perhaps be more easily made aware of his lapses 
when they occur. When we do succeed in using scientific method for the systematic 
exploration and comparison of alternative courses of action, we are doing simply the 
best we can do to bring some order into the vast, chaotic mass of technological, eco-
nomic, and political facts and predictions which form the universe of data in which 
reasonable military decisions have to be made.”1562
Brodie discussed the relationship between the civilian strategists and their military 
clients, noting “relations between the civilian scientific strategists and their military 
clients have in the main been thoroughly good and mutually profitable,” and when 
this “has not been so, it is usually because we are dealing with character weaknesses 
on one or both sides. Most military officers know their own worth, and their special 
qualifications for indispensable service, and are content to recognize the limits of their 
training and experience. Some are not.”1563 Brodie added the “same is true on the side 
of the analysts. It has always been true that creative abilities are not necessarily com-
bined in the same person with such character endowments as tact and modesty.”1564 
The relationship had become especially close with the “coming to office with the 
Kennedy Administration of the extraordinarily able, vigorous, and self-confident Mr. 
Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense,” which “had extraordinary consequences 
with respect to the relationships we have been discussing,” and though “[s]ome of 
these consequences are likely to be enduring,” Brodie cautioned that “others will 
no doubt be but temporary.”1565 Brodie described the “team that entered office with 
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Mr. McNamara” as including “in positions of relatively high responsibility, a small 
group of persons who had made their mark as strategic analysts of the kind we have 
been describing,” and “[t]his nucleus of experts on the staff were able also to enlist 
the services, on a part-time consultative basis, of others who had had the same kind 
of training and experience. With such able and knowledgeable people on his staff or 
otherwise available to him, and speaking a kind of ‘cost effectiveness’ language which 
as a former industrialist he had come to understand and appreciate, Mr. McNamara 
quickly developed so marked a confidence in his own judgment that he was before 
long making decisions that ran counter to the unanimous advice of committees of 
his military advisors.”1566 Indeed, McNamara did this with “the now famous TFX 
airplane controversy, and also in refusing to countenance the construction of more 
new aircraft carriers (besides the already-built Enterprise) with nuclear propulsion, 
insisting instead on the cheaper conventional propulsion,” but “[e]ven more important 
was his insistence on planning to fight even large-scale local wars with conventional 
rather than with tactical nuclear weapons,”1567 a policy that would come to haunt him 
after the humbling defeat in Vietnam.
But importantly, Brodie commented that “[i]t should be noted that no previous 
Secretary of Defense had ever made a decision of mostly military significance against 
a unanimous judgment of the Joint Chiefs. Some of them had reluctantly intervened 
when the Joint Chiefs were hopelessly split, but only after urging them to come to 
a meeting of minds if possible. What was new in Mr. McNamara’s method was not 
only that he was willing to place his own judgment against that of his military advi-
sors, but also that the kind of analytical investigations which the separate services had 
previously conducted on their own initiative and responsibility, which enabled them 
to reserve to themselves authority to accept or reject the advice they received from 
the institutions like RAND which they supported, were now being reported directly 
to the Secretary of Defense. In short, the military to a large extent lost control of the 
kind of analytical operations which they had themselves sponsored. It probably did 
not help matters that some of the civilians involved were very young and not inclined 
to be especially tactful or deferential to the military. The remarkable thing is that rela-
tions did not become more critical.”1568 
Brodie anticipated that “much of this situation is bound to be impermanent” and 
saw “little chance for institutionalizing the pervasive and searching kind of civilian 
control of the whole gamut of important military decisions that a very special kind of 
Secretary aided by an unusual array of assistants has eagerly undertaken,” predicting 
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that “[m]ost future Secretaries will not want to shoulder that kind of responsibility” 
and as a consequence, we could “thus expect in the future to see the military chieftains 
or the Joint Chiefs regain much of their formerly unchallenged responsibility and 
authority for major military decisions and for providing their political superiors with 
appropriate advice.”1569 However, Brodie added that “[o]n the other hand, a number 
of important trends already existing before the present Administration and brought 
to fuller fruition under Secretary McNamara represent long-term and largely irrevers-
ible changes,” including “the new kind of budgeting according to strategic functions 
rather than to services” as well as “the tendency for the making of decisions on major 
weapons systems to be brought into the direct purview of the office of the Secretary 
of Defense.”1570 Brodie further expected it would be “probably unlikely that military 
leaders will quickly forget the salutary shock of being required to present closely 
reasoned justifications for their recommendations, rather than merely their sovereign 
judgment,” and “since their problems are not getting any simpler, we may expect that 
they will continue to rely heavily on the kind of intricate systems analysis to which 
they have by now become entirely accustomed.”1571 And the military would indeed 
“continue to rely heavily on the kind of intricate systems analysis to which they have 
by now become entirely accustomed,”1572 yielding to the analytical prowess of the new 
corpus of civilian strategists at RAND and, increasingly, serving at the highest levels 
of the Pentagon. Only a few years later, such a sea change in how strategy was made 
would come back to haunt both sides, as the effort at controlled-escalation taking 
place in Vietnam began to tragically spin out of control. 
From Prophet to Courtier: ‘What RAND Hath Wrought’
As Colin Gray recounted in his Autumn 1971 Foreign Policy article, “What RAND 
Hath Wrought,” the 1950s “saw a renaissance of strategic thought” during which “such 
civilian theorists as Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Rowen, Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schell-
ing, Herman Kahn, William Kaufmann and Henry Kissinger constructed an edifice of 
strategic theory that has come to have a profound impact upon all important aspects 
of U.S. defense policy” and so when President Kennedy came to power at the dawn 
of the sixties, “the promise was high” – particularly as the “civilian strategists came to 
Washington to assume an influential role in a new administration.”1573 But when writ-
ing a full decade after Kennedy had come to power (and more than a quarter-century 
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before his 1999 tribute to Clausewitz in Modern Strategy, which was also, to a lesser 
degree, a tribute to Brodie), Gray then felt it was “fair to say that their performance 
has not lived up to their promise” – adding, “[a]nd that’s putting it mildly.”1574 
As Gray observed: “The Vietnam war, the conduct of the strategic arms race and 
major intra-alliance difficulties suggest that the following charges may be leveled at 
the strategic scholars whose theories won official acceptance in Washington.”1575 The 
first is that the “methodology of the civilian strategists has been dominated by an 
‘economic conflict’ model” and its “assumption that inter- national conflict can be 
analyzed in terms of rational ‘strategic men’ has been vital for the progress of theory-
building in strategy, but it has proved fatal to the relevance of theorists who have 
shifted from model- building to prescription.”1576 The second is that “[b]ecause they 
are essentially men of ideas, the civilian scholars of strategy have been overimpressed 
with the potential transferability of theory to the world of action.”1577 And third, that 
“[t]he civilian scholars who arose in the 1950’s to fill certain obvious holes in strategic 
understanding succeeded, first, in gaining intellectual access to political and military 
elements in opposition to the Eisenhower Administration, and, second, gained access 
in the early 1960’s to the actual policy making processes of government. The prophets 
became courtiers. The consequence has been that since the middle and late 1960’s the 
United States has been living off its strategic theoretical capital.”1578 
As Gray saw things, “If policy prescription may be described as the advocacy of 
‘viable solutions,’ so scholarship should be viewed as the pursuit of truth. The civilian 
strategist has fallen between the two extremes. The ‘think-tank’ world, as exemplified 
by the RAND Corporation, has been the middle ground between academe and govern-
ment. Yet because of its dual loyalty – to the needs of problem-oriented officials and 
to the disinterested or ‘policy-neutral’ standards of scholarship – it has tended to pro-
duce both irrelevant policy advice and poor scholarship.”1579 And this was particularly 
evident in Vietnam: “It would appear that by most criteria the Vietnam War has been 
a massive failure for the United States,” Gray writes; “Success or failure are not to be 
measured solely in terms of the objectives attained, but also by the costs incurred.”1580 
Gray observes that the Vietnam War “has unfortunately been taken to be a test case 
for the doctrine of flexible response,” where the United States had “tried everything 
short of a ‘take-over’ of the government in Saigon, the employment of nuclear weapons 
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and an invasion of the sanctuary area of North Vietnam. Nation-building, counterin-
surgency, limited war, a controlled escalation of punishment by air-power – all have 
been attempted and all have failed to produce either the military-political defeat of 
the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese or the negotiated settlement that was expected.”1581 
On the other hand, Gray thinks that Vietnam “does not demonstrate the inutility 
of flexible response.”1582 Instead, “What it does demonstrate is that the United States 
was ill-advised to wage a protracted, semi-conventional war on the Asian mainland 
against an enemy whose pain threshold for settlement was either non-existent or was 
unattainable, and in tandem with a local government distinguished by its lack of 
popular support and by its degree of corruption (these distinctions are, of course, far 
from unique).”1583 Thus the “failure of America’s strategic theorists over Vietnam was 
not at the level of theoretical understanding. Rather, the theorists failed to insist to 
their government in strong enough terms that the task was too great. There is good 
reason to question the mode of employment of American military power in Vietnam 
(particularly the air war against North Vietnam and the extensive and unrewarding 
‘search and destroy’ operations). But the truth appears to be that, in the 1960’s, South 
Vietnam was not a nation that could be ‘built’ by massive American intervention. The 
most that could be accomplished, at frightful cost to the American political system, 
was the elimination of the possibility of military victory by the Viet-cong, while the 
victory of North Vietnam in the long term would seem to have been assured.”1584
In the Winter 1971-72 edition of Foreign Policy magazine, Brodie’s “Why Were We 
So (Strategically) Wrong?” responded directly to Gray’s “What RAND Hath Wrought” 
article in the previous edition that “charged that a number of civilian strategists (in-
cluding this one) fell flat on their faces over the past decade in trying to predict the 
character and outcome of the Vietnam war.”1585 Brodie concedes that “[i]n this he is 
obviously quite correct, and it is an important and disturbing conclusion. It might be 
highly instructive to explore why they (or we) have erred, and that is why, at the request 
of the editors of Foreign Policy, I am responding to Mr. Gray’s critique.”1586 Brodie cites 
Gray, who wrote that “If policy prescription may be described as the advocacy of ‘vi-
able solutions,’ so scholarship should be viewed as the pursuit of truth. The civilian 
strategist has fallen between the two extremes.”1587 Brodie notes Gray’s attitude “reflects 
much of the social science thinking of our time, but I find it particularly inopportune 
1581. Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,” 112.
1582. Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,” 112.
1583. Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,” 112.
1584. Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,” 112.
1585. Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1971-72): 151.
1586. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 151.
1587. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 151.
332 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
in this instance. For strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if one prefers, is nothing if not 
pragmatic. Strategy is a ‘how to do it’ study, a guide for accomplishing something and 
doing it efficiently. The question that matters in strategy – as in many other branches 
of politics – is, will the idea work? More, will it be likely to work under the precise 
and inevitably special circumstances under which it will next be tested? How much 
these circumstances are known or knowable depends partly on how close we are to the 
moment of testing. The failure of the civilian strategists in Vietnam, as Mr. Gray fails 
to notice, is that that part of their theory he most admires proved utterly irrelevant, 
and many of their ideas which were not irrelevant proved false.”1588 Adds Brodie, “The 
score as tested against the special reality of Vietnam was much worse than it should 
have been, and the error is measured in something much more tragic than red-faces. 
Mr. Gray chides the ‘civilian scholars of strategy’ with being ‘overimpressed with the 
potential transferability of theory to the world of action.’ What, pray, could their 
theory possibly be for if it were not meant to be transferable to precisely that world? 
The theory of strategy is a theory for action, or, to turn around Gray’s own words, 
strategy is a field where truth is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions.”1589 
Brodie explains that strategic theory “differs from theory in the pure sciences only 
in that the latter is content to describe and explain rather than to prescribe,” but that 
at heart both face the reality check of the real world.1590 “Social scientists who yearn 
for the theoretical and methodological elegance of the physical sciences often seem 
unaware that theorists in physics evaluate their formulations entirely by whether they 
are ultimately proved or disproved by experiments or other observations, in other 
words by whether they accord fully and consistently with the real world.”1591 Brodie 
also notes that Gray “accuses these well-meaning but dangerous people of whom he 
writes of insinuating themselves, especially during the McNamara regime, directly 
into the policy-making process,” suggesting a complicity and perhaps even a mali-
cious intent that mirrors the popular misperception of Machiavelli as the conniving 
would-be courtier ingratiating himself with the Prince’s circle.1592 Brodie cites Gray, 
who “puts it, ‘The prophets became courtiers,’ with a consequent loss of their purity 
and allegedly also a bootless using up of their ‘strategic theoretical capital.’”1593 
Brodie scolds Gray for such a generalization, and also reveals his own frustration 
having lacked an enduring connection with the decision-making elite: “People like in 
general to be more, rather than less, useful, and as one who was not invited into the 
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McNamara circle I am bound to say I would not have felt sullied if I had been. My 
own service at high levels in the Pentagon came much earlier in time, and during a 
very few months in that place I learned a great deal that was useful to my subsequent 
thinking. Perhaps the most useful thing I learned was how badly things are done at 
the strategic level in the ‘world of action,’ but the shocks that go with the experience 
help overcome the diffidence which an outsider might otherwise feel.”1594 Brodie 
thus sympathetically describes the enormous weight on the shoulders of the strategic 
theorists, and recounts how when he joined RAND in 1951 he was the sole analyst 
with an interest in, and knowledge of, strategy – and over time, even as the number 
increased, “the number has always remained small – especially if one limits the count 
to those who demonstrated a capacity for some originality. Upon this small group 
there fell by default the job of determining how to think about the atomic bomb, 
and how to do so under technological and political circumstances that were steadily 
and rapidly changing.”1595
Brodie retells the story of his lone opposition to the conventional build-up by 
NATO in the face of Soviet armed strength along the central front, noting that “[o]
n the question, for example, whether or not the United States and its NATO allies 
should build up large conventional forces in Europe, which for several years was the 
prime issue in American foreign security policy, I believe that mine was the only 
American voice raised in criticism and opposition, at least as recorded in published 
statements,” and had Brodie “desired to avoid offending leaders of the inner circle,” 
he explains, “the Administration view would have escaped any criticism. Not that it 
mattered greatly in this instance, because the effective opposition came from the sit-
down strike of our NATO allies. Whether I was right or wrong is beside the point; 
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what counts is that the issue, which was certainly important enough, did not present 
such self-evident answers as to warrant the near-absence of debate.”1596 
Brodie discusses his own skepticism for systems analysis, and a widespread over-
dependence upon it, noting that “[a]nother great misfortune in the last two decades 
was the wholly excessive attention and deference paid to systems analysis, a deference 
which Mr. Gray fully shares.”1597 And while Brodie accedes that, “[c]ertainly the tech-
nique of systems analysis is indispensable for the consideration of many important 
military questions raised in the modern era” such as selecting “appropriate weapons 
systems among types not yet developed,” which “would be a baffling and terribly 
wasteful business without it,” Brodie believes while “it is an important tool in making 
some military decisions, it is not coterminous with strategy, as Mr. Robert McNamara, 
among others, thought it was.”1598 Brodie lays blame for the Vietnam debacle squarely 
on systems analysis, and the over-dependence of strategic analysts, especially that of 
Defense Secretary McNamara, upon this new method. As Brodie explained, “Classical 
systems analysis, despite the yeoman’s work done by Alain Enthoven’s office, has had 
just about zero relevance to everything concerned with Vietnam.”1599 Brodie believes 
“[o]ur failures there have been at least 95 percent due to our incomprehension and 
inability to cope with the political dimensions of the problem, not forgetting that 
part which is internal to the United States,” and that “[i]f we had understood these 
problems we should certainly not have gone in, and the failure belongs not simply 
to the ‘civilian strategists’ but also to the political science profession, at least that part 
of it which is involved in foreign policy questions and regional studies.”1600 And “[a]
mong those errors that were primarily military,” Brodie places “at the top the failure to 
anticipate properly the importance of giving the opponent a sanctuary which comprises 
his entire homeland,” as “[f ]or over three years it was not a sanctuary against bombing 
(which also failed to deliver the results expected of it – and let us hear no more from 
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Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp about our not having done enough bombing); but it has 
always been a complete sanctuary against ground force incursion, which meant that 
the enemy could, to paraphrase Lord Bacon, take as much or as little of the war as he 
wanted, and could shift his degree of participation whenever he wanted. Our errors 
here, partly the result of misreading the lessons of Korea, were disastrous.”1601 But as 
Brodie observes, “that disaster pales in comparison with the consequences of our will-
ful blindness in trying to shore up a corrupt, inefficient, and thoroughly unpopular 
regime. We had no business trying, and we could not succeed.”1602 Brodie cites Gray, 
who wrote, “The failure of America’s strategic theorists over Vietnam was not at the level 
of theoretical understanding. Rather the theorists failed to insist to their government 
in strong enough terms that the task was too great.”1603 Brodie responds, “Well, one 
would wish that that were so. It is pretty nearly the opposite of the truth.”1604 Indeed, 
as Brodie observes, “At the level of ‘theoretical understanding’ their error was total.”1605 
Brodie considers “the cures,” noting that “Gray has some, but I do not fully un-
derstand them. They seem to be counsels of perfection – more emphasis on purer 
theory and on avoiding ‘the seductions of power.’”1606 Brodie presents, perhaps in 
frustration at his own exclusion from that inner circle, “the opposite advice for a man 
of younger or middle years, provided he were invited to be operational at or near the 
highest levels,” as “[h]e would learn a good deal that is perennial about the military, 
the politicians, and ‘how things are done,’ and inasmuch as he would last at most for 
one administration and probably much less if he were a free spirit with an independ-
ent mind, not too much of his life would be taken up in the process.”1607 But “[i]f he 
wants to be a thinker about important issues and make significant contributions in 
writing, he must of course avoid getting entangled in the bureaucracies, though even 
they manage to absorb some quite exceptional men without always ruining them,” 
such as “George Kennan, and there are some others.”1608 
1601. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 156.
1602. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 156.
1603. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 157.
1604. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 157.
1605. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 157. Brodie elaborated, “Also, I know no one among the civilian 
strategists Gray mentions and some others besides who by the end of 1965 had manifested any misgivings about the course 
that President Johnson had embarked upon. Most assuredly I know of none of the group who seemed to think that the 
‘task was too great.’ On the contrary, for some of them it was precisely the kind of application of their ideas which they 
could not help but relish – for example, the concept that by granting sanctuary to North Vietnam from our ground forces 
we could assure China’s staying out of the war. This would mean, they thought, that we could keep the war limited and 
fight it on our own terms. They were probably right about keeping China out, but not about the price. One also painfully 
remembers all the talk about building up conventional forces not only for Europe but for stamping out ‘brush fires’ – which 
by definition included Vietnam – until we began to pour oil on the flames.”
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Ever the realist, Brodie finds much learning taking place from the Vietnam experi-
ence, noting that “[w]e are even now learning a great deal from the Vietnam experi-
ence precisely because it has been so searing and so prolonged. We are witnessing in 
various places, including the pages of this journal, what appears to be a searching 
post-mortem (though at this writing the war is not yet the corpse it ought to be).”1609 
Brodie adds that “[w]e are learning to be mistrustful of political dogmas, and less 
diffident about confronting military dogmas,” and that “[w]e certainly need to stress 
the superior importance of the political side of strategy to the simply technical and 
technological side,” and to “[p]reserve and cherish the systems analysts, but avoid the 
genuflections.”1610 Brodie believes there remains “a long way to go,” but points out that 
“much distance has already been traveled. When we recall how we discussed methods 
for demonstrating ‘our superior resolve’ without ever questioning whether we would 
indeed have or deserve to have superiority in that commodity, we realize how puerile 
was our whole approach to our art. Well, one learns from hard experience, though in 
this case we have learned also the importance of depressing the quantity of comparable 
experience in the future.”1611
A few years later, in his 1977 International Security article “Across the Nuclear 
Divide: Strategic Studies, Past and Present,”1612 Gray more sympathetically revisits 
the transition in strategic studies from the pre- to the post-nuclear worlds and sug-
gests that the “immediate pre-nuclear origins of nuclear-age strategic studies may 
easily be identified in the operational research industry that flourished in the Second 
World War;” and yet, he finds that it was “still true to say that the several perceived 
discontinuities imposed by the technological changes that began with the first atomic 
bombs have resulted in the growth of a strategic studies community that is sociologi-
cally very distinct indeed from its functional parallels in the past,”1613 as illustrated 
by the new found expertise of civilian strategists recognized by the military: “In the 
1970s when a national military college in the United States or Britain wished to hear 
an authoritative exposition of the political, economic and military implications of 
new tactical nuclear weapon technologies, it tended to invite a civilian to deliver the 
address – even a civilian who had no direct military experience whatever,” and Gray 
found this to be “a major development that a civilian should be believed to have the 
most appropriate credentials for an exposition on such a subject,” particularly since 
1609. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 160-61.
1610. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 161.
1611. Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” 161.
1612. Colin S. Gray, “Across the Nuclear Divide: Strategic Studies, Past and Present,” originally published in International 
Security 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), 24-46 and republished in Gray’s Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2006).
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before 1945, civilians “were not invited to instruct the military profession on how its 
news weapons could be used most effectively.”1614
Far less critical, Gray now specifically identifies Brodie’s 1959 Strategy in the Missile 
Age as “the most widely praised book on contemporary strategy,” and suggests that 
“[s]trategists, daunted by the dimensions of Edward Mead Earle” and his mammoth 
anthology, The Makers of Modern Strategy, “could obtain a far quicker ‘fix’ on their 
pre-nuclear heritage from the first four chapters of Brodie’s work,” which Gray de-
scribed as “witty, brilliant, and economical,” in addition to being “also very conten-
tious,” including Brodie’s views on the “poverty” of theoretical writings on war.1615 
Gray cites Brodie: “As one goes in quest of the wisdom of the past on the subject of 
war, one notices first of all how small is the number of general treatises on strategy 
even over the space of centuries. There have been many great soldiers in the past, and 
military historians have favored us with thousands of volumes recounting the exploits 
of outstanding military leaders, as well as of many of them not so outstanding. But 
this richness of writings in military history does not prepare us for the poverty in 
theoretical writings on the strategy of war. Indeed the few theorists have enjoyed an 
exceptional scarcity value.”1616
But Gray also challenges Brodie, writing that the “principal frailty in Brodie’s argu-
ment is that it requires a baseline for assessment,” and if in fact “there was a ‘poverty in 
theoretical writing’ (and it is by no means self-evident that this was the case – although 
this author agrees with Brodie),” then the question remains “is that a poverty in quan-
tity, in quality, or in both?”1617 Indeed, Gray suggests that the “quality of contemporary 
theory may be reflected in the protracted absence of a direct clash of arms between the 
superpowers,” which in fact endured from the Cold War’s beginning through to its 
end, much to the relief of many, though Gray concedes that “there is no way of being 
certain that this is the case.”1618 And in addition to the successful prevention of general 
war between the superpowers and consequent avoidance of nuclear warfare, Gray also 
observes that at least with regard to the quantity of strategic theorizing, the “scale of 
effort of strategic theorizing from the mid-1950s onwards was unprecedented,” also 
posing a challenge to Brodie’s description of a poverty of theoretical writing on war.1619 
But the issue of quality remains, and it is here Gray is more sympathetic to Brodie: 
“To confront Brodie’s argument directly, it is useful to pose two questions. First, are 
there more first-class minds studying the interface between war and politics today than 
1614. Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006), 25.
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was the case, say, in 1900,” and if so, then “is the numerical discrepancy reflective 
not of a pre-nuclear ‘poverty’ but rather of the scale and complexity of contemporary 
problems?”1620 Gray notes that while “the strategic studies community today is very 
large by comparison with times past,” that nonetheless “the number of theoretical 
innovators is very small indeed,” measured by Gray to be “between 5 and 10 perhaps 
– though their identity would be disputed according to personal preference.”1621 Gray 
is of the view that “[g]iven the compression of comprehension time imposed by upon 
theory-builders by the pace of technological innovation, it is quite plausible to argue 
that the scale of strategic theoretical activity prior to 1945, allowing for the peaks 
and troughs of inventiveness that characterize all streams of intellectual endeavor, was 
neither inappropriate to the pace of military developments, nor – historical contexts 
recalled – was it on a scale greatly disproportionate to that conducted today.”1622
Gray endeavors to maintain a balance between his great respect for Brodie’s strategic-
theoretical contributions, and his contrary view on the issue of Brodie’s claim with 
regard to this strategic theoretical poverty; as he concludes: “As a naval historian and 
theorist of the first rank, Bernard Brodie was, of course, full aware of both the con-
tinuities and the discontinuities in strategic problems and thought effected in part 
by the development of nuclear weapons. However, the overall impression left by the 
first four chapters of Strategy in the Missile Age is one of an era marked by strategic 
intellectual ‘poverty’ and by military malpractice. The statements in a positive vein 
are swamped by the generally negative thrust of the argument.”1623 Despite Brodie’s 
negativity of tone, Gray nonetheless lauds Brodie’s 1959 tome as seminal, writing: “It 
was a landmark text: a work summarizing and transcending the debates of a decade,” 
and “remains, in the 1970s, the first book on the subject of strategy that newcomers 
are requested to read.”1624 And, even with Brodie’s negative assessment of the state of 
strategic-theoretical art, Gray concludes that, “even if Brodie were correct in his implicit 
claim that pre-nuclear strategic theory was but a pale and undernourished forerun-
ner of contemporary theorizing, it does not follow (and, indeed, Brodie suggests to 
the contrary) that pre-nuclear military and diplomatic practice offers no substantial 
reward to the determined scholarly explorer.”1625 
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Strategic Thinkers, Planners, Decision Makers
Brodie would continue to examine, through to his very last article published in 1978, 
the rise of the civilian strategists, that group of defense intellectuals Fred Kaplan 
colorfully dubbed the “wizards of Armageddon,” a group to which Brodie not only 
belonged, but for many its most esteemed member. Brodie described this group less 
colorfully than Kaplan, but perhaps more accurately as the civilian-scientific strategists, 
or as the new scientific strategists, and he would close his 1973 War and Politics with 
a discussion of their rise in its final chapter, “Strategic Thinkers, Planners, Decision 
Makers,” resuming his quarter-century examination (since his 1949 World Politics 
article) of the civilian defense intellectual, and his increasing – though by no means 
untroubled – contribution to the formulation of strategic-military policies. In this 
final chapter, he revisits Clausewitz, as well as his predecessor Machiavelli, as well as 
his generation of military and civilian strategists, bringing to a close his discussion of 
war, and politics, and the fundamental relationship between the two. He starts out 
with the insights of the “great Marshal Maurice de Saxe,” who “observed in his Reveries 
that most commanding generals displayed on the battlefield the utmost confusion,” 
attributing this to the fact that “very few men occupy themselves with the higher 
problems of war,” and instead “pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is 
the only branch of the military art,” so “[w]hen they arrive at the command of armies 
they are totally ignorant, and, in default of knowing what should be done, they do 
what they know.” Brodie seems to find some personal comfort in these observations, 
and notes while “these words were written over 200 years ago, they have applied 
perennially to the art of the soldier, and apply about as well now as when they were 
written.”1626 Brodie wonders how the “few military geniuses that time and the passage 
of many wars throws across our vision” managed to “learn the art of the general,” and 
how those who assumed the highest levels of command “learn strategy?” Brodie finds 
that the “strategic conception is more abstract than the tactical one” and thus less 
readily learned through “precept and experience,” suggesting that there needs to be 
an “inventiveness, a native cunning, and a tendency to reflect on the enemy’s goals as 
well as the needs and aspirations of his allies.”1627
While Maurice, like Frederick the Great, put pen to paper and authored his “own 
little book” published posthumously in 1757, Brodie observes that “[l]ike Frederick’s 
Instructions to His Generals (1747) and memoranda to his successor, Maurice’s book 
was not intended by its author for publication,” and like Frederick, Maurice “dwelt 
mostly on homely matters concerning the handling and provisioning of armies, and 
1626. Brodie, War and Politics, 434.
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only incidentally and in passing made observations or contributions on what we should 
now consider fundamental strategy.”1628 And when Clausewitz emerged a century 
later in the wake of Napoleon, penning “the first really adequate treatise on strategy, 
and still by a wide margin the greatest, he paid little attention to either Maurice de 
Saxe of Frederick,” and instead “pa[id] his respects to the original Renaissance source 
of wisdom on politics and strategy, Niccolo Machiavelli.”1629 As Brodie observed, 
“Clausewitz, who tended to scorn most other military writers, treated Machiavelli 
with respect because like him ‘he was convinced that the validity of any special analysis 
of military problems depended on a general perception, on a correct concept of the 
nature of war.”1630 Brodie further reflects that “Machiavelli’s large contribution reminds 
us that there have always been some few civilians to whom the study of warfare was 
intriguing as something besides history, and of course we know that most military 
history has been written by civilians, especially in modern times. Soldiers have always 
cherished the image of themselves as men of action rather than as intellectuals, and 
they have not been very much given to writing analytical inquiries into their own 
art.”1631 Indeed, Brodie noted that “[p]erhaps as a result of some defensive feeling on 
the matter, military men have in the past turned a certain degree of obloquy on those 
of their colleagues who were in their eyes too scholarly about war,” much like the later 
naval strategist Mahan, who “would be called ‘a pen-pushing sailor’” and who only 
truly came into his own when “he was transferred to an essentially civilian pursuit as a 
faculty member of the new U.S. Naval War College.”1632 By and large, however, Brodie 
has found “civilian writers with something important to say have usually been well 
received by the professionals, who understand their own needs and also the paucity 
of contributions by their own brethren,” though Brodie notes “[s]ome professional 
military may in certain moods, inveigh against ‘armchair strategists,’ by which they 
mean interlopers on their terrain who are not identifiable by service uniform, but this 
is usually an attitude of disgruntlement concerning particular views in which they are 
in disagreement,” and concedes “there are an always have been a few primitives who 
consider the fact of wearing or having worn a uniform the indispensable entitlement 
to the expression of any views on military affairs; but these are normally the ones who 
would never read anything of a reflective character anyway even if written by one with 
the most unchallengeable military credentials.”1633
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Brodie explains that the “role of the civilian in contributions to this field, which 
became so prominent following World War II, is more understandable when we reflect 
further on what strategy really means and what it embraces,” and his definition starts 
with the concept from Mahan that defined strategy as pertaining to operations prior 
to contact with the enemy, and upon contact, tactics are employed.1634 Brodie accepts 
this as a starting point, as it “helps us to get on with the real job of exploring the true 
meaning of the idea,” which he traces back once more to Clausewitz, the intellectual 
inspiration of War and Politics and to whom its title is largely a tribute. “The idea 
stressed repeatedly in this book, explicitly and implicitly, is that which most makes 
Clausewitz stand out from those who might otherwise come near to being his peers and 
which accounted for his being impressed with Machiavelli,” and this is “the concern 
with the fundamental nature of war as a branch of politics.”1635 So while the “general 
has indeed been trained or conditioned to want desperately to win, and will be willing 
to pay any price possible to do so,”1636 there nonetheless “has to be at the top, certainly 
in the civilian and preferably also in the military departments o the government, the 
basic and prevailing conception of what any war existing or impending is really about 
and what it is attempting to accomplish. This attitude includes necessarily a readiness 
to reexamine whether under the circumstances existing it is right to continue it or 
whether it is better to seek some solution or termination other than victory”1637 – as 
ultimately happened in Vietnam. Brodie finds in Clausewitz such a sensibility, noting 
he had “learned from experience very early in his career the importance of ‘the cor-
rect political bias’ for any nation at war,”1638 and notes with interest that “Clausewitz, 
whose life from boyhood on was spent in military service and who as a scholar and 
philosopher was totally self-taught, should have grasped the essence of the issue, the 
nexus between politics and strategy, so much more clearly than virtually all of his 
peers and successors,” and attributes the clarity of his insight to “the extraordinary 
power and reach of his mind” as well as to “some bitter and extraordinary personal 
experiences to help him along the war.”1639 Among these was Clausewitz’s decision 
(along with “various others of the leading reformist soldiers of Prussia”) to resign 
his commission serving Friedrich Wilhelm, and to cross over to the Russians, “thus 
becoming nominally the enemy of his own king and that of the king’s army, which 
contained two of his brothers.”1640 And, Brodie added, “[w]ith the Russians he fought 
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in the great campaign of 1812, in which the Grand Armee went to Moscow and then 
perished in the retreat,” and “witnessed with his own eyes and was torn to the core 
by the unspeakable horrors of this flight.”1641 This would “no doubt accentuate his 
feelings of that the correct use of thought in the handling of (war) deserved a very 
high priority.” Brodie notes Clausewitz’s “real anguish at the horrors he saw” clashed 
with his strategic logic that a more aggressive blow against the retreating French was 
needed to consolidate the victory, and he speculates that “the inner conflict between 
his undoubted compassion and something much fiercer in his nature must have 
contributed to the depression that seems to have developed steadily throughout his 
life.”1642 Brodie feels a connection with “this sensitive, retiring, and deeply emotional 
man,” and though he “knew very well the worth of his own ideas, such searing experi-
ences, including that of the occupation of Paris afterwards, would burn deeply into his 
consciousness the necessary unity of war with its object.”1643 Brodie notes Clausewitz 
was especially “appalled by the vindictive behavior and attitudes of his Prussian col-
leagues,” which “undoubtedly confirmed his feelings about the supreme requirement 
of appropriate political direction during war and its aftermath, which he developed 
so persistently in his On War.”1644
Brodie considers Clausewitz something of a strategic prophet, whose ideas still 
resonate with relevance today. “Although no single author could be an adequate 
‘guide’ to us in our present problems, and not alone because the world we live in is so 
different from his, the startling insights that leap up at us from so many pages of his 
great work are still often directly applicable to our own times. There has been no one 
to match him since.”1645 Brodie notes Clausewitz “specifically rejected the notion that 
there could be any well-defined body of particular rules or principles that universally 
dictated one form of behavior rather than another,” in contrast to “his contemporary, 
Antoine Henri Jomini,” and Brodie suspects Clausewitz “would have been appalled” 
at recent efforts by “various army field manuals” that “attempt to encapsulate cen-
turies of experience and volumes of reflection into a few tersely worded and usually 
numbered ‘principles of war.’”1646 While such a “catalog of numbered principles . . . 
may be necessary to communicate to second-order minds (or minds too busy with 
the execution of plans to worry much about the specific validity of the ideas behind 
them),” or “may help the ordinary commander to avoid the most glaring or com-
monplace errors,” Brodie believes a such a “catalog of principles must be recognized 
1641. Brodie, War and Politics, 443.
1642. Brodie, War and Politics, 445.
1643. Brodie, War and Politics, 446.
1644. Brodie, War and Politics, 446.
1645. Brodie, War and Politics, 446.
1646. Brodie, War and Politics, 446.
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists: At the Nexus of War and Policy 343
for what it is, which is a device intended to circumvent the need for months and years 
of study of and rumination on a very difficult subject,” and notes that in his time, 
“in the training of the modern officer such study and rumination are not allowed for, 
either at the staff college level or the war college,” as it “takes too much time” and 
requires “analytical and reflective qualities of mind that are not commonly found 
either among student officers or among their instructors.”1647 On top of this, Brodie 
observes the “military services have learned very well that what they need most in 
their commanders is that quality called ‘leadership,’ and in this they are quite right.”1648 
As consequence, however, “that talent which is also necessary in the top leadership, 
that is, strategic insight, may come off a very poor second.”1649 In Clausewitz’s time, 
Brodie notes, this was resolve “by distinguishing between the qualities necessary in 
the commander, who was expected to provide leadership and aggressive drive, and 
his chief of staff, who was supposed to do much of his tactical and strategic thinking 
for him,” much as Clausewitz himself had served.1650
Brodie finds “[t]here are some today who yearn to see created a true science 
or theory of strategy, replete with principles that are both immutable and deeply 
meaningful, but they only indicate by that desire a basic misunderstanding of their 
subject,” and taking his cue from Clausewitz’s generality, recalls how “in these pages” 
he has “been lauding the modernity of Clausewitz,” but that his modernity is not the 
kind to “give us the answers to our contemporary problems but which, at its best, 
will sharpen our receptivity to appropriate insights about those problems.”1651 Brodie 
contrasts this strategic insight fostered by Clausewitz with the “twinge of delight” we 
feel when reading Plato’s insights from two millennia ago: “It is not that Plato adds to 
our understanding; we can feel the pleasure only because that understanding already 
exists.” However, he believes “[w]e do in fact learn something from Clausewitz – a 
good deal more, I think, than we ever learn from Plato,” even though in the end 
“what we get from Clausewitz is a deepening of sensibility or insight rather than a 
body of rules.”1652 Nevertheless, Brodie assures us that strategic thinking is ultimately 
“pragmatic,” and thus aims to generate a “theory for action,” one that accepts that 
“uncertainty is itself a factor to be reckoned with in one’s strategic doctrine.”1653 Be-
cause strategic theory is designed to be “transferable to the world of action,” Brodie 
explains, “it is like other branches of politics and like any of the applied sciences, 
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and not at all like pure science, where the function of theory is to describe, organize, 
and explain and not to prescribe.”1654 
Brodie noted the civilian-scientific strategists belonged to “a group that evolved 
almost entirely since World War II, mostly in the United States, and usually associated 
with institutions like the RAND Corporation and a number of other organizations 
that have sprung up.”1655 Brodie noted that the “use of scientists for assistance in mak-
ing tactical suggestions goes back to at least World War I,” but that “employment 
of scientists for advice in military decisions was carried very much further in World 
War II, especially in the novel field of strategic bombing,” and at that war’s end “the 
nuclear scientists showed what they had been up to all this time in the extremely secret 
Manhattan District Project,” and “the prestige that the accomplishment of the nuclear 
bomb gave to scientists in general . . . accounted probably more than any other one 
thing for the conviction of General H.H. Arnold,” the chief of staff of the U.S. Army 
Air Forces “that scientists should be retained on a continuing basis in peacetime,” and 
so RAND was established as an outside, autonomous organization that was “closely 
associated” with the Air Force.1656 
His conviction on the continued utility of scientists to America’s strategic planning 
was reinforced by the worrisome “fact that the Germans had rather disturbingly beat 
us in several important technological advances, including a jet engine” that may well 
“have been enough to stop entirely the Anglo-American air offensive” had it been 
applied not to bombers as Hitler urged, but instead to fighters.1657 Arnold’s deci-
sion, Brodie added, was imitated by the other services. Brodie credits RAND for its 
“outstanding contribution . . . to modern strategic thinking” with systems analysis, 
which promised “to be far superior to anyone’s simple, intuitive judgment,”1658 and 
to “produce far more reliable results.”1659 With the election of John F. Kennedy, and 
his appointment of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense, came to the office 
of the Secretary of Defense “a mind most sympathetically attuned to the charms of 
systems analysis,”1660 which would come to play a central role in decision-making, 
resulting in a “struggle to control” the decision-making process with the services. 
Brodie cites several leading military men, whose opposition to the rise of the defense 
intellectual, appeared uniform. General Thomas D. White, who served as Air Force 
chief of staff, wrote “In common with many other military men, active and retired, I 
1654. Brodie, War and Politics, 453.
1655. Brodie, War and Politics, 453.
1656. Brodie, War and Politics, 453.
1657. Brodie, War and Politics, 459.
1658. Brodie, War and Politics, 462.
1659. Brodie, War and Politics, 463.
1660. Brodie, War and Politics, 464.
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists: At the Nexus of War and Policy 345
am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called 
professional ‘defense intellectuals’ who have been brought into this nation’s capitol. I 
don’t believe a lot of these often over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, 
mathematicians and other theorists have sufficient worldliness or motivation to stand 
up to the kind of enemy we face.”1661 And General Curtis LeMay, who headed up SAC 
and commanded the strategic bombing campaign in Japan, retiring after serving as Air 
Force chief of staff, echoed this sentiment, writing: “The military profession has been 
invaded by pundits who set themselves up as popular oracles on military strategy,” 
and “Today’s armchair strategists, glibly writing about military matters to a public 
avid for military news, can do incalculable harm. ‘Experts’ in a field where they have 
no experience, they propose strategies based upon hopes and fears rather than upon 
facts and seasoned judgments.”1662 Brodie challenges LeMay, noting “[i]nsofar as he is 
clearly alluding to the trials of thermonuclear war, he does not explain where in fact 
the military have got the ‘facts’ and the ‘seasoned judgments’ that are denied to the 
civilians who are also occupying themselves full-time on the same problems.”1663 Indeed, 
Brodie counters LeMay’s dismissal of the seeming inexperience of civilian strategists 
by noting the “much-touted ‘experience’ that the military so commonly advance in 
their special claims to superior wisdom in military decisions is in this realm almost 
always irrelevant,” though Brodie does concede, as he earlier did, that “[c]ertainly 
senior military men possess indispensable skills acquired only through experience,” 
and “[c]hief of these is the ability to command.”1664 But “when it comes to choosing 
major weapons systems for some future state of affairs that may be considerably more 
different from the present . . . there often exists no military experience whatever that 
is relevant.”1665
However, Brodie does not overplay his defense of the civilian strategists, noting their 
own “overvaluation of systems analysis,” and he explains how the “best of the systems 
analysts have most often been trained as economists,”1666 which means they are “nor-
mally extremely weak in either diplomatic or military history or even in contemporary 
politics,” and yet are “rarely aware of how important a deficiency this is for strategic 
insight.”1667 Brodie notes in contrast how “the great strategic writers and teachers of 
the past, with the sole and understandable exception of Douhet, based the develop-
ment of their art almost entirely on a broad and perceptive reading of history – in the 
1661. Brodie, War and Politics, 466.
1662. Brodie, War and Politics, 467.
1663. Brodie, War and Politics, 467.
1664. Brodie, War and Politics, 472.
1665. Brodie, War and Politics, 472.
1666. Brodie, War and Politics, 474.
1667. Brodie, War and Politics, 475.
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case of Clausewitz and Jomini mostly recent history but exceptionally rich for their 
needs,” while “the present generation of ‘civilian strategists’ are with markedly few 
exceptions singularly devoid of history.”1668 And though Brodie admits that it “could 
be argued that in a world that has to adopt itself to nuclear weapons, the reading of 
history may be an impediment,” he concludes that this is not the case, particularly “if 
we continue to consider strategy what Clausewitz considered it – a branch of politics, 
a ‘continuation of politics by other means.’”1669
Brodie’s Place in the Development of Nuclear Strategy
Brodie’s final article would be published just months before his 1978 death in the 
pages of International Security – though it had first appeared two years earlier as a 
1976 Advanced Concepts and Information Strategy (ACIS) working paper and later 
re-appeared posthumously as a chapter in the 1983 anthology National Security and 
International Stability that he co-edited with Michael D. Intriligator and Roman 
Kolkowicz, and which ensured Brodie had a hand in writing his own epitaph and thus 
a say in his own legacy. “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” as it was titled, was 
based on his plenary address at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and 
Society National Conference held at University of Chicago that year. It is fitting that 
this broad theme was the topic of his final article, since Brodie was a pivotal player 
from the very start of the atomic era when his phraseology would help to define the 
new era with the publication of The Absolute Weapon. His later effort to top this with 
the formulation of the “Missile Age” as what he hoped would become the defining 
concept of the next chapter of the nuclear age did not take – though his book by the 
same title, as earlier discussed, became one of the most highly regarded works on that 
era, and in many ways it was his failure to so define that next chapter of the nuclear 
period that would mark the beginning of his decline in influence. Nonetheless, even if 
he failed to achieve the same level of celebrity as his best-selling and more extroverted 
colleague Herman Kahn, he remained an active voice with a steady presence in the 
academic literature throughout the nuclear period right up until his death.
Brodie rightly claims credit for being there right at the starting gate, noting the 
central concept that “was put forward almost at once at the beginning of the nuclear 
age” and which was “still the dominant concept of nuclear strategy” was “deterrence,” 
and that “[i]t fell to me – few other civilians at the time were interested in military 
strategy – to publish the first analytical paper on the military implications of nuclear 
weapons,” his Fall 1945 Occasional Paper at the Yale Institute for International Studies, 
1668. Brodie, War and Politics, 475.
1669. Brodie, War and Politics, 475.
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“The Atomic Bomb and American Security.”1670 Adds Brodie, “[i]n expanded form it 
was included as two chapters in a book published in the following year under the title 
The Absolute Weapon, which contained also essays on political implications by four 
of my Yale colleagues.”1671 Brodie cited from that work his most famous paragraph, 
widely cited, with and without his approval, which stated that “the first and most vital 
step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take meas-
ures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind,” 
and while “[t]hus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win 
wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no 
other useful purpose.”1672 Brodie reflected that “while the idea of deterrence per se was 
certainly nothing new, being as old as the use of physical force, what was distinctively 
new was the degree to which it was intolerable that it should fail. On the other hand, 
one could add that ‘in no case is the fear of the consequences of atomic bomb attack 
likely to be low,’ which made it radically different from a past in which governments 
could, often correctly, anticipate wars that would bring them considerable political 
benefits while exacting very little in the way of costs.”1673
Brodie observes that since The Absolute Weapon was published over thirty years earlier, 
“there has been much useful rumination and writing on nuclear strategy and especially 
on the nature of deterrence, but the national debates on the subject have revolved 
mostly around three questions, all relating directly to the issue of expenditures,” which 
were: “1) What are the changing physical requirements for the continuing success 
of deterrence? 2) Just what kinds of wars does nuclear deterrence really deter? and 3) 
What is the role, if any, for tactical nuclear weapons? Far down the course in terms 
of the public attention accorded it is a fourth question: If deterrence fails, how do 
we fight a nuclear war and for what objectives? The latter question has been almost 
totally neglected by civilian scholars, though lately some old ideas have been revived 
having to do with what are called limited nuclear options. Otherwise most questions 
about the actual use of nuclear weapons in war, whether strategic or tactical, have 
been largely left to the military, who had to shoulder responsibility for picking specific 
targets, especially in the strategic category, and who were expected to give guidance 
about the kinds and numbers of nuclear weapons required.”1674 Brodie points out the 
unprecedented fact that “[v]irtually all the basic ideas and philosophies about nuclear 
1670. Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1978), 65. Published 
earlier as a 1976 Advanced Concepts and Information Strategy (ACIS) working paper with the same title, and republished 
posthumously as chapter 2 in the 1983 anthology National Security and International Stability (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, 
Gunn & Hain, 1983) that Brodie co-edited with Michael D. Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz, 5.
1671. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 65; also in National Security and International Stability, 5.
1672. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 65; also in National Security and International Stability, 5-6.
1673. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66; also in National Security and International Stability, 6.
1674. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66; also in National Security and International Stability, 6-7.
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weapons and their use have been generated by civilians working quite independently 
of the military, even though some resided in institutions like Rand which were largely 
supported by one or another of the services,” and as a result, when it came to the 
new art of nuclear strategy, “the military have been, with no significant exceptions, 
strictly consumers, naturally showing preference for some ideas over others but hardly 
otherwise affecting the flow of those ideas.”1675 
One consequence of the prominent role played by civilian strategists in conceptual-
izing deterrence was that “to the military man deterrence comes as the by-product, not 
the central theme, of his strategic structure,” and “[a]ny philosophy which puts it at 
the heart of the matter must be uncongenial to him. One military writer significantly 
speaks of the deterrence-oriented ‘modernist’ as dwelling ‘in the realm of achieving 
non-events in a condition where the flow of events is guided, not by his initiatives, 
but by other minds.’ And further: ‘The obvious difficulty with deterrent theory . . . 
is the yielding of the initiative to the adversary.’”1676 Brodie disagreed with the view 
that initiative was surrendered to the adversary, since “to prepare against all possible 
crises in the future, it is desirable to minimize that proportion of our retaliatory forces 
which the opponent can have high confidence of destroying by a surprise blow and to 
help keep alive in his mind full awareness of the penalties for miscalculation,” which 
provided America with a mission to ensure that deterrence would endure until the 
political conditions that defined the Cold War stand-off resolved themselves, as they 
would just a decade after Brodie’s death.
Brodie observes that the strategic community is “inhabited by peoples of a wide range 
of skills and sometimes of considerable imagination,” and that as a result, “All sorts 
of notions and propositions are churned out,” but whether they are “worth a second 
thought, however, is another matter,” and “should undergo a good deal of thought 
before one begins to spend much money” in their development, since on matters of 
national defense, “sums spent on particular proposals can easily become huge.”1677 
Brodie cautions that “thinking up of ingenious new possibilities is deceptively cheap 
and easy, and the burden of proof must be on those who urge the payment of huge 
additional premiums for putting their particular notions into practice.”1678 Brodie’s 
own thoughtful analysis, across nearly half a century of technological and strategic 
change, instead proffered us a consistent set of ideas firmly embedded in an historical 
context – one that did not presume simplicity but instead recognized the complexi-
ties and ambiguities in the world, and in so doing, endeavored to reduce the grave 
1675. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66; also in National Security and International Stability, 7.
1676. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66; also in National Security and International Stability, 7.
1677. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 83; nearly verbatim in National Security and International 
Stability, 21.
1678. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 83; also in National Security and International Stability, 21.
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dangers inherent therein and to combat lesser ideas that were oft-floated, whether in 
the pages of the popular press, more erudite scholarly journals, or top-secret-stamped 
memos circulating in the halls of power.
In a March 23, 1978 letter (just eight months before Brodie died from cancer on 
November 24 that year) from a then very young Dennis Ross – a 1970 graduate of 
UCLA and former graduate student in its political science department who would 
leave the academic world for the policy arena, rising to the very highest levels of power 
as an advisor to four American presidents in both major political parties – writing 
in praise of Brodie’s final article, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” based on 
his plenary address at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society 
National Conference held at University of Chicago that year, and published by the 
National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, as well as the 
Spring 1978 edition of International Security: “Dear Professor Brodie, I just wanted to 
drop you a note to let you know how much I enjoyed your recent ACIS paper – ‘The 
Development of Nuclear Strategy,’” noting Brodie had “reminded us, once again, of 
the larger questions we should be addressing. While my present surroundings seem 
to place a premium on narrow operational thinking, your teachings prevent me from 
straying too far into the realm of strategic fantasy – thanks.”1679 
Strategy as an Art:  
A ‘Classical-Military’ Response to the Scientific Strategists
In an intriguing response to the theorists of deterrence and the limitations of their 
civilian-scientific orientation is presented by U.S. Army Col. Richard L. Curl in his 
1975 Strategic Review article, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age.”1680 Adding to its 
intrigue, this work – critical as it is – was cited by Brodie himself in his Spring 1978 
International Security article, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” his final work. 
We will first examine Brodie’s discussion of the article, and then look more closely 
Curl’s critique of deterrence and its theoretical tradition.1681 
Brodie had observed how, “Since 1946 there has been much useful rumination and 
writing on nuclear strategy and especially on the nature of deterrence, but the national 
debates on the subject have revolved mostly around three questions, all relating directly 
to the issue of expenditures … 1) What are the changing physical requirements for the 
1679. Letter from Dennis Ross to Brodie, March 23, 1978. Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223). UCLA. Ross was 
then working in the Secretary of Defense’s Office, and would later serve as Policy Planning Director at the U.S. State 
Department in the first Bush Administration, later becoming America’s special envoy to the Middle East, during the entire 
two-term presidency of Clinton – returning as a special envoy for the region at the start of the Obama administration in 
February 2009, where he is now grappling with the complex transformation of the Arab world known as the “Arab Spring.”
1680. Richard L. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” Strategic Review 3 (Winter 1975), 46-56.
1681. Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1978), 65-83.
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continuing success of deterrence? 2) Just what kinds of wars does nuclear deterrence 
really deter? and 3) What is the role, if any, for tactical nuclear weapons?”1682 But 
Brodie noted that “[f ]ar down the course in terms of the public attention accorded it 
is a fourth question: If deterrence fails, how do we fight a nuclear war and for what 
objectives?”1683 Brodie contends that this “latter question has been almost totally 
neglected by civilian scholars,” a view that Herman Kahn would surely disagree with, 
“though lately some old ideas have been revived having to do with what are called 
limited nuclear options. Otherwise most questions about the actual use of nuclear 
weapons in war, whether strategic or tactical, have been largely left to the military, who 
had to shoulder responsibility for picking specific targets, especially in the strategic 
category, and who were expected to give guidance about the kinds and numbers of 
nuclear weapons required. In that connection, one must stress a point which certain 
young historians who are new to the field have found it difficult to grasp.1684
Brodie writes that “[v]irtually all the basic ideas and philosophies about nuclear 
weapons and their use have been generated by civilians working quite independently of 
the military, even though some resided in institutions like RAND which were largely 
supported by one or another of the services,” and thus “the military have been, with 
no significant exceptions, strictly consumers, naturally showing preference for some 
ideas over others but hardly otherwise affecting the flow of those ideas. Whatever 
the reasons, they must include prominently the fact that to the military man deter-
rence comes as the by-product, not the central theme, of his strategic structure. Any 
philosophy which puts it at the heart of the matter must be uncongenial to him.”1685 
It is here that Brodie cites Curl, noting: “One military writer significantly speaks of 
the deterrence-oriented ‘modernist’ as dwelling ‘in the realm of achieving non-events 
in a condition where the flow of events is guided, not by his initiatives, but by other 
minds.’ And further: ‘The obvious difficulty with deterrent theory . . . is the yielding 
of the initiative to the adversary.’ In the preceding sentence initiative has already been 
called the sine qua non of success.[6]”1686 These quotations, as noted in footnote number 
six, are from Col. Richard L. Curl’s article, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 
in the Winter 1975 edition of Strategic Review. 
The article itself was derived from Curl’s thesis at the U.S. Army War College, 
which juxtaposes the “classicist” versus “modernist” influences on military strategy, 
noting the former was “dominated by military-historical influences,” but the “advent 
of the atomic era brought an ascendancy of civilian-scientific influences,” and while 
1682. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66.
1683. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66.
1684. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 66-67.
1685. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 67.
1686. Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” IS, 67.
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“classical strategy sought to serve political ends by achieving military victory, the 
modern strategists have been preoccupied with avoiding war, not with winning it,” 
a preoccupation that Curl argues dates back before the atomic era when “concern 
for the destructive power of weapons had led some to conclude that war was now 
impractical and weapons should be limited by agreement,” but whose “[e]xpecta-
tions of universal peace foundered in an era of great wars.”1687 Curl’s article starts off 
with Brodie’s famed aphorism, first articulated in 1945 but more widely read in his 
contributions to the 1946 The Absolute Weapon, and to which Curl attributes Brodie’s 
famous words: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been 
to win wars. But from now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose.” As Curl observes, “When Bernard Brodie and his 
collaborators in the Yale Institute of International Studies penned these lines in 1946, 
they were giving expression to a philosophy which seemed so apparent, considering 
the awesome destructive potential of the A-Bomb, so attuned to the American view 
of war as an unmitigated disaster, and so compatible with America’s new position as 
a satiated superpower, that the philosophy rapidly became dogma,” and this “dogma, 
in turn, became the foundation for the strategy of deterrence which has guided our 
national military and foreign policy ever since.”1688 
It is intriguing that Curl recognizes Brodie’s philosophy had reified into dogma, and 
also ironic in that Brodie was such a passionate critic of doctrinaire thinking and his 
entire approach to the philosophy of war, with all its complexities, has been to resist 
dogma and the over-simplification of reality that it courts, as evident in his critique of 
rules-based military handbooks that seek to boil down war’s many complexities into 
simple, actionable aphorisms. Brodie waged a lifelong battle against dogma, and dueled 
with those he felt succumbed to its oversimplicity, emulating Clausewitz and rebuking 
Jomini for failing to embrace complexity with the same fervor as the Prussian he so 
admired. That his efforts helped foster the emergence of the predominant strategic 
dogma of the Cold War is truly sardonic. Curl believes Brodie’s 1946 book “marked 
a dramatic change in the character and quantity of American strategic thought,” one 
Curl believes was “dramatic enough to be termed revolutionary” with three parts: 
firstly that the “influential thinking was now overwhelmingly ‘civilian-scientific’ in-
stead of ‘military-historical’;” secondly, that as a “consequence, the center of gravity of 
strategic thinking shifted from its traditional European base to America;” and thirdly, 
that the “‘classical’ strategist was relegated, if not to an intellectual graveyard, at least 
to a semi-moribund state of catatonia.”1689 In contrast to classicist who “devoted his 
1687. Richard L. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” Strategic Review 3 (Winter 1975), 46.
1688. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 46.
1689. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 46-47.
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time and talent to determining how wars could be won,” the new modernist instead 
“believed that force could be eliminated or at the very least intelligently controlled” 
and in so doing “took the threat of the use of force as a major element in the definition 
of strategy, and devoted their time to determining how wars could be avoided.”1690 
The classicist favors action, while the modernist hopes for inaction, or as Curl 
describes, in the passage that caught Brodie’s eye and was subsequently quoted in his 
Spring 1978 International Security article, his very last article before he passed from 
this world that very same year: “The classicist can focus on fairly concrete events and 
outcomes while the modernist must dwell in the realm of achieving non-events in 
a condition where the flow of events is guided, not by his initiatives, but by other 
minds. In classical strategic theory, the initiative is considered a sine qua non – the 
key to success.”1691 Moreover, Curl argues, the “superior strategist is he who controls 
his adversary’s actions – who causes him to react predictably and to the strategist’s 
advantage. The obvious difficulty with deterrent theory in these terms is the yielding 
of the initiative to the adversary,” and thus it is “scarcely surprising then to find, as 
one traces the development of deterrent theory to America, a distinct thread of intel-
lectual frustration over this point. Indeed the search for the initiative, though disguised 
with words such as ‘increased options’ or ‘flexibility,’ is the single most prominent 
evolutionary thread of modern strategic theory.”1692 
This thread sought to redress the general neglect by deterrence theorists to offer 
a roadmap forward should deterrence fail; indeed, Brodie, even in his seminal 1959 
Strategy in the Missile Age, which “essentially codified deterrent theory to that point 
… offered no thought on how, if worst came to worst and deterrence somehow 
failed, nuclear war should or could be conducted.”1693 And so it “was left to one of 
his RAND colleagues, Herman Kahn, to attempt for the first time in his behemoth 
effort, On Thermonuclear War, a more classical-oriented approach on how to survive 
and win,” and which argued “nuclear war could be ended with a majority of the U.S. 
population surviving – the proportion of which could be increased by a number of 
preparatory measures,” and that there existed “options which might be available within 
a range of nuclear conflicts,” so instead of “assuming a spasm type of war as the only 
possibility, Kahn suggested a controlled nuclear war-fighting strategy with targets tied 
to political ends.”1694 While Kahn’s classical approach to strategy generated a “barrage 
of criticism ranging from unfriendly to hysterical” from the more modernist deter-
rence theorists that was “notable more for a sense of moral outrage than for objective 
1690. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 47.
1691. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 48.
1692. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 48.
1693. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 49.
1694. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 49.
Bernard Brodie and the Rise of the Civilian Strategists: At the Nexus of War and Policy 353
or intelligent analysis,” Curl lauds Kahn for restoring “some of the key elements of 
an operational, positive strategy which had been missing for the past ten years.”1695 
The clash of Brodie’s thesis with Kahn’s antithesis would yield to a new synthesis of 
“enhanced deterrence” that went beyond “graduated response” to a more “credible 
response,” but as Curl describes, “deterrent theory had seen an increasing search for a 
strategy more sensitive to the classical concepts but still centered, first and foremost, 
on the avoidance of war.”1696 
Brodie – in contrast to the gregarious Kahn (whose training was as a physicist and 
whose strength appears to have been in his ability to deliver engaging, often hilarious, 
and almost always marathon briefings) – was much more the philosopher of nuclear 
war whereas Kahn would be its chief publicist. Their written works addressed many 
of the very same themes, often at the same time, but whose styles and personalities 
so differed with a notable impact on the reach and influence of their efforts, Brodie 
penetrating more deeply into the fundamental, indeed one might say academic, essence 
while Kahn more broadly disseminating ideas to the lay public as well as the policy 
and warfighting communities. This parallelism strikes an uncanny resemblance to the 
rivalry between Clausewitz and Jomini during the Napoleonic period, so much so that 
both Clausewitz and Brodie would die much sooner than their more popular rivals, 
and as a result, Kahn and Jomini would not only get the last say, so to speak, but they 
would be able to lay the institutional foundation for their influence to penetrate deeply 
into the formulation of military doctrine during their lifetimes and in the years that 
immediately followed. It would take the passage of much time for Clausewitz to be 
rediscovered, and for his voice to finally echo well beyond his grave as new generations 
of theorists found his wisdom reached far into the future, and this is in part one of 
my reasons for revisiting the works of Brodie, sensing the time may be right for his 
wisdom to emulate that of his great Prussian mentor and reach across the chasm of 
time. On the irony of Kahn’s greater notoriety, one of his popular works was Thinking 
About the Unthinkable, with a new edition to come out immediately after his death 
called Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s, influencing the debate that was 
then raging on nuclear strategy even after he had passed on to eternity. Brodie had 
sought to label the thermonuclear era as the “Missile Age,” inspired by the earlier 
“Machine Age” that became part of his first book’s title, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 
insisting to his publisher that his widely regarded Strategy in the Missile Age retain the 
“Missile Age” in its title. His original title was Strategy Meets the Missile Age, which his 
publisher found awkward on the ear. Even the famous concept of the absolute weapon, 
while the title of the 1946 book on nuclear strategy edited by Brodie, was not his own 
1695. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 49.
1696. Curl, “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” 49.
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invention – but that of his colleague and fellow contributor to The Absolute Weapon, 
William T.R. Fox, but it would be forever tied to Brodie because this influential book 
appeared with his byline, under his editorial leadership.1697 
Brodie’s and Kahn’s topics were nearly identical, but their styles, their philosophical 
and theoretical approaches, and their use of language greatly differed – sometimes sub-
tly, sometimes obviously. While the warfighters favored action over inaction and were 
thus prepared (on the surface) to cross the nuclear threshold, and the deterrers favored 
inaction over action and thus sought to preserve that threshold forever unbroken, each 
in his own way thought about, and risked, the unthinkable. The warfighters appeared, 
on the surface, to be more firmly in the tradition of classical realism (their language was 
bolder, and more aligned with action), but it was the deterrers who threatened a far 
more absolute Apocalypse in their effort to hold the line and to prevent the outbreak 
of nuclear war. What they threatened to unleash was far more destructive than the 
more limited nuclear use contemplated by the warfighters (at least during the early 
stages of nuclear war). Which approach was the more dangerous, and which more 
likely to sustain the peace, remained a riddle throughout the Cold War, and even in 
these many years since that conflict’s quiet end, the ambiguity remains, unresolved. 
Brodie famously probed deeply, hoping to penetrate the fog of complexity, in 
contrast to Kahn, who surveyed broadly, aiming for clarity and in the end achieving 
celebrity for his efforts. It was Brodie who had the most enduring impact on the evolu-
tion of strategic theory, while Kahn’s approach found greater favor in the formulation 
of strategic doctrine – as noted by Jeffrey D. Porro in the June/July 1982 edition of 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Porro examined the battle for strategic influence 
between Brodie and Kahn, one of the few articles to explicitly juxtapose these two 
prominent theorists within a dialectical framework, with Brodie representing the 
Clausewitzian perspective, and Kahn representing a decidedly non-Clausewitzian 
perspective.1698 Porro’s article starts out by noting, “The ideas of two men have set the 
terms of the debate among U.S. policymakers over nuclear strategy. For the moment, 
the view of one has prevailed,” namely Herman Kahn; “But if we are to reduce the 
risk of nuclear war, we must return to those of the other,” none other than Bernard 
Brodie. As Porro observes, “Throughout his work, Kahn the physicist never asked the 
questions that bothered Brodie: What possible political goal could justify the loss of 
1697. As noted in The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order,” William T.R. 
Fox anticipated the relative versus absolute gains debate when he coined the phrase The Absolute Weapon: ‘When dealing 
with The Absolute Weapon, arguments based on relative advantage lose their point.’ Richard J. Harknett, “State Preferences, 
Systemic Constraints, and The Absolute Weapon,” in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute 
Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
67, citing William T.R. Fox, “International Control of Atomic Weapons,” in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon, 181. 
1698. Jeffrey D. Porro, “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38, No. 6 (June/July 1982), 
16-20. 
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a hundred cities or even a ‘few’ million people? Could the people of a nation which 
suffered even ‘limited’ nuclear damage be expected, in Brodie’s words, to ‘show much 
concern for the further pursuit of political military objectives?’”1699 And while not eve-
ryone “who rejected Brodie’s view of nuclear strategy agreed completely with Kahn,” or 
disagreed with Kahn’s rosy optimism on “the prospects of recovery from nuclear war,” 
most came to believe “Brodie’s view of deterrence was insufficient, and that it would 
be more advantageous for us if our forces could fight a nuclear war by attacking the 
Soviet military.”1700 And while “supporters of Brodie’s version of deterrence were far 
from silent,” Porro found that “they no longer had their former impact” and by “late 
1976, even the ‘moderates’ writing about nuclear arms accepted the need for increased 
war fighting capabilities.”1701 While “[s]ome in what had become the minority Brodie 
school placed their hopes in the election of Jimmy Carter,” Porro observes that Harold 
Brown, Carter’s defense secretary, “began to sound like the others. In 1978 he said: ‘We 
cannot afford to make a complete distinction between deterrence forces and what are 
so awkwardly called war fighting forces.’ Over the next two years he elaborated what 
he called a ‘countervailing strategy,’ which meant having plans ‘to attack the targets 
which comprise the Soviet military force structure and political power structure, and 
to hold back a significant reserve.’”1702 
While Brodie had acknowledged, in War and Politics in 1973, that it was “not accept-
able to all that deterrence is all-important and that ‘winning’ is a matter of crude and 
brutal irrelevance,” and noted “the military, among others, have consistently refused 
to accept this notion,”1703 by the end of Brodie’s life, what had once been a dialectic 
pitting Brodie’s thesis against Kahn’s antithesis (and the Cold War-era thinking of 
Colin S. Gray) had achieved a synthesis of sorts. As the dueling ideas of the “wizards 
of Armageddon,” the phrase elegantly coined by Fred Kaplan, inched their way closer 
to reality, and the debate became entwined by the co-evolution of both doctrine and 
policy, a passionate and partisan debate would engage academia, government and the 
military for the better part of a generation, eventually finding a consensual middle 
ground, aiming for deterrence while at the same time preparing for its failure. We 
thus witnessed a fascinating dialectical interaction between theory and doctrine, as 
abstract thought interacted with the constant probing of military action (and prepa-
ration) – and in this dance of thought influencing action (which in turn influenced 
thought again), deterrence and warfighting would begin to converge, forming a nuclear 
dialectic that guided the pace and composition of the arms race between the Soviet 
1699. Porro, “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” 17. 
1700. Porro, “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” 17. 
1701. Porro, “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” 19. 
1702. Porro, “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” 19. 
1703. Brodie, War and Politics, 378.
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Union and the United States until the two competing superpowers, locked in their 
own deadly struggle, would come to experience their own unique, and unexpected, 
synthesis – bringing to a peaceful end a struggle that had once threatened an Apoca-
lyptic end to civilization itself. This dialectic would present striking parallels between 
an earlier evolutionary dialectic witnessed in Clausewitz’s theoretical response to the 
Napoleonic Wars, whether in contrast to the contending ideas of his contemporary 
rival Jomini, or as recent Clausewitz scholars have tended to instead emphasize, that 
between the “early” or “Idealist” Clausewitz who was responding to Napoleon’s sweep-
ing early victories, and the “late” or “Realist” Clausewitz who came to understand how 
the Napoleonic juggernaut was slowed, and then reversed, and as “absolute” war was 
once again constrained by the limits imposed by the rational objectives of policy.1704
Brodie and His Rivals: The Battle for Posterity
In his comparative discussion of Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and Bernard Brodie 
in the January-February 1967 edition of Air University Review, “American Strategic 
Thinking,” John W. Chapman observes that Brodie “is a strategist whose style of 
thinking differs significantly from those exhibited in the works of Kahn and Schell-
ing,” and who “describes himself as a ‘pragmatic thinker’ and derides the ‘romantic’ 
and ‘mechanistic’ and other deficiencies which he detect[s] in the writings of others,” 
an irony of sorts given the highly mechanistic nature of the very system of mutual 
nuclear deterrence envisaged by Brodie, the subject of some later criticism by Barry D. 
Watts in 1984. As Chapman notes, in contrast to Kahn and Schelling, “Brodie seems 
inclined to regard the world as not so pervaded by either insecurity or uncertainty as 
they would have it. In his perspective the relevant alternative[s] narrow down sharply. 
We are indeed in a difficult and dangerous situation, but situations have a structure 
to them, which is open to historical and analytical investigation; we can, as we have 
in the past, think our predicament through.”1705 
While writing a full decade before neorealism would emerge as the in-vogue variant 
of realism, embedded in international structures the primary causality of international 
relations, Chapman presciently points out that “Brodie’s concern with the structure of 
the political and strategic environment derives possibly from his background in political 
science; analysis in that field typically runs in terms of the shaping influences which 
the structure of an institution exerts upon its constituent processes. In this connec-
1704. Stephen J. Cimbala synthesizes the apparently distinct “early” and “late” Clausewitzes, arguing instead that Clausewitz 
observed two distinct and conflicting forces in war, a “strong” and a “weak” force; the strong force includes those forces 
“which propel war toward its absolute form,” and the weak includes “those which resist this trend.” See Stephen J. Cimbala, 
Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 15-16.
1705. John W. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking,” Air University Review, January-February 1967, http://www.
airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/jan-feb/chapman.html. 
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tion, perhaps one should notice also his earlier work, A Guide to Naval Strategy, naval 
strategy being an area of strategic thinking which is peculiarly responsive to reflection 
that is styled structurally.”1706 Chapman sees in Brodie the art of a constructive realist 
motivated to fuse ideas with real structures to embody them. Noting that “Brodie is 
resolutely empirical, looking hard at the given and specific situation” and “manifestly 
reluctant to drift off into conceptual speculation,” Chapman reiterates that “it helps in 
differentiating him from other strategic thinkers to stress his sensitivity to the structural 
aspects of strategic confrontations. He exhibits a bracing suspicion of the abstract, of 
thought that moves on rails of principle – he once said that the classical principles 
of war are little more than refined common sense – and of the overly sophisticated. 
Compare his reference to ‘the marvelous clarity of the choice between nonwar and 
destruction’ (in Escalation and the Nuclear Option) with talk of ‘thresholds,’ ‘bargain-
ing,’ ‘escalation ladders,’ and the like.”1707
In his June 1965 RAND report and his 1966 book version with the same title – 
largely identical in substance, with the addition of an appendix and a new introductory 
chapter, “Brodie argues that there has been a ‘crucial change’ in the ‘general strategic 
environment’” and in marked contrast to Wohlstetter, he believed that a “stable balance 
of terror has been reached at the strategic level, and his evaluation of this development 
does differ interestingly from those of Kahn and Schelling. ‘Unless we are dealing with 
utter madmen, there is no conceivable reason why in any showdown with the Soviet 
Union appropriate manipulations of force and threats of force, along with more positive 
diplomatic maneuvers, cannot prevent deterrence from failing.’”1708 Brodie concluded 
that it was a “fairly safe prediction that from now on neither side will be able seriously 
and convincingly to use for political ends threats of strategic nuclear attack, or anything 
that in scale is even close to it.”1709 But as Brodie put forth Escalation and the Nuclear 
Option, “strategic stalemate means tactical freedom, and he suggests that ‘the use or 
threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons may often be counterescalatory.’”1710 This is 
a marked change from his earlier position presented in his 1959 Strategy in the Missile 
Age in which he wrote, “between the use and non-use of atomic weapons there is a vast 
watershed of difference and distinction, one that ought not be cavalierly thrown away, 
as we appear to be throwing it away, if we are serious about trying to limit war.”1711 As 
Chapman reflects, “Apparently Brodie has had occasion to change his mind on this is-
sue,” and he adds that a “number of considerations seem to influence Brodie’s stance on 
1706. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1707. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1708. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1709. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1710. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1711. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
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tactical nuclears. If any one consideration is decisive, it is his belief in strategic stalemate: 
there can be no general war. And this circumstance of itself offers encouragement to the 
provocative and the aggressive, those who would escalate, not to the top rungs of the 
ladder, to be sure, for they are gone; rather up the ladder for political advantage. Some 
such nations can be deterred, and safely so, by the threat to use, or the actual use of, 
tactical nuclear weapons.”1712 Brodie reiterated this view in his 1965 paper, “What Price 
Conventional Capabilities in Europe?” which appeared in Problems of National Strategy: 
A Book of Readings (1965), Henry A. Kissinger, ed., in which he argued, “I see no basis 
in experience or logic for assuming that the increase in level of violence from one divi-
sion to thirty is a less shocking and less dangerous form of escalation than the introduc-
tion of any kind of nuclear weapons.”1713 Chapman suggests that “Brodie’s appraisal is 
consistent with his style of strategic thinking, with his focus upon the structure of the 
situation, as distinguished from the way in which the use of nuclears would stand out. 
If it is structure that counts, i.e., the relations of the adversaries, then one can ignore the 
subtleties of psychological restraints. Indeed, their introduction only serves to blur the 
realities, appreciation of which is at the foundation of rational calculation.”1714 
Chapman finds that, particularly as compared to Kahn and Schelling, Brodie appears 
“rather more confident than many that the intentions of potential enemies can reliably 
be interpreted and forecast; politics is a less volatile activity than many are tempted to 
think; speculation about the us[e] of resolve is no substitute for study of an opponent’s 
character and characteristic ways of behaving.”1715 Adds Chapman: “His method is to 
begin with direct analysis of the situation confronted; this sensitizes him to changes in 
the strategic environment, as he calls it; this in turn would seem to prepare him to place 
greater confidence in the possibility of forecasting political behavior, in estimating the 
pressures of codes and character in a situation. Here I would contrast Kahn’s assumption 
that political behavior is likely to be irrational, the more so when persisting insecurity 
is present, and his assumption that the irrational cannot be forecast. In this perspective, 
any confrontation is likely to seem more precarious than it would appear to Brodie.”1716) 
Chapman also sees a marked contrast with “Schelling’s emphasis on uncertainty, derived 
from his conception of military and strategic activity as dynamic processes containing 
their own inherent tendencies. Brodie would seem to be saying that the very structure 
of a confrontation imposes constraints upon the political and military processes that go 
on within it, including those human responses that would be called irrational. Stability 
need not be premised on the presence of a dominant and dominating power, as Kahn 
1712. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1713. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1714. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1715. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1716. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
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would have it; nor need stability be tied to the kinds of mental processes revealed by 
Gestalt investigation.”1717 In short, the stability that Brodie predicts will emerge from 
the nuclear strategic balance emerges naturally from the very bipolar structure of inter-
national relations that took root in the post-World War II world, as two nuclear-armed 
superpowers faced off across their nuclear chasm; the world that Brodie perceived, and 
which his ideas on deterrence helped to create, was one where the mutuality of risk and 
of fear inherent in the nuclear balance induced restraint. In short, Brodie’s ideas about 
deterrence and its mutuality, first conceived at the dawn of the nuclear age, would take 
root, and from them would emerge the very bipolar stability that would enshrine the 
emergent theory of neorealism that would reign supreme until the Cold War’s end.
In his concluding thoughts, Chapman observes that Henry Kissinger, in his “Edi-
tor’s Conclusion” to his 1965 edited volume, Problems of National Strategy: A Book of 
Readings, wrote that “national security policy is not primarily a technical problem, but 
a challenge to political understanding, and ultimately, to philosophical insight.”1718 
Chapman adds to this, just as “[p]olitical theorists and philosophers differ over the 
ways in which it is profitable to think about ourselves and to investigate our environ-
ment,” then “so, too, do our strategic philosophers. They all have styles, each one of 
which is powerful and illuminating, and perhaps also constricting,” and rather than 
choose one over the other, Chapman believes that we “need not choose among styles 
of thought; rather we should be aware that there are various dimensions to strategic 
thinking, no one of which may with impunity be neglected.”1719 For “principles do 
not apply themselves,” as their “application is an operation of judgment, and this 
requires an understanding of the environment in which they are to be applied.”1720 
So while Herman Kahn’s “way of thinking is grounded in the political principle that 
men require security in order to be rational,” Chapman points out that the “pragmatic 
Bernard Brodie would fix our attention upon the actual situation that we confront. 
Theories generate principles, and situations have structures. Both sorts of consideration 
are fundamental, but in different ways. Without principles, we lack direction; without 
a map, directions lose their meaning. ‘Strategic principles’ there are, but they can be 
misleading without a grasp of the ‘strategic environment,’ Brodie’s environmentalistic 
way of thinking seems particularly relevant,” and “impressive insights … flow directly 
from Brodie’s concern with structural relationships.”1721 
It is the complicated relationship, and eventual theoretical rivalry, between Herman 
Kahn and Bernard Brodie that strikes a chord with that earlier clash of theoretical 
1717. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1718. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1719. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1720. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
1721. Chapman “American Strategic Thinking.” 
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styles between Clausewitz and Jomini; as with these two influential Napoleonic-era 
rivals, Brodie’s and Kahn’s written works addressed many of the very same themes, 
often at the same time, but whose styles and personalities so differed with a notable 
impact on the reach and influence of their efforts, Brodie penetrating more deeply into 
the fundamental, indeed one might say academic, essence while Kahn more broadly 
disseminating ideas to the lay public as well as the policy and warfighting communi-
ties. This parallelism indeed presents an uncanny resemblance to the rivalry between 
Clausewitz and Jomini, so much so that both Clausewitz and Brodie would die much 
sooner than their more popular rivals, and as a result, Kahn and Jomini would not 
only get the last say, so to speak, but they would be able to lay an institutional founda-
tion for their sustained influence to penetrate deeply into the formulation of military 
doctrine both during their lifetimes and in the years that followed. It would take the 
passage of much time for Clausewitz to be rediscovered, and for his voice to finally 
echo well beyond his grave as new generations of theorists found his wisdom reached 
far into the future, and this is my hope for Brodie, as the time may now be right for 
his wisdom to emulate that of his great Prussian mentor and reach across the vast 
chasm of time. On the irony of Kahn’s greater notoriety, one of his popular works was 
Thinking About the Unthinkable, with a new edition to come out immediately after his 
death called Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s, influencing the debate that 
was then raging on nuclear strategy even after he had passed on to eternity. 
But this famous phrase, “thinking about the unthinkable” – which would spawn 
several imitators in later years including Jeff Smith’s 1989 Unthinking the Unthink-
able: Nuclear Weapons and Western Culture; Peter R. Lavoy’s, Scott D. Sagan’s and 
James J. Wirtz’s 2000 Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Weapons, as well as numerous articles including my own 
2004 Rethinking the Unthinkable: Nuclear Weapons and the War on Terror and Wade 
L. Huntley’s Unthinking the Unthinkable: U.S. Nuclear Policy and Asymmetric Threats 
rebutting my effort – was not the brainchild of Herman Kahn, as noted in the pages 
above, but in fact was first suggested by Brodie. As Booth observed in his chapter 
on Brodie in Makers of Nuclear Strategy, “In words which Herman Kahn was later 
to echo and make famous, Brodie summed up the task of the new strategists as fol-
lows: ‘War is unthinkable but not impossible, and therefore we must think about 
it.’ Thinking About the Unthinkable (the title of Kahn’s 1962 book) is what Brodie 
did in the late 1940s, and he communicated his ideas by means of regular lectures 
to the American military and a steady output of publications.”1722 Indeed, Brodie 
was the first to introduce the notion that fighting nuclear war was “unthinkable” 
1722. Ken Booth, “Bernard Brodie,” in John Baylis and John Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinters 
Press, 1991), 25.
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as early as 1946 – a full sixteen years before Kahn would make “thinking about the 
unthinkable” famous.
In his 1992 Survival article, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strat-
egy,” Michael Howard writes that during the Cold War, “some of the best minds in 
the Western world addressed themselves to the problem of maintaining an effective 
balance of power without having to fight a war that nuclear weapons would render 
inconceivably terrible to both sides,” and the result of their efforts, “a huge literature 
developed, misleadingly labelled ‘strategic studies’: misleading, because the subject 
under discussion was not how to fight wars, the traditional concern of strategists, but 
how to prevent them. Most of the contributors had never heard a shot fired, or even 
a bomb dropped, in anger, which gave their writing a curiously arid quality; but then, 
their concern was not how to do it, but how to ensure that it was never done.”1723 As 
he put pen to paper in 1992, he noted that already “their work is beginning to seem 
as remote as that of sixteenth-century theologians, their jargon as abstruse and irrel-
evant as the vocabulary of transubstantiation and consubstantiation. When librarians 
consign their collections, first to the remotest stacks, then to the cellars, finally to the 
recycling process, what will be left?”1724 
Howard includes Brodie as one of two names that he thinks “are likely to figure 
on any short list,” the other being Albert Wohlstetter – “not only because of what 
they wrote, but also because of what they stood for. Some have seen them as the Carl 
von Clausewitz and the Henri Jomini of their day, the one for the profundity of his 
insights, the other for the clarity of his analysis. Another comparison, to continue the 
theological analogy, might be with Martin Luther and John Calvin; the first for his 
pioneering perception of a central and fundamental truth, the second for his implac-
able logic in following the trail of reasoning, however unpopular the conclusions to 
which it led. In any case, Brodie and Wohlstetter stand as pole and antipole in the 
strategic analysis produced since World War II.”1725 Howard observes that Brodie and 
Wohlstetter “had little time for one another. Although trained as a political scientist, 
Brodie wrote primarily as a historian, interested less in analysis of static situations 
than in process and development, the significance of the contingent, the part played 
in history by accident and personality and by complexities of which only hindsight 
can make us aware.”1726 
Howard recounts that Brodie “discovered Clausewitz rather late in life, in the course 
of thinking about limitations on war and the primacy of policy over strategy, but it 
was the Clausewitzian concept of friction that fascinated him. Like Clausewitz, he 
1723. Michael Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” Survival 34: 2 (Summer 1992), 107.
1724. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 107.
1725. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 107-08.
1726. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 108.
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insisted that war in reality was very different from war on paper; this was especially 
true of nuclear war. While initially welcoming the contribution that systems analysis 
could make to strategic thought and military planning, Brodie became increasingly 
sceptical about its utility” and in fact “remarked at a moment of particular frustra-
tion, that they seemed to have ‘a trained incapacity for giving due weight to social 
and political imponderables’.”1727 It is curious that Barry D. Watts’ primary criticism 
of Brodie was his failure to fully acknowledge the implications of friction in his work, 
since Howard suggests here that Brodie was in fact “fascinated” by the concept – a view 
that is borne out by a close look at his voluminous writings on war and strategy, which 
probe the psychological undercurrents of war and recognize the ubiquity of chance 
and uncertainty (albeit without frequent use of such Clausewitzian buzzwords as fric-
tion or fog.) Howard notes Brodie thought even less of “the professional military – a 
failing that was, in his chosen profession, something of a disadvantage,” and he recalls 
how Brodie, “[i]nvolved first as a young staff-officer in analysing naval operations in 
World War II and then as an independent consultant to the chief of the Air Staff in 
1950, … complained bitterly about what he saw as the ossified nature of the military 
mind, the absence of flexibility and critical analysis in their thinking,” and Howard 
agrees that Barry Steiner “quite reasonably suggests that much of the trouble lay with 
Brodie himself. He was a young man with a high opinion of his own abilities, who 
tended to reach conclusions rapidly on the basis of solitary contemplation and who 
lacked the patience and tact to argue through his conclusions in a group environment. 
In this, he had much in common with his British mentor, B.H. Liddell Hart, who 
was also a loner; crafting his concepts in the solitude of his study, enunciated them as 
dogmas, impatient of the bureaucratic process of translating ideas into programmes 
and resentful of his consequent lack of effective power.”1728 
Howard recalls that in 1950, General Hoyt Vandenberg “called on Brodie to advise 
on targeting policy against the Soviet Union,” and at the time, Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) “wanted to plan an all-out attack against Soviet industrial capability, focusing 
on the Soviet Union’s electrical network. Brodie argued that with the limited number 
of atomic bombs available, this would have little effect on the capacity of Soviet armies 
to overrun Europe and that the SAC would do better to attack a small number of cities 
in the expectation that the shock to Soviet morale, with the threat of further punish-
ment in reserve, would force a reversal of policy - a programme, in fact, of ‘intra-war 
deterrence’. Brodie failed to persuade his clients. Within a few years the development 
of thermonuclear weapons and Soviet retaliatory capabilities rendered both strategies 
1727. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 108.
1728. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 109.
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out of date.”1729 Brodie believed “nuclear war could never be won and should never 
be fought” and had “made his famous Lutheran declaration of principle as early as 
1946: ‘Thus far the chief purposes of our military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them’. It was slightly premature: four 
years later, he was advising the military establishment how to win a war. But by the 
mid-1950s, his declaration of faith was common ground among virtually all strategic 
thinkers, who differed only as to how it should best be implemented.”1730 
Howard recalls that it was “at this stage that the gap began to appear between ‘ex-
istential’ deterrence, as formulated in the United States by Brodie, and what might 
be termed ‘credible deterrence’, a school virtually founded by Wohlstetter,”1731 which 
differed primarily on how nuclear war could be prevented: “For Brodie, as for most 
European thinkers, the mere possibility of nuclear retaliation, irrespective of target, 
was deterrence enough: the explosion of a hydrogen bomb over a single city would be 
a catastrophe beyond imagination, and no sane statesman would contemplate running 
any risk of it happening. Brodie rejected Wohlstetter’s contention that the mere feasi-
bility of a Soviet pre-emptive strike made the balance of terror ‘delicate’. Such a belief, 
he maintained, ‘took no account whatever of the inhibitory political and psychological 
imponderables that might and in fact must affect the conditions implied by that word 
“delicate”. . . . Many things are feasible that we have quite good reason to believe will 
not happen’.”1732 Adds Howard, “In fact, strategic thinking, Brodie believed by 1955, 
‘had reached a dead end’ because nuclear war could no longer serve its Clausewitzian 
purpose as an instrument of policy. Some manipulation of nuclear risk would still be 
necessary, he agreed, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe, where he saw tactical 
nuclear weapons as having continued utility. Beyond that, he dissociated himself from 
the kind of detailed analysis that occupied his colleagues at The Rand Corporation, 
where his comments were increasingly sardonic and destructive. ‘A plan and a policy 
which offers a good promise of deterring war’, he wrote, ‘is by orders of magnitude 
better in every way than one which depreciates the objective of deterrence in order to 
improve somewhat the chances of winning’.”1733 Brodie feared the ‘warfighters’ – as 
one wing of the credible-deterrence camp would come to be called – inadvertently 
undermined deterrence by signalling a lack of resolve, watering down the threat and 
thereby diluting the policy’s effectiveness.
Howard has more sympathy, it seems, for the Wohlstetter school, writing that “such 
a criticism was to misunderstand, if not to misrepresent, what Wohlstetter and his col-
1729. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 110.
1730. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 110.
1731. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 110-11.
1732. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 111.
1733. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 111.
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leagues were trying to do. Rightly or wrongly, they denied that ‘existential deterrence’ 
was enough. The Soviet Union, they maintained, would not be deterred by implausible 
threats; and threats to attack its cities, when it had the capacity to retaliate in kind 
against the West, were entirely implausible. (Brodie, incidentally, remained vague 
about what targets should be attacked if his own rules for the limitation of nuclear 
war prohibited attacks on cities.)”1734 Wohlstetter, Howard explains, “believed that it 
was necessary to present the adversary with a strategy that was not only feasible but 
credible: to maintain invulnerable retaliatory forces targeted in such a way that intra-
war deterrence could be preserved by ensuring that whatever the Soviets did would 
be seen to result in greater suffering for themselves than they would be able to inflict 
on the United States and its allies. This was not, as Brodie depicted it and as some 
strategists have demanded of it, a ‘war-fighting’ strategy, much less a ‘strategy for vic-
tory’. It was, rather, a sustained effort to map out the nightmarish territory that lay 
between the failure of deterrence and the escalation to extremes that Clausewitz had 
described and Brodie so much feared.”1735 
Adds Howard: “Careful Jominian reasoning, argued Brodie and his followers, 
would be torn to shreds by Clausewitzian friction the moment the first missile landed. 
It was a valid critique, but not a very helpful one,”1736 and one that left the military 
without guidance. And so, as the years passed, they would turn less and less to Brodie, 
finding his brand of Clausewitzian theory quite unhelpful when it came to making 
hard choices over weapons systems and targeting plans. And so, notes Howard, “At 
the end of his life, Brodie despaired of strategy because nuclear war could never, in 
his view, be an instrument of policy. Wohlstetter would not have dissented from that 
conclusion, but he saw that nuclear weapons could be instruments of policy. Whether 
consciously or unconsciously, the United States used them as such”1737 – and it may be 
argued that America’s continuously evolving efforts to maintain the nuclear balance 
that Wohlstetter once called “delicate” contributed to the swift, largely unexpected, 
and markedly nonviolent conclusion of the Cold War, and the ultimate triumph of the 
very policies that embraced the bomb, forcing strategists of the Cold War to wrestle 
with the unthinkable. 
1734. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 111.
1735. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 111.
1736. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 112.
1737. Howard, “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy,” 116.
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Chapter Six
Bernard Brodie: A Clausewitz for the Nuclear Age?
The ‘Absolute’ Imperative:  
Reuniting War and Politics in the Age of Absolute War
Bruce Fleming, in his Spring 2004 Parameters article, “Can Reading Clausewitz Save 
Us from Future Mistakes?” observed that, “Perhaps most important among the recent 
commentators seeing On War as a book that, read properly, would have saved us from 
many mistakes was Bernard Brodie, the ‘dean of American civilian strategists’ – as he 
is called in the jacket copy for his magisterial War and Politics.”1738 Fleming contin-
ues: “Brodie takes Clausewitz’s most famous assertion as central for War and Politics. 
Its cover gives a visual equivalent of the title, as well as of Brodie’s understanding of 
Clausewitz’s famous assertion. The cover shows a soldier’s combat helmet side-by-
side with a diplomat’s silken top hat. Brodie’s summary of Clausewitz’s concept is 
that ‘war takes place within a political milieu from which it derives all its purposes.’ 
Brodie comments: ‘This understanding has never fully got across to the great major-
ity of those people who think or write about war, and even less to those who fight it.’ 
Brodie recommends, as a result, civilian control of the military – more specifically, 
control by civilians who know something about the capabilities of the military and 
who themselves have taken to heart Clausewitz’s central perception, what Brodie calls 
‘genuine civilian control.’ In arriving at this last notion, Brodie evokes and rejects what 
he considers the simplistic and wrongheaded view of a relation between civilian control 
and the military: ‘a simple ‘stop-go’ approach, so that the actual outbreak of war was 
the occasion for instituting completely new sets of values and objectives, especially 
the objective of winning the war for the sake simply of winning. . . . The disposition 
towards this attitude is especially a mark of the military profession. . . . All the more 
reason for genuine civilian control.’”1739
On Clausewitz’s most famous dictum, that war is a continuation of policy by other 
means, Fleming observes that Brodie believed “Clausewitz is offering a statement in 
the form of ‘should’ rather than ‘is.’ War should be the continuation of policy, but 
all too often is not. All we have to do is pay attention to Clausewitz to save ourselves 
a lot of trouble. Brodie quotes from the final chapter of On War: ‘The subordination 
of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has 
created the war. . . . The subordination of the military point of view to the political 
is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.’ . . . In Brodie’s view, a careful reading 
1738. Bruce Fleming, “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?” Parameters (Spring 2004): 65-66.
1739. Fleming, “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?” 66.
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of Clausewitz can explain our failures in the past; at the same time there is hope that 
taking our principles to heart can prevent such debacles in the future.”1740 As Flem-
ing writes, “We should therefore ask, When Clausewitz offers as a dictum ‘war is the 
continuation of policy by other means,’ should we understand this as a definition valid 
for all time? Or is it a goal to aim for? Perhaps, as a third alternative, a generalization 
about most situations? Is it an expression of his Kantian side, or his pragmatic one? 
And this means that we must ask the larger question: What is the relation between 
theory and practice in this work as a whole?”1741 Fleming notes “the fact is that On 
War is a deeply ambivalent work as regards the relation it proposes between theory and 
practice. . . . The text itself is a theoretical mess. . . . For this reason, commentators 
should go slowly in claiming that dipping into On War helps to ‘prove’ their particular 
position. It can be used just as easily to ‘prove’ the opposite. Brodie’s invocation of 
Kant makes clear some of the pitfalls of any author with one foot in the ideal and one 
foot in the real, and shows us the difference between an author, Kant, who consciously 
set up two disparate realms, and another, Clausewitz, who alternated between them 
and never was able to relate them.”1742
Brodie seems to intuitively grasp Clausewitz’s fundamental challenge, the use of 
philosophy, a practice of the mind, to probe the depths of the reality of war, and to 
somehow bridge the gap between action and thought, between reality and the philo-
sophical abstractions used to contemplate it. Brodie takes his cue and his inspiration 
from the master philosopher of war, and in the course of his journey confronts the 
self-same ambiguities and contradictions. Clausewitz tried to comprehend, and wholly 
explain, the new contours of total war, and Brodie sought the same of nuclear war, and 
both struggled with their audiences, particularly the desire in military circles for clarity 
and certainty, two seeming impossibilities in a world obscured by fog and riddle with 
inherent ambiguity. In his 1959 lecture on “Strategy as an Art and a Science,” Brodie 
writes that Clausewitz “represents what we might call the ‘philosophic interpretation 
of military history,’ and who is certainly the greatest figure in that tradition.”1743 
1740. Fleming, “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?” 66-67.
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As Brodie points out, “Clausewitz has been called ‘the prophet of total war,’ when 
in fact he is almost the very opposite: he is almost ‘the prophet of limited war.’ His 
deductions on strategy were derived from a close reading of the military history es-
pecially of his own times, which embraced the Napoleonic wars, but also the wars of 
the preceding two centuries. Of the ten volumes into which his posthumous works 
were gathered, seven are devoted to monographs in history. His treatment of military 
history is comprehensive, careful, and, above all, objective. This, I submit, is still the 
key to the good utilization of history and strategic studies.”1744 Brodie adds that “the 
qualities that make Clausewitz great” include “his philosophic penetration and breadth, 
which make him examine the place of war in the lives of nations and which thus save 
him from the error which is common to so many lesser figures in the field – the error 
of considering war as though it were an isolated act, serving no purpose outside itself,” 
as well as “his insistence upon looking at the particular subject he is discussing from all 
sides. He is just as determined to make clear the exceptions to any rule as he is to set 
down the rule itself. It is for the latter reason that Clausewitz insists that there are no 
principles of war; that is, there is no system of rules which, if pursued, will guarantee 
success. His contemporary Jomini scolded him for that position. Clausewitz has been 
criticized on the grounds that he left no “system” of strategy, no method which can 
be indoctrinated by teachers and learned by students. The observation is true, but I 
consider it to his great credit rather than a ground for criticism.”1745
In the nuclear age, the tension between the Clausewitzian and the Jominian ap-
proach to war theory would be echoed in the field of nuclear strategy, as the “nuclear 
warfighters” (largely, but not exclusively, within the military services) and the pure 
“deterrence theorists” (largely civilians, but not exclusively so – mostly in academia, 
government, and the many policy research organizations with a foot in both worlds) 
faced off, presenting two distinct visions of order for the nuclear age: one primarily 
emphasizing action, the other primarily thought, with reality nestled somewhere in 
between. While they shared much in common, including an appreciation of the de-
structive magnitude of nuclear weaponry, and like Jomini and Clausewitz possessed 
great knowledge of the roots of contemporary conflict, their theoretical styles differed 
much like Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s did. In the case of Kahn and Brodie, each wrote 
about the same phenomena (the impact of the bomb on international security, the 
but is rather a phase in the political activity of states. This brings him to qualify considerably everything he said previously 
about war being pure violence. ecause of his dialectical method, Clausewitz is very difficult to understand by anyone who 
tries to read him casually. But he is easy enough to quote, and some of the sentences in his opening pages have quite a lot 
of blood and thunder in them. The authority of his words has therefore been used to underline the absurdity of trying to 
moderate war when, in fact, the whole tenor of his book is that war is a political act and must therefore be governed by 
the political objective. He returns to this theme again and again throughout the book.” 
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dynamics of escalation, the nature of limited war, and the necessity for thinking about 
the unthinkable), much like both Jomini and Clausewitz wrote about the impact of 
Napoleon on European security, and how he transformed not just the nature of war 
but the entire strategic landscape. So similar were Brodie’s and Kahn’s interests that 
they twice authored volumes that deeply influenced the strategic debate within a year 
of each other; first with Brodie’s 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age and Kahn’s 1960 
On Thermonuclear War, and next with their sequential texts in the mid-1960s on the 
topic of escalation, with Kahn’s 1965 On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios and 
Brodie’s 1966 Escalation and the Nuclear Option written at nearly the same time and 
thus without reference to the other. And yet, despite their many notable similarities, 
their philosophical approaches, and their styles of theorizing, were markedly different.
Ken Booth, in his chapter profiling Brodie in Makers of Nuclear Strategy, suggests 
that “[s]trategic history will acclaim Brodie as the Clausewitz of the age of nuclear 
deterrence,” even if, during his lifetime, he was “somewhat overshadowed in fame by 
more prolific, protagonistic and precocious members of his profession” and thus “failed 
to have Albert Wohlstetter’s direct influence on policy;” “never displayed Herman 
Kahn’s inflated virtuosity;” “did not exhibit Thomas Schelling’s formal reasoning;” 
and “lacked Henry Kissinger’s experience in the practice as well as the theory of great 
power.”1746 But despite lacking these qualities associated with his better known col-
leagues, Brodie’s “reputation has been secure in the minds of the most distinguished 
of his profession,” with Michael Howard having “described him as ‘quite the wisest 
strategic thinker of our generation’” and Thomas Schelling, saluting him upon his 
passing as being “first – both in time and in distinction” among his peers.1747 As John 
Baylis and John C. Garnett, editors of Makers of Nuclear Strategy, note in their intro-
duction, “Edward Meade Earle’s classic Makers of Modern provided us with a model,” 
and add that it was “fitting that the first chapter should focus on the work of Bernard 
Brodie, who edited The Absolute Weapon, a “major landmark in the story of thinking 
about nuclear weapons,” and whose contribution argued that the “unique destruc-
tiveness of the new weapons meant the avoidance of war was now all-important … 
opened the debate and set down an agenda for deterrence which became the main 
preoccupation for nuclear strategists for decades ahead.”1748 Echoing Booth, they laud 
Brodie’s work as being “outstanding in the way it explained the new and frequently 
ambiguous interrelationship between war, politics, and strategy,” and predict that 
“[f ]uture generations of are likely to acclaim Brodie as ‘the Clausewitz of the age of 
1746. Ken Booth, “Bernard Brodie,” in John Baylis and John Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinters 
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nuclear deterrence.’”1749 They further argue that “Brodie’s contribution to strategic 
studies is profound. Students of the subject, Booth argues, have more to learn from 
‘a silent dialogue with a major thinker of the past,’ like Brodie, than with ‘the loudest 
talkers of the present,” and according to Booth, “‘there has been no one to match him 
since.’”1750 Indeed, Booth recognizes Brodie as “the quintessential strategist of the first 
generation of the nuclear age,” and “[a]bove all he was concerned to nurture the roots of 
strategic thinking,” which Brodie believed “had been most comprehensively expressed 
by Carl von Clausewitz.”1751 And so, “Brodie attempted to develop Clausewitz’s legacy 
for the first nuclear generation,” and “explained the novel and frequently paradoxical 
interrelationships between war, politics, and strategy.”1752 
Bringing Clausewitz to America: The Clausewitz Project
Brodie himself would come to realize that there was really only one prior theorist of 
war who shared with him the very same objective – that of bringing wisdom, in the 
form of philosophical inquiry, to the study of war, its nature, and its conduct, and to 
thereby constrain its otherwise natural tendency to escalate toward absolute warfare 
– and that was Clausewitz. In the early 1960s, Brodie commenced participation in a 
long-term project associated with Princeton University Press known as the “Clausewitz 
Project,” a collaboration with renown Clausewitz scholars Peter Paret and Michael 
Howard which continued for more than a decade that aimed to bring to the Anglo-
American audience all of Clausewitz’s works, including some never before translated 
into English. As originally envisioned, the project would have yielded six volumes to 
be published over several years. But various issues including problems with transla-
tion and ongoing delays eventually caused the project to be cancelled, but not before 
it produced an important contribution to the Clausewitz literature with Princeton’s 
seminal 1976 translation of On War.
In his foreword to Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the 
21st Century, Howard recalls that the “idea of a new translation of On War originated 
in the late 1950s when Peter Paret and I were working together at King’s College Lon-
don,” while Paret was “studying the connection between military and political ideas in 
eighteenth-century Prussia for his thesis on Yorck von Wartenburg” and Howard was 
“devising my first courses for the new Department of War Studies.”1753 While Paret 
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“was particularly concerned with the inaccuracies and misinterpretations in the existing 
English translations of On War, I was more interested in the continuing value of the 
text as a didactic tool for both civilian and professional students of war, particularly 
its insight into the concept of ‘friction’ and the central importance of ‘moral forces’, 
of which, during my own military service, I had become very aware.”1754 Back in 
Princeton in 1961, Paret “took up the matter with historian Gordon Craig and the 
political scientist Klaus Knorr,” which together “persuaded the Princeton University 
Press to sponsor am ambitious project for a translation of all Clausewitz’s military 
and political writings in six volumes, each with a separate editor and translator,” and 
a “meeting of those interested took place in Berlin in June 1962 [sic.], attended by 
Werner Hahlweg, whose edition of On War would provide the basis for the English 
translation; the American historian John Shy, Knorr, Craig, and in addition to Peter 
and myself, the strategic thinker Bernard Brodie,” who “had just published his work 
Strategy in the Nuclear [sic.] Age and was particularly interested in Clausewitz’s think-
ing about ‘limited war’.”1755 Howard recalls that both Knorr and Princeton University 
Press “were very anxious to enlist his cooperation, since they considered, quite rightly, 
that his name would give the project credibility with a far wider audience,” though the 
result was that a “certain tension developed between the historians on the panel, who 
saw me as the appropriate editor … and the political scientists and representatives of 
the Press, who preferred Brodie. The problem was resolved by appointing both of us,” 
but “[s]ince neither had sufficient command of German to undertake the translation, 
I undertook to find a professional translator, while Peter, who was virtually bilingual, 
would exercise a droit de regard over all six volumes.”1756
Howard writes that he “was fortune in finding an excellent translator in Angus 
Malcolm” who “was a former member of the British Foreign Office who, having 
recently completed a translation of Karl Demeter’s The German Officer Corps, was 
broadly familiar with the subject matter” and who “had the further advantage of living 
within easy walking distance of me in London,” though nonetheless “the work made 
slow progress.”1757 As Howard recalls, “Malcolm and I, working in London, produced 
drafts that we tried to make as close to contemporary English usage as possible,” and 
“then checked these, first with Peter, who by now was teaching at the University of 
California; then with Brodie in Los Angeles; and finally with the Princeton University 
Press in New Jersey whose translators found much of the Malcolm-Howard version 
too colloquial for their liking; all this in an era before either fax machines or email 
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had been invented. By 1970, the task was still not complete, and poor Malcolm died 
while still at work on the project.”1758 Howard added that “even less progress had been 
made on the other volumes in the projected series,” and that “[i]n fact, none of them 
got off the ground at all. Understandably, Princeton University Press cancelled the 
original project.”1759 Howard credits Brodie for saving what remained, and ensuring 
that the now famous 1976 Princeton edition of On War came to press: “That On War 
survived owed much to the continuing enthusiasm and influence of Bernard Brodie 
– whose enthusiasm, indeed, was so great that his introductory essay swelled to such 
a length that much of it had to be detached and printed as a separate afterword. In 
1974, Brodie persuaded the Press to sign a new contract,” and Paret and Howard “then 
undertook a revision of the entire text, and the volume finally appeared in 1976.”1760 
Howard notes that this proved “timely,” as the “Vietnam War had interested both 
military leaders and political scientists in the relations between political and military 
leadership,” while the “continuing menace of nuclear weapons made the distinction 
between ‘absolute’ and ‘limited’ war alarmingly relevant; while Clausewitz’s emphasis 
on friction, moral forces, and leadership qualities gave him credibility with profes-
sional soldiers who might otherwise have found much of his writing either excessively 
abstract or out of date. It was our good fortune to be able to present his work in a text 
that was accessible both to military colleges and to university students.”1761
By the spring of 1963, after the idea of the Clausewitz Project had taken root, Paret 
mentioned the project to Brodie; then in a follow-up letter the next fall, written on 
Princeton University Center of International Studies letterhead on November 7, 1963 
while a visiting scholar there, Paret wrote to Brodie: “You may recall our conversa-
tion last spring about the possibilities of preparing a scholarly edition of Clausewitz’s 
writings in English. This project has now reached the final stage of planning. We 
are thinking of a number of volumes – perhaps as many as six – presenting a reli-
ably translated text together with very substantial introductions and analyses. Some 
members of the editorial board are Gordon Craig, Klaus Knorr, Michael Howard, 
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and myself.”1762 Paret added, “Klaus and I wonder whether we could persuade you 
to join us. Specifically we would like you to undertake the interpretation of On War. 
We recognize that this is the most important and most difficult task of all, and we 
know that is no-one as well qualified as to handle it. The analysis should, of course, 
not only place the work in its historical context, but also speculate on the meaning 
Clausewitz’s approach may have for contemporary problems of war and strategy. At 
present our time-table is flexible, and – needless to say – there is no expectation that 
such a major piece of work could be done quickly. Please let me know how you feel 
about this. I look forward to your reactions with great interest.”1763 
Paret wrote again on January 13, 1964, providing some “early information about 
the organization of the Clausewitz project,” and noting: “Gordon Craig and I will 
act as the general editors of the series, which will probably consist of six volumes,” 
and other editors would include Basil Liddell Hart, Michael Howard, Klaus Knorr, 
John Shy, Karl Dietrich Erdmann and Werner Hahlweg.1764 A meeting was planned 
for Europe, and Paret asked Brodie if he had any suggestions for a meeting place. 
He also noted he was seeking translators “who can turn Clausewitz’s prose into clear 
and – I hope – reasonably elegant English.”1765 Noting he and Craig had met with 
the other editors already, they asked Brodie if they could get together “for a thorough 
exploration of the editorial and interpretive problems of your volume before the gen-
eral meeting in June,” perhaps out in the Bay Area closer to Brodie’s Santa Monica 
location, since Paret was only in Princeton until the end of that month.1766 On Janu-
ary 17, 1964 Brodie replied to Paret, noting he was “delighted to have further news 
about the Clausewitz project, especially the news that it is to include also people like 
Liddell Hart and Michael Howard.”1767 
With regard to a possible meeting place, Brodie felt “somewhere in Germany seems 
appropriate,” and noted he had visited the Fuerungsakademie in Hamburg, and that 
he had been “greatly impressed with the attractive person and exceptional intelligence 
of the commandant, with the fine military library run by an unusually dedicated and 
knowledgeable director, and with the attractive physical plant located on the outskirts 
of the city near a very fine natural park. I am sure the group would be most welcome 
there and would find the environment a congenial one for the meeting. The Ger-
man Defense Ministry would also be pleased with such a choice and would probably 
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find ways of being helpful.”1768 He also suggested “an even more pleasant locale for a 
meeting in the middle of June would be somewhere in southern France like Arles or 
Aix-en-Provence,” and added, “Our British colleagues would probably appreciate a 
chance to warm up.”1769 Brodie also suggested two translators for the project: Ewald 
Schnitzer, a former RANDite then at UCLA, and Freda Mendershausen. And noting 
he promised his family a ski trip to Mammoth or Yosemite during Easter week, he 
suggested dropping in to Davis after for the meeting.
On January 22, 1964, Brodie authored a memo sent to C.A.H. Thomson, J.M. 
Goldsen, and R. McDermott titled “Participation in Clausewitz Project,” noting he 
was invited by Paret to “participate in a project to be led by Paret and by Professor 
Gordon Craig of Princeton, which has as its purpose the preparation of a new edition 
of all the writings by Clausewitz,” much of which “has never been translated into 
English, and this will now be done. Also a new translation will be prepared of his 
famous work, On War.”1770 Brodie’s “responsibility would be for editing On War, and 
that others in the project would be responsible for other portions of the work.”1771 
Brodie noted he had “accepted Paret’s invitation (in a longhand letter written from 
home, of which I did not retain a copy) subject to the proviso that I could not begin 
work on it for another six months,” which was accepted, so “I am now committed to 
the task.”1772 Brodie added. “My understanding is that there will be no fees or royalties 
of any kind; at least nothing of the sort has been mentioned. It is strictly a scholarly 
enterprise, obviously a worthy one, and my association with it will, I trust, reflect 
credit on RAND.”1773 Brodie expected “to do the work on my own time, although I 
may wish at some future time to raise the question whether the project is not relevant 
enough to RAND to warrant my attending meetings of the project members on work 
time rather than on leave.”1774
Klaus Knorr, at Princeton, wrote to Brodie on January 22, 1964 on the Clausewitz 
Project: “I am also delighted with the Clausewitz project, the way it is going, and your 
participation in it.”1775 And on January 24, 1964 Brodie replied to Knorr, praising 
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Knorr’s recent article, in “Memorandum No. 28,” saying he had “done quite a superb 
job, your arguments being right in every detail and also exceedingly well expressed.”1776 
But he also added, “I must rebuke you, however, for bowdlerizing (p. 26) the quotation 
of a former teacher of yours (and mine) in the late ‘30s. My recollection is that Viner 
said ‘Pacifism is like manure, a fine thing if evenly spread.’ Of course, it is somewhat 
dangerous to use the simile, because some people might think you mean to draw 
the correspondence between the two commodities even closer.” Brodie added, “I 
am delighted that we are now going to be on the Clausewitz project together…”1777 
A February 26, 1964 letter to Knorr raised some logistical issues including Brodie’s 
desire to get hold of a “formal announcement of the new project from the Princeton 
University Press” to submit to RAND for consideration as “a legitimate part of what 
we call ‘RAND-sponsored research,” which would thus “make it possible for me to 
charge travel time on the project to RAND, and probably get some help on the travel 
expenses.”1778 Knorr replied on March 2, noting the formal announcement was in the 
works, and would send a copy as soon as it became available. He added that “John 
Shy has procured finance from some other source,” so Brodie should attend the June 
meeting as “it will be financed one way or other.”1779 He added that “If RAND should 
decide against a contribution I should be able to find the money somewhere.”1780
On March 17, 1964 Brodie wrote to Paret with detailed information on available 
flights to Sacramento for their meeting with Craig. The next day, on March 18, 1964: 
Brodie wrote to Gordon Hubel, noting. “I am eagerly awaiting that announcement 
you are preparing for the Clausewitz project. In fact, more than eagerly. So is Peter 
Paret for similar reasons. We both need it in our business. We shall appreciate your 
sending it as soon as you can.”1781 The very next day, on March 19, Brodie wrote again, 
somewhat apologetically explaining, “I feel I owe you an explanation for my perhaps 
too-vehement request of yesterday,” and explaining his need to document his request 
for “RAND-sponsored research,” and adding he had been told by Herb Bailey that “the 
thing was in your hands.”1782 Brodie also noted “since I pledged myself to the project 
some time last November or December, I am embarrassed that I still don’t have in my 
hands the kind of descriptive statement I need. It is, of course, not your fault; but, at 
any rate, you are the one we are now looking to produce the required words.”1783 On 
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March 27, 1964: Brodie updated Knorr on the results of his meeting in Davis with 
Paret, noting the trip “turned out to be most fruitful. We talked in the main about 
the sorts of things that ought to be covered in my introduction to Vom Kriege; also 
about the possibilities of expanding the committee, perhaps by including one or two 
Frenchmen.”1784 As Brodie has not yet secured approval from RAND for the project, 
he “had to make the trip as part of my annual leave” and was “obliged also to send 
you the airlines receipt, for reimbursement of my travel expenses,” which included 
$43.79 for the return airfare and $5 for ground transport including parking.1785 Brodie 
reiterated he was still awaiting the formal announcement from Princeton University 
Press’ Hubel and thus could not yet submit the project to RAND for consideration, 
so did not yet know whether they would support the project.
At last, on April 10, 1964, Princeton University’s Department of Public Information 
announced: “A critical edition in English of the writings and correspondence of the 
19th century political and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, is being prepared 
under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, 
Professor Klaus Knorr, Director of the Center, announced today,” which was expected 
“to consist of six volumes” that “will require several years to complete.”1786 The an-
nouncement presented a brief synopsis of Clausewitz’s contribution to the study of 
war, and noted “Not more than one-tenth of Clausewitz’s writings have been in print 
at one time since his death in 1831. The new Princeton series will contain material 
that has never been published, and much that has been out of print even in Germany 
since the 19th century.”1787 On May 1, 1964: Brodie wrote to Knorr, commiserating 
with him on his back treatment in hospital, as he was himself on the mend from back 
surgery earlier in the year. He also sought clarity on the timing and location of the 
June meeting. On April 25, 1964, Paret wrote to Brodie, confirming the press release 
had been sent to RAND, and incidentally noting that in his recent clearance inves-
tigation for a Top-Secret clearance, the issue of having “once been under psychiatric 
care” came up, when Paret had noted he had undergone analysis while in England and 
had even provided the name of his analyst to RAND security with “full authorization 
to question him,” and that the RAF had in fact interviewed him. Paret told the Air 
Force investigators that “they had been misinformed, that I had never in my life seen a 
psychiatrist professionally, that I had been analyzed when I lived in England, and that 
I hoped they understood the difference between analysis and psychiatry. They nod-
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ded – but rather doubtfully, I’m afraid. . . It is pointless, I am sure, to be irritated by 
the clearance process; but this episode did strike me as both inefficient and naïve.”1788
On May 7, 1964, J.M. Goldsen sent a RAND Memo to George Clement on the 
subject of “RSR Grant for Bernard Brodie.” It noted Brodie had been invited to par-
ticipate in the Clausewitz Project, and to “edit the translation of On War, the most 
famous and the most important of Clausewitz’s writings, and to provide an introduc-
tory essay.”1789 Brodie had “accepted while he was still on sick leave last Fall” and that 
“It did not appear to him that he would have to cut into any RAND time, or seek any 
RAND support for his participation,” and that he had “expected that the expenses 
for the few conferences planned with members of the project would be reimbursed 
by the project and that he could carry on his own participation via annual leave. It 
now appears that the amount of time required will be somewhat greater than Bernard 
originally estimated. Moreover, Princeton did not allocate travel funds, and whatever 
funds for travel Klaus Knorr has available he groans to allocate to this purpose.”1790 
The Social Science Department reviewed with Brodie the amount of time he would 
need to spend on the project, and asked for funds to enable him to spend no more 
than 15 days on the project in each of the years 1964 and 1965 plus $1,000 in travel 
funds in each of those years.
On May 15, 1964 Brodie wrote to Knorr, upbeat about the upcoming Berlin 
meeting in June and noting that Joe Goldsen had submitted a request for funding to 
RAND, but that he had not yet heard the result and could not predict the outcome 
due to “special problems within RAND at this time.”1791 Brodie budgeted his flight 
to Berlin at $874.20 in economy class, with additional expenses to be no more than 
$50 to $75. He added he would “not wait to see you compare notes about broken 
backs. I will send you a letter on the subject next week.”1792 On May 22, 1964, Brodie 
wrote to Paret, noting he “will see you at the Hotel Am Zoo on Friday,”1793 near to the 
Tiergarten. After the meeting Brodie intended to fly to Paris for a nine or ten day tour 
of Burgundy, Provence, and Languedoc, and asked: “Would you like to come along?” 
and adding, “I am looking forward to our meeting in Berlin, which is now really quite 
close.”1794 On May 28, 1964, Brodie wrote to Paret, asking for clarity on Berlin meet-
ing date and whether it was scheduled for 13-14 June, or 12-13 June; he also noted 
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he had found a good translator in Washington whose “writing style in English is quite 
elegant,” in addition to the two persons he had mentioned earlier. Not having more 
details on the terms of employment he suggested waiting until Berlin before taking 
any further initiatives on this matter.1795 On May 31, 1964, Paret wrote to Brodie, 
noting he too was looking forward to the Berlin meeting “and to Europe generally,” 
and adding his thanks for the travel invitation, “It is just what I should like to do, and 
I wish I could join you; but I am giving a lecture in Hamburg on the 22nd – just the 
wrong time.” Noted Craig had “invited some interesting people from the University, 
RIAS, etc., to join us for dinner on Saturday. It should be very pleasant.”1796
On July 29, 1964, Gordon Hubel, the executive assistant at Princeton University 
Press, wrote to Brodie, noting he had received the minutes of the editorial board 
meeting on the Clausewitz project, “as well as a note from Peter Paret. Everything 
seems to be going along well, which gives me great pleasure. This is going to be a 
really important publishing event, and I am glad you are so closely connected with 
it.”1797 The minutes of the “13-14 June 1964 Meeting of the Editorial Board” noted 
the project “intends to make available to the Anglo-American reader the significant 
historical, political, and theoretical works of a writer whose pioneering role in the 
development of modern military and political thought is not yet fully understood,” 
and which would include multiple volumes including volumes on military history, 
the Prussian Reform era combing history and strategic theory, political writings and 
letters, and one volume containing On War.1798 The organization of each to include “a 
carefully translated text, based on the best German original, whether published or un-
published, accompanied by a critical apparatus and an extensive analytic introduction,” 
as well as a “brief general introduction that describes the edition as a whole and places 
the particular volume within it.”1799 Gordon Craig had begun work on his political 
writings; John Shy on the campaign of 1796; Peter Paret on the Prussian Reform era; 
and the “special and diverse problems posed by On War can be most effectively man-
aged by two editors, and Bernard Brodie and Michael Howard have agreed to share 
responsibility for this volume – each writing a separate essay.”1800 Possibly expanding 
the project was discussed, such as including the later Napoleonic campaigns, such as 
the 1799 and the 1812-15 campaigns. Translation, and additional editorial problems 
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such as footnotes and bibliographies discussed; administrative and financial matters 
“are in the hands of Klaus Knorr,” as CIS at Princeton “sponsors the project,” and the 
first two or three volumes were expected to be ready in 1965.1801 
But reality set in, and it was not until April 23, 1967 that Paret wrote to Brodie, at 
long last, that: “Enclosed is a revised translation of ch. 1 of On War. I’d be very glad to 
have your comments on I, particularly since it is one the most important theoretical 
parts of the whole work. I would have sent it to you much earlier, but in going over 
the typescript of the translation before sending it to the printer, the P.U.P. editor and 
I discovered so many misspellings, deletions, and plain mistakes (on the part of the 
translator as well as of the various typists) that we have had to go very carefully over 
the entire ms once more. It has been a very time-consuming process, but a necessary 
one, and I believe the result is worth the effort.”1802 Paret added, “Michael Howard, 
who was in Princeton for a few days, discussed the outline of his introduction with 
me. Klaus unfortunately was in the hospital, and could not share in our talk. Michael 
believes, and I agree with him, that a historical introduction would be meaningless 
without some analysis of the text. This would relieve you of the need to analyze ON 
WAR in detail, and instead give you the opportunity of using the work as a basis for 
a discussion of the possibilities and methodological problems, and limitations of sys-
tematic analyses of conflict in general. In this connection I would again be very glad 
to have your views on the enclosed chapter. We are returning to California around the 
middle of June, and I hope it will be possible for, you and me to get together during 
the summer. Until then, with all good wishes.”1803 On May 11, 1967, Brodie wrote to 
Paret, noting receipt of the revised translations of Chapter 1 of On War on April 23, 
1967: “The translation looks to me to be superb. Knowing of your own considerable 
intervention, I am naturally assured of its complete accuracy, and it reads exceedingly 
well. Simply on the merits of the translation it will obviously be a great advance over 
the Modern Library version by Jolles. Klaus Knorr was here in the latter part of last 
week and told me of the great amount of work you had to do on it personally after it 
had left the hands of the translator. It is too bad you had to spend so much time on 
it, but I hope you will feel that the results are rewarding enough to justify your effort. 
I get a positively electric effect out of reading this chapter. It is the stimulation one 
gets from witnessing a really great mind at work. It leaves me in no doubt that there 
will be much to say concerning the present utility of Clausewitz – a question about 
which I wondered.  … I might say the two issues which interest me the most at present 
are: a) Clausewitz’s great and ubiquitous emphasis on the dominance of the political 
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aim (which is what makes his work so modern and alive), and b) the contrast of his 
methodology with the types presently in vogue.”1804
Brodie also raised the question of Paret’s planned departure from U.C. Davis’ faculty: 
“Let me now ask you a few questions about yourself. I hear you are thinking of going 
to England, and that you might accept an academic appointment at LSE. If you are 
interested in leaving Davis, would you consider UCLA a sufficient improvement? . . 
. The history department here clearly needs building up, and getting you here would 
be the best way I know for starting that process. The university itself has very much 
to commend it, and the area ought to be congenial to both you and especially your 
wife, with her special interest in psychoanalysis.”1805
Brodie’s concern – expressed in his May 1, 1967 letter to Paret – that Howard’s 
comments had left him with the impression that apart from their progress on the 
translation of On War, the bulk of the multi-volume Clausewitz project “lay much 
in the future,” would prove to be well placed; while the translation of On War would 
resume and successfully march toward completion over the coming years, the rest of 
the Clausewitz Project would not. The fate of the project would be described by PUP 
editor Herb Bailey in a letter to Brodie on January 12, 1973: “I want to come back to 
the eight-volume edition of Clausewitz that we once agreed to do, and that we finally 
and regretfully felt that we couldn’t sustain as a continuing commitment. I don’t know 
what happened to that, but I want to say again that our decision not to carry the 
project as a continuing commitment did not mean that we felt that we could never 
do it. In particular, if and when the new translation of ON WAR is completed and 
ready for publication, we would like very much to consider it. Perhaps other volumes 
too, if one could project them on a reasonably sure schedule. How does the matter 
stand? I hope you will keep our interest in mind.”1806 
Clausewitz’s Passion for the Study of War
In January 1973 – the year Brodie would publish his own Clausewitzian treatise on 
war, War and Politics – Brodie penned a book review of Roger Parkinson’s 1971 Clause-
witz: A Biography in World Politics, where he goes well beyond reviewing Parkinson’s 
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work, presenting his own thoughts on Clausewitz, which would be further developed 
in War and Politics as well as in his contributions to the 1976 Princeton edition of 
On War.1807 Brodie writes that we are “especially indebted to the author of this book 
because of the extraordinary paucity of biographies of the great man who is its sub-
ject,” who, as the author’s mentor, Michael Howard, noted in the foreword, “remains 
almost completely unknown.”1808 Brodie recognizes the book’s “notable virtue” but 
also points out that its author had “within a rather short span of years published two 
books prior to this one and already another one since, and none of the others bears 
any relation in period, and very little in locale or field of interest, to the matter of this 
book. To slip in and out of a subject like Carl von Clausewitz betrays to any thorough 
historical scholar an undue note of bravura. Clearly the author is not a specialist on 
the period of the Prussian military reforms, and one should not expect from him the 
kind of primary scholarship in the field that one gets from a Peter Paret, or, for a later 
date, from Howard himself.”1809 
But to the author’s credit, Brodie adds that his vocation “seems to be that of a war 
correspondent (there have indeed been enough wars to keep a man going between 
scholarly pursuits), in which respect he stands in some excellent historical and con-
temporary company – beginning, I suppose, with Friedrich Engels. … Parkinson 
belongs with the best of this breed, and his vocation has no doubt assisted him in 
developing a talent which would in itself make him a worthy pupil of Howard’s: he 
writes extremely well. The present book is a pleasure to read, and if the author is not 
as insightful about the challenging psychological aspects of Clausewitz’s nature as he 
ought to be – one should be able to recognize deep depression as a morbid symptom 
– he does at least as well in that area as the great majority of scholarly specialists in 
the field could do.” 1810 Brodie finds that Parkinson “has done what might be called a 
‘sufficiency’ of research, to which I will try to give meaning by suggesting that he could 
profitably have done more, but for the present it will do. … and while he may have 
skipped an item or two, what he has read he has read perceptively, and he has been 
deft in weaving the resulting insights into his narrative,” marred only by the occasional 
“dubious conjecture or evidence of carelessness or outright error” that “pops up.”1811 
Among such doubtful elements of Parkinson’s work is his “observation (derived from 
Karl Schwarz, Clausewitz’s chief German biographer) that it was Kant who should be 
or at least has been ‘held responsible for the logical methods and dialectical sharpness 
in Clausewitz’s own work’” when it is Brodie’s firm belief that “the one he obviously 
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followed with the most respect and whose dialectical method he unfortunately adopted, 
however superficially, was clearly Hegel, who is not mentioned in Parkinson’s book at 
all.”1812 Brodie adds that “Hegel’s philosophy of history and of the state was certainly 
more congenial to Clausewitz than the entire teaching of Kant, who was after all the 
author of the tract on Perpetual Peace (1795), where in his moral scheme of things war 
has no place-an idea that Hegel explicitly and emphatically rejected.”1813 He further 
notes the “well-known Hegelian troika of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is apparent 
in Clausewitz’s presentation, especially in the ‘finished’ first chapter of On War.” 1814
Brodie seizes upon Parkinson’s sensitive description of Clausewitz – with his “high 
forehead; the large, intelligent, rather mournful eyes; the sensitive and faintly humor-
ous mouth: this might be a poet or composer of the early Romantic period rather 
than a man who had first put on uniform at the age of twelve and who served as a 
professional soldier from beginning to end of the Revolutionary Wars of 1792-1815” 
– writing “one should add, as the man who wrote Vom Kriege, not simply the greatest 
book on war but the one truly great book on that subject yet written. The fact that he 
looked intelligent should not surprise us, because he was in truth a genius.”1815 Brodie 
describes this projection onto Clausewitz’s soft appearance of an almost Kantian belief 
in his sensitivity as not inaccurate, but incomplete, writing: “Looks in these matters 
are notoriously deceiving, but we do know … that tenderness and compassion were 
truly in him, but, as we shall see, they were in conflict with something else. It is this 
conflict, mostly shut out of his awareness but resulting in melancholy and depression, 
that becomes an important key to understanding Clausewitz the man.”1816 Noting 
Clausewitz’s “unfortunate admiration and imitation of the Hegelian style,” which 
“committed him to statements which, especially when read out of context, have him 
breathing words of fire as though he felt a perverse love for them,” Brodie concedes 
“there is no doubt that there was something about war which Clausewitz found deeply 
exciting, and it may well have been not the glory in it but the violence. He may indeed 
have had a perverse love for those fiery words and the thoughts they conjured up.”1817 
But importantly, Clausewitz proceeds throughout On War to “introduce modifying 
principles, and he continues to do so throughout the book,” but as Brodie describes, 
“By his own conscious choice of formal logic there is no inconsistency in his doing so. 
For he points out that it is only in ‘the abstract realm of pure conception’ (that is, in 
the ‘idealistic’ realm of Plato and his too numerous followers, including Hegel) that 
1812. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 290.
1813. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 290.
1814. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 290-91.
1815. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 291.
1816. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 291.
1817. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 292.
382 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
war permits of no modifying principles; in the real world, in which war is a politi-
cal act to achieve a valid political purpose or else quite meaningless in an altogether 
abhorrent fashion, we are dealing with a quite different brew. It is still a devil’s brew, 
but that is neither Clausewitz’s fault nor his intellectual concern. He lived, like the 
rest of us, in a world he never made; but unlike many living today, he could not really 
imagine an alternative world and likely did not want to.”1818
While Brodie identifies a closer affinity between Clausewitz and Hegel than with 
Kant, in contrast to Parkinson (among others including his more recent biographer of 
our generation, Hew Strachan), he also notes the Prussian’s unique respect for Machi-
avelli, “who had written, besides his more famous II Principe, the Arte delta Guerra 
and the Discorsi, the first being obviously and the second quite largely on the art of 
war. Clausewitz treated Machiavelli with respect because, like him,” citing the words 
of Felix Gilbert’s chapter in Makers of Modern Strategy, “‘he was convinced that the 
validity of any special analysis of military problems depended on a general perception, 
on a correct concept of the nature of war.’”1819 Brodie marvels on how Clausewitz, 
“whose whole life from boyhood on was spent in military service and who as a scholar 
and philosopher was totally self-taught, was able to grasp the essence of the issue, 
the nexus between politics and strategy, so much more clearly than virtually all of 
his contemporaries and successors,” which Brodie attributes primarily to “his native 
intellectual prowess, the extraordinary power and reach of his mind” but that as a 
catalyst, Clausewitz “also had some bitter personal experiences to help him along the 
way,” as “[h]is entry into the Prussian army coincided with the beginning, in France, 
of the Terror” and “[h]e was to be deeply immersed in the whole vast Napoleonic 
cataclysm” and “soon came to look upon Napoleon (whom he always referred to as 
‘Bonaparte’) about as our own generation looked upon Hitler-the enemy of Europe 
and of mankind.”1820 Brodie notes with approval that Clausewitz “was nevertheless 
objective enough always to credit this detested man with being a superlative general.”1821
It was the “searing experiences” at war against Napoleon that “burnt the idea of 
the necessary unity of war with its objective deeply into the consciousness of this 
sensitive, retiring, and deeply emotional man,” and which illuminated his theoretical 
endeavors during the “sixteen years of life remaining to him,” which “were externally 
uneventful – no doubt a good thing for his literary production – but left him ever 
more deeply dissatisfied.”1822 He was soon “promoted to Major-General in 1818, at 
the age of 38, and made director of the Allegmeine Kriegsschule in Berlin,” where 
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“his duties excluded teaching and were confined to administration,” which “gave him 
more time for his writing but heightened his gloom. … He was again made military 
tutor to the Crown Prince, which certainly showed some mark of royal favor, and 
in 1827 his noble status and that of his brothers was at last fully authorized. But 
Clausewitz still felt not sufficiently noticed. And he was always sad.”1823 But his mel-
ancholy did not impede his theoretical and analytical output, and Clausewitz “had 
already written and privately circulated a substantial amount and even published 
some of it; almost all of it was well received. Within the next decade he would write 
much more, all of it obviously having high value in his own eyes and those of the 
few others who saw it.”1824 
Brodie speculates that Clausewitz’s depression was fueled in part by the relative ennui 
of peace and notes that in 1830, “events occurred that caused Clausewitz to spring to 
animated life and, for a while, to become almost deliriously happy. The troubles that 
broke out all over Europe in that year, and especially the new revolution in France … 
seemed to bring the likelihood of a new war. His father-in-law reported Clausewitz 
as being positively cheerful at the thought of war, which was expected to break out 
with his own old enemy, France.”1825 But in the end, “there were no military opera-
tions, and ‘Clausewitz’s depression returned far deeper than ever before.’”1826 Brodie 
writes, “We must confront the fact that this man, who had seen so much of the worst 
horrors of war, whose face still bore the marks of the frostbite he had acquired in the 
Russian campaign, had been brought from chronic depression into positive exultation 
at the thought of going to war again, especially against the French. When he found 
this was not to be, that there was going to be no war at all, he was plunged back into 
the deepest gloom.”1827
Brodie looks inward to a psychological explanation to explain Clausewitz’s de-
pressed response to the continuation of peace: “Why this relapse? To a chief of staff 
aged fifty, who must have known in his heart that he was cut out to be a staff officer 
and not a commander, a new war could bring no special honors. Did he really have a 
passion for glory, or did he feel that as a soldier his real fulfillment in life could only 
be found in campaigning? Or did he simply love war? If the latter, we must again 
ask, why? Someone who loves war must love, among other things, aggression and 
violence, terrible violence, which he can both witness and partake of. Such a taste is 
common enough, but is by no means to be considered normal. It argues some in-
ner rage-repressed, unconscious, but alive. We can no longer hide our thoughts and 
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questions behind ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis.’ The bloody phrases so often quoted out 
of context from his great posthumous work burn with their own fierce fire. They 
are kindled by something within.”1828 Brodie notes that this ‘inner rage’ is “indeed 
countered and, on intellectual balance, overcome with other words in which the 
intellect is at work rather than passion; and the intellect in this case is tremendously 
strong,” but concludes that: “We are dealing here with a deep internal conflict, and 
there can be no doubt that this conflict is directly linked to his growing depression. 
That is about all we can say on the basis of what we know, and it is really not very 
much. Let those who take fright at the thought of “analyzing” the dead notice that 
our speculative thrust has not penetrated very deep, and that it is based on tell-tale 
signs of the most unquestionable singularity and importance. Chronic depression as 
Clausewitz knew it, only fitfully interrupted by rather odd stimuli, does not suggest 
a state of emotional health.”1829 Brodie adds, “One wonders also how a man in the 
throes of such conflict and depression could produce as much writing as Clausewitz 
did. He did speak about feeling ‘paralyzed,’ and such a feeling and also the connected 
behavior are the common consequence of attempting to cope with strong unconscious 
conflicts. But he was not paralyzed in actuality.”1830 Indeed, Brodie suggests that “[p]
erhaps the fact that the writing was always about war gave him the needed release. Just 
as Machiavelli’s great work was inevitably a projection of himself acting as a prince, 
and as a prince who knows when and how to refrain from mercy (which is just about 
always), so Clausewitz’s was a projection of himself acting not as chief of staff but as 
a field marshal, and the occupation contemplated was not statecraft but war. In his 
case, however, the slaughter and destructiveness inherent in war were made good by 
the fact that a superb intelligence was guiding everything towards a politically wise 
end. Slaughter can at least be dedicated to statecraft, and the use of intelligence can 
achieve economies in the necessary acts of destruction.”1831
When Clausewitz succumbed to cholera in 1831, at 51, just nine hours after show-
ing his first symptoms, Brodie observes that his “doctors said he had died because he 
lacked the will to live, and Marie agreed with this. Cholera can take the lives also of 
those who want to live, and can do so very fast; but it is significant that the doctors 
and Marie could entertain their own special convictions on the matter.”1832 Brodie 
shares Parkinson’s observation, that: “Marie knew very well the reason for her husband’s 
death. ‘Life for him was a nearly uninterrupted succession of disappointments, of suf-
fering, of mortification. ... Oh yes, on the whole, he had achieved much more than he 
1828. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 302.
1829. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 303.
1830. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 303-04.
1831. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 304.
1832. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 304-05.
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could expect when it started. He was well aware of that, and grateful. But neverthe-
less, he never reached the summit. And every satisfaction always had a thorn in it, to 
add pain to the pleasure. He had friendship, to a rare degree, with the excellent men 
of his period. But not recognition.”1833 While sympathetic with Marie’s sentiment, 
Brodie notes “Clausewitz had indeed ‘achieved much more than he could expect when 
it started,’ and if that left him with a feeling of ‘a nearly uninterrupted succession of 
disappointments,’ then, as one would put it today, he had a problem-one that was 
internal to himself and not external. And how characteristic of such a problem that 
‘every satisfaction always had a thorn in it.’ It is most certainly not true that he lacked 
recognition.”1834 Indeed, Brodie adds: “The King and the Crown Prince, incidentally, 
did not omit to express their condolences publicly as well as privately to Marie on 
her husband’s death. And why, in heaven’s name, should he have expected to reach 
“the summit”? As Clausewitz had said over and over again, she, Marie, would publish 
his work after his death. Back in Berlin she had packets of papers, his Hinterlassene 
Werke (posthumous works), which would ultimately reach ten volumes, the first 
three of which would be On War. In the scarcely more than four years remaining to 
her, Marie would herself prepare and edit eight of these ten volumes. At the time of 
Clausewitz’s death, few if any had read this great bulk of writing. He did in fact reach 
the summit, in the only way possible to a man whose gifts are mainly if not exclusively 
intellectual, but he was bound to reach it posthumously.”1835
Brodie closes his discussion of Clausewitz – and to a lesser degree, of Parkinson’s 
work – with an examination of Clausewitz’s most famous dictum, that war is a con-
tinuation of policy by other means, which in the years that immediately followed 
Clausewitz’s death seems to have been lost on military practitioners, the result, in 
part, of the unfinished state of Clausewitz’s writing, which obscured this central the-
sis from all but the first and final books of his multi-volume opus. As Brodie writes, 
the “most important single idea in On War, the one that suffuses so much of it and 
makes it great, is the idea that war must never be an act of blind violence but must 
be dedicated to achieving the supreme goals of statecraft and must therefore be con-
trolled by that dedication. Parkinson shares the view that this is Clausewitz’s basic 
contribution, and he cites some appropriate passages from the work to underline 
it.”1836 Brodie writes that “[w]e have long known that Clausewitz too shared the view 
that this was his most important contribution,” and recalls that “Marie’s brother, 
Heinrich von Briihl, in helping his sister to edit her late husband’s work, came upon 
a note written by Clausewitz in 1827 that read as follows: ‘I regard the first six books, 
1833. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 305.
1834. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 305.
1835. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 305.
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386 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
of which a fair copy has now been made, as only a rather formless mass which will be 
thoroughly revised once more.’ Clausewitz stressed in this note the primary impor-
tance he attached to the conception according to which war is regarded as ‘nothing 
but the continuation of state policy with other means’” but “then added: ‘This point 
of view, everywhere maintained, will bring much more unity into our investigation, 
and everything will be easier to disentangle. Although this point of view will chiefly 
find its application in Book VIII, nevertheless it must be fully explained in Book I 
and also contribute to the revision of the first six Books. By such a revision the first six 
Books will be freed from many a piece of dross; many a fissure and gap will be closed; 
and many a generality can be converted into more definite thoughts and forms.’”1837 
Brodie notes that Clausewitz later wrote that, “If by the revision of Book VIII [where 
his ideas on political control of military action are mainly developed] I have cleared 
up my ideas, and the main features of war will be properly established, it will then 
be the easier for me to infuse the same spirit into the first six Books, and there, too, 
to make those features everywhere visible.” 1838 But Brodie adds: “All this Clausewitz 
failed to do before his death; however, the first chapter of the first book, which is the 
only chapter he considered completed, does bring in very prominently and almost at 
once the idea mentioned above as his basic conception, and in the later pages of that 
same chapter it is developed considerably. It is then virtually lost to view until the last 
part, Book VIII, where it comes to the fore again and is developed much further. We 
know now that he would have suffused the relevant ideas through the remainder of 
the book, where it would have been much less easy to lose sight of them-and much 
less easy also for later editors deliberately to blur or delete them.”1839 
But because Clausewitz died before completing his revisions, the “bulk of the work 
in its present state is devoted to describing how to win wars,” and Brodie wonders, 
“What would have been the results if he had accomplished his goal? We know that 
the military profession has always been, at least until quite recently, allergic to the idea 
which Clausewitz considered his most important one. The elder von Moltke, who had 
been a student officer at the Berlin War Academy while Clausewitz was director of it 
and who subsequently read On War fervently, was nevertheless able, as a field marshal, 
to declare: ‘The politician should fall silent the moment that mobilization begins.’ 
That was certainly the idea of the generals who prepared for and who fought World 
War I.”1840 Thus, “In the various condensations of On War that were published under 
military auspices in the nineteenth century and down to World War II, the sections 
which contain Clausewitz’s thoughts on the primacy of the political objective – the 
1837. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 306.
1838. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 306.
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basic idea that war is too important to be left to the generals – are either obscured, 
corrupted, or entirely eliminated.”1841 
And the price of this would prove high. As Brodie concludes: “Well, one might 
say, what can one expect of the military, who, among other things, don’t like to have 
control taken away from them? But the fact is that even so distinguished a German 
military scholar as the late Dr. Herbert Rosinski was able to make substantially the 
same error. He asserts that the basic teaching of Clausewitz (as he puts it: it was only 
when ‘he turned back to seek his foundations in the inner logic of his subject that he 
found himself on firm ground at last’) is – what? That the aim of war is ‘the overthrow 
of the enemy’s power of resistance.’ That is what Rosinski calls Clausewitz’s ‘unique 
achievement.’ Achievement it may be, unique it certainly is not. And if is not unique, 
it is hardly much of an achievement, although it makes more sense than ‘winning 
ground’ or gaining ‘the honor of the battlefield.’ Rosinski certainly saw a great deal 
more in Clausewitz than these few words of his indicate, but the basic message passed 
him by. Clausewitz, had he lived to finish his work, would at least have caught the 
Rosinskis of this world. And even the military would have found it more difficult to 
escape. His book would also be more alive today for scholars. “1842
War and Politics: A Tribute to Clausewitzian Theory
In his January 12, 1973 letter to Brodie reaffirming his interest in publishing the new 
translation of On War if and when it was completed, Princeton University Press editor 
Herbert S. Bailey congratulated Brodie on his recently published review-article, “Re-
view: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” in the January 1973 edition of World Politics. 
As Bailey described, “I have just finished reading your review-article on Clausewitz 
in the current issue of World Politics, with great pleasure and interest, and it brings 
on a flood of thoughts. First, the article is written with such clarity and force that it 
makes me again most regretful that we aren’t publishing your new book”1843 – Brodie’s 
1973 War and Politics, his effort to apply Clausewitz’s most famous dictum linking 
war and politics to the historical experience of modern warfare. Bailey continued, “It 
also suggests other things, the first being that you yourself ought to write the book on 
Clausewitz that Parkinson didn’t write. Your article is full of knowledge of Clausewitz 
in depth and detail, combined with the kind of feeling for the man and the situation 
that would yield the kind of book on Clausewitz that is needed. Why don’t you do 
 
1841. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 308.
1842. Bernard Brodie, “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” 308.
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it? It would be a big project, but an absorbing one, and obviously the subject appeals 
to you.”1844 
But if taking on another big Clausewitz project, so soon after the last one had col-
lapsed, did not appeal, Bailey offered that “[t]here is another possibility that comes 
to mind, a shorter book on Clausewitz, not a biography but an appreciation of his 
intellectual contribution, relating it to twentieth-century experience. You refer in your 
article to the preparations for World War I, and there is a brief reference to Hitler, but 
in reading it I couldn’t help thinking about the experience of Korea and Viet Nam. It 
is possible that, in terms of putting knowledge to work, an interpretative work of this 
kind might be more effective, and it could also be done in briefer compass.”1845 Ironi-
cally, that was precisely Brodie’s objective in War and Politics, which indeed reflected 
upon the Korean and Vietnam experiences from a Clausewitzian perspective, from 
which Brodie would attribute the Vietnam war’s ultimate strategic failure. Perhaps 
unaware that Brodie’s forthcoming War and Politics was already at heart a tribute to 
Clausewitz, Bailey suggested, “I would love to hear how all this strikes you. In any 
case, congratulations on an excellent article.”1846 
Brodie’s thinking about Clausewitz was not limited to his role introducing the new 
translation of On War but would also serve to frame a separate volume on strategy that 
is indebted to Clausewitz’s most famous dictum on the interconnection of war and 
policy and which came to press several years before the much anticipated translation 
of On War. Indeed, Brodie’s 1973 War and Politics showed how deep an inspiration 
Clausewitz was to Brodie, inspiring not only the title, but permeating its very es-
sence, in which he sought to apply this most fundamental component of Clausewitz’s 
theory of war to his own era, and more so than in Strategy in the Missile Age, and to 
explain the interconnection of war and politics, not just nuclear war, but all the wars 
of the nuclear age, through an historical analysis of World War II and in particular its 
strategic bombing, which transformed in that war’s closing days into the world’s first 
and so far only nuclear war; Korea; and Vietnam (and its failure), and a theoretical 
discussion about war not only in the nuclear era but the humbled, post-Vietnam era.
After departing RAND, Newell Bringhurst recounts that Brodie “carried on his 
research and writing in the one-thousand-square-foot study the Brodies had built in 
1970 on a small bluff of their Pacific Palisades property, just above the main house,” 
and there he “had completed his last book-length work, War and Politics, published 
in 1973. Reflecting Bernard’s continuing interest in American foreign policy, the 
book was clearly influenced by American failure in the Vietnam War. The author 
1844. Bailey, Letter to Brodie, January 12, 1973, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
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took note of the failure of the United States to deal effectively with the relationship 
between strategy and politics in the last four wars in which the country had been 
engaged. Brodie maintained that a military force should always be subservient to a 
nation’s political goals and purposes, a dictum the United States had not followed 
in prosecuting its wars in the twentieth century, particularly the Vietnam War.”1847 
But despite his best efforts, Bringhurst observes: “Unfortunately, War and Politics, 
which Bernard regarded as his most important work, was not initially well received, 
although in time it did gain the recognition it deserved. The book’s early failure was 
due, at least in part, to the fact that neither Bernard nor his ideas were attracting the 
attention of important foreign policy experts. Contributing to Bernard’s diminished 
visibility since the forties and fifties was his physical condition, as well as the ‘writer’s 
block’ he had suffered during the 1960s. Removed from the public spotlight, he had 
lost the prominence he had once enjoyed in the field of American foreign policy.”1848 
Added Bringhurst in a footnote, “In presenting this thesis, Bernard utilized concepts 
developed in the nineteenth century by the great German military strategist, Carl von 
Clausewitz – whom Bernard greatly admired and with whom he strongly identified, 
both on a personal and an intellectual level.”1849
While War and Politics is a heart a tribute to Clausewitz, Brodie also pays tribute 
to two of his most influential professors who had recently died. Brodie is said to have 
been Quincy Wright’s protégé, as reported by Kaplan in Wizards of Armageddon 
among others, but he was also greatly influenced by the economist Jacob Viner, as 
Kaplan has also noted. But in Brodie’s preface to War and Politics in 1973, he credits 
Viner first and foremost, saluting him for his enduring intellectual influence, writing 
“I would like to pay my grateful respects to the memory of my greatest teacher, Jacob 
Viner, who at the time I was his student in graduate school over thirty years ago was 
Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Whatever is good in my work 
owes something to him, and I was especially conscious of his eyes over my shoulder 
in writing chapter 7.”1850 This glowing attribution of a lifelong influence is in marked 
contrast to his tribute to Wright: “I also offer my respects to another dedicated and 
scholarly teacher of whom I was very fond, Quincy Wright, formerly Professor of 
International Law and Political Science at the University of Chicago. Both were 
friends and colleagues as well as former teachers.”1851 From the language Brodie uses 
to present these two tributes it is clear he is acknowledging a deep intellectual debt to 
Viner, and merely a close fondness for Wright, quite a distinction. That Viner is said 
1847. Newell G. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 221.
1848. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life, 221.
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to have helped Brodie come to the important realization that nuclear weapons were a 
stabilizing force in the world, and from this derived an enduring faith in the strategy 
of deterrence – putting him at odds with colleagues who would question their faith 
along the Cold War’s half-century long turbulent journey, but providing a consist-
ency to his work as he repeatedly chastised doubters on the underlying mechanisms 
of deterrence when they lost sight of them – helping to thereby direct Brodie along a 
trajectory he would follow for another three decades, and providing the intellectual 
seed that was perhaps the ultimate foundation for Brodie of his formulation of de-
terrence, something that was yet fully developed to any degree of certainty when he 
first addressed the new weapon in 1945, but which was firmly resolved by 1946 and 
remained resolved in Brodie’s mind for the rest of his life.
It is interesting to note that chapter 7 is the only chapter that Brodie attributes in 
his preface to a prior publication even though War and Politics is not unlike Strategy in 
the Missile Age in being largely an anthology of Brodie’s works, with a substantial por-
tion of his chapters having appeared earlier as papers, articles or lectures – sometimes 
with whole passages verbatim, while others are updated with additional information. A 
quick glance reveals chapters (and there subsections) sharing titles with past work, and 
a closer look reveals identical paragraphs flowing at times in identical sequence with 
other identical paragraphs, having been largely pasted from past work into the present 
work – but not universally, as often new paragraphs are inserted, and at other times, 
new sentences are added to pre-existing paragraphs. But Brodie only acknowledges 
in his preface that, “An earlier version of Chapter 7, ‘Some Theories of the Causes of 
War,” appeared in the two-volume Festschrift published in Paris in 1971 in honor of 
a friend and a great contributor to insight on matters of war and peace,” Raymond 
Aron; “I have, however, entirely rewritten it and greatly expanded it for this book. 
The rest is almost entirely new.”1852 While it is true that Brodie has “greatly expanded” 
and largely rewritten his earlier chapter, it is hard to argue that it was “entirely rewrit-
ten” – nor, moreover, to overlook that he published in Security Studies Paper No. 17, 
Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy co-edited by Brodie and Henry Kissinger (with one 
chapter from Kissinger and four from Brodie), a chapter (more aptly a paper, since 
the Security Studies Papers were collections of shorter works that included newspaper 
articles, lectures and speeches, conference papers, and other brief works) with the title 
“Theories on the Causes of War,” differing only in the absence of the word “Some” 
from the chapter in War and Politics.1853 
1852. Brodie, War and Politics, viii.
1853. See Henry A. Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper No. 17 
(Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 1968), particularly its fifth chapter/paper, “Theories on the Causes 
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Because Brodie was the series editor as well as the paper author, it seems curious that 
its origins were overlooked, and for the sake of historical accuracy – of the origins of 
that 1973 chapter within the very structure and substance of the earlier 1968 paper, 
which covers much similar ground – recognition of this fact by Brodie would have 
been helpful to later scholars. But Brodie’s claim that the rest of War and Politics “is 
almost entirely new” rings somewhat hollow upon realization that not just chapter 
7, to which he gratefully credits Viner for his seemingly watchful and protective eye 
looking over Brodie’s shoulder from the great beyond, but many other chapters had 
their origins elsewhere – including chapter 8, “Vital Interests: What Are They and 
Who Says So?” which is derived in large part (though not entirely), and with much 
verbatim (including many paragraphs in identical sequence, albeit not all), from his 
1971 booklet, Strategy and National Interests: Reflections for the Future – which we 
discussed at the end of chapter five of this work – published by the National Strategy 
Information Center, whose third chapter is “Vital Interests: By Whom and How 
Determined?” on pages 11-24. Further, in Chapter 10, “Strategic Thinkers, Planners, 
Decision-Makers,” in War and Politics, one sees many echoes of his earlier work, in-
cluding a section on the “Scientific Strategists” that bears much in common with his 
chapter of the same name in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists 
and National Policy-Making published by Columbia University Press in 1964 and the 
longer version of that chapter with the slightly elongated title, “The American Scientific 
Strategists” that appeared as a RAND working paper in October 1964 but which also 
includes elements that bear a similarity to his discussion in his 1971 Foreign Policy 
article, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” as well as his discussion of systems 
theory and the scientization of national security decisionmaking and over-dependence 
on systems theory causing a tragic neglect of more fundamental political issues in his 
1971 Strategy and National Interests: Reflections for the Future.1854
Brodie does credit Michael Howard for his assistance with Brodie’s first chapter (“De 
quoi s’agit-il?”) on the meaning of Clausewitz’s notion that war has its own language 
but not its own logic, which is defined by the political objective (boiled down into 
the more famous Clausewitzian dictum, war is a continuation of policy by other means), 
though the ideas presented therein can be traced back to numerous articles, papers, 
chapters and reviews by Brodie on and about Clausewitz including reviews of Howard’s 
work on Clausewitz and their joint collaboration with Peter Paret on the decade-long 
Clausewitz Project that yielded the seminal Princeton translation of On War in 1976; 
and similarly, among the six scholars Brodie credits for their assistance on his chapters 
on Vietnam is William Gerberding, with whom he co-edited and jointly contributed 
1854. See: Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1971-72), 151-161 and 
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chapters to their 1968 UCLA Security Studies Paper No. 13, The Political Dimension 
in National Strategy: Five Papers – whose title is at heart Clausewitzian – and which 
included Brodie’s article, “Learning to Fight a Limited War” which discussed Vietnam 
in critical detail, paving the way forward to Brodie’s later 1971 article in Foreign Policy. 
So while there is much that is new and certainly updated in War and Politics, there 
are so many connective threads to his earlier work that one can define the book as 
less a new contribution to Brodie’s vast canon, and more a synthesis of his work since 
Escalation and the Nuclear Option and an effort to reframe his work that followed 
Strategy in the Missile Age, re-asserting the importance of (and challenges inherent 
in) limiting war and reflecting on the dangers of divorcing the dynamic of escalation 
from its important, Clausewitzian political context. Brodie dueled with Kahn on the 
nature of escalation, and sought to embed escalation in its political context – but his 
voice of restraint was overshadowed by the towering voices of his colleagues, including 
Kahn (and also the highly influential Schelling), whose ideas on a separate logic of 
escalation appealed to the architects of American defense policy during the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations and whose legacy was the humbling, and Brodie believes, 
preventable debacle, of Vietnam. But as tragic as Vietnam was, as Brodie had noted in 
his December 3, 1967 article in the Los Angeles Times, “Learning to Fight a Limited 
War,” “At least we can be grateful that thus far nuclear weapons have been kept out of a 
business that is unfortunate enough already.”1855 And even with the tragic inevitability 
of the Vietnam defeat approaching its final act, Brodie, as noted in War and Politics, 
finds reassuring that the underlying global stability predicated upon mutual nuclear 
deterrence held firm, suggesting “one argument against skepticism with respect to 
American nuclear reliability is that it reflects a gross exaggeration of the adversary’s 
proclivity for going to the nuclear brink,” and adding: “Thus far, there has been none 
of that reckless playing of ‘chicken,’ of swift resort to brinksmanship, that filled so 
many of the fantasies of Herman Kahn and others in the 1960s.”1856 At least with 
regard to nuclear war, a Clausewitzian balance held, and with it the recognition that 
war must remain rational.
This is perhaps why Brodie feels so passionate about revisiting Clausewitz’s tragically 
ignored counsel; Brodie thus starts off War and Politics with Clausewitz’s profound 
but often overlooked insight that war “has its own language but not its own logic,”1857 
something the escalation theorists as well as the firebreak theorists who advocated CWE 
failed to grasp as they logically proceeded up the escalation ladder, seeking to convey 
a language of war without being cognizant of the foundational political logic – and 
1855. Bernard Brodie, “Learning to Fight a Limited War,” in The Political Dimension in National Strategy: Five Papers, 
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fighting an unnecessary and costly (albeit limited) war, not only to a conventional 
stalemate fought well below the nuclear firebreak, but ultimately to a self-imposed 
defeat, leaving the field of battle to its opponent without really having ever been 
defeated at the tactical level. Vietnam, in its tragedy and wasted effort, would prove 
Brodie correct – that the firebreak theorists who advocated CWE had completely 
misunderstood how deterrence worked, and the all-important, intimate connection 
of war to politics (and the supremacy of the political objective), which Brodie sought 
to re-assert in War and Politics, his final synthesis of the many smaller pieces he had 
written to a very wide audience, from classified military briefings to college lectures and 
conference panels; from esoteric academic journals and small student-run university 
newspapers to major urban dailies. Brodie knew war and politics were connected, and 
so he spoke to all of its pillars, from the civilian to the military, from the lay-public 
to the highest levels of strategic command. With Vietnam on his mind but the final 
defeat still yet to come, Brodie would conclude his 1973 work with an allusion to 
the Clausewitzian principle that he started with some 496 pages earlier, writing in his 
final sentence: “Yet the civil hand must never relax, and it must without one hint of 
apology hold the control that has always belonged to it by right.”1858
War and Politics also reflects something a synthesis for Brodie of his very first reflec-
tions on Socrates as a young student in 1932 and Socrates’ best known student and 
biographer, Plato with his later philosophical mentor, Clausewitz; whom he noted 
in 1945 but would not fully embrace for another half-decade, when the advent of 
thermonuclear weapons forced a reassessment of the Prussian’s relevance . Plato in 
many ways turned Brodie on to knowledge and its strategic importance (as well as the 
challenge of its ambiguities) – while Clausewitz taught him to use that knowledge to 
understand, as much as possible, the causes and dynamics of war, to better prevent 
war and, if prevention was no longer possible, restrain war from its own absolute and 
terrible logic. Brodie recalls how there was “a tradition among scholars going back at 
least to Plato that considered it a corruption of the best fruits of the human mind to 
try to put them to practical use,” and that the “glory of knowledge for its own sake 
perhaps explains why Plato was so intent on having the rulers of states study geometry, 
which might be of use to an engineer or an architect but hardly to a king.”1859 Brodie 
would turns to both Plato and Clausewitz to understand the failure of Vietnam; first, 
Clausewitz showed how to extract meaningful lessons from history: “We have, after 
1858. Brodie, War and Politics, 496.
1859. Brodie, War and Politics, 240. What Brodie may have overlooked is that Plato wanted the ruler to comprehend, 
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understanding. And so geometry, as Thomas Hobbes would later also recognize, became an essential tool of statecraft and 
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the international realm. In more modern times, balance of power politics and geopolitics would reflect a geometrical 
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all, in all these pages been lauding the modernity of Clausewitz,” but “[i]t is, however, 
the kind of modernity that will not give us the answers to our contemporary problems 
but which, at its best, will sharpen our receptivity to appropriate insights about those 
problems.”1860 Thus, Brodie writes, “We noted Clausewitz’s explanation why Napoleon, 
to defeat Russia, had to go to Moscow. As it happens, the same reasoning goes far to 
explain the motivation for the North Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968. But it is a 
similarity with enormous differences.”1861 While “Clausewitz would have had a lively 
appreciation for both the similarities and the differences” of these two events that span 
a century and a half, Brodie observes: “We do not, of course, have to read Clausewitz 
to understand the latter campaign. It may be that the recognition that his comments 
do in fact bear upon that campaign provides us little more than a titillation of scholarly 
delight, just as reading in Plato some sharp insight into human nature gives us today, 
some 2,400 years later, a twinge of delight that is really one solely of recognition that 
he saw things as we do. It is not that Plato adds to our understanding; we can feel 
the pleasure only because that understanding already exists.”1862 In contrast, “We do 
in fact learn something from Clausewitz – a good deal more, I think, than we ever 
learn from Plato. Yet, without some measure of sensibility to begin with, the reading 
of Clausewitz or of Plato, will confer neither delight nor advantage. Still, what we get 
from Clausewitz is a deepening of sensibility or insight rather than a body of rules, 
because insofar as he does offer us rules he is at once avid to show us all the qualifica-
tions and historical exceptions to them.”1863
As he explained in his preface, Brodie pays ultimate tribute to Clausewitz, the guid-
ing inspiration throughout War and Politics from its first page to its last: “The central 
idea of this book I have borrowed from Clausewitz who, as a seventeenth-century 
writer said of Machiavelli, ‘hath been too often taxed for his impieties.’ It is a simple 
idea, and the novice would justly imagine it to be commonplace – that the question 
of why we fight must dominate any consideration of means. Yet this absurdly simple 
theme has been mostly ignored, and when not ignored usually denied.”1864 Brodie 
wrote that Clausewitz’s effort to develop his thesis contextualizing war in policy 
was “an accomplishment against perennial resistance, indicated by the fact that this 
understanding has never fully got across to the great majority of those people who 
think or write about war, and even less to those who fight it.”1865 Brodie believes when 
Clausewitz argued his “often quoted but constantly misrepresented dictum” positing 
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war’s interconnection with policy that the theorist was “very far from intending this 
remark cynically, as is often supposed,” and in fact “intended to make, had he lived” 
it “the central organizing thesis of the whole.”1866 Brodie in War and Politics seeks to 
present much the same central thesis, applying it to the world that was twice embroiled 
in world war, and was now confronting not only “the advent of nuclear weapons” but 
also America’s “particularly perplexing and tragic involvement in a distant and hitherto 
obscure peninsula in Southeast Asia,” which revealed a global scale of conflict that 
greatly eclipsed the nineteenth-century warfare that Clausewitz had intuited totality 
from, but which did not achieve true totality until Brodie’s era. 
The Clausewitz Project Concludes
On February 22, 1973, Princeton University Press editor Bailey again wrote to Brodie, 
starting off with a word of encouraging clarification on the new letterhead used by 
the press: “Dear Bernard, I want to assure you that I am still here at dear old PUP. 
The names at the top of the letterhead list are our Board of Trustees, and Harold W. 
McGraw, Jr. (whose full-time job is being president of McGraw-Hill) is the president 
of our Trustees. I go by the title of director – a fine distinction.”1867 And so, Bailey had 
not defected to McGraw-Hill; instead, its president was serving as president of the 
board at PUP. Bailey thanked Brodie “for telling me about Peter Paret’s and Michael 
Howard’s reaction to my letter on the Clausewitz project,” explaining, “I’m not sure 
how well informed you were, since our dealings were through Cy Black in his capac-
ity as director of the Center of International Studies here. The Clausewitz project 
ran far beyond the deadlines originally agreed to, and constituted a heavy financial 
commitment at a time when publishing is difficult. Therefore we informed Cy that in 
accordance with the provisions in the contract we could no longer consider ourselves 
bound, though we would be willing to reconsider the project if and when manuscripts 
could be presented. I guess I’ll have to straighten it out with Paret and Howard, so 
that there won’t be any misunderstanding.”1868
On May 19, 1973, Brodie wrote to Bailey, providing him with an update of the 
soon to be completed translation of On War, on the hope that PUP would still be 
interested in publishing it despite the collapse of the more ambitious multi-volume 
project that the press had given up on, writing that “Peter Paret and Michael Howard, 
having now completed their translation of Clausewitz’s ON WAR, have authorized 
me to write you to inquire whether you are still interested in securing its publication 
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for Princeton University Press.”1869 Brodie added, “I sincerely hope you are, and I say 
that with no proprietary interest in the matter,” and explained that “[t]his is the first 
complete translation into English of this great work from the original uncorrupted text, 
and the extraordinary competence of this team of translators would guarantee its being 
a superb translation. Both men are distinguished historians, both are thoroughly at 
home in German, especially Paret, and both write extremely well in English, especially 
Howard, whom I would nominate as perhaps the best stylist among historians writing 
today in the English language.”1870 Brodie noted, with prescience that would anticipate 
the high regard and enduring reputation of what generations of students would come 
to know as the seminal translation of On War, that it “will not be improved upon 
as a translation” and “reads extremely well in English,” and “incidentally reads quite 
differently from the next best translation – that produced by Jolles in the Modern 
Library Edition of 1943, which has been long out of print. The version which Penguin 
Books is currently circulating is a truncated edition of the old Graham translation, 
with a perfectly awful introduction by Anatole Rappaport. Thus, the competition in 
the field is strikingly surpassed.”1871 Added Brodie, “I need not go into the reasons 
why I think you should publish it. You have shown yourself quite well aware of those 
reasons, especially in your letter to me following my review-article on Clausewitz in 
World Politics last January, in which I called Clausewitz’s work the only truly great 
book on war ever written. In your letter you expressed a keen desire to have a chance 
to bid again on this particular work when it was completed.”1872 
Describing the status of the translation project, Brodie noted he had in his “pos-
session Xerox copies of only a few chapters of the work, though enough to give me 
a feeling for the quality of the translation. Peter Paret has what I believe is the only 
copy of the whole translation, and because the money in the original grant has long 
since run out, it would be up to the publisher to produce one or more Xerox copies 
for the three persons – the two translators and myself – who are committed to writ-
ing introductory essays.”1873 He added that it was “of course a very long book, about 
as long as the Jolles translation, which runs to 631 pages sans index in the Modern 
Library edition, each page having at least half again as many words as any of the books 
of mine published by PUP. The plan is to have in addition three introductory essays, 
probably of unequal length, by Paret, Howard, and myself, dealing respectively with 
(a) a note on the present translation and on the person of Clausewitz, (b) the place 
of On War in the history of strategic thought, and (c) the value of the book to the 
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modern reader. Plans for these essays have not proceeded very far, and our thought 
was that if you undertake to publish it, we should be most interested in your views 
about how much space to devote to the three essays.”1874 Brodie concluded that, “In 
sum, this translation represents a scholarly accomplishment of the first importance by 
an international team which also commands an exceptional degree of prestige. Paret is 
well known for his writings on Prussian military reforms at the time of Clausewitz, and 
of Howard one can justly use the word ‘famous’ for his work on the Franco-Prussian 
War. He has also just won a much coveted prize in Britain – the Wolfson Prize I 
believe it is called – for his writing of Grand Strategy, which is Vol. 4 of the official 
British history of World War II,” and humbly added, “I expect to derive more glory 
from being associated with this production than I could possibly lend to it with my 
own name.”1875 Brodie closed his letter with a discussion of communication protocols, 
on the expectation the project would be embraced once again by PUP: “Peter Paret 
suggests that I should communicate to him your reply, but if I am right in assuming 
that that reply will be favorable, I propose instead that you write directly to him at 
Stanford – with a copy to me and also one to Michael Howard at All Souls, Oxford. 
It will be Peter who signs whatever contract is concluded, on behalf of himself and 
Michael Howard. My own contribution will not be even remotely sufficient to warrant 
my being a party to the contract. I am here functioning simply as a special friend of 
this one publisher and also of the translators. The latter agree with me that Princeton 
University Press would be unquestionably the best American publisher to handle it, 
bearing in mind also PUP’s affiliation with Oxford University Press.”1876 In a P.S., 
Brodie added that he had “finally got some extra copies of my own new book, War 
and Politics, and I am putting one in the mails for you this very day.”1877
Just three days later, on May 22, 1973, Bailey wrote directly to Peter Paret as Bro-
die had suggested, explaining the demise of the multi-year, multi-volume Clausewitz 
Project, while reaffirming his interest in bringing to press the new translation of On 
War. He referenced the May 19 letter from Brodie that he enclosed with his letter to 
Paret, and observed, “Bernard is certainly right; we would like very much to see the 
manuscript of the translation of Clausewitz’s ON WAR that you and Professor How-
ard have prepared. If it lives up to Bernard’s advance billing, which I don’t doubt, it 
will surely be a book we want to do.”1878 He added that “of course you know that we 
have been interested in this project since it was started at the Center for International 
Studies at Princeton, and we canceled the overall contract for the Clausewitz volumes 
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only long after the deadline had been passed and when we felt that circumstances did 
not permit us carry that series as a continuing commitment. Thus I am particularly 
pleased that the translation of ON WAR can be made available to us, and I hope 
that you will send it at the first opportunity. Then, assuming that after examination 
we are able to proceed, we shall be glad to provide the Xerox copies required for the 
three editors. We shall also perhaps have some ideas about the introductory essays.”1879
Bailey noted that Princeton’s “long-standing relationship to Oxford University Press 
will be discontinued after August 1 of this year, and we are making independent ar-
rangements to sell our books in the British Commonwealth,” and while “[t]his will 
include, where appropriate, selling editions or rights to individual British publishers, 
including in some instances Oxford,” he explained that “there will no longer be the 
automatic flow of Princeton books through Oxford.”1880 Bailey concluded that “the 
main thing is the book itself, and I shall hope to be receiving the manuscript from 
you. Many thanks for remembering our interest.”1881 In a letter dated the same day, 
Bailey wrote to Brodie, enclosing a copy of his letter to Paret, noting “As you can see 
from the enclosed copy to Peter, I was delighted to receive your letter about the trans-
lation of Clausewitz’s ON WAR. Your comments on the translation are most helpful, 
and I trust that we shall be able to go ahead with it. Many thanks for keeping us in 
touch.”1882 He added, “I was glad to hear that a copy of your new book WAR AND 
POLITICS is on its way to me, and I shall look forward to reading it. Many thanks 
in advance. I just wish it were on our list.”1883 
With PUP and the original team of translators and contributors re-engaged, a 
smaller version of the once massive Clausewitz Project would continue, involving the 
new translation by Howard and Paret of On War with commentary and analysis by 
Brodie. In a brief letter from September 14, 1973, PUP associate director and edi-
tor R. Miriam Brokaw wrote to Brodie, noting that Bailey had passed along to her 
Brodie’s “letter of September 7, with the description of what you plan to do in your 
introduction to the Clausewitz. This is fine, and I want to thank you for it. As soon 
as we have all of the outlines, we will give the manuscript to a reader.”1884 And just 
two days later, Bailey wrote to Brodie, noting he had that day “received both your 
general introduction entitled ‘Why Read On War Today?’ and the detailed chapter-
by-chapter analysis,” and while “[o]bviously I haven’t had a chance to read any of 
the material yet, though I will as soon as I can,” he explained that the “ purpose of 
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this letter is mainly to acknowledge receipt.”1885 Bailey added, “From a quick look, it 
seems to me desirable to separate the general introduction from the detailed analysis, 
with the detailed analysis as an appendix,” which is in fact how they were ultimately 
presented; and while Bailey had not “yet received the introductions from Peter Paret 
and Michael Howard,” he was “expecting them by the end of the month. Then we’ll 
start the book into the editorial process and production, and it will be good to have 
it under way here at last.1886 As for Brodie’s War and Politics, Bailey added, “Did I 
tell you that I am enjoying your book WAR AND POLITICS, which I didn’t quite 
finish before returning to the Press from my summer’s leave. I am a great admirer of 
the Brody style, and I keep wishing that the book had a Princeton imprint.”1887All the 
elements for the new translation of On War ultimately arrived, and the project was 
put under contract by PUP on February 24, 1974; when finally published two years 
later, complete with supplemental analysis by Howard, Paret and Brodie, it would 
contribute greatly to the resurgence in Clausewitz studies, gaining a wide and enduring 
readership among scholars, strategic analysts, and professional soldiers. 
Prior to publication, the project participants considered the best manner for dividing 
book royalties, and a draft contract for a three-way split between Paret, Howard and 
Brodie struck Brodie as being overly generous to him given the substantial amount 
of time and effort that Paret and Howard devoted to the project, and to the challenge 
of their translation effort. As Brodie explained in a letter to Paret written on January 
21, 1974, “I am sorry to be flagging down a train which seems at last to be mov-
ing so smoothly, but I am returning the contract forms because I cannot sign them 
in their present form.”1888 As he explained, “Of course I appreciate your generosity, 
but that is exactly what is wrong with the present contract. I have always felt that I 
ought not even be a party to the contract, if for no other reason than that it tends to 
bind you to accepting my contribution, which you have not yet seen and may not 
approve of.”1889 Brodie added, “I have no idea how many copies will be sold, but I 
don’t doubt that neither you nor Herb expects it to be a run-away bestseller. Under 
the present terms, if the total royalties come to $1500 or thereabouts, I share equally 
with you and Michael. In view of the tremendous work that you and he have done 
on the translation, in addition to which you both are also going to write introductory 
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essays, I consider that quite unfair and something I cannot accept.”1890 Indeed, Brodie 
suggests he “should be happy to be included simply for the glory of the thing, but if 
you feel happier with my getting remuneration, I suggest the following: 10 per cent 
of the royalties to go to me from the beginning, the other 90 per cent to be divided 
equally between you and Michael. That still seems generous to me. I will not make 
an issue of whether or not I am a signatory to the contract but I repeat that I consider 
it unnecessary that I should be.”1891 The final terms of the contract, titled “Princeton 
Press Contract for Clausewitz” and dated February 28, 1974, included among its 
many details item number “5. Delivery of Manuscript,” with a commitment that the 
authors will “agree to deliver the complete manuscript, together with all illustrations, 
maps, charts, drawings, or other material (except index) to be included in the work, 
not later than June 1, 1974,” and item number “10. Royalties,” which committed 
to the following royalty stream, “On regular hardback book sales within the United 
States (except for the special cases listed below), the following stipulated percentage of 
the list price: 10% on the first 5,000 copies sold; 12-1/2% on the next 5,000 copies 
sold; and 15% thereafter,” with item number “14. Additional Provisions” identify-
ing a royalty split along the lines proposed by Brodie to Paret: “The royalties shall 
be divided as follows: 10% to Professor Brodie, 45% each to Professors Howard and 
Paret.”1892 All three signed the contract, bringing the long-gestating project one step 
closer to fruition. In the coming months, the project participants would discuss their 
respective introductory materials. 
On May 30, 1974, Brodie wrote to Paret and enclosed some samples from his 
evolving “Guide” to reading On War. “I am sending you herewith another portion, 
where some of the examples I give in the commentary to individual chapters are 
drawn from quite recent events. I don’t know whether this is good or bad.”1893 Brodie 
continued, “Let me explain how I got to where I am. When I first began my essay, 
I had (as is usually the case with me when I begin writing a piece) only a very vague 
and tentative idea of where I wanted to go. I knew I wanted to make the point that 
ON WAR deserves reading for what it conveys of perennial importance about war. 
I also had a somewhat banal but very pragmatic objective, which was that of trying 
to help the person reading ON WAR for the first time to understand it.”1894 Brodie 
added that the “latter objective was sparked by a number of things, but mainly by 
my two visits to the Naval War College at Newport, R.I. during the last year. There, 
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as you know, they truncated and in the horrible Graham translation. It also has the 
useless and obnoxious introduction by Anatole Rapoport. It was clear [the] student 
officers were quite restive under the obligation to read the book, and simply weren’t 
getting anything out of it. They could not see that it was saying anything of value to 
them. This struck me as a waste and a pity. Naturally, a good number of those people 
are probably not bright enough to appreciate Clausewitz on any terms, but some 
among them are.”1895 
Brodie explained that he “did not intend to get into a detailed commentary, but 
after finishing my general remarks in thirteen pages, I felt that someone had to help 
the reader get into and understand that marvelous first chapter. Some of the com-
mentaries I have seen by experts do the very opposite. So many writers talk about 
how esoteric and metaphysical is the Clausewitzian approach. What the reader needs 
to have pointed out to him is that the metaphysical touch is quite superficial and 
confined mostly to the first chapter, and that he should not let himself be bugged by 
it. [It] is profound, but the profundity is entirely pragmatic, and that’s what I try to 
bring out.”1896 As Brodie noted, “Naturally, after finishing the first chapter and then 
the rest of Book I, the mold seemed set for going on. I recalled vaguely that you or 
Michael was going to include something of a synopsis with his contribution, and I 
certainly did not want to compete. But I do want to be sure that the task of helping 
the novice reader to understand what is in this book does not fall between those three 
stools. However, I am not psychologically or emotionally committed to anything. It 
is clear to me that I must finish going through the book again, which for me will be 
the fourth or fifth time, and the commentary I am writing is really a set of notes on 
what I am reading. Then, if you think it best, I can use the material which is now in 
book-by-book commentary to flesh out what is now in the first thirteen pages, so 
that I will finish with an essay of perhaps forty to fifty pages. That would also mean 
shortening my entire piece.” 1897 So while Brodie agreed with Paret that “the original 
scheme continues to make sense,” he added “I also submit that a synopsis is not inte-
gral to any of the three headings you list under Paret, Howard, and Brodie, and also 
that a simple synopsis is not of much value” – and “[b]y ‘simple synopsis’” he meant 
“something that is essentially an outline without commentary” – Brodie informed 
Paret, “I shall proceed as I am going until I hear further from you, but I am quite 
prepared for a drastic change in course.”1898
On August 23, 1974, Michael Howard wrote to Brodie, enclosing “both the draft 
of my Clausewitz introduction and a copy of my review of War and Politics. The latter 
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may be quite extensively revised in proof, but as it may be some little time before it 
appears I thought you would like to see at least my preliminary reflections. They are 
not, as you will observe, entirely unfavourable!”1899 As Howard explained, “We seem 
to disagree only about Churchill’s strategy. In almost the only book I have written 
to which you have not made a flattering reference, The Mediterranean Strategy in the 
Second World War, I tried to show that Churchill’s strategy did not, except on one or 
two exceptional occasions and at the very end of the war, have any ‘power political’ 
considerations in mind, and in so far as it had they were concerned to assert British 
independence and prestige quite as much against the United States as against the 
Soviet Union. Still, this is a very minor difference: on the whole I thought the book 
quite splendid, and full of marvelously quotable quotes.”1900 Howard noted he had 
reduced his introductory essay on Clausewitz from around 9000 to 6000 words, and 
explained that he “would not like to see the edition expand to two volumes,” since 
“[i]n so doing, I think it would lose much of its point. But I would like to explore 
the possibility of including your comments in small print at the beginning of each 
book. This should not take up a great deal of space and would give us the best of both 
worlds. I agree that serving officers do need some guide through the jungle, especially 
in Book V!”1901 Howard closed by welcoming Brodie’s comments on his enclosed 
draft. Brodie replied on September 1, 1974 with a long list of notes and suggestions, 
including numerous typographical and grammatical comments. Upon further reflec-
tion, Howard decided against breaking apart Brodie’s “Guide,” coming to the very 
same conclusion that Paret and Brodie came to. 
Brodie also wrote to Howard on September 1, 1974, following up on his earlier 
letter “containing my general (not unfavorable) comments on your Clausewitz piece,” 
with this new letter containing “the specific notes I promised you,” adding “I have 
considered nothing that crossed my mind too trivial to mention.”1902 On the trivial, 
Brodie suggested, for consistency’s sake that perhaps Howard will not “want to use the 
‘von’ before Clausewitz if you do not use his first name,” as that “seems not to accord 
with recent usage – or be consistent with Peter’s or mine in the same book.”1903 On 
a matter of substance from a footnote on page three, Brodie mentions that “Neither 
you nor, I think, Peter anywhere mentions why Count von Bruhl made changes in the 
wording between the first and second editions. Were they printer’s errors? Was Cl.’s 
handwriting difficult to read? Or was von Bruhl being simply arbitrary? You might 
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not have the answer, but if you do it should certainly be included.”1904 On a matter 
of historical interpretation, Brodie noted that on page four, “in exact middle of page, 
you have the following sentence: ‘In France General Foch, who was in other respects 
the most outstanding follower of Clausewitz, wrote in 1903 in his principles of war…
etc.’”1905 Brodie challenges Howard on this point: “Now, it has been a long time since 
I read Foch, though I have the book in my possession and will look through it again 
the first chance I get. However, my strong recollection about his book leads me to feel 
that what you say about him in the portion I have quoted above is unjustified. My 
strong conviction is that his book stands in the most striking contrast to just about 
everything Clausewitz said he stood for, your own immediately following quotation 
from him being but one example. He is unreflective, full of dogmatic principles, given 
to extraordinary errors in his historical examples, etc. I know that Foch paid lip service 
to Cl., but he was in no sense a follower, deriving much more from the tradition of 
Jomini via du Picq and adding his own arrogant, unthinking, boastful machismo. If 
I may say so, I wrote an essay on Foch right after reading his book, and you will find 
it in my Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 40-55.”1906 Back to the trivial, Brodie adds, 
“Incidentally, you don’t have a comma where I put one above after ‘Clausewitz’ (your 
words are run together at that point),” and on a matter of historical accuracy, Brodie 
adds, “and in 1903 he was not a general but a colonel (I think).”1907
Brodie engages Howard in a debate on who best interprets the strategic environ-
ment on the eve of World War I, noting: “Same page, a few lines further down, you 
speak of Col. Colin’s book ranking as ‘the outstanding summary of the military situ-
ation in Europe on the eve of the Great War.’ Are you not forgetting Ivan Block? To 
be sure, Block wrote in the 1890s, but he certainly predicted the character of W.W.I 
infinitely better than the Foch’s and the Colin’s. Colin’s book I read very long ago 
and Block’s I reread only recently, but I do not remember being at all impressed with 
Colin.”1908 Brodie added, “In general, I think you let Foch and Colin get away with 
too much. True, they were children of their time, as in some respects Clausewitz was 
a child of his, but in the respect that matters here Cl. went counter to his own time 
and thus became timeless, where Foch and Colin reject the idea that the strategy of a 
war must conform to the political aim they were doing their part to making, capped 
by an empty victory. The only one I can see on the eve of World War I who was truly 
Clausewitzian is Schlieffen – the concept of the plan is lifted bodily out of the last 
chapter of Book VIII – and I think Schlieffen is on record as writing that if the Plan 
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fails, Germany must at once seek a negotiated peace.”1909 Brodie concludes this point 
by adding, “As you know, I speak briefly about Foch in my piece, and I plan to say 
something about Schlieffen too in the revision, and while I am not worried at all about 
you and me overlapping, I do think we need to be concerned about gross inconsistency 
between us. I shall therefore appreciate your letting me know what modifications if 
any you make in your remarks – and I shall of course send you a copy of my revised 
version.”1910 Brodie engages Howard in further debate over Clausewitzian doctrine, 
noting: “Page 6, second Paragraph. You speak of Cl.’s ‘doctrine of the two kinds of 
war’ and ask whether one did not ‘imply a valid alternative objective in the attrition 
of the enemy.’ I suspect that Cl.’s answer would be a resounding ‘no,’ if by attrition 
you mean what happened in W.W.I. That attrition was after all Vernichtungsstrategie 
in slow motion, and was clearly different from what Cl. was talking about in Par. 2 of 
the ‘Notice’ and throughout On War. You translate Delbruck’s Ermattungsstrategie as 
‘strategy of exhaustion’ and find that it characterized the warfare of the 18th C. ‘and 
the campaigns of Frederick the Great.’ My German dictionary translates Ermattung 
as ‘exhaustion,’ but also as ‘lassitude,’ and the verb form as ‘growing weary’. It is in 
this latter sense, it seems to me, that Cl. speaks of 18th C. warfare and of Frederick’s 
enemies. Frederick himself was willing enough to fight desperately to achieve his end, 
but he clearly counted (according to Cl.) on his enemies not doing so. Clausewitz may 
condemn Austrian generals for not showing enough enterprise, but he never criticizes 
Austrian governments for dispensing with ultimate strategies.”1911
On page seven, at the end of the first paragraph, Brodie comments, “You are quite 
right in saying that Cl. was ‘intensely parochial’ in the sense that he paid not the 
slightest attention to sea power, despite the role it played in the Peninsular War,” but 
counters that “it seems too much to charge him with bequeathing this ‘most disastrous 
legacy’ to the German Army. After all, the Prussia of his time did not have the High 
Seas Fleet that Germany had in 1914, and one would expect 20th C. Germans to do 
some thinking for themselves. And to mention a war with which you have more than 
passing acquaintance, the Franco-Prussian war was affected not at all by the fact that 
France had absolute naval superiority.”1912
Brodie continues the debate on Foch, commenting on page eight, paragraph two, 
that: “This continues a point I have made above. Your first sentence ends with the words 
‘perhaps a little misleading,’ which I think is a considerable short-fall from what needs 
saying. I agree with your comment about Liddell Hart putting it well (about Foch) 
but disagree strongly with your sentence that Foch ‘borrows heavily’ from Cl.’s ideas. 
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What you quote is not substantial enough to warrant such a remark, and, incidentally, 
I would not castigate Foch for failing to make attribution for an idea that has entered 
the domain. We all frequently use ideas the source of which we have forgotten.”1913 
Also on page eight, in the final full paragraph on that page, Brodie challenges How-
ard’s interpretation of the influence of Clausewitz on French doctrine: “Your quote 
from the French F.S.R. of 1895 does not seem to me to bear out your remark that 
‘the French Army had become as totally imbued with Clausewitzian ideas as had its 
German adversaries.’ It seems to me your account for this quote in your own excellent 
statement which begins at the bottom of your page 1 with the words: ‘…many of the 
ideas which we now think of as peculiarly Clausewitzian…etc.’ A short quote like that 
on your page 8 really proves nothing except that a certain catch phrase has caught on, 
like that concerning ‘imposing one’s will on the enemy.’ You and I have heard many 
people use that expression who didn’t have the slightest idea what Clausewitz was all 
about. The sense of what you quote could just as well have come from Jomini, and I 
refer again to your statement beginning at the bottom of your page 1.”1914
Brodie comments on page ten, at the end of paragraph three, noting to Howard: 
“You quote Liddell Hart’s ‘Not one reader in a hundred’ statement and follow it 
with your own: ‘The reader will have to judge for himself as to the correctness of this 
verdict.’”1915 Brodie concludes, “I come down on the side of L.H., which is why I think 
my Baedecker’s guide is so necessary. It was particularly that first chapter that made 
me embark on it. It certainly confused me the first time I read it, and I had studied 
philosophy as an undergraduate, which the great majority of readers will not have 
done.”1916 On the next page, Brodie corrects Howard for exaggerating Clausewitz, not-
ing on page eleven, paragraph two, “You very aptly cite L.H.’s critique of Clausewitz 
with approval, and include the phrase ‘the contempt for manoevre.’ [sic.] I do not see 
a ‘contempt for manoeuvre’ in Cl. He certainly condemned 18th C. fascination with 
it, but he also at every opportunity warned against direct frontal attacks, and talked 
about the necessity for outflanking or enveloping the opposing army, and how one 
can do that without ‘manoeuver’ [sic.] I don’t know. One could perhaps speak of ‘a 
seeming contempt for manoeuvre.’”1917 Brodie added, in a note on the inconsistency 
of spelling of the word manoeuvre, “By the way, one way in which British spelling 
differs from American is in that word which you call ‘manoeuvre’ and which modern 
American dictionaries call ‘maneuver,’” though this does not account for the wide 
range of spelling employed by Brodie in his letter. Brodie’s final comment is from page 
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twelve, paragraph two, noting “where you quote the U.S. Army F.S.R. for 1923. My 
comment is the same as that of the top paragraph on this sheet, relative to the French 
F.S.R. of 1895, only more so.”1918 He closes by writing, “Zu Ende. Despite my above 
comments, I still think yours is a magnificent essay.”1919 As a P.S. he added a further 
compliment, noting “I very much enjoyed your review of the Hoopes book on Palles 
in the TLS,” the Time Literary Supplement.1920
Paret wrote to Brodie on September 11, 1974, noting “I talked with Herb [Bailey], 
and before I had a chance to suggest the solution you and I had discussed” with regard 
to placement of Brodie’s “Guide,” Bailey himself had “suggested it on his own. He 
thinks that it would be a shame to cut up your detailed analytic commentary, and 
feels that the proper way of handling it would be to print it as a block at the back 
of the volume.”1921 Howard described this solution in his own words in a letter on 
September 18, 1974 to Brodie, beginning his letter as per his usual manner with “My 
Dear Bernard,” noting receipt of both Brodie’s August 31 and his more thorough and 
critical September 1 letters as well as Brodie’s “final draft of your introduction and 
guide to ON WAR.”1922 He added, “Also today a letter from Peter with his comments 
on my introduction and his proposed solution to your bulk problem – i.e. printing 
your guide at the end of the volume. To this I am entirely agreeable. I also think that 
your introduction would be printed first.”1923 (Brodie’s introduction was ultimately 
placed third after Paret’s and Howard’s.) 
Howard next addressed the issue of his review of Brodie’s War and Politics in the Time 
Literary Supplement, noting, “First, the TLS rushed my review of War and Politics into 
print while I was away and before I could even correct the proofs. I hope that you have 
by now seen it in the issue of September 4th, with a very good photograph of yourself 
to grace it. In the light of this I won’t take up any of the points you made except to say 
that my Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War is not the same as Vol IV 
in Grand Strategy. It was a short book I wrote earlier, specifically dealing with the (in 
my view mistaken) belief that Churchill’s strategy was ‘politically’ inspired. I am put-
ting a copy in the post to you.”1924 Next, Howard took up a point by point response 
to Brodie’s many critical responses to his introductory essay, both the trivial and the 
substantive – agreeing with many but not all of Brodie’s points. “As for my Clausewitz 
introduction, I shall deal with your points seriatim,” after which he addressed just a 
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single issue of substance in Brodie’s “excellent introduction.”1925 Howard agreed with 
Brodie on the issue of the ‘von’, conceding, “All right: not ‘von’ Clausewitz.”1926 On the 
matter of “Von Bruhl’s corrections. Having waded through the first edition one can 
see why they were necessary. There are innumerable misprints and obscurities which 
frequently defeated even Peter. Since the original manuscripts have disappeared one 
cannot now say whether this was due to illegible handwriting or clumsy phraseology. 
But you are right: the point must be clear.”1927 As for “Foch: again you are right. To 
describe him as ‘a disciple of Clausewitz’ tout court is very misleading, and I shall omit 
the phrase entirely.”1928 On the matter of Jean Lambert Alphonse Colin, author of the 
1912 The Transformations of War: “Our first disagreement. A lot happened between 
1899 when Block wrote and 1912, when Colin did, and Colin gave the last general 
conspectus of what armies were like and what their doctrines were before war broke 
out in 1914. He certainly did not attempt the kind of forecasting which made Block 
so outstanding, but he gave a very sound and thorough summary of ‘the conventional 
wisdom’ of his time. I don’t think it is a matter of ‘letting him get away’ with anything. 
He wrote what he wrote: I try to explain why he wrote it, rather than make the rather 
obvious point that he, in common with nearly every one else, got it wrong. NB my 
quotation of what I consider to be one of Clausewitz’s wisest remarks at the bottom 
of page 4. Clausewitz was a timeless genius: Colin and Foch were not – they were in 
different ways very typical of their generation. I don’t think that there is any difference 
to resolve between us over this.”1929 As for “‘The two kinds of war.’ The controversy in 
the periodicals was over precisely the point that you make. I could have a long footnote 
describing it but, as I said in my text, it did not bear at all on contemporary military 
thinking and so I have spared the reader. Gordon Craig deals with it very well in his 
essay on Delbruck in Makers of Modern Strategy.”1930 On “Clausewitz and sea power. 
Yes: it is worth making the point that Clausewitz wrote in and for a land-locked Prus-
sia. Incidentally French command of the sea did have a noticeable effect on the second 
half of the Franco-Prussian War. Gambetta was able to re-equip the French forces very 
largely because of foreign arms importations and the continuation of trade kept French 
credit high.” 1931 Howard noted, “I am prepared to modify what I say about Foch’s debt 
to Clausewitz by saying this his borrowings were extremely selective, but the passages 
I quote are pure Clausewitz. Even if they were by then idées reçues that makes them 
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none the less Clausewitzian. I suspect that Foch got them from his Ecole de Guerre 
lecture notes rather than from reading the text; but since these are virtually the only 
general ideas (apart from his obsession with the offensive) that are to be found in his 
Principles of War, and since one finds really nothing comparable in Jomini, I am afraid 
that I see no reason to change my mind over this. The same applies to the French 
FSRs – and I could find you many such quotations. The concept of war as a clash of 
wills and its object being to impose ones will on the enemy which ultimately could 
be done only by taking the offensive- one does not find this kind of thing in Jomini 
and his followers. They are not perhaps the passages in On War which do Clausewitz 
the greatest credit, but they are certainly those which had the greatest influence at the 
time.”1932 As for “Liddell Hart on Clausewitz’s obscurity. I think he exaggerates this but, 
as I say, the reader must decide for himself.”1933 Howard proceeded to British versus 
American spelling conventions, noting: “For ‘contempt for manoeuvre’ read ‘apparent 
downgrading of manoeuvre’. The English spelling of this and other words will no doubt 
be picked up by the copy editor.”1934 And on “US Army FSR. Again, I could back this 
up by many quotations from Marshall’s directives and Eisenhower’s correspondence 
about the need to break the enemy will to fight by defeating his main forces in battle. 
Perhaps I should expand this paragraph.”1935
Howard next turned Brodie’s introduction, writing: “About your own excellent 
introduction I have only one quibble: your giving Schlieffen the accolade of being a 
true disciple of Clausewitz on the strength of one reported statement (tu quoque!) 
that, if the Schlieffen plan failed, Germany should make peace. Now I accept that he 
was a follower of Clausewitz in the sense that I have described on page 5 of my text, 
but so far as politics was concerned he was, according to Gerhard Ritter, an agnostic 
in that he just didn’t want to know: he did his job and the politicians did theirs. He 
would no doubt have scrapped the plan if his Kriegsherr had told him it was politi-
cally unacceptable, but he did not see it as his job to worry about such things. This 
was not really a Clausewitzian attitude. In any case it is not really enough to say that 
Schlieffen was ‘on record’ with such a statement. When did he make it, how often, 
and under what circumstances? It certainly does not come through as an intrinsic part 
of his military doctrines, and I have not come across it myself.”1936 Howard closed by 
noting “that is literally my only criticism” and adding, “You will pick up the mistyp-
ings for yourself. All best wishes to you both, Michael.”1937
1932. Howard, Letter to Brodie, September 18, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA. 
1933. Howard, Letter to Brodie, September 18, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA. 
1934. Howard, Letter to Brodie, September 18, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA. 
1935. Howard, Letter to Brodie, September 18, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA. 
1936. Howard, Letter to Brodie, September 18, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
1937. Howard, Letter to Brodie, September 18, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
Bernard Brodie: A Clausewitz for the Nuclear Age? 409
Howard sent Brodie an additional, but undated letter, written by hand and in 
response to an earlier letter from Brodie dated September 23, 1974, addressing ad-
ditional issues of substance and historical interpretation, and after a kind salute to 
“My dear Bernard,” explained, “I have not replied sooner to your kind and useful 
letter of September 23rd since I have been ploughing through the proofs of the text 
before getting to your appendix, in the hope that I could repay you in kind. All I can 
offer, apart from some obvious misprints which you will certainly have picked up, is 
a. a contradiction between the introduction, when you give Clausewitz’s age on first 
seeing service as 12, and the appendix, when you give it as 13 (the latter I think is 
right); b. a slight inaccuracy in your introduction when you suggest that Clausewitz 
died on the Polish Frontier rather than after his return to take up his new post vide. 
Paret’s introduction. Your comment on galleys 41-2 about Clausewitz’s limited experi-
ence of mountain warfare is of course correct, but one must bear in mind that his first 
experience of war was in the Vosges in Alsace, and he had three years of it at rather a 
formative period of his life.”1938 He added, “Incidentally I cannot agree with you that 
the low German casualty figures on the Western Front in World War I compared with 
those of the Allies indicated that they had absorbed the Clausewitzian doctrine of the 
defensive. The whole of German military literature from about 1890 until 1915 argues 
the contrary, as does their record in the war itself. After the failure of the Schlieffen 
Plan they launched three major offensives in the West, all at heavy cost: 1st Ypres in 
November 1914, 2nd Ypres in spring 1915, and Verdun in 1916. It was then very 
largely the ascendancy of the “Easterners,” Hindenture and Ludendorf, in OHL, 
which led to the decision to stand on the defensive in the West, but only in order to 
take the offensive in the East. Once the Eastern Front was liquidated they resumed 
the offensive in the West in March 1918. If you were to look at comparative casualty 
figures August 1914 until June 1916 I think you get a fairer picture; and even then 
one must take into account such variables as tactical doctrine, training levels and feed 
back from experience. Still, we can argue this one out privately!”1939
On October 3, 1974, Brodie wrote to Howard, presenting “Comments on new draft 
(2nd version) of ‘The Influence of Clausewitz,’” noting “All are picayune except the 
last.”1940 While trivial, they are nonetheless of interest to historians of Clausewitz as well 
as of Brodie and his generation of strategic thinkers. On page one, Brodie comments, 
“The very long first paragraph can be divided into two or three. My own suggestion 
would to be to put paragraph markings at lines 12 and 22. You might go through the 
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MS and check the length of all paragraphs.”1941 Also on page one, with regard to the 
second line from the bottom, Brodie writes the “[w]ord ‘Jominian’ is all right if my 
essay comes first, because I mention Jomini by full name and say something about 
who he was. I should nevertheless prefer to see: ‘with the dogmatism of a Jomini.’”1942
As for page two, the second full paragraph, Brodie comments, “The third sentence 
bothers me slightly. What you are saying may have been true when Cl. wrote the no-
tice of 1827. But as I read On War now, the contrast between books 7 and 8 is quite 
marked. Bk. 7 is very clearly still a rough draft, but Bk. 8 looks to be very much more 
finished. Chapters 6 and 9 are among the greatest in the whole work. I suspect he did 
a good deal of work on Bk VIII after writing the 1827 document, though there are still 
evidences of its being other than completely finished.” Of a more picayune nature, in 
the same paragraph Brodie writes, “You mention a ‘first theme’ and a ‘second theme,’ 
but in the following paragraph you refer to ‘the above three elements.’ So I went back 
looking for the third theme, which I finally found in the very last clause of the par. It 
should be clearly marked as ‘third theme.’”1943
On page four, line four, Brodie comments substantively, “I think that word ‘only’ 
is a little extreme and perhaps unjustified. ‘Almost exclusively’ would be better. It is 
true that Bk. I, Ch. 1 and Bk. VIII, Ch. 6 bear almost the whole burden of the argu-
ment, but my recollection is that he at least speaks of it several times elsewhere. For 
example, in describing the necessary qualifications of the commander-in-chief he says 
that he also has to be something of a statesman, to understand the political objective of 
the war and conform to them.”1944 On page six, line ten, Brodie reverts to the trivial: 
“Title Nation in Arms should be underlined. (In general I believe in not reposing any 
confidence in the copy editor, at least until you know who the creature is going to be 
and how competent he or she is. The one I had for War and Politics was unbelievably 
bad).”1945 In a similar vein, he writes of the second to last line in this same paragraph 
on page six, “The word ‘fewer’ seems to me to be slightly better than ‘less.’ It’s like 
the difference between ‘paucity’ and ‘dearth’: one refers to numbers and the other to 
quantities other than numerical.”1946 And on historical interpretation, Brodie com-
ments on page eight, paragraph two, line six: “I suggest changing the date ‘1870’ to 
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‘1815.’ There were a great may developments along the lines you mention between 
1815 and 1870.”1947 And on page eleven, on the line in the middle of that page with 
the word “presciently,” that the “remark you quote of Schlieffen’s strikes me as being 
the very reverse of prescient. What happened in W.W.I is that it did prove possible to 
conduct a strategy of attrition ‘when the support of millions of combatants runs into 
milliards of marks.’ Schlieffen, like so many others, was entirely off the mark on that 
argument. Bloch, incidentally, was one of the very, very few who understood what 
resources the state could mobilize.”1948 And, on the trivial, on “Same page, seventh 
line from bottom: Word ‘his’ strikes me as slightly better than ‘its.’”1949 Similarly 
picayune, “Page 12, line second from end of first par. A dash should be substituted 
for the semicolon.”1950
This brings Brodie to what he describes as “the one truly substantive comment, 
which I hesitate to make because I made it on your first draft. After one intervention 
one should be prepared to agree to disagree. However, the point is an important one 
and what you say about it bothers me very much, especially because I consider the 
‘strategy’ of W.W.I., if it can be called that, so blind, so stupid, and so loathsome.”1951 
As Brodie describes: “It first comes up at the bottom of your page 10, which is, I 
think, close to or identical with what you had before. All I will say about it now is 
that the word “valid” (4th line from bottom) is at the very least ambiguous. The real 
issue arises with what you say at the bottom of p. 14 and the top of p. 15. The two 
points I object to are 1. That there is any significant similarity between the attrition 
strategies of W.W.I and what could be called (with considerable license) the attrition 
strategies of the 18th century, and 2. That one can find in Clausewitz any significant 
justification for the kind of prolonged insane slugging that went on, especially on the 
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western front, for over four long years.”1952 After presenting such detailed feedback on 
Howard’s interpretation of Clausewitz’s applicability to World War I, Brodie closes 
with a positively upbeat general assessment of Howard’s introductory essay: “Having 
said all this I must assure you again that my admiration for your paper is (with the 
sole exception of the point made just above) absolutely unbounded.”1953 
On October 10, 1974, Herb Bailey wrote to Brodie, enclosing a copy of a letter 
to Paret that he authored on the same date, addressing Brodie’s lengthy “Guide” for 
the reading of Clausewitz’s On War. Bailey noted that the “enclosed copy of a letter 
to Peter is self-explanatory. It answers some of the questions in your letter of October 
5,” and explaining that “Much as I like your Reading Guide, I think it is just too 
much to add to the introductions before the reader gets to the text. I hope you will 
like the solution I have proposed. The paragraph referring to the Guide is obviously 
only a draft, and you may want to rewrite it entirely.”1954 Bailey also mentioned his 
intervention in a dispute between Brodie’s wife Fawn and her publisher, regretting his 
involvement in the matter: “Finally, a last word on the Julian Boyd-Fawn M. Brodie 
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Concerning point 2: The key sentence is what you say at the top of p. 15. Your wording has changed somewhat, but you 
speak now of Cl.’s alleged “disdain for strategic maneuver.” I see no evidence of such disdain in On War, and I see plenty 
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pretty significant considering his times as compared with W.W.I and also considering the attitudes he might have been 
expected to have about the “pushes” of W.W.I.
When you talk about Cl’s alleged advocacy of compelling the enemy “to use up his reserves at a greater rate than one is 
expending one’s own,” I think that word “compel” is not really justified, but more to the point, Cl. is describing a decisive 
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into several days (rather than several months or years) the kind of battle that Clausewitz was specifically describing as tak-
ing place within one day. And the kind of maneuver (strategic) that Schlieffen set up for the execution of his plan comes 
straight out of Bk. VIII, Ch. 9 of On War. 
I think you would be justified in saying that only by the most superficial (hence unwarranted) analogies could the generals 
of W.W.I claim to find some inspiration in Clausewitz.
Concerning Cl’s “dogged refusal to be put off by heavy casualties,” we simply cannot know from his attitudes concerning 
Napoleonic-type wars what they would have been for W.W.I. After all, he was the one who insisted that strategy must 
conform to the political objective, and I wonder whether he would not have found the casualties accepted in WWI as 
being in conflict with that basic principle.
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dispute. I wish I had never gotten into it, since I don’t think I accomplished much and 
I succeeded only in alienating both parties. Although I think I was right in my general 
perception of the situation, I did not take enough care with the letters I wrote, and 
so it would have been better if they had not been written at all. Really I should have 
left the whole thing to Julian and Fawn, and stayed out of it myself altogether.”1955 
He closed his letter by reaffirming his admiration for Brodie’s “Guide,” writing: “To 
get back to ON WAR, I think that I have not sufficiently expressed my admiration 
for your Reading Guide. I think it is a superb contribution, and it will surely help 
to make our edition the one that is the most widely used.”1956 He included as an at-
tachment a draft paragraph for insertion at the end of the three introductory essays, 
alerting readers to the “Guide” in the book’s back matter, with the note, “Insert at end 
of Brodie introduction, p. 23.”1957 The proposed text stated: “It may seem odd at the 
end of these three introductions, dealing with the genesis of ON WAR, its influence, 
and its relevance today, to refer the reader to the Appendix: A Guide to the Reading 
of ON WAR. Thinking that we have already interposed perhaps more than enough 
comment between the title page and the text, we have placed this guide at the end 
of the book. We do not want to direct attention away from Clausewitz’s text, but we 
suggest that the use of the Guide, before, during, or after reading, will enable most 
readers to gain more from Clausewitz’s rich and profound work.”1958 In the end, this 
text would be boiled down to a more concise “Thinking that we have interposed 
enough comment between the title and the text, we have placed at the end of the 
book ‘A Guide to the Reading of On War.’ Eds.”1959 This abbreviated note appears on 
page 58 of the published edition.
In Bailey’s letter to Paret, also penned on October 10, 1974, he noted that he had 
“now read the three introductions, and I want to say first of all that I am most enthu-
siastic about them. Although there are some repetitions, and perhaps cross-references 
should be inserted as you suggest, they fit together very nicely. I happened to read 
Bernard’s introduction first, and I liked it so much that I immediately felt it should be 
the first in order. But now, having read the other two introductions, I think it would be 
better to go back to the original order: Paret, Howard, Brodie. They provide a logical 
sequence, and it would be hard to choose among them on any other basis.”1960 As well, 
Bailey noted he had “also read Bernard’s Guide, which I think is very illuminating and 
helpful, and I am delighted that it is going to be in the book. However I’m concerned 
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about putting too much material before the beginning of the Clausewitz text, and so 
I come back to the idea that the Guide should be put at the end of the book, as an 
appendix. I don’t want it to be overlooked, though, so in addition to listing it in the 
contents, I have prepared a paragraph to be added at the end of Bernard’s essay (after 
the asterisks), calling the reader’s attention to the Guide. Bernard may want to say it 
differently, but this draft at least suggests a direction. A copy is enclosed.”1961 Bailey 
presented some feedback on the introductory essays, noting “It would be false and 
misleading to give the impression that Clausewitz had said the last word on all types 
of warfare, but one gets the strong feeling from the Howard and Paret essays and 
from the first part of the Brodie essay that Clausewitz really is very relevant today.”1962
On September 22, 1975, Paret wrote to Brodie, noting although Howard and he 
had “agreed that he would do the proofreading of the entire opus,” that “[n]ow that 
we have galleys I have of course gone over my introduction (and found quite a few 
errors in the process) and have also read the other two introductions and your guide. 
I am sending Michael my corrections and suggestions for his piece, and am doing 
the same with yours. Enclosed are those galleys that I have marked – as you see, there 
are only a few.”1963 Paret added, “Let me also suggest that you check your quotations 
with the final text. It would be embarrassing if any discrepancies slip through.”1964 
Paret concluded, “Having read the three introductions and your guide I feel certain 
that we have produced a useful piece of work. Readers will take different things from 
our various analyses, but everything dovetails nicely, and I do think the total effect 
1961. Bailey, Letter to Paret, October 10, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
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about these topics either in the Howard essay or in Brodie’s. It would be false and misleading to give the impression that 
Clausewitz had said the last word on all types of warfare, but one gets the strong feeling from the Howard and Paret essays 
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several “fall-back positions,” that are almost enough to convince one that reading Clausewitz is hardly worth the trouble. 
I wonder whether this can’t be stated more positively without being false to the material. This concludes my observations 
on the essays, though I want to finish by saying that I thoroughly enjoyed them and believe they will serve as excellent 
introductions to the Clausewitz text. I shall look forward to hearing what you think about all this.”
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is enlightening rather than obscurantist.”1965 Brodie and Howard traded several let-
ters offering corrections to each other’s work. Final proofs of the manuscript became 
available in December, during which Brodie and Lewis Bateman, the editor assigned 
to the project, clashed over the presentation of Brodie’s “Guide,” whose placement 
in the back matter of the book seems to have caused Brodie some offense, a condi-
tion worsened by the editor’s decision not to provide special typographical recognition 
in the contents, which Brodie had sought. As Bateman wrote in a letter to Brodie on 
December 19, 1975, “While I agree with you that your ‘guide’ is more than an ap-
pendix, its quality alone will indicate this. Thus, I do not think that it needs special 
typographical recognition in the contents. In any case, as you know, the display of 
this element in the contents is a question for the designer who, while considering your 
request, will make the final decision.”1966 Brodie responded by bringing the matter 
to Bailey’s attention, and in his Christmas day letter to Bailey wrote, “I feel it is time 
for me to go direct (sic.) to the boss, for which I trust Mr. Bateman will forgive me. 
I am sending him a copy of this letter anyway.”1967 Noting Bateman’s response to the 
presentation in the contents of Brodie’s “Guide,” he explained to Bailey that: “This 
was in reply to a letter of mine pointing out that with my Guide now at the back of 
the book, the mousy way in which it is indicated in the “Contents” permits it to be 
quite lost to view. This concern is doubly warranted by the fact that the title page as 
presently structured, a copy of which was enclosed with Bateman’s letter, makes no 
mention of the Guide – unless it is submitted under “with commentaries by” Peter, 
Michael, and myself. It seems to me that that promise is quite fulfilled by the three 
introductory essays. In other words, I am not worried about the reader’s thoughts on 
the Guide when he reads it (i.e., concerning Bateman’s reference to “its quality”), nor 
am I worried about the careful reader missing it.”1968 
1965. Paret, Letter to Brodie, September 22, 1975, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
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1967. Brodie, letter to Bailey, December 25, 1975, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), UCLA.
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“What I am worried about is that its very existence will be overlooked by all sorts of casual reviewers and browsers, yes, 
all eighty-odd pages of it. I am not putting an exaggerated value on my own work; it is enough that others besides myself 
thought it worth including in this volume. I am only saying that so long as it is there, its presence ought to be adequately 
signaled. Let me not be vain about it, but it might even help to sell the book. The type size in which it is presently given is 
the same as that for the individual chapters of ON WAR, some of which will be only one page long and none over about 
twenty-five pages. . . . I think that the Guide, and for that matter also the three introductory ‘commentaries’, should be 
set off in a type of a size approximating that used for the titles of the eight books of ON WAR, which individually happen 
to average about the length of my Guide (though I well understand that length is not all there is to it). In any case it 
seems to me a strange notion, indeed an absurd one, that in a matter of this importance the designer ‘will make the final 
decision.’ This is the first time I’ve encountered that idea. Bateman seems to have anticipated my disappointment with the 
title pages, because he suggests that any reservations I might have be taken up by Peter Paret. This I shall do by sending 
Peter a copy of this letter. I do not feel that any special display is indicated but I do feel strongly that a separate mention 
is necessary – separate, that is, from the reference to the ‘commentaries’ by M., P., and B.”
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Brodie raised a second concern, which while “of much less importance” was “nev-
ertheless not trivial.”1969 Brodie had asked Bateman “to consult with you [Bailey] on 
whether I could have my contribution bound separately (that is, introductory com-
mentary and guide) for presentation to friends and colleagues,” and “got back an answer 
that seemed rather arbitrary. I was told I could buy the whole book, which of course 
I knew in advance. Now it happens that for most of the persons I have in mind, it 
would not only be too costly but inappropriate. I don’t know what it says about them, 
but I actually have friends who are more interested in Brodie than in Clausewitz.”1970 
Brodie added that “Unfortunately, I do not normally make copies of my own letters 
when I type them myself, so I don’t know just how I put the matter originally. Any-
way, no one asked me whether I was prepared for thirty to fifty copies, which, if for 
the price were within reason, I would. By the way, I do not know yet what the whole 
book will cost. And am I wrong in assuming that you are not intending to put it out 
in paperback?”1971 Bailey responded to Brodie on December 31, 1975, noting “I have 
your letter of December 25,” and commenting, “Let me say immediately that I have 
confidence in Mr. Bateman as an editor, and I think you should too,” while at the 
same time agreeing with Brodie that “there is a real problem of emphasis here, and 
some changes should be made in the direction that you suggest.”1972 
Bailey further agreed that “it is also significant, especially from a publishing point 
of view, that commentaries have been provided by three such well-known scholars,” 
and also “that a Guide by Bernard Brodie is included. These are things that readers 
will want to know, and that we as publishers want to convey to readers in order to sell 
the book.”1973 And so, Bailey noted, “I am again alerting our sales department to the 
fact that the presence of the commentaries and Guide will sell the book as much as the 
existence of a new and improved translation. And this of course should be reflected in 
the typography of both the jacket and the book itself. I have been over the proofs with 
Mr. Bateman, and we have agreed on some changes. The title page will be properly 
descriptive, stating that the translation is by Paret and Howard, the commentaries are by 
Paret, Howard, and Brodie, and the Guide is by Brodie. Mr. Bateman is sending a draft 
title page to Peter for his approval, since he has handled all the arrangements. I am also 
sending Peter a copy of this letter.”1974 Bailey added that “In the text of the book, the 
commentaries and the Guide will each be set off by a separate half title, and appropriate 
changes of emphasis will be made in the table of contents. The exact typography will of 
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course be worked out by the designer, but Mr. Bateman as editor will oversee the work 
to make sure that the typographical emphasis is appropriate.”1975 Bailey added, “I’m 
glad that you brought this matter to my attention, because I really think that we were 
not sufficiently emphasizing some of the most attractive aspects of this volume. It will 
be relatively easy at this point to make the necessary changes. I hope that you and the 
other editors will be pleased.”1976 As for the pricing, Bailey noted “we are planning a list 
price of $17.50,” and that “Promotion plans are already under way, the book is included 
among the leading titles in our spring catalogue, and at about the time of publication 
we will let you know in detail what advertisements will appear, etc.”1977 With regard to 
Brodie’s desire for printed excerpts of his contributions to the work, Bailey wrote: “Mr. 
Bateman asked me earlier about the idea of providing separates of the Guide, and I told 
him (as he wrote to you) that we would greatly prefer not to provide them, even at cost. 
The reasons he gave are genuine, and in addition it does cost a good deal of disruption 
in the production process to have to provide separates of sections of a book.”1978 Bailey 
added, “I hope you won’t think that this is an arbitrary decision; indeed there would 
be no reason to make such a decision arbitrarily when we would much prefer to please 
you and the other editors. I know that it is common to provide separates of journal 
articles, where the routines are set up for it, but it is a different matter with books.”1979
In the final production of the long-awaited translation of On War, Bailey’s described 
changes were made largely as described with only minor modifications. The front cover 
started with “CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ,” in bold type followed by “ON WAR” in 
larger bold type sandwiched between two horizontal lines, underneath which appeared 
“Edited and Translated by” in non-bold italicized type, beneath which came in three 
lines “MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET,” followed in turn by “Introductory 
Essays by PETER PARET, MICHAEL D. HOWARD, and BERNARD BRODIE; 
with a Commentary by BERNARD BRODIE” in smaller type. (A 1984 edition was 
published with an index added, that resulted in a modification to the front cover, with 
the words “Indexed Edition” added in non-bold, italicized text of an even smaller type. 
The inside cover was presented much the same, but instead of “Indexed Edition” up 
top, at the very bottom of the page appear “Index by ROSALIE WEST,” in the same 
sized type as the three lines describing the introductory essays and commentary.) In 
the table of contents, “A Commentary” is presented after Book Eight, “War Plans” 
in the same sized type, and the title to Brodie’s “Guide,” officially “A Guide to the 
Reading of On War,” is in the same sized type as the sections of each of Clausewitz’s 
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chapters. And so, after over a decade, the Clausewitz Project, in a greatly reduced and 
far less ambitious form, came to press.
On July 29, 1976, with the new translation of On War ready to be release, PUP’s 
publicity and promotions coordinator, Marcia Brubeck, wrote to Brodie on the matter 
of promotional copies: “Now that ON WAR is almost out, we are completing the lists of 
people to receive complimentary copies. We are asking you, Mr. Howard, and Professor 
Paret each to suggest three individuals to receive promotional copies. Mr. Bateman has 
given me your letter of March 19 suggesting Admiral Turner and Major Winton. Would 
you like to add the name and address of a political scientist?”1980 Brubeck again wrote 
on October 6, 1976, confirming that PUP had “sent a copy of On War to International 
Security” and that the requested “copy of The Role of Providence in the Social Order will 
be sent to you as soon as it is available. Unfortunately, I must report that your 40% 
author’s discount does not apply to the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, but you may of course 
buy copies at the list price of $22.50”1981 per copy, adding, “I hope this is helpful.”1982
With the much truncated Clausewitz Project now finally completed with the pub-
lication of the Princeton edition of On War, Bailey wrote to Brodie on October 14, 
1976, observing that “ON WAR is off to a good start, I think, and I trust that you are 
pleased with the appearance of the book, even after all the discussion of the arrange-
ment of materials, the title page, etc. It’s hard to please everyone, but I think we came 
out with a reasonable solution. Certainly I think your own contribution to the book 
is going to be recognized as invaluable.”1983 Bailey planted the seed for a new Brodie 
project on strategy, noting that the “problem of nuclear proliferation is on everyone’s 
mind these days, along with the special problems of new types of war heads and mis-
siles. Ed Tenner, our science editor, and I have been wondering whether it isn’t time for 
a new book to put these subjects in perspective from several points of view – military 
strategy, economic implications, technology exchange, the problem of intelligence, 
and so forth.”1984 Bailey added: “Perhaps the principles haven’t changed much since 
your STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE, but the circumstances certainly have. We 
also now have behind us the experience of Vietnam, greater knowledge of biologi-
cal warfare, etc. In short, perhaps it is time for a reassessment of the broad question 
of strategy today, or at least the question is worth asking? What do you think? Is it 
something that you yourself would want to undertake, or would you suggest someone 
else? At any rate I’d be grateful to have your thoughts on the subject.”1985 
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Brodie responded favorably to Bailey’s suggestion, and on October 29, 1976, Bailey 
again wrote to Brodie, in which he observed being “delighted that my letter suggesting 
that the time is ripe for a new overall look at the general question of military strategy, 
which of course relates to international politics (vide Clausewitz), caught you at the 
right time. There aren’t many people who have been immersed in this subject as long 
as you have, or have made such contributions to it, and a new book from you now 
is a most pleasing prospect.”1986 Bailey added that he “shall be looking forward to 
hearing how your ideas progress and how the work goes along. Obviously something 
like this is going to take time, but you will be drawing on years of thinking about the 
problems.”1987 Bailey closed his letter by reiterating, “I really am glad that my letter 
struck the right note with you.”1988
Brodie on the Continuing Relevance of On War
Brodie had first heard of Princeton’s effort to bring forth a modern translation of 
Clausewitz’s work for the Anglo-American world in a conversation with Peter Paret in 
the spring of 1963, and participated in the project for the better part of a decade before 
the project would be cancelled owing to its many challenges. But one major portion 
of the project, the translation of Clausewitz’s classic tome, On War, was completed 
and came to press, at last, in 1976, with both a brief, fourteen-page introductory essay 
(“The Continuing Relevance of On War”), and a lengthier, seventy-page commentary 
presented as a commentary in the book’s back matter (“A Guide to the Reading of On 
War”). As the editors finally agreed, the “Guide” was presented immediately following 
Brodie’s introductory essay with these brief words: “Thinking that we have interpreted 
enough comment between the title page and the text, we have placed at the end of 
the book, ‘A Guide to the Reading of On War.’”1989
In “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” Brodie contemplated Clausewitz’s 
seminal tome’s relevance to the world after Hiroshima. Not only might the reader 
wonder if “a book written a century and a half ago, and on war of all things, is really 
worth his time? That question would arise even if nuclear weapons had never been 
invented, but those weapons do indeed seem to make a totally new universe. Or do 
they?”1990 While this question would percolate beneath Brodie’s words for many more 
years, and would in fact define his efforts as a theorist stretching from the dawn of the 
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nuclear age to the immediate post-Vietnam era, he attempts to address it head on in 
this introductory essay to On War: “There has been a good deal of fighting without 
nuclear weapons since the two were used on Japan in 1945, including wars which 
for some of the participants represented total commitment. Still, if it is not yet an 
established fact it is at minimum a strong possibility that, at least between the great 
powers who possess nuclear weapons, the whole character of war as a means of settling 
differences has been transformed beyond recognition. Why then read Clausewitz?”1991 
Brodie contends that “Clausewitz’s work stands out among those very few older books 
which have presented profound and original insights that have not been adequately 
absorbed in later literature,” and while “there are other books including some dealing 
with contemporary and especially nuclear weapons issues,” he believes that “none can 
equal it in importance or displace it in its timeliness.”1992 Indeed, Clausewitz’s work 
stands in marked contrast to such important military theorists as Foch and Douhet, 
whose influence was widespread in their own time, but whose longevity proved much 
more limited, without, in Brodie’s estimation, any lasting utility. Clausewitz, Brodie 
believes, “is probably as pertinent to our times as most of the literature specifically 
written about nuclear war,” and while the latter present “a good deal of useful tech-
nological and other lore,” they also suffer from “the absence of that depth and scope 
which are particularly the hallmark of Clausewitz. We miss especially his tough-minded 
pursuit of the idea that war in all its phases must be rationally guided by meaningful 
political purposes.”1993 
Brodie specifically castigates his increasingly popular colleague Herman Kahn for this 
very reason: “That insight is quite lost in most of the contemporary books, including 
one which bears a title that boldly invites comparison with the earlier classic, Herman 
Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War. Kahn incidentally based his main argument – that the 
United States could survive and therefore ought not too much fear a thermonuclear war 
with its chief rival – on technical premises that are certainly obsolete today, whether 
or not they were realistic when his book was published in the not-so-distant year of 
1960. Also, Kahn’s book does not, as Clausewitz’s does, have much to say of relevance 
to the Vietnam War which has intervened since and which caused the United States 
so much soul-searching and agony, though far less of the latter than that borne by the 
nation it set out to save. Kahn may still usefully supplement Clausewitz, but only in a 
limited sense is he more timely, and he does not in any way help to supplant him.”1994 
This goal, perhaps, was Brodie’s very own inner aspiration, as he pursued a path toward 
philosophical greatness much like the enigmatic Socrates that he explored as a young 
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student in 1932, and Kahn’s failure to supplant Clausewitz may well have kept this 
prize unclaimed for Brodie to pursue with his fullest vigor.
Brodie reflects on Clausewitz’s undogmatic style, noting he was “often intent upon 
demonstrating the pitfalls of such axioms, which is the quality chiefly in distinguish-
ing him from Jomini, as well as from virtually all his successors. That is one of the 
chief reasons why military people are so often disappointed with Clausewitz, for they 
are particularly accustomed in their training to absorbing against a tight schedule of 
time specific rules for conduct, a practice reflected in their broad use of the term “in-
doctrination.” Clausewitz, on the contrary, invites his readers to ruminate with him 
on the complex nature of war, where any rule that admits of no exceptions is usually 
too obvious to be worth much discourse.”1995 As for the post-World War I efforts to 
“encapsulate centuries of experience and volumes of reflection into a few tersely worded 
and usually numbered ‘principles of war,’” as reflected in the proliferation of field 
manuals, very much in the Jominian tradition, Brodie believes “Clausewitz would have 
been appalled,” and no doubt “not surprised at some of the terrible blunders that have 
been perpetrated in the name of those ‘principles,’” much like those contemporaries 
of his whom Clausewitz described as “‘the scribblers of systems and compendia.’”1996 
However, Brodie is aware (and later came to personally experience) that the “price 
of admission to the Clausewitzian alternative of intense rumination, sometimes in 
pages most densely packed with sharp insights, is a commitment to be responsive. 
This requires a different kind of reading from what we are normally accustomed to,” 
and in contrast to the speed reading suitable to “the great masses of stuff” facing most 
professionals: “With Clausewitz, however, one should be prepared to tarry, to pause 
frequently for reflection.”1997 
In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz
Brodie would revisit Clausewitz one last time during his final year of life, in a review 
of Peter Paret’s 1976 Oxford University Press book, Clausewitz and the State, in the 
Winter 1978 edition of the Journal of Interdisciplinary History, one of Brodie’s very final 
publications, and incidentally, his second review of Paret’s book – his first appearing 
1995. Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” 57. Brodie continued, “This quality is seen especially in his attitude 
toward such notions as were already beginning to be called ‘principles of war.’ Though he could hardly avoid establishing 
certain generalizations, which is inevitably the result and the purpose of analytical study, he specifically and vehemently 
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Clausewitz, who has been responsible for the endlessly quoted remark that ‘methods change but principles are unchanging,’ 
and it is largely for that reason that Jomini had far greater influence on military thinking in his own and later times, at least 
among non-Germans. It was Jomini who was looked to for guidance by both sides in the American Civil War, which in his 
very long life he lived to see concluded. And, as we have seen, it was Jomini whom Mahan called ‘my best military friend.’” 
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a year earlier in the Winter 1977 edition of International Security, “In Quest of the 
Unknown Clausewitz: A review of Paret’s Clausewitz and the State,” International 
Security 1, No.3 (Winter 1977).1998 Brodie and Paret had engaged in a long dialogue 
on Clausewitz dating back many years, and while they did not always agree on all 
things Clausewitz, Brodie’s review found Paret’s contribution to the literature to be “a 
distinguished book, and it would be a magnificent example of the historian’s art at its 
best even if its subject were a person of less significance than Carl von Clausewitz.”1999 
Brodie observes that Paret’s work “gives us access, in English, to the mind and work 
of one whose name is a byword but whose life and thought are virtually unknown to 
all but a small handful of scholars, most of them German or of German origin. And 
for these few Clausewitzian scholars, in whatever language they write, it is an original 
contribution of first importance.”2000 Brodie notes that “Paret not only analyzes and 
clarifies Clausewitz’s philosophy in its final bloom but also traces its development from 
early adult- hood,” and that he is “keenly attuned to the influences upon Clausewitz’s 
development of the philosophical thought and the military and political events of the 
frenzied and volatile period in which Clausewitz lived his two lives, the active military 
one and the scholarly one.”2001 Brodie adds that “[i]t might also be relevant in this age 
of psychohistory to point to something not altogether evident from the book itself,” 
and that is “Paret comes from a family of psychoanalysts, and his wife is one,” and 
Paret “himself has devoted a good deal of study to the work of Freud and his follow-
ers, and he is clearly sympathetic to that work.”2002 
Brodie notes Paret “acknowledges that he has deliberately ‘understated’ those aspects 
of his subject’s inner life that might have occurred to him as he read Clausewitz’s 
voluminous personal documents, such as his letters to his wife and others,” adding 
that “[p]erhaps he does so excessively, and he admits as much. But in his last chapter, 
where he makes a calm assessment of Clausewitz’s character and personality, mostly 
1998. Bernard Brodie, “In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz: A review of Paret’s Clausewitz and the State,” International 
Security 1, No.3 (Winter 1977).
1999. Bernard Brodie, “Review of Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8, No. 3 
(Winter, 1978), 572.
2000. Bernard Brodie, “Review of Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8, No. 3 
(Winter, 1978), 572.
2001. Brodie, “Review of Clausewitz and the State,” 573. Brodie added, “As the title indicates, Clausewitz’s changing 
concept of the state is selected as the central organizing thesis, for it is the basic idea in the Clausewitzian philosophical 
structure that war has meaning only as it carries out the policy of the state. Fortunately, however, Paret does not permit this 
theme too exclusive a dominance. Paret has the advantage through birth and rearing of being completely at home in three 
languages, including German, in which he does most of his research, and English, in which he writes smoothly and with 
a flawless clarity. To that he adds a capacity for meticulous scholarship, which is marked also by extraordinary breadth and 
depth. He seems to have read and absorbed everything of even the most modest relevance to his work. The connections 
he reveals between persons, writings, and events bear witness both to a penetrating insight and to the most fastidious care 
for the correctness of his factual detail. Such a level of historical scholarship is rarely attained.”
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to refute what he regards as unfounded assertions by others, he explains his cau-
tion. It is a brief chapter, but unusually important, even apart from its centering on 
Clausewitz. Paret apparently believes, with Freud, that the door to the unconscious 
does not open easily.”2003 As Brodie elaborates: “‘Historians,’ he says, ‘may consider it 
useful to attempt interpretations of the psychological elements and dynamics of their 
subjects. But unless they and their readers are content with purely subjective specula-
tions, their interpretations will . . . have to deal critically with all the evidence, and 
be prepared to admit ignorance when necessary evidence is lacking’ Paret, in short, 
though with no less knowledge of the relevant discipline, is at the opposite end of 
the spectrum from a Mazlish, who in a recent ‘psycho-biography’ of Henry Kissinger, 
based entirely on open sources and one pro-forma interview, declared that he knew 
Kissinger better than Kissinger knew himself.”2004 Brodie finds that the “reputation 
of Clausewitz is great enough to warrant his being the subject of Paret’s largest and 
finest work thus far,” and he notes its publication “has come just prior to that of the 
new and superior translation of On War by Paret and Michael Howard,” published by 
Princeton University Press, that Brodie contributed to by means of both a foreword 
and an afterword and which “happens also to coincide with the publication in Paris 
of the two-volume work on Clausewitz by Aron.”2005 
Brodie describes the riddle of Clausewitz’s endurance stemming from the complex-
ity of his thinking and the inability to boil his philosophy down to simple maxims, 
noting: “Yet what a strangely ambiguous thing is the Clausewitzian reputation, resting 
on a base that is solid in merit but projected through a century and a half mostly on 
the strength of hearsay. As one who sedulously avoided the propounding of precepts 
or ‘principles’ in the manner of his contemporary Antoine Henri Jomini, or of later 
writers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ferdinand Foch, or Giulio Douhet, Clause-
witz is not likely to have had any indirect influence. The basic ideas of each among 
the others could be summed up more or less adequately in relatively few words and 
transmitted, usually with an aura of revealed truth, to many who have never read 
him or possibly have never heard of him. That could not be done with Clausewitz. 
He could influence only those who carefully and thoughtfully read at least his major 
work, first published posthumously in 1832. To do this was long impossible to anyone 
not at home in the German language.”2006 Brodie rhetorically asks, “If his influence 
was so clearly limited outside Germany and somewhat questionable even inside that 
country, why does he, at this late date, merit so much attention?”2007 The answer to 
2003. Brodie, “Review of Clausewitz and the State,” 573-74.
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this question of Clausewitz’s long influence, Brodie offers, is: “Simply because his has 
been the one truly great mind throughout man’s warring history to have committed 
itself to developing a comprehensive theory of the essential character and purposes 
of war and of the means of studying it,” and that Clausewitz “succeeded sufficiently 
to produce a profound work with strong claims to timelessness. In short, one reads 
Clausewitz today not because of his real or alleged influence in the past or because 
certain modern ideas about war are supposed to be traceable mainly to him, but be-
cause of his continuing intrinsic value.”2008 
2008. Brodie, “Review of Clausewitz and the State,” 573.
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Chapter Seven
After Brodie: The Continuing Evolution of Clausewitz Studies
An American Renaissance in Clausewitz Studies
Just as fighting men embraced Jomini for many decades after Napoleon’s eventual 
defeat, and welcomed the precision of his maxims (which left little in doubt), it 
would be mostly men of letters – historians, theorists, analysts, and philosophers of 
war – who first embraced Clausewitz and his classic On War in post-World War II 
America, at least before the humbling defeat in Vietnam inspired American soldiers 
and their commanders to plough through the Prussian’s long and convoluted opus. 
War, to Clausewitz, was an extreme but natural expression of policy. He fought against 
Napoleon and saw in the extreme chaos of his time a compelling justification to 
fight. The moral imperative of war from his perspective was so profound, so obvious, 
that it needed little explanation or justification in his work. Indeed, Napoleon was 
such a gathering threat to European security that war against him, as a necessary and 
continuing response to his imperial threat, justified itself in Clausewitz’s mind, even 
when his King would make a separate peace. 
Raymond Aron aptly captures the spirit of Clausewitz with the title to the English 
translation of his book on the Prussian: Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. If Clausewitz 
presents us with his new paradigm of strategy as an art, then the study of war becomes 
something beyond theorems and other scientific pretense, just as Brodie himself 
would later conceive of the study of war in the nuclear age. As Aron described: “Over 
a period of some fifteen years he sought to formulate a conceptual system, a theory 
(in the sense that we speak of economic theory today) which enables the concept of 
war (or real wars) to be thought out with lucidity. At the age of 25, influenced by 
Scharnhorst and events, he already knew which types of theory to reject as being 
contrary to the nature of things and as offering bad advice: namely those which failed 
to recognize the role of emotion, of military virtues and of passions; in short, of the 
human side of war and its conduct, those which put forward strict rules and claim to 
have discovered one rule amongst them all which is responsible for victory or defeat, 
those which failed to take heed of the singularity of each combination of events, and 
exclude the part played by accident and good or bad luck. But of what worth is a 
theory that bears no resemblance to unilateral, pseudo-rational, illusory, deadly doc-
trines? Clausewitz pondered for fifteen years before he gave a definitive answer which 
none the less remains ambiguous in certain respects. He, too, could have quoted after 
Montesquieu the Latin adage: proles sine matre creata. Like the author of De l’esprit 
des lois, who perhaps influenced him more than the Germans thought, he sought the 
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theory of a praxis amenable to changes in history, to the hazards of fate and to human 
passions.”2009 And yet, Aron noted, “[w]hile the purpose is not in doubt, the same 
cannot be said for the unfinished work,” which remained riddled with contradiction, 
as “Clausewitz himself never succeeded in entirely clarifying his own ideas.”2010 This 
may account, in part, for why Clausewitz’s “masterpiece remained unfinished,” and 
why “he did not want it published in his lifetime.”2011 
And so unlike his mentor Scharnhorst, Clausewitz kept his work largely to himself, 
apart from three anonymous articles that he published. As Aron described, Clausewitz 
“never perfected the Treatise and he wrote, before sealing the manuscript, that the 
latter in its existing form lent itself to all sorts of misunderstandings.”2012 Clausewitz 
therefore did not, as in his early work destined for the young and future king, write 
directly to his peers or even to win the favor of the Crown. Aron believes he wrote 
instead “for himself ” and “for those who would be prepared to study him” in later 
ages. Not unlike the classical realists, from Thucydides on up, he wrote for poster-
ity, participating by intent in a grand dialogue with and across history.2013 But in 
his lifetime, he otherwise “never dreamt of publication because he was aware of the 
grandeur of his work and because he suffered in advance from the criticisms that he 
foresaw. Too sensitive to face the lack of understanding without bitterness, too proud 
to defend his writings, he wrote for posterity.”2014 
Since Clausewitz wrote for the future, more so it seems than for the present, Aron 
believes it is “legitimate” to attempt a more contemporary “interpretation of Clause-
witz in the light of Lenin or of Mao Tse-Tung, or in relation to the nuclear age,” as 
has so often been done by theorists of war in later ages – so long as we “respect the 
prerequisites of historical knowledge,” and that we do not confuse “what Clausewitz 
meant to say to those who belonged to his world, to those who shared the same his-
torical experience and who gave the same meanings to words” with “the interpretation 
of the meaning or meanings which his work and system retain or take on for us, in 
terms of our own world and our own experiences.”2015 Adds Aron, “Whoever confuses 
the two tasks violates the rules of historical dialogue.”2016 The tradition established 
by Clausewitz, that’s now so well established in the contemporary strategic thinker’s 
mind, and in recent years has cast as strong an influence on the mind of the military 
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commander as Jomini’s approach had for generations before, looks at war as a chaotic 
realm on par with Plato’s world of fleeting sense, a world so difficult to understand 
that only through philosophy, a dialectical inquiry between reality and mind, between 
war’s pervasive fog and the ingenious commander’s mind’s instinctual clarity, will reveal 
underlying cause and effect. 
Clausewitz emerged from the very same Napoleonic revolution in warfare that 
brought forth Jomini, but not at the Emperor’s side where Jomini had stood but in-
stead standing in his path. Clausewitz’s determined effort to understand, and through 
understanding, to defeat Napoleon became a quest that nearly cost him his career, as 
he became an outspoken advocate of military reform, new popular militia forces, and 
briefly took up arms in opposition to his very own King. Clausewitz practiced what 
he preached, and this perhaps has contributed to the endurance of his voice across 
the ages. For a time, his determination and his undying sense of commitment to the 
struggle helped to set back his career. But in the end, his wisdom and his preeminent 
reputation helped to restore his success even in the face of such adversity. And yet 
despite standing on the opposite side of the battlefield, Clausewitz was much like 
Jomini, the man who lived in the shadow of Napoleon and whose theoretical response 
never quite broke free from this shadow. 
While clearly on the other side, Clausewitz was not so far removed from this other 
father of modern strategic thought who is sometimes juxtaposed as Clausewitz’s nemesis 
and who enjoyed, in his own lifetime, far greater influence than the Prussian theorist 
so beloved in our own time. Jomini looked more to science than art and philosophy 
to help elucidate some fundamental maxims from the Napoleonic experience, and 
to thereby help harness the objectivity and power of modern scientific theory to 
help to reshape military history, and influence the way we view the events of his era. 
Jomini thus became our eyes and ears as we travel through the Napoleonic period. 
As Thucydides used the decline of Athenian military power during the long war of 
the Peloponnesus as his explanatory model, fueling his eventual rise to global, indeed 
millennial, fame as The Historian, Jomini used the rise of Napoleon as his model to 
become The Scientist of Strategy or the founding father of modern military science – 
while Clausewitz used the eventual fall of Napoleon (coupled with his stunning rise), 
to construct a dynamic and complex model, becoming along the way The Philosopher 
of War. Historian, scientist and philosopher – each on a mission to leave in our minds 
his image of reality, in the hope that this will help us move more securely from present 
to future, illuminated by the lessons of the past. 
In his study of Clausewitz’s impact on Anglo-American strategic thought, Clausewitz 
in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945, Christo-
pher Bassford wrote that “Clausewitz himself was skeptical of the role of theory in 
forming the character of military leaders, although he hoped it could educate their 
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judgment, and On War’s intended audience is unclear. Clausewitz wrote essentially 
for the ‘military analyst.’ In practice, that probably means staff officers and military 
historians rather than commanders.”2017 Bassford has found that on both sides of the 
Atlantic, “Clausewitz’s admirers were generally military reformers, or at least persons 
seriously dissatisfied with any status quo;” and often, especially so in the nineteenth 
century, they were “social reformers” and “‘maverick’ personalities.”2018 His admirers 
tended to include military professionals “during those rare periods – generally brought 
on by severe military embarrassments – when military reform was in fashion,” as the 
“tendency toward philosophical hairsplitting necessary in the application of Clause-
witz’s methods is rather alien to the spirit of military organizational culture.”2019 
When it came to Clausewitz’s linkage of war and politics, Bassford found the British 
to be generally accepting of this premise, being “quite aware of the connection” from 
their own historical and strategic experiences. But in America, he found, “professional 
soldiers bitterly resisted the idea that politics had any relevance to military strategy or 
operations,” and despite the constitutional subordination of the military to civilian 
control, “the U.S. Army as an institution continued to argue that politics ceased when 
war began,” a view shared by the Air Force, but one the Navy, under the influence 
of A.T. Mahan and later George Meyers, rejected with its view that diplomacy and 
external international politics “drove naval policy in both peace and war.”2020 Bassford 
observes that the “Truman-MacArthur crisis over Korea settled this issue in a practi-
cal sense, but it was undoubtedly the Vietnam experience that finally drove home to 
the army as an institution the inherent interaction of war, politics, and policy.” The 
post-Vietnam era thus saw the “official adoption of Clausewitz as a guiding light in 
most of the American armed services.”2021
As one can see immediately in Book I of On War, in the chapter on “Danger,” 
Clausewitz was no apologist for the horror of warfare, with his portrait of total war 
reminiscent of other students of chaos, like Thucydides and Hobbes. War’s terror 
was familiar to him: he first experienced battle at the young age of twelve, very likely 
before his very first wet dream (with sexual maturation occurring later then than it 
does now): thus war was perhaps his first encounter with intimacy and passion, his 
first exposure to the blood and sweat of others, his first venture into adulthood. It was 
likely his first love just as it was no doubt his first hate. He did not glorify and simplify 
what Sherman (not likely the first) called Hell. He did not strip it of its uniqueness 
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not rob it of its sophistication. Instead he tried to understand its troubled soul. He 
sought to master it, much like Machiavelli sought to master fortuna. He looked into 
its womb for its very origins, and did not turn away from its secrets no matter how 
intimate. Instead he revealed what it truly was, as seen through his eyes, described in 
his words, bringing his observations of war directly to us many years later. Indeed, 
over a century later, we still read his account of war with fascination. It rolls across 
our visual fields like Tolstoy. It does not lose its relevance, because his questions were 
so basic that the answers even today make sense, good sense. Though his answers are 
not simple, they are good, provocative, and deep. 
That is why Clausewitz has come into fashion as we entered our age of complexity 
and asymmetry – and in particular, after America’s humiliation in Vietnam, when his 
talk of friction and uncertainty struck a chord with bloodied, and humbled, military 
commanders. Paret tells us that Clausewitz’s classic had less noble beginnings. As one 
might expect from the literature of his period, he began with an inquiry into the un-
derlying scientific principles of strategy, much like Jomini. Like Jomini, he wanted to 
“set down [his] conclusions on the principal elements of this topic [strategy] in short, 
precise, compact statements.”2022 
But this was soon abandoned, and the result of his search for truth became his 
sprawling, uncompleted, and quite difficult to fully digest magnum opus, On War. As 
Bassford describes: “On War is often less a window into reality than a mirror for its 
reader, perhaps necessarily so. This has been my own experience with it. When I first 
read it as an undergraduate at the College of William and Mary, it was the abstract 
discussion of ‘absolute war’ and the idea of war as a rational continuation of policy 
that seemed to me to be its essence. When I read it during my military service, it was 
the discussion of friction, chance, and moral factors that most struck me. Today, when 
I work as a historian, it is Clausewitz’s historicist philosophy that provides the key to 
understanding. Every time I had read it, it has seemed a different book, but it is only 
myself who has changed. Thus it is little wonder that the survivors of trench warfare 
of 1914-18 saw their experiences in On War’s pages, just as Vietnam veterans tend 
to see in it a textbook on what went wrong in their war. That this is the case would 
not have surprised Clausewitz, who insisted that personal experience was essential to 
any understanding of the phenomenon of war. . . . Like the finest tools available to 
artists, scientists, or soldiers, the product of a Clausewitzian approach is very much 
dependent on the peculiarities of the mind that wields it. However the predispositions 
of the reader may affect his or her view of war, the lens offered by Clausewitz provides 
for a much more distinct vision.”2023
2022. Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy (1986), 187.
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Often when Clausewitz is discussed, it is in done with comparative reference that 
other theorist of his generation who became in many ways his primary rival with regard 
to asserting a lasting historical influence, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. As Hew 
Strachan has observed, “If modern strategic thought finds its roots in the nineteenth 
century, Jomini has a much greater claim to be its father than Clausewitz;” having 
“served as a staff officer with the French army of Napoleon between 1805 and 1813, 
writing as he went, and then devoting the rest of his career to redefining his thoughts 
about warfare.”2024 
Hew Strachan, in Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography, notes “Clausewitz’s specific 
blows against Jomini in On War were few and glancing, rebutting what Jomini laid 
down as general principles,” but his critique of Jomini was “much more forthright 
in his other works, and became more so as he grew older,” as the rivalry gained trac-
tion – such as in an historical analysis of the French campaign against the Austrians 
in Italy in 1796 which rebuked Jomini’s analysis as “insufficient, full of gaps, obscure, 
contradictory – in short it is everything that an overall account of events and their 
relationships should not be.”2025 While “[i]n all probability Clausewitz had not even 
crossed Jomini’s horizon until these words were published in 1833, two years after 
Clausewitz’s death,” Strachan noted Jomini “rose to the challenge” and in the preface to 
his 1838 Precis de l’art de la guerre claimed to “have been able to find in [Clausewitz’s] 
labyrinthine intellect only a few insights and noteworthy points.”2026 Adds Strachan: 
“Jomini’s criticisms of Clausewitz are worth quoting at length, precisely because they 
have never been wholly dismissed,” and it took fifteen years before Clausewitz’s On 
War was translated into French, limiting its early readership, and once translated, it 
received a critical response from French military instructor La Barre Duparcq whose 
“reactions mirrored those of Jomini.”2027 Further, when On War was revised and reissued 
in 1853, its first edition of 1,500 copies had not yet sold out, even though the third 
and final volume had been published nearly twenty years before. Strachan also cites 
Wilhelm Rustow’s 1857 reaction, who, “while comparing Clausewitz to Thucydides 
and saying he was ‘good for all times’, confessed that he ‘has become well known, but 
is very little read.’”2028 
And, he added, “Like Jomini’s judgment, Rustow’s has never lost its force,” at least 
until “Prussia’s stunning and rapid victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-
71, culminating in the unification of Germany,” which “inaugurated the first true 
discovery of Clausewitz,” after which “[t]he German army now became the model for 
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Europe, and Clausewitz was cast as its intellectual father.”2029 This culminated in the 
strategic thinking of Erich Ludendorff, whose 1935 Der totale Krieg was not about 
Clausewitz’s “total war” but a more modern, and in the end destructive, “totalitarian 
war” that focused on “how to mobilize the whole state for war,” with war no longer 
a continuation of policy, but policy now subordinated to war.2030 It was Ludendorff 
who “therefore acted as a bridge between the ideas of the German General Staff in 
1914-18 and the rhetoric of Fascism,” with its erosion of “the distinctions between war 
and peace” and definition of “politics as an existential struggle for survival.”2031 The 
Nazis thus breathed new life into Clausewitz, and Hitler found in On War a model 
for German recovery from its “heroic collapse.”2032 Interestingly, Clausewitz also ap-
pealed to the Communists, finding supportive readers in Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, 
though initially rejected by Stalin as obsolete in “the machine age of war” before being 
rehabilitated by Khrushchev and integrated with Marxist-Leninist doctrine.2033 Not-
ing that “[e]ach generation has read Clausewitz differently, often selectively,” Strachan 
concludes that “neither Hitler nor Marx was wrong,” and that “there was something 
in Clausewitz for each of them.”2034 Strachan points out how: “Every generation has 
tended to look at what Clausewitz wrote in the light of its own preoccupations, but in 
using his thoughts in this way is always in danger of treating the text selectively. That 
in itself is neither illegitimate nor inappropriate, but by the same token no one school 
can claim the monopoly of wisdom in its interpretation of Clausewitz’s work.”2035
Bassford also considers the enduring appeal of Clausewitz to future generations of 
strategic theorists, as well as the recent resurrection of Jomini – in part to counter the 
growing influence of the new generation of theorists inspired in part by Clausewitz, 
often called the “neo-Clausewitzians,” in his paper, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their 
Interaction,” presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary 
Europe at Georgia State University on February 26, 1993. He probes the relationship 
of these two pivotal interpreters of the Napoleonic experience, their rivalry as well as 
their common perspectives.2036 Bassford notes the two theorists are often perceived 
to be, and presented as, adversaries representing opposing views, but he finds that 
they share much in common: “Most frequently, Jomini is treated as being somehow 
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the opposite of Clausewitz: military educators often hurl the epithets ‘Jominian’ and 
‘Clausewitzian’ at one another as if those single words somehow summed up their 
opponents’ fallacious world-views and defects of personal character.”2037 But this is not 
always the case, as “a number of thoughtful observers have considered the differences 
between Jomini and Clausewitz to be rather inconsequential,” such as the American 
naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose “father, military educator Dennis Hart 
Mahan, is generally considered to have been a devout Jominian, and so is his son.”2038 
Bassford notes both Mahans were “creative thinkers in their own right, and calling 
them ‘Jominians’ is an unfair characterization,”2039 not just because the term is some-
times applied pejoratively, but because its overlooks the influence of Clausewitz on 
their strategic thinking. Indeed, as Bassford notes, “[t]he younger Mahan eventually 
became familiar with Clausewitz, calling him ‘one of the first of authorities’;” but find-
ing “Clausewitz to be in essential agreement with Jomini in all significant respects,” 
Mahan “continued to put forth his arguments in largely Jominian terminology.”2040 
Bassford also notes that the “great British Clausewitzian Spenser Wilkinson thought 
that Mahan and Clausewitz were in general accord” while “[i]n Germany, Albrecht 
von Boguslawski also argued that Jomini and Clausewitz were saying the same thing,” 
and at the “U.S. Naval War College Professor Michael Handel has sought to reconcile 
the two theorists.”2041 
Clausewitz and Jomini “often appear either as opposites or as twins,” but Bassford 
suggests “the truth lies somewhere else,” and that “[i]n reality, Jomini and Clausewitz 
saw much the same things in war, but saw them through very different eyes.”2042 
Bassford traces their commonalities to their shared interest in Frederick the Great’s 
campaign, their shared experiences of the Napoleonic Wars (albeit on opposing sides), 
and their mutual awareness of each other’s works. Despite these shared experiences, 
Bassford observes “their approaches to military theory were fundamentally different, 
and the source of these differences can be found in their very different personalities.”2043 
Bassford notes that “[a]side from their differing relationships to Napoleon, the fun-
damental differences between Clausewitz and Jomini are rooted in their differing 
concepts of the historical process and of the nature and role of military theory.”2044 As 
he elaborates: “Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, rejecting absolute categories, 
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standards, and values. The past had to be accepted on its own terms. … In contrast, 
Jomini’s view of history and of war was static and simplistic. He saw war as a “great 
drama,” a stage for heroes and military geniuses whose talents were beyond the com-
prehension of mere mortals. … The purpose of his theory was to teach practical lessons 
to “officers of a superior grade.” Accordingly, Jomini’s aim was utilitarian and his tone 
didactic. His writing thus appealed more readily to military educators. His later work, 
Summary of the Art of War (Precis de l’Art de la Guerre, 1838), became, in various 
translations, popularizations, and commentaries, the premier military-educational 
text of the mid-nineteenth century.”2045 Bassford believes that “[m]uch of the contrast 
between Jomini and Clausewitz can be traced to such philosophical factors – and to 
the frequent abridgement of On War, which makes it appear much more abstract than 
Jomini’s work when in fact they often discussed the same practical subject matter.”2046 
Though the two famed theorists of war never met in person, Bassford speculates that 
they “may have caught a glimpse of one another from opposite sides during the tragic 
crossing of the Beresina river during the French retreat from Moscow,” and adds that 
“they interacted intellectually, influencing one another’s thinking over a long period 
of time.”2047 Indeed, Bassford notes that “[w]hen the young Clausewitz wrote his 
Principles of War (1812) for his student the Prussian crown prince, he seems to have 
been rather taken with Jomini and his argument about interior lines,” referring to 
Jomini throughout while utilizing his “geometric vocabulary,” even though the older 
Clausewitz who penned On War “would be quite skeptical on all these matters.”2048 
And while he “accepted Jomini’s fundamental strategic theme,” that “[t]he theory of 
warfare tries to discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and 
material advantages at the decisive point,” he qualified it in a manner that would now 
think of as signature Clausewitzian, adding “As this is not always possible, theory also 
teaches us to calculate moral factors: the likely mistakes of the enemy, the impression 
created by a daring action, . . . yes, even our own desperation.”2049 Bassford finds the 
older Clausewitz of On War “became extremely skeptical of Jomini,” and his “sweep-
ing critique of the state of military theory appears to have been aimed in large part” 
at Jomini, in particular his insistence upon “fixed values” when “in war everything 
is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities;” his focus 
“exclusively toward physical quantities” when “all military action is intertwined with 
psychological forces and effects;” his consideration of “only unilateral action, whereas 
war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites,” as well as “the ‘lopsided char-
2045. Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.”
2046. Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.”
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acter’ of the theory of interior lines.”2050 And yet, Bassford notes, “[a]nyone who reads 
Jomini’s most famous work – and if you think few people actually read On War, there 
are even fewer who read the Summary – will notice quite readily that Clausewitz’s 
remarks seem unduly harsh and misleading,” and that “Jomini’s prefatory comments 
seem quite reasonable and entirely compatible with a Clausewitzian understanding 
of war, despite Jomini’s personal barbs at Clausewitz.”2051 
Indeed, Bassford points out that Jomini does indeed comment “on the importance 
of morale; the impossibility of fixed rules (save perhaps in tactics); the need to assign 
limits to the role of theory; skepticism of mathematical calculations (and a denial 
that Jomini’s own work – despite all the geometrical terminology and diagrams – was 
based on math); the disclaimer of any belief that war is ‘a positive science;’ and the 
clear differentiation between mere military knowledge and actual battlefield skill.”2052 
Moreover, Bassford writes that “Jomini acknowledged the truth of Clausewitz’s 
strong connection between politics and war,” and his “Summary is full of references 
to ‘politique’ – the same term as Clausewitz’s Politik.” Bassford notes one reason for 
the perceived gulf between the two theorists is their “similarity” on the relationship 
of war to politics “is hidden by the standard English translation, which substitutes 
the term ‘diplomacy’.”2053 Nonetheless, “Jomini’s recognition of the validity of many 
of Clausewitz’s points did not lead him to genuinely adopt Clausewitz’s philosophy,” 
and “he found the Prussian’s approach intellectually arrogant, overly metaphysical, 
and simply too damned difficult to digest,” preferring “simplicity and clarity” over 
“a ‘pretentious’ search for deeper truths.”2054 On a personal level, Bassford notes that 
Jomini felt “deeply wounded by the criticisms in On War,” resulting in “a number of 
sneers,” even if he nonetheless makes “concessions on theoretical issues” to his Prus-
sian rival.2055
Bassford chronicles the “return of Jomini” to a position of influence among military 
theorists, and notes “certain recent attempts to revive Jomini” have arisen as “reaction 
against the predominance of Clausewitzian theory in this country since the Vietnam 
war,” as well as his influence among the nuclear theorists – in addition to what retired 
U.S. Army Colonel Arthur Lykke, a professor of strategy at the Army War College, 
called the “excessive influence of ‘Clausewitz nuts’,” and what was described by U.S. 
Army Colonel Lloyd Matthews, editor of Parameters, as “the prostitution of Clausewitz 
since 1981, particularly in [the U.S. Army’s] FM 1005 and its various degenerate off-
2050. Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.”
2051. Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.”
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spring,” in a July 17, 1989 letter. Both of these complaints, cited by Joel Achenbach in 
his December 6, 1990 Washington Post article, “War and the Cult of Clausewitz: How 
a Long Dead Prussian Shaped US Thinking on the Persian Gulf,” Bassford believes 
“have some justification.”2056 Bassford is sympathetic to Jomini’s re-emergence, and 
believes “most of what Jomini had to contribute that was of real value – which was a 
great deal – has long since been absorbed into the way we write practical doctrine,” 
while “Clausewitz’s contributions, on the other hand, have not. Indeed, given the 
brilliance and subtlety of many of Clausewitz’s concepts, it is hard to see how they 
could ever become the ‘conventional wisdom.’”2057
And yet, even amidst a Jominian resurgence, Clausewitz’s influence remains strong, 
and since the end of the Cold War has appeared to re-intensify, permeating both 
the halls of academia as well as the military services, cross-pollinating both strategic 
theory and doctrine, even making something of a cameo appearance in America’s 
re-articulated counterinsurgency doctrine, FM 3-24, in December 2006, again pre-
cipitating a neo-Jominian backlash against its population-centric focus which, like 
the first wave of Cold War strategists a generation earlier, seemed to over-emphasize 
the primacy of policy and underemphasized the centrality of battle in war. In addi-
tion to a brief reference in chapter one of FM 3-24 rebutting Clausewitz’s belief that 
insurgency could only play a role in defensive operations,2058 a prominent quotation 
from Clausewitz introduces the fourth chapter, “Designing Counterinsurgency Cam-
paigns and Operations.” Drawn from chapter one, section twenty-seven of On War 
on “The Effects of This Point of View on the Understanding of Military History and 
the Foundation of Theory,” which followed section twenty-six reiterating that “All 
Wars Can Be Considered Acts of Policy,” Clausewitz is cited as saying: “The first, the 
supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander 
have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither 
mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This 
is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”2059
Clausewitz would be proud to discover that he would ultimately cast such an en-
during influence on military thought across the ages. And so would his close partner 
in life, his beloved wife Marie. In her introduction to the posthumous publication of 
her husband’s On War, she wrote: “The work to which these lines serve as a preface 
occupied almost entirely the last twelve years of the life of my inexpressibly beloved 
2056. Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.”
2057. Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction.”
2058. “Clausewitz thought that wars by an armed populace could only serve as a strategic defense; however, theorists after 
World War II realized that insurgency could be a decisive form of warfare.” David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, eds., 
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 2006), 1-20.
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husband, who has unfortunately been torn too soon from myself and his country. To 
complete it was his most earnest desire; but it was not his intention that it should be 
published during his life; and if I tried to persuade him to alter that intention, he often 
answered, half in jest, but also, perhaps, half in a foreboding of early death: “Thou shalt 
publish it.” These words (which in those happy days often drew tears from me, little 
as I was inclined to attach a serious meaning to them) make it now, in the opinion 
of my friends, a duty incumbent on me to introduce the posthumous works of my 
beloved husband, with a few prefatory lines from myself; and although here may be 
a difference of opinion on this point, still I am sure there will be no mistake as to the 
feeling which has prompted me to overcome the timidity which makes any such ap-
pearance, even in a subordinate part, so difficult for a woman. It will be understood, 
as a matter of course, that I cannot have the most remote intention of considering 
myself as the real editress of a work which is far above the scope of my capacity: I 
only stand at its side as an affectionate companion on its entrance into the world.”2060
While the loss of her beloved life partner was tremendous, the profound happiness 
she felt at his side for over two decades was sustained “by the treasure of my recollec-
tions and of my hopes, by the rich legacy of sympathy and friendship which I owe 
the beloved departed, by the elevating feeling which I experience at seeing his rare 
worth so generally and honourably acknowledged.”2061 It is interesting to note that 
in her final years, she gained in her own professional services a proximity to power 
that seems fitting, much like that which Machiavelli had long desired, a desire that 
seems to have similarly frustrated her husband, an admirer of Machiavelli who felt a 
certain kinship to the earlier theorist (quite similar to that which Brodie would later 
feel toward Clausewitz.) Clausewitz had toiled at some distance from such power, and 
from the influence he had hoped to one day gain. But like Socrates, whose millennial 
endurance resulted from his pupil’s machinations, and his willing exit from the earthly 
stage so that his ideas could take an ideational form upon his passing, as the literary 
transformation of Socrates from teacher to a metaphorical persona constructed by his 
ablest of students took place, upon the untimely passing of Clausewitz from his own 
earthly stage, his ideas later re-emerged on a higher plain, as enduring philosophical 
illuminations of man’s darkest art. 
It took Marie von Clausewitz’s intervention, persistence, editorial stewardship, and 
undying belief in and eternal love for her beloved husband to bring Clausewitz’s writ-
ings to life, and to join the pantheon of great constructive realists whose dialogue has 
continued for posterity. Perhaps her gaining the ear of the Crown Prince was part of 
her grand design to bring Clausewitz’s influence to bear upon future generations. In 
2060. Marie von Clausewitz, “Preface to the First Edition,” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Col. J.J. Graham, 
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any event, he would no doubt have been pleased, to learn of the “trust confided to me 
by a Royal Couple”2062 that enabled Marie to become Governess to Prince Friedrich 
Wilhelm, who would one day come to power as Emperor Frederick III – but who, 
because of his father’s longevity, would end up reigning for a brief 99 days. In his 
short rule, however, Frederick III was renowned for his liberalism, and had he lived 
may well have nurtured forth a less bellicose Germany into the European family of 
nations. His liberal instincts and his close ties to England were things he shared with 
the previous century’s youthfully idealistic Frederick, the aptly-named Frederick the 
Great, whose Anti-Machiavel rejected so many of realism’s cold, hard truths, nearly all 
of which would be renounced by the older, empowered Frederick when he became a 
veritable Philosopher-King, displaying unprecedented military boldness upon gaining 
the throne, and whose legacy would inspire Napoleon, whom Clausewitz famously 
dubbed the “God of War.”
Marie von Clausewitz viewed her fortune in gaining this position, and the trust of 
the royal family, to be “a fresh benefit for which I have to thank the Almighty, as it 
opens to me an honourable occupation, to which I devote myself. May this occupation 
be blessed, and may the dear little Prince who is now entrusted to my care, some day 
read this book, and be animated by it to deeds like those of his glorious ancestors.”2063 
This allowed her to serve the very state that her beloved had dedicated his life to pre-
serving, and enabled her to present his work with an introduction that was “Written 
at the Marble Palace, Potsdam” on June 30, 1832, imbuing On War with an official 
imprimatur. And so, through the undiminished love of Marie von Clausewitz, her 
husband’s philosophical treatise, unfinished but nonetheless edited and re-organized, 
posthumously came into the world, fueled by the intensity of her faith that it would 
not just influence the young prince under her care, but the countless legions of unborn 
princes and future warrior kings yet to come.
Clausewitz’s ‘Reception’: The Ambiguities of Enduring Influence
It is interesting to note in recent years, numerous Clausewitz scholars have shifted 
their emphasis to what Bassford described as the Prussian’s “reception” from the much 
harder to measure though more widely discussed “influence,” as if taking their cue 
from Brodie’s final thoughts on the endurance of the Prussian’s ideas across such a vast 
stretch of history. Bassford can be credited for continuing this shift in our time, well 
after Brodie’s exit from the earthly stage. His 1994 work, Clausewitz in English: The 
Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945, set the tone for this shift. 
2062. Marie von Clausewitz, “Preface to the First Edition,” Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1873).
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In an email to this author, Bassford explained his approach: “My experience is that 
the ‘influence’ of a thinker is impossible to trace/quantify/characterize. That’s why I 
went with the ‘reception’ of Clausewitz, for which there is actually evidence.”2064And 
yet, while difficult to measure in a strictly quantitative manner, intellectual history is 
all about influence and how ideas transmit across time. While the shift to “reception” 
is admirable in its humility, it tends to obscure the direct intellectual connections con-
veyed by the word “influence,” and with regard to Clausewitz, his influence has been 
indisputably significant even if without a tangible metric, and even if each generation 
tends to interpret the Prussian altogether differently. 
Much the same can, of course, be said of Brodie. As demonstrated in the pages 
above, it is obvious Brodie’s “influence” quickly rose and then later declined, causing 
him to feel a great frustration on his descent that may very well have paralleled that 
felt by Clausewitz at the end of his life. Like Clausewitz, Brodie’s ideas have penetrated 
deeply and have had a lasting impact, not only on the world of theory, but that of 
doctrine as well, as chronicled by Steiner in his biography of Brodie. In time, Brodie’s 
bountiful and thoughtful writings, which resisted short-term trends and specialized 
terminology to a large degree as compared to his peers whose works appear to be more 
a taxonomy of labels (i.e., “Type I” and “Type II” deterrence, terms that are seldom 
ever used any more), may thus again resonate with future scholars as well as strategists. 
Brodie aimed for a clarity of expression and analysis that was largely free of overly 
specialized jargon, and he strived for deeper historical connections that help place his 
ideas within the longer narrative of Western military history. We may yet witness a 
“Brodie renaissance” on par with the renaissance in Clausewitz studies that intensified 
after the 1976 culmination of the Clausewitz project, which Michael Howard credits 
in no small part to Brodie. 
While perhaps not as grand as the Clausewitz renaissance Brodie helped to precipi-
tate, perhaps among young nuclear states, as well as mature nuclear states rethinking 
both conventional and nuclear strategies in an increasingly nuclear world, his ideas 
and writings will enjoy a second wind. A posthumous renaissance in Brodie studies 
would in many ways help to offset the bitterness felt by Brodie during his decline 
as his more colorful colleagues saw their influence rise – including Henry Kissinger, 
who rose to great power, and Herman Kahn, who enjoyed widespread celebrity and 
would go on to found his own think tank, the Hudson Institute – as has been noted 
in the pages above by several scholars, including Newell Bringhurst, Ken Booth, and 
Barry Steiner, among others. 
As Hew Strachan has described Clausewitz’s comparable situation: “When Carl 
von Clausewitz died in 1831, he was a disappointed and frustrated man” who had 
2064. Chris Bassford, E-mail to the Author, February 26, 2012.
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“aspired to fame, but thought he had not achieved it.”2065 Fame would eventually 
come to Clausewitz, much like many great artists whose ideas were ahead of their 
time, resulting in their posthumous rehabilitation and celebrity. As Benoit Durieux 
has described, “One of the most striking features of the Clausewitzian bibliography 
is the contrast between the perennial fame of the Prussian general and the recurrent 
judgement that his ideas are outdated, useless, incomprehensible, or dangerous.”2066 
Helping to explain the selective and often self-serving interpretations of the Prussian, 
Durieux explains: “Quite naturally, the first readers devoted much attention to the 
recipes they found in the book that would enable them to achieve operational success,” 
whether the French School which “emphasized the importance of moral forces in war” 
or the Marxists who “used Clausewitz’s ideas about the people in arms to elaborate 
their theory of revolutionary war,” or the post-Vietnam American theorists of war “led 
by Colonel Harry Summers” who “were the first to underline the importance of the 
paradoxical trinity and the fog of war.”2067 
Excluded from Durieux’s list is the group most central to this present work, the 
nuclear strategists – who in contrast to the post-Vietnam theorists that emphasized 
Clausewitz’s trinity and who continue to wield great influence in the literature – focused 
their attention on Clausewitz’s most famous but perhaps least complicated dictum of 
all: that “was is a continuation of policy other means.”2068 But this particular group 
would be thoroughly examined by a contemporary of Durieux, Antulio J. Echevarria II, 
in his chapter in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Jan Willem Honig and Daniel Moran, eds., 
2011 Clausewitz, the State and War entitled “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering 
the Primacy of Policy in On War,” as well as in his book-length work, Clausewitz and 
Contemporary War, which like the above-noted work edited by Strachan and Herberg-
Rothe, was published by Oxford University Press in 2007. 
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Since Brodie’s exploration of Clausewitz coincided with the dawn of the nuclear 
age, and his focus was first and foremost on the prevention of “absolute” war, one 
can forgive his seeming disinterest in Clausewitz’s “wondrous Trinity,” though to be 
fair, the interconnection of war and politics does to a large degree encapsulate some 
of the key inter-relationships that define the trinity – especially in the democratic 
West where politics itself is comprised of two of the trinity’s pillars: the people and 
the government, and which asserts constitutional control over the third, the armed 
forces. In Brodie’s political context, then, one can reasonably argue that a focus on the 
war-policy nexus is not necessarily a dismissal of the trinity but perhaps an embrace 
of the trinity by another name, and that the real shift that took place with the post-
Vietnam interest in Clausewitz’s trinity, and the dynamics of Trinitarian warfare, was 
largely one of semantics. Of course, some theorists of Trinitarian warfare would be as 
guilty of simplifying Clausewitz as some critics such as Echevarria suggest Brodie and 
his nuclear-era colleagues were by focusing seemingly exclusively on the primacy of 
policy and the war-policy nexus, and would initially, as seen in the work of Summers, 
conflate the trinity with the three institutional pillars that most commonly embodied 
the trinity: people, state, and military, when in fact the trinity is more commonly 
understood to reflect the underlying social forces that in some cases correspond with 
these three institutional pillars, albeit not necessarily exclusively: passion, reason and 
chance. Durieux points out that there is “not one single Clausewitzian theory, but 
several, elaborated at different periods in close conjunction with the prevalent political, 
strategic and military context,” and further explains that this “is completely consonant 
with Clausewitz’s original conception of his own work.”2069
Jon Tetsuro Sumida, in Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, also takes 
a long view to Clausewitz’s influence, tracing Clausewitzian currents in the work 
of prominent strategists and scholars including Julian Corbett, B.H. Liddell Hart, 
Raymond Aron, and Peter Paret, all Clausewitz scholars in their own right. The very 
widespread and enduring support for On War, both its influence upon and its so-
called “reception” by theorists of war across the many years since the Prussian’s death, 
is recounted by Jon Tetsuro Sumida in Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On 
War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008). As he recounts: “General 
Helmuth von Moltke, the architect of victory in the major conflicts that unified 
Germany between 1864 and 1871, regarded Clausewitz’s On War as comparable in 
importance to The Iliad and the Bible. In 1911, Julian Corbett, Britain’s preeminent 
naval strategic theorist, observed that On War was ‘more firmly established than ever 
as the necessary basis of all strategical thought.’ The distinguished German military 
and naval historian Herbert Rosinksi maintained more than half a century later, in 
2069. Durieux, “Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking,” 252.
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1966, that Clausewitz’s masterpiece was ‘the most profound, comprehensive, and 
systematic examination of war and its conduct’ in existence, and then declared, ‘It 
towers above the rest of military and naval literature, penetrating into regions no other 
military thinker has ever approached.’ In 1976, Bernard Brodie, America’s pioneering 
theorist of nuclear strategy, argued that On War was ‘not simply the greatest but the 
only truly great book on war.’”2070
According to Jon Tetsuro Sumida, in Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On 
War, “For Clausewitzian studies, 1976 was a seminal year. Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret published a new English translation of On War, which was more accurate and 
much more readable than its predecessors. Paret also published Clausewitz and the 
State” and “Raymond Aron published Thinking About War: Clausewitz,” known in 
English as Clausewitz: Philosopher of War.”2071 But this “rich harvest of 1976 did not 
result in a consensus view of the general meaning of On War; indeed, interpretations 
of the work have varied widely and its meaning remains open to debate,” as “none of 
these thinkers achieved complete command of On War. Nor has anyone since their 
time produced a satisfactory explanation of Clausewitz’s thought.”2072 
In his 2007 Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography, Hew Strachan comments on the 
renewal of interest in Clausewitz precipitated in part by the 1976 publication of the 
Princeton translation of On War: “Two of the most distinguished historians of their 
generation, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, were responsible for the translation. 
Howard had fought with distinction in the Second World War: Clausewitz appealed 
to him as a soldier writing for other soldiers. His aim was an English version that sol-
diers themselves would read, and, just in case they did not, Bernard Brodie, a star of 
the strategic studies firmament of the nuclear age, concluded the volume with a short 
summary of the text. The Princeton edition of On War has proved far more successful 
than the German original ever was.”2073 Strachan continues: “Over the last thirty years 
American soldiers in particular have responded to Howard’s hopes. One of them was 
Colonel [Colin] Powell” who “described On War as ‘a beam of light from the past 
still illuminating present-day military quandaries’. Confused by the disintegration in 
Vietnam of the army he loved, and alarmed by the gulf that had opened between it 
and the society it served, he found explanations for what had gone wrong in On War. 
‘Clausewitz’s greatest lesson for my profession was that the soldier, for all his patriot-
ism, valor, and skill, forms just one leg in a triad. Without all three legs engaged, the 
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military, the government, and the people, the enterprise cannot stand.”2074 For Powell, 
it was Clausewitz’s trinity that proved most salient, in marked contrast to the earlier 
strategic theorists who focused more upon the primacy of policy, as Brodie and his 
Cold War colleagues tended to do. As well, Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., “like Powell, 
highlighted Clausewitz’s ‘trinity’, which he, also like Powell, maintained was made up 
of army, government and people.”2075 Though both Powell and Summers can be said 
to have oversimplified the trinity, perhaps as much as critics of the Cold War theorists 
overstated the importance of Clausewitz’s famous war-policy dictum, their embrace 
of the trinity reflects the emergence, post-Princeton translation, of a new focus for 
Clausewitz scholars, on a theme that perhaps better suited the complexity and asym-
metry of the post-Vietnam period, much the way it continues to do so.
Hugh Smith also addresses the issue of Clausewitz’s influence, writing: “Since the 
publication of On War between 1832 and 1834 Clausewitz has become a key figure in 
understanding war – at times ignored, condemned or canonized, his ideas sometimes 
merely misunderstood, sometimes deliberately distorted. His actual influence over 
strategy, whether for good or ill, has also been debated, though the topic is so elusive 
that scholars have preferred to focus on his ‘reception’ – the ways in which others have 
understood his ideas and reacted to them.”2076 Smith recalls how: “At the outset On 
War attracted some immediate criticism, not least from Jomini whose reputation as an 
analyst of military affairs outshone that of Clausewitz for much of the century. In his 
Summary published in 1838 Jomini aimed numerous barbs at his rival, while adjusting 
many of his ideas to Clausewitz’s analysis. On War also won ardent supporters who 
sensed that it was a work of intellectual significance,” including Engels who “recom-
mended him to Marx,” and yet “with the initial print run of 1500 copies still not fully 
sold it is fair to say that Clausewitz had fallen into ‘respectful oblivion’.”2077 But this 
would change in time and by a third edition in 1880, “Clausewitz now enjoyed a strong 
following, even reverence, in Germany, though many readers complained of his obscure 
philosophy.”2078 “Clausewitz’s wider reputation also grew,” and after French and later 
English translations, “[m]ilitary colleges in Europe and North America adopted On 
War as a major text.”2079 After World War I, a new wave of critics emerged – namely 
Liddell Hart and General J.F.C. Fuller, the former who “was determined to pain him 
as ‘the apostle of total war’ and the antithesis of his own strategic nostrum, the indirect 
approach to victory. The concept of absolute war, he argued, encouraged a focus on 
2074. Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography, 2.
2075. Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography, 2.
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mass and battle to the exclusion of all else,” and Liddell Hart came to believe that “On 
War and its theory of unlimited war … had ‘gone far to wreck civilization.’”2080 And 
“General Fuller picked up the theme of obscurantism, dismissing On War as ‘little 
more than a mass of notes, a cloud of flame and smoke’ and Clausewitz himself as 
outmoded, an obsolete ‘general of the agricultural period of war.’”2081 
And yet, Smith asks, “But how could such a work be so influential? For both Fuller 
and Liddell Hart, Clausewitz had failed to distinguish the moderating elements in his 
philosophy from inflammatory ideas such as absolute war and the importance of mass. 
Ordinary soldiers could not be expected to follow a text that was ‘too metaphysical’ 
and whose ‘generalizations made more impression than his careful qualifications’. Not 
even generals could understand his subtle logic and ‘philosophical jugglery’. To fully 
grasp On War required ‘a mind already developed by years of study and reflection’; it 
simply ‘befogged the plain soldier’. In a continent arming for war Clausewitz’s ideas 
had simple been too dangerous.”2082 In contrast to Liddell Hart’s and Fuller’s strenu-
ous criticism of Clausewitz, Captain T.E. Lawrence (famously known as “Lawrence 
of Arabia”) “was a great admirer of On War, finding it ‘logical and fascinating’, and 
considered Clausewitz the intellectual master of all writers on war. Lawrence shared 
his emphasis on the political and social context of military action.”2083 Clausewitz also 
asserted much influence in the Soviet Union, where “Lenin, who grasped the linkage 
between war and politics better than most, urged senior officers of the Red Army to 
study the Prussian general,” and three themes in particular “struck a chord in commu-
nist ideology. First was Clausewitz’s historicism, his belief that war reflected changing 
social and material conditions. Second was Clausewitz’s rejection of war as a subject 
that would yield to scientific analysis. Struggle – whether in war or revolution – could 
not be reduced to mere technique. Third was Clausewitz’s insistence that policy must 
control military action.”2084 And though Stalin “later dismissed Clausewitz’s ideas as 
relevant only to the ‘hand-tool period of warfare’ rather than the machine age, more 
serious thinkers in Russia argued for recognition of the progressive features in his 
work.”2085
In his chapter on Clausewitz in his sweeping A History of Military Thought, Azar Gat 
writes of how “interest in Clausewitz, after an eclipse between the two World Wars 
(except in Germany), was revived in the 1950s, predominantly owing to the significance 
that his treatment of the relationship between policy and war and of limited war bore 
2080. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 240.
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on the political and military problems of the nuclear age. A ‘Clausewitz renaissance’ 
has developed in strategic and political literature, perhaps no less popularized and 
selective in nature than the attitudes to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century, though, 
ironically, with opposing emphases.”2086 Gat writes that prior to 1827, Clausewitz’s 
thinking greatly differed from his later thoughts on the nature of war: “The nature of 
war is fighting; hence all the characteristics of its ‘lasting spirit’: the primacy of the 
engagement and of the major battle, aided by a massive concentration of forces and 
aggressive conduct, and aiming at the total overthrow of the enemy. Throughout his 
life, this conception was the centre-piece of Clausewitz’s military outlook. It reflected 
the overwhelming impact of the Napoleonic experience, was the source of Clausewitz’s 
attacks on the war of manoeuvre in all periods and particularly in the eighteenth 
century, and formed the basis for his belief in a universal theory of war.”2087 But then 
his ideas changed: “Ironically, in 1827, this whole military outlook fell into a deep 
crisis. In the middle of composing On War, Clausewitz’s line of thought underwent 
a drastic change of direction, the only revolutionary transformation in the otherwise 
steady evolution of his ideas. In a note on the state of his work dated 10 July of 
that year, Clausewitz announced his intention to revise On War on the basis of two 
guiding ideas: firstly, that there are two types of war: all-out war and limited war; 
and secondly that war is the continuation of policy by other means.”2088 Continues 
Gat, “The crisis of his conception of the nature of war was equally destructive for 
Clausewitz’s lifelong conception of theory. In his efforts to resolve this comprehensive 
crisis, he transformed but did not abandon his old military outlook, and resorted to 
completely new theoretical devices. He was occupied with this during his last three 
working years.”2089 Gat adds with regret that “the origins and nature of Clausewitz’s 
new theoretical framework have remained a mystery,” as has been “the exact nature of 
the transformation in his thought.”2090 And, Gat adds: “This explains why Clausewitz’s 
ideas could be interpreted so differently by successive generations” and why “the men 
of the nineteenth century emphasized the place of the major battle and the element 
of destruction in Clausewitz’s thought” while “modern readers, contending with the 
problem of limited war and seeking out the full complexity of the link between politi-
cal and military activity, have stressed theme sin his later thought.”2091
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Fueled in part by the rejection of “the military and political legacy of the Ger-
man Reich, a new, ‘good’ Clausewitz has had to be created, set apart from his ‘bad’ 
successors.”2092 And, as suggested by Echevarria, Gat writes: “While blaming their 
discredited predecessors for being tendentious and one-sided, modern interpreters 
have therefore themselves failed to recognize that the imperative of destruction was 
the basis of Clausewitz’s conception of war,” and “some have even denied that he held 
such an idea at all.”2093 But for the “men of the nineteenth century, the heyday of the 
idea of all-out war, elevated Clausewitz to the pantheon of classics for his outlook on 
war described above. But for the present-day reader, after the collapse of the dogma of 
destruction in the First World War and the renaissance of limited war in the nuclear 
age, this outlook should have raised questions had its real nature not been obscured 
by Clausewitz’s later development and the difficulties of interpreting it.”2094
Not unlike Brodie whose embrace of deterrence was at heart prescriptive, Clause-
witz also embedded prescription into his theorizing, quite contrary to the popular 
view. As Gat describes: “Much has been written to the effect that Clausewitz totally 
rejected prescriptive theory, and as we have seen, this interpretation does have roots 
in Clausewitz’s conception of theory. However, this is only a partial understanding of 
his approach as a whole. He maintained that the theory of war was not prescriptive 
only in the sense that any doctrine derived from it would always be partial and require 
judgment in application. But he did believe that the true theory of war provided les-
sons which the genera; had to bear in mind. Theory was by no means divorced from 
praxis; on the contrary, it had to be translated into praxis. Now we have also seen what 
concrete ideas he had in mind: to aim for great objectives, to achieve the utmost con-
centration of force, to act as aggressively as possible in order to annihilate the enemy 
army in a major decisive battle, and to destroy the ability of the enemy state to resist. 
He believed that ‘unnecessary’ manoeuvres, preference for indirect military means, 
and evading decision in battle contradicted the spirit of war, were bound to lead to 
failure, and thus had to be avoided. These ideas are highly imperative; Clausewitz had 
no interest in empty truths.”2095 While his prescriptions did not differ notably from 
those of his rival Jomini, and as Gat noted earlier, his earlier thinking in 1804 revealed 
“a strikingly similar conception to the one that Jomini developed that very same year 
but had not yet published,”2096 and would be “again fully revealed in Clausewitz’s next 
comprehensive work, Principles of War for the Crown Prince (1812).”2097 Gat later identi-
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2093. Gat, A History of Military Thought, 202.
2094. Gat, A History of Military Thought, 211.
2095. Gat, A History of Military Thought, 213.
2096. Gat, A History of Military Thought, 205.
2097. Gat, A History of Military Thought, 207.
446 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
fies a key differentiator: “In opposition to Jomini in particular, Clausewitz stressed the 
diversity of historical experience, and asserted that the theoretician must not elevate 
himself above the times by the force of standards of measurement which he regarded 
to be universal. Every period’s particular form of warfare stemmed from its unique 
political, social, cultural, and personal conditions,” or as Clausewitz himself put it, 
“‘Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war.’”2098
Gat writes that: “It was nevertheless Clausewitz’s sensitivity to the diversity of 
historical experience that, in 1827, when most of On War was already drafted, led to 
the crisis in his outlook on war and conception of theory,” and which first become 
evident in Book VI on defense. “This is no coincidence. Since the aim of defence is to 
preserve the status quo, the defender may choose to delay operations, withdraw, and 
avoid confrontation in the hope of wearing the enemy down. This may lead to what 
Clausewitz called a ‘war of observation’: a prolonged, indecisive struggle which lacks 
energy and involves almost no fighting. In truth, the attacker too, sometimes appears 
to ‘ignore the strict logical necessity of pressing on to the goal.’ This realization leads 
to a wider one: ‘There is no denying that a great majority of wars and campaigns are 
more a state of observation than a struggle for life and death – a struggle, that is, in 
which at least one of the parties is determined to gain a decision. A theory based on 
this idea could be applied only to the wars of the nineteenth century.”2099 Further, Gat 
cites Clausewitz, who realizes that: “‘To be of any practical use,’ theory must take into 
account that, apart from ‘the kind of war that is completely governed and saturated 
by the urge for a decision – of true war’, there exists a second kind of war. Moreover, 
‘the history of war, in every age and country, shows not only that most campaigns are 
of this type, but that the majority is so overwhelming as to make all other campaigns 
seem more like exceptions to the rule’.”2100 And so, as Gat observes, “Clausewitz’s view 
of the nature of war as all-out fighting, centring on the engagement, fell into crisis,” 
which precipitated the “celebrated transformation in his thought with which he was 
to struggle in the writing of Book VIII and revision of Book I of On War,” as recalled 
by his note of 10 July 1827.2101
Gat further cites Clausewitz: “One might wonder whether there is any truth at all 
in our concept of the absolute character of war were it not for the fact that with our 
own eyes we have seen warfare achieve this state of absolute perfection. … Are we 
then to take this as the standard, and judge all wars by it, however much they may 
diverge? … But in that case, what are we to say about all the wars that have been fought 
since the days of Alexander … We would be bound to say … that our theory, though 
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strictly logical, would not apply to reality.”2102 As Gat describes, “This dilemma shatters 
Clausewitz’s lifelong conception of theory,” as Clausewitz came to realize that “theory 
conflicted with reality; the ‘concept of war’ did not withstand the ‘test of experience’; 
the universal contradicted the historical; the unity of the phenomena of war, based 
on a ‘lasting spirit’ that encompassed the diversity of ‘forms’, disintegrated; and the 
practical imperatives derived from this ‘spirit’ – the significant content of theory – 
lost their validity.”2103 This leads to the emergence of Clausewitz’s famous dictum, the 
interconnection of war and politics and what Cold War theorists would elevate to the 
primacy of policy (much against the interpretative wisdom of Echevarria who felt this 
disregarded Clausewitz’s intended balance as encapsulated by his “wondrous trinity”); 
and, it leads Gat to Clausewitz’s effort to resolve this contradiction between theory and 
reality, universality and history, with his new synthesis (and the cornerstone to the Cold 
War theorists’ renewed interest in and sympathetic embrace of the famed Prussian.)
And so as Gat recounts, “The relationship between politics and war dominated 
Clausewitz’s thought during his last years, generated a revision in his theory of war, 
and had attracted most of the attention in our time.”2104 In his effort to resolve this 
contradiction between theory and reality, Gat turns to Aron, and writes that “the late 
development of Clausewitz’s thought can only be understood within the context of his 
attempt to bridge the gulf in his theory of war by reconciling his old conceptions of 
the nature of war which he did not abandon, with his new awareness of the diversity 
of wars in reality. As largely noticed by Aron, the revision in Clausewitz’s thought took 
shape in two main stages. Beginning at the end of Book VI and continuing in Book 
VIII, the last book of On War, it was further developed in Book I, the only one that 
Clausewitz succeeded in addressing in his plan to revise the whole of the work.”2105 
Gat notes, “At the end of Book VI Clausewitz realizes that the war of destruction is 
not the exclusive form of war, and that by ignoring that which does not conform to 
it, theory becomes cut off from historical reality. We have seen the devastating threat 
that this growing realization posed to his conception of the nature of war, which was 
dominated by the Napoleonic experience. What was now to become of this concep-
tion? Initially, Clausewitz was unprepared to abandon it. It was therefore necessary 
for him to devise an intellectual structure which would accommodate it together 
with his new ideas. He therefore recognizes the existence of two types of war, but 
claims that the war of destruction expresses the nature of war and thus takes priority; 
against half-hearted war, an all-out one would always gain the upper hand. A new 
concept now becomes necessary: ‘the urge for decision’ is true war, or absolute war 
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if we may call it that’. Limited wars are not a genuine form of war but the results of 
various factors which exercise counter-influences on the real, absolute nature of war 
and modify it.”“2106 Gat notes “In Book VIII, Clausewitz examines the problem ex-
tensively and compromises with the same solution,” and “since theory cannot ignore 
reality, one must leave ‘room for every sort of extraneous matter. We must allow for 
natural inertia, for all the friction of its parts, for all the inconsistency, imprecision, 
and timidity of man; and finally we must face the fact that war and its forms result 
from ideas, emotions, and conditions prevailing at the time … Theory must concede 
all this; but it has the duty to give priority to the absolute form of war’.”2107 As Gat 
writes, “All these factors, interior and exterior, are alien to the nature of war, but limit 
its intensity in practice. Limited wars, which include most of the wars in history, are 
therefore the result.”2108 Continues Gat: “Hence the relationship between war and 
politics, which encompasses most of the exterior factors,” since in “most cases, war is 
not the dominant activity in the life of nations. A variety of other values, goals, and 
considerations guide nations and prevent a maximization of the conduct of war.”2109 
And so in Book VIII, on War Plans, Gat notes Clausewitz “expounds upon the full 
implications of his new ideas, asserting that the scale, character, and objectives of the 
military operations result largely from an interplay with ther scope and nature of the 
political aims. The explication of this point in particular was an original contribution 
of Clausewitz, to be further developed only with the modern study of international 
relations. The influence of the political aim on the objective of operations, he wrote, 
‘will set its [the war’s] course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, 
and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.”2110 
This ultimately leads to Clausewitz’s “celebrated chapter entitled ‘War Is an Instru-
ment of Policy’.”2111
Gat writes that this chapter “marked a further shift” in Clausewitz’s thinking and 
his effort to close the gap between theory and reality: “If the understanding of war 
was dominated by its political function, the primacy given to absolute war lost much 
of its point. In the dilemma between his lifelong view of war on the one hand, and 
the diversity of political aims and military operations in historical reality on the other, 
Clausewitz was moving a further step towards the latter,” even though “he did not alto-
gether abandon the core of his old conception. … This was the basis for the amended 
compromise of Book I, which Clausewitz revised, as he had planned in July 1827, after 
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he completed Book VIII, the last book of On War.”2112 Here Clausewitz recognizes that 
“Napoleonic warfare is no longer perceived as the only correct form of war. Violence 
in war is now presented in connection with tendencies towards escalation which are 
inherent in the interplay between the belligerents’ aims and efforts.”2113 By the time 
Clausewitz revises Book I, he “elaborates the argument put forward in Book VIII … 
with one significant change; the lulls in military activity are no longer seen in a nega-
tive light, and the factors which explain them no longer include man’s imperfection 
and timidity. War is not discharged in a single explosion due to the activity of various 
factors within war which are summarized for the most part by the concept of friction, 
and owing to influences, mainly political, which are exterior to war. … Politics thus 
places itself above war and modifies it to suit its needs.”2114
Gat later writes that, “In the famous chapter ‘War Is an Instrument of Policy’, 
Clausewitz finally resolves the contradiction in his mind between war as the all-out 
use of force and the varying degrees of limited war revealed in historical experience, 
without relinquishing either of these ideas. War as a political and multi-faceted phe-
nomenon is the unity that fuses the pure nature of war, which constitutes merely 
a partial understanding of reality, with the political conditions and requirements: 
‘Up to now, we have considered the difference that distinguishes the nature of war 
from every other human interest, individual or social …. Now we must seek out the 
unity into which these contradictory elements combine in real life, which they do by 
partly neutralizing one another … Being incomplete and self-contradictory it [war] 
cannot follow its own laws, but has to be treated as part of some other whole; the 
name of which is policy … Thus the contradictions in which war involves ... man, 
are resolved.”2115 As Gat writes, “The unity of the phenomenon of war … is salvaged. 
The ‘primordial violence, hatred, and enmity’ of the nature of war are directed by the 
‘commander’s creative spirit’ through the ‘play of chance and probability’ to achieve 
the political aim. This is the ‘remarkable trinity’ which is presented by Clausewitz at 
the end of the first chapter of Book I.”2116 And so, a “new intellectual tool assisted 
him in devising what he regarded as an adequate solution to the crisis into which 
his universal theory of war had fallen in 1827.”2117 We thus come full circle, to the 
primacy of policy, and the effects of friction, on war. It is the former that would 
dominate Brodie’s thinking about war in the nuclear age and upon which he would 
pin his hopes for man’s salvation, and the latter which would come to define one of 
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the most common complaints about Brodie’s reasoning: that deterrence, to succeed, 
would have to in essence operate in a friction-free manner, as there was no room for 
error or miscalculation. Later critics would point to the broader balance of the trin-
ity, and criticize Brodie and his generation for focusing on the primacy of policy; 
but ultimately, it was the primacy of policy that brought Brodie and his colleagues 
to Clausewitz’s doorstep and motivated them as they devoted considerable time and 
effort to launch what would become a renaissance in Clausewitz studies, one result 
of which would be the emergence a generation later of critics of Brodie and the first 
generation for the one-dimensionality of their analysis.
Gat looks to Clausewitz’s rediscovery after World War II, writing: “National self-
examination after the Second World War led the German historians to Clausewitz, 
whose conception of the relationship between political leadership and military com-
mand could be integrated into the new liberal-democratic model. This conception, 
divorced from its actual historical and intellectual context, and sharply contrasted with 
the legacy of the Second Reich, became one of the major reasons for Clausewitz’s revival. 
In the United States, the complex problems of controlling the military machinery in a 
superpower democracy led to a similar trend.[97] A certain compatibility in viewing the 
relationship between political leadership and military command was thus responsible 
for the fact that the conceptions of a Prussian thinker, whose political thought centred 
on adapting the tradition of Prussian etatisme to the conditions of nationalist post-
Revolutionary Europe, were enlisted to serve the political and ideological code of the 
liberal Western democracies.”2118 Curiously, Clausewitz’s own behavior early on was at 
odds with his later view that subordinated war to politics: “Yet, Clausewitz’s own life 
story not only sets this conception into its historical context but also places it in an 
ironic light. Throughout the great events of his period, the struggle for independence 
against Napoleon and the reform of the Prussian state, Clausewitz, the military man, 
bitterly opposed the political aims and even the declared policy of his king. He and 
his fellow reformers in the army, who comprised a ‘purely military body’, took part 
not merely in discussions on the adjustment of aims and means, but in formidable 
power struggle within the Prussian leadership, which stemmed from conflicting class 
interests and contending social and political visions, and which centred on no less 
than the reshaping of Prussia’s social structure and foreign policy. At a time of crisis, 
Clausewitz left for Russia to fight Napoleon, acting against government policy and his 
king’s orders. The fundamental controversies in reality encompassed a much wider scope 
than could be resolved by raisons d’etat, and cut across institutional lines of political 
leadership and military command. This irony has escaped those who today have raised 
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to prominence Clausewitz’s conception of the relationship between political leadership 
and military command. They have in mind the controversies between Bismark and 
Moltke, and Truman and MacArthur, where a rejection of the particular positions 
held by the military command was happily in union with our contemporary political 
outlook that postulates the supremacy of the political leadership.”2119
Gat notes one advantage enjoyed by the current generation of Clausewitz scholars 
that the first generation largely lacked. “We now have the advantage of possessing a 
sequence of Clausewitz’s early works which provide an almost continuous picture of 
the development of his thought from 1804. Equally helpful is the fact that Clausewitz 
did not live to finish the revision of On War, and that the book we possess is therefore 
a draft that provides a history of the course of the work, almost linearly documenting 
the development of his thought, the problems he encountered, and his attempts to 
resolve them. Yet, the objective difficulties of the subject and biased approaches to it 
have reinforced each other in obscuring the nature and development of Clausewitz’s 
idea.”2120
Looking Beyond the ‘Primacy of Policy’ to the ‘Wondrous Trinity’
There has been some scholarly criticism in recent years of the first wave of post-World 
War II Clausewitz scholars and their tendency to overlook some of the more complex 
and contradictory dimensions of Clausewitz’s On War that are currently in vogue, and 
instead focus on one or two major (and often simple) themes, the most popular being 
Clausewitz’s famous dictum, that “war is a continuation of policy by other means,” 
with some other Clausewitzian themes being friction, center of gravity, and escalation. 
Such a critique has been leveled by some against Brodie’s work, though generally not 
without an appreciation of, and recognition for, his pioneering efforts to stimulate a 
“Clausewitz renaissance” in America. 
Brodie, as part of the first wave of post-World War II Clausewitz scholars in America, 
can be viewed to be dated, and but to a large degree his emphasis of what Antulio J. 
Echevarria II has described as the “primacy of policy” can be attributed to the intense 
strategic challenges of the early nuclear age, when re-asserting the primacy of policy 
was considered by many to be a one of the most essential imperatives of the era, as 
well as to the fact that Brodie and his colleagues were to a large degree pioneers in the 
newly emergent field in the American academy of Clausewitz studies. As Echevarria 
describes: “Since the beginning of the Cold War, historians and political scientists 
in the United States and elsewhere have given considerable privilege to Clausewitz’s 
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expression that war is the ‘mere continuation of policy (Politik) by other means,’” and 
“Michael Howard, one of the translators of the 1976 edition of On War, referred to it 
as ‘Clausewitz’s famous dictum,’” while the “eminent American scholar and strategic 
logician, Bernard Brodie, called it the Prussian theorist’s ‘great dictum,’” while Ray-
mond Aron “labeled it ‘Clausewitz’s famous formula.’”2121
Echevarria concedes that “several statements in On War seem to support the idea 
that the primacy of policy constitutes the core of Clausewitz’s thinking. … Taken 
together, these and similar statements in On War were interpreted by Cold War 
scholars to mean that the central principle in Clausewitz’s thinking was the primacy 
of policy.”2122 But as Echevarria argues, “that interpretation does not fully account for 
the more balanced relationship Clausewitz described in his much discussed trinity of 
hostility, chance, and purpose. Nor does it adequately address the political determin-
ism Clausewitz succumbed to in book VIII, as he attempted to reconcile the apparent 
conflicting tendencies he observed in war’s nature.”2123 Echevarria traces the “roots of 
the Cold War emphasis on the primacy of policy … at least to Brodie, who in 1946, 
edited a short volume entitles The Absolute Weapon” in which he “essentially argued 
that the advent of atomic weapons required a revolution in the way people thought 
about war,” and his belief that from that point forward “the purpose of military estab-
lishments” must no longer be “to win wars” but instead “to avert them,” an argument 
that “quickly gained currency among defense intellectuals.”2124 Echevarria writes that: 
“It was thus but a small step to move from the ‘absolute weapon’ to ‘absolute war,” 
and “[f ]or Brodie, the essence of this move was ‘the decline in rational control of war 
situations by those responsible for state policy.’ While Clausewitz pointed primar-
ily to social and political changes wrought by the French Revolution as the reasons 
for a decline, Brodie insisted that the ‘great increase in the volume and power of the 
means of fighting also had much to do with it.’ Quoting directly from Clausewitz, he 
stated: ‘the means available – the efforts that might be called forth – had no longer 
any definable limits; the energy with which the war itself could be conducted had 
no longer any counterpoise, and consequently the danger for the adversary had risen 
to the extreme.’ A war without definable limits, a war of extremes, seemed to fit the 
definition of absolute war.”2125
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Brodie was not alone in emphasizing the primacy of policy; Echevarria noted that 
“Robert Osgood, perhaps the leading American theorist of limited war during the 
period, made extensive use of certain parts of On War to build a case for the primacy 
of policy,”2126 adding that Osgood’s limited war theory “was stimulated by two con-
siderations, the first being what he understood to be Clausewitz’s principle that armed 
force must serve national policy, and the second being the general imperative to con-
tain military violence in the nuclear age.”2127 As well, Raymond Aron also “displayed 
this same tendency, emphasizing the need to subordinate ‘war to policy as a means 
to an end,’” and he “used the concept of ‘absolute war’ as a negative, to warn that all 
‘real wars’ could approach it, if ‘violence escapes the control of the chief of state.’”2128 
Echevarria writes that “[w]hile in the opening chapter of On War it might appear that 
Clausewitz is arguing that war tends to escalate out of control, this is not his argument. 
Nor is he maintaining that war should only be waged with maximum aim and effort. 
Instead, Clausewitz’s point is that a war’s escalation is rooted in uncertainty, which is 
best described by the laws of probability, and not by anything intrinsic to war itself. 
There is no law or imperative intrinsic to war’s nature that would necessarily cause 
it to escalate. Real war, as history shows, can either wind down or escalate.”2129 But 
Echevarria adds that a “number of nuclear strategists who purported to understand the 
pitfalls of escalation made the same error” and “took Clausewitz’s concept of absolute 
war as an ideal, believing that his basic argument was that all wars tend to escalate 
toward the extreme seemingly represented by this ideal,” and as such “the correlation 
between Brodie’s ‘absolute weapon’ and Clausewitz’s ‘absolute war’ was obvious and 
unproblematic for many military strategists and academics,” when Echevarria believes 
“Clausewitz’s point actually was that absolute war was not an ideal in that sense, but 
rather an absurdity, an impossibility, and, in fact, all but inconceivable. It is war 
stripped of all realities, and thus can neither be achieved nor approached. The term 
absolute war has, over the decades, taken on a life of its own, or rather many lives, 
quite independent of Clausewitz’s final formulation,” which is of concern to Echevar-
ria “to the extent that absolute war was so readily, and so inappropriately, equated to 
nuclear war in the minds of political theorists.”2130
Citing Brodie’s guide to reading On War, which many now view to be dated, Eche-
varria credits Brodie for explaining that “the idea that policy was supreme was itself 
likely to be misunderstood, if not rejected outright,”2131 and that it “suffers this fate 
2126. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 131.
2127. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 132.
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for a number of reasons, one being that war does arouse passions, usually very strong 
ones, and another being that generals like to win decisively whatever contests they are 
engaged in, and do not like to be trammeled by a political authority imposing consid-
erations that might modify that aim.”2132 And yet, Echevarria notes, “the idea of the 
primacy of policy became almost fundamental for American political theorists of the 
Cold War era,” and it became so pervasive an ideas that some adherents, like Thomas 
Schelling, “used it without necessarily referring to Clausewitz.”2133 Echevarria suggests 
that “concluding that the primacy of policy was the key ingredient in Clausewitz’s 
theory was an obvious and justifiable observation for Cold War thinkers to make,” 
since “the primacy of policy actually equated to firm and unrestrained control over 
the use of violence,” and the “one constant they recognized in any ‘rational’ policy 
was that the level of violence must be restricted so as to avoid risk of escalation, even 
if by so doing the original objective could not be achieved,” owing to the gravity of 
the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.2134
Echevarria finds that the “idea of the primacy of policy is still reflected in much 
of modern American literature on war, including the memoirs of prominent US 
military commanders, and was reinforced by the post-Vietnam renaissance of Clause-
witz in military and scholars publications, though its source has become somewhat 
obscured.”2135 But Echevarria nonetheless believes that “to represent Clausewitz in 
this way is ultimately as misleading as depicting him as the ‘Mahdi of Mass’ or the 
‘apostle of total war,’ as Liddell Hart and others have done. Both interpretations, 
in fact, destroy the balanced theory Clausewitz tried to construct. At first blush, 
the distortion produced by Brodie and others seems merely to correct the view of 
Clausewitz as an advocate of absolute war. Yet a closer examination reveals that this 
correction goes too far” and “willfully overlooks the basic premise and logical flaw in 
Clausewitz’s argument, as well as the limits he placed on policy,” though Echevarria 
recognizes (if not fully appreciating) that this “overcorrection was shaped in no small 
war by the presentist concerns of historians and political and social scientists writ-
ing under the shadow of the Cold War,” where “apprehensions regarding the threat 
of a devastating nuclear exchange … induced scholars to stress the role of policy in 
limiting war. From there it was but a small step to Osgood’s concept of limited war. 
… Clausewitz’s many statements regarding the relationship between war and policy 
provided welcome support for this view,” and provided a welcome “counterweight 
to such dangerous claims as General Douglas MacArthur’s of-repeated assertion that 
in war there is ‘no substitute for victory.’ Such claims seemed to pervade the military 
2132. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 134.
2133. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 134.
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mind. If left unchecked under the strategic circumstances of the Cold War, they could 
well lead to catastrophic escalation.”2136
Echevarria seems harsh in his equation of the primacy of policy to the earlier view 
of Clausewitz as an apostle of total war; the latter is certainly untrue while the former 
is not only partly true, for many scholars of Clausewitz, especially the first wave of 
post-World War II strategic theorists like Brodie, Paret and Howard who grappled 
with the new challenges of a nuclear world (for the first time in human history), and 
who were rightly concerned about the risks, particularly in light of the devastation 
of World War II which was fought, until its final few days, conventionally. That they 
emphasized the primacy of policy as Brodie did is not, in my view, an overcorrec-
tion; it was a necessary correction, enabling scholars and soldiers alike to embrace 
Clausewitz and not reject as Liddell Hart and his disciples did. Echevarria seems to 
comprehend this, occasionally showing sympathy to the context. But in the end, he 
finds the emphasis by Brodie and many others of his generation of the primacy of policy 
to be unbalanced, and to disregard the other pillars that balance Clausewitz’s trinity. 
Interestingly, such a view was shared by Michael Howard, co-translator of the 1976 
Princeton edition of On War, who took aim at Brodie’s rival Herman Kahn among 
others (dubbed by Anatol Rapoport the “neo-Clausewitzians”) “for ignoring ‘all three 
elements in the Clausewitzian trinity: popular passion, the risks and uncertainties of 
the military environment, and the political purpose for which the war was fought.”2137
It’s not just the neglect of the other elements of what Colin Powell would describe 
as the “triad” that defined Clausewitz’s trinity that concerns Echevarria. He is also 
concerned by the neglect of Clausewitz’s own “significant limits regarding the extent 
to which policy should influence military operations,” though Echevarria again recog-
nizes “these limits are somewhat overshadowed by the number of times his revelation 
concerning the importance of politics is repeated.”2138 Echevarria adds that “Clausewitz 
does indeed provide a number of significant caveats regarding political control over 
the use of force,” which in “most cases … refer both directly and indirectly to the 
nature of war,” which Echevarria earlier notes is defined by Clausewitz “explicitly” 
as “a dynamic activity that involves opposing wills, each reacting to or attempting to 
preempt the other.”2139 This dynamic nature is key to Echevarria, who explains that 
since “war involves living forces rather than static elements, it can change quickly 
and significantly in ways the logic of policy may not expect.”2140 Echevarria further 
explains that: “Accordingly, when Clausewitz wrote that policy should not ask war to 
2136. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 135.
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accomplish something against its nature, he spoke volumes,” and this “becomes clearer 
when we examine his ‘wondrous’ (wunderliche) Trinity” that “consists of three dynamic 
forces: a subordinating or guiding influence, the play of chance and probability, and 
the force of basic hostility,” and “these three tendencies manifest themselves, more or 
less, through three institutions surveyed in Book VIII” of On War: “the government, 
which attempts to subordinate war for some purpose; military institutions, which 
must deal with the violence, chance, and unpredictability of combat; and the popu-
lace, through which the force of basic hostility is expressed,” though “the divisions 
between government, military, and people are artificial” in that “[g]overnments can 
display hostility as much as militaries or peoples, if not more.”2141 Echevarria surmises 
that Clausewitz’s use of the term “Trinity” may well have been “deliberate” in that 
“it conveys the sense that the three forces intrinsic to war are separate, yet part of an 
indivisible whole.”2142
According to Echevarria, the “three institutions” that embody the Trinity “have as-
sumed various forms over time and among different cultures,”2143 which explains how 
war itself could be unchanging even back before the modern state itself had evolved, 
and how in the future, wars would be fought in largely stateless vacuums by tribes 
and other non-state entities and still be subject to the same intrinsic forces. Echevarria 
explains that: “These forces, in fact, come into play in every war, though the role of 
one is sometimes more pronounced or influential than the others. The Trinity thus 
tells us that no tendency is a priori more influential in determining the shape and 
course of war than any other. Thus, to single out policy or politics as the central ele-
ment of war’s nature is to distort the intrinsic balance of the Trinity, and ultimately to 
compromise is dynamism.”2144 Echevarria thus concludes that “Clausewitz’s wondrous 
Trinity thus negates the notion of the primacy of policy,” which is “just as important 
as chance and hostility,”2145 but to Echevarria, not fundamentally or universally more 
so – though Clausewitz’s own recognition of the changing balance in the influence of 
the three pillars of the trinity suggests that policy can be a primary influence, much 
as Brodie and his colleagues hoped it would be throughout the dangerous nuclear 
stand-off that defined the Cold War. Thus Echevarria’s primary criticism of Brodie 
and his colleagues appears to collapse upon a closer reading of Clausewitz; Brodie 
may not have necessarily argued that policy was or must always achieve primacy; just 
that during the nuclear age, as he crafted his strategy of deterrence and helped shape 
its evolution, he prescribed its primacy. Again during the Vietnam War, he found war 
2141. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 146.
2142. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 146.
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and policy to again diverge, dangerously so – one more reminder for the necessity 
in the nuclear world to strive to ensure the primacy of policy, even if this would not 
always be the case, as Echevarria would find to be true in the post-Cold War world, 
a world largely unforeseen by Brodie before his death in 1978 when the Cold War 
was at its peak.
And so Echevarria argues, “Only when viewed historically… would we be able to 
determine how influential each of those forces was on the actual course of events.”2146 
Looking back on the Cold War, and its unique dangers, we can now see with clarity 
that policy achieved the primacy so desperately sought by Brodie and his colleagues; so 
while Echevarria criticizes them for their overcorrection to earlier images of Clausewitz 
as an apostle of total war, he also seems to appreciate how central the goal of prescrip-
tion was to their theoretical work, bridging the world of political and military action 
with the aspiration to influence doctrine, and to shape the very policy they hoped 
would achieve a decisive primacy. As Echevarria put it, “as a reconstruction of his 
wondrous Trinity has shown, a theory of war would have to remain suspended above 
the dynamic forces of purpose, chance, and hostility. In other words, a theory that 
insists on the primacy of policy is ultimately one-dimensional, and thus not suitable in 
Clausewitz’s eye,” or perhaps one should qualify, universally suitable.2147 But Echevar-
ria adds, “All this is not to say that the United States should not insist on the primacy 
of policy whenever it conducts its wars, or that it should refrain from requiring strict 
civilian control over the military in order to preserve its core democratic values. It 
is only to say that Clausewitz finally settled on a different approach.”2148 Brodie did 
precisely that, emphasizing the primacy of policy as the one glimmer of hope in an 
otherwise perilous nuclear world, one chance for reason to outshine chance or hostil-
ity, and ensure our survival. But because of this emphasis on primacy at the exclusion 
of other elements of Clausewitz’s complex thinking, elements now more in vogue, 
Brodie and his generation of Clausewitz theorists appear to be somewhat dated, and 
as Echevarria describes, uni-dimensional.
Echevarria revisits these issues in his book on Clausewitz, Clausewitz and Contem-
porary War, where Brodie again has a substantial presence, particularly in its section 
revisiting “The Primacy of Policy.” Here, he writes that: “Readers will find a number 
of statements in On War which lend credence to the belief that the primacy of policy 
became the core of Clausewitz’s thinking,” and thus “since ‘the conduct of war in its 
major aspects is thus policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen’, the 
subordination of the ‘military point of view to the political one’ is the only relation-
2146. Echevarria, “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War,” 148.
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ship that makes sense.”2149 But adds Echevarria: “Aside from a few exceptions, such 
statements seem to have made little impression on theorists and practitioners through 
the first half of the twentieth century,” a situation that would change dramatically as a 
result of “the experience of two devastating world wars, and threat of runaway escala-
tion during the Cold War.”2150 He thus noted Robert Osgood, “perhaps the leading 
American theorist of limited war between the 1950s and the 1970s, made extensive 
use of certain parts of On War to build a case for the primacy of politics as a basis for 
his theory.”2151 And, Echevarria adds, “Other American political theorists of the Cold 
War era, such as Thomas Schelling, adopted the idea of the primacy of politics with-
out necessarily referring to Clausewitz,” though Brodie, much like Osgood, explicitly 
embedded his theories within a Clausewitzian framework.2152 But Brodie did question 
the military’s willingness to surrender to political supremacy during war time. Writes 
Echevarria: “As Brodie later explained, the idea that policy was supreme was itself 
likely to be misunderstood, if not rejected outright: ‘It suffers this fate for a number 
of reasons, one being that war does arouse passions, usually very strong ones, and 
another being that generals like to win decisively whatever contests they are engaged 
in, and do not like to be trammeled by a political authority imposing considerations 
that might modify that aim.’”2153
Echevarria further writes that “Brodie and other scholars of his generation, in short, 
overemphasized the significance of the primacy of policy in the Prussian’s theories, 
though they did so with good intentions. For instance, in considering such expres-
sions as, ‘policy will permeate all military operations and, in so far as their violent 
nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them’, these scholars stressed 
the first part of the statement, namely, that policy will pervade military operations, 
while downplaying the important qualification – ‘in so far as their violent nature will 
admit’.”2154 But, continues Echevarria: “Good intentions notwithstanding, represent-
ing Clausewitz in this way is ultimately as misleading as depicting him as the ‘Mahdi 
of Mass’ or the ‘apostle of total war’, as Liddell Hart and others did decades earlier. 
Both interpretations, in effect, destroy the balanced theory, and body of knowledge, 
Clausewitz sought to construct. As we saw in the previous chapter, his theory settled 
on a tripartite explication of war. At first blush, this distortion produced by Brodie 
and others seems merely to correct the erroneous view that Clausewitz was an advo-
cate of absolute war. Yet a closer examination reveals that this correction, in effect, 
2149. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 85.
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goes too far; it willfully overlooks the basic premise of Clausewitz’s argument, as well 
as the limits he placed on policy. This overcorrection was shaped in no small way by 
the presentist concerns of historians and political and social scientists writing after 
the ruinous world wars of the twentieth century, and under the threatening shadow 
of the Cold War.”2155 
Indeed, Echevarria adds that “apprehensions regarding the threat of a devastating 
nuclear exchange or of a major military escalation in a conventional sense between the 
two powerful alliances – perhaps the most powerful the world had seen to that point 
– induced scholars to stress the role of policy in limited war.”2156 This was certainly the 
case for Brodie. Echevarria is sympathetic to the risks and dangers of the nuclear world, 
and why theorists of war in the nuclear era came to overemphasize the supremacy of 
policy, but he feels it fundamentally overstates one pillar of the tri-partite trinity. As 
he puts it in his discussion of “Policy Versus the Trinity,” Echevarria writes that “the 
wondrous trinity tells us that no tendency is a priori more influential in determining 
the shape and course of war than any other. Thus to single out policy or politics as 
the central element of war’s nature is to distort the intrinsic balance of the trinity, and 
ultimately to compromise its dynamism.”2157 Echevarria further writes: “Clausewitz’s 
wondrous trinity, thus, negates the notion of the primacy of policy; it renders policy 
as purpose, and holds it a priori just as important as chance and hostility.”2158 For 
Clausewitz, “a theory of war would have to remain suspended above the dynamic forces 
of purpose, chance, and hostility,” and thus “a theory that insisted on the primacy of 
policy was ultimately one-dimensional, and thus unrealistic in Clausewitz’s eyes.”2159
Echevarria dramatically starts his book off by first noting how Brodie, “the renowned 
American scholar of strategic thinking, once claimed that On War’s ideas, ‘though 
densely packed in, are generally simple and are for the most part clearly expressed in 
jargon-free language.”2160 But Echevarria quickly counterattacks, writing: “Perhaps 
no other statement regarding Carl von Clausewitz’s work has been so completely 
misleading. Understanding On War is a difficult and at times genuinely frustrating 
task. Most of its ideas are not simple, but complex: like a finely woven cloth, the 
significance of each thought depends on its relation to the others.”2161 Echevarria’s 
blistering assault on Brodie continues: “At times the overall pattern is ambiguous, 
2155. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 86-87.
2156. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 87.
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indicating that Clausewitz himself was not always sure where he stood. At other times, 
the pattern changes, sometimes abruptly and at others more subtly, leaving readers with 
conflicting impressions. The language he used to develop his thoughts, moreover, is 
at times sewn together with an outmoded philosophical jargon, all but impenetrable 
to modern readers. However, that jargon, like his frequent use of metaphor, serves 
important purposes, for he considered the form of an expression as essential as the 
content. Overlooking form for substance thus runs the risk of misinterpreting On War 
altogether. In short, taking Clausewitz’s ideas to be simple and jargon-free is a sure 
step toward misunderstanding them.”2162 Brodie’s belief in the ultimate accessibility 
of Clausewitz, and inherent elegance of his thought, has been noted by Azar Gat as 
well; Gat, who describes Brodie as “one of the chief contributors to the ‘Clausewitz 
renaissance’,” recalls in a footnote how, when responding to the complaint from Hu-
bert Camon that Clausewitz was the “most German of Germans … In reading him 
one constantly has the feeling of being in a metaphysical fog,” that Brodie “dismissed 
this complaint with the words: ‘This is simply nonsense’.”2163
One cannot help, after having explored Brodie’s decades-long commitment to 
Clausewitz scholarship, his long and largely under-appreciated contribution to the 
decade-long Clausewitz Project and its best known published product, the widely 
read 1976 “Princeton translation” of Clausewitz’s On War, his untiring promotion of 
Clausewitz studies, and his lifelong effort to reconcile Clausewitz’s theories with the 
new challenges of the nuclear age, but to find this immediate assault on Brodie at the 
outset of Echevarria’s otherwise thoughtful book, to quite misrepresent the breadth, 
subtlety, and depth of Brodie’s comprehension of Clausewitz. Brodie’s introductory 
and concluding essays to the Princeton translation of On War were meant not to be the 
final word on Clausewitz’s legacy but instead to serve as both an introductory welcome 
to new students of Clausewitz, and to encourage, not discourage, one’s entry into the 
world of Clausewitzian theory, akin to the reassurance of a teacher to a first-year stu-
dent, and not the combative words of a young scholar engaging in a sneak attack on 
an important but now deceased scholar who was no longer around to defend himself. 
The record, as presented in the pages above, show that Brodie’s views on Clausewitz 
were much more nuanced than this singular, and seemingly decontextualized, quota-
tion selected by Echevarria to start his book with a bold but quite unfair bang. 
One might expect given this prominence on page one of his book that Brodie would 
perhaps be a central part of his story, but Brodie is mentioned only re-enters the scene 
as one of several Cold War scholars that Echevarria, more sympathetically than one 
would expect from his first page assault, describes as over-emphasizing “policy” at the 
2162. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 1.
2163. Gat, A History of Military Thought, 229, n33, citing page 18 of Brodie’s guide to reading On War.
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expense of other equally important components of Clausewitz’s “wondrous trinity,” 
reiterating his argument as put forth in his chapter in Clausewitz, the State and War. 
That Brodie appears on only a handful of pages, and is not as central to the plot as one 
might therefore expect, suggests that Echevarria’s initial assault on Brodie is without 
context, and perhaps inappropriate in its overstatement. In the index, Brodie appears 
only three times, the second (on page 8) being a footnote associated with his first ap-
pearance on page one as discussed above. But after noting how difficult and complex 
Clausewitz can be, Echevarria steps back somewhat and adds: “This is not to say that 
Clausewitz’s masterwork is too difficult to grasp: it is not. However, Brodie’s miscues 
underscore the need for an approach that offers readers an introductory knowledge of 
On War’s form, it purpose, and methodology. As Clausewitz himself warned, unless 
one’s observations are rendered in proper form, readers may understand the individual 
concepts, ‘but the overall thought will remain incomprehensible’. To be sure, several 
efforts to guide readers through On War’s concepts already exist. However, none of 
them explains the book’s form adequately. Brodie’s own guide, which has the advantage 
of accompanying the justly celebrated English translation of On War by Sir Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret, is a chapter-by-chapter analysis all but bereft of any consid-
eration for the form in which the ideas appear.”2164 This, of course, is the very purpose 
behind Echevarria’s work; so perhaps it is fortuitous for him that Brodie’s efforts a 
generation earlier had proved so disappointing to Echevarria. 
But it remains important to recall that Brodie, a celebrated theorist of war, was one 
of the first of his generation to call for a renaissance in Clausewitz studies, and worked 
harder than most to ensure future generations would have a solid platform to begin 
their studies of the famed Prussian. For a long time, it was Clausewitz’s contemporary 
and in many ways rival Jomini that dominated strategic studies. When Brodie and 
his colleagues made their bid to restore Clausewitz to his rightful spot at the center 
of the study of war, they were doing a great service to future generations of scholars 
who might otherwise be debating Jomini’s focus on decisive points and the geometry 
of interior and exterior operations today. It is fair to critique Brodie’s effort, and to 
note that it is dated with the passage of time and the profound transformations in 
world politics, notably the Cold War’s end. And, it is fair to note Brodie’s seeming 
disinterest in Clausewitz’s “trinity” and his efforts to both simplify and clarify, and 
neither to embrace nor to surrender to complexity as scholars of our time tend to do. 
And, it is fair to suggest as Echevarria does that Brodie’s over-emphasis of Clausewitz’s 
dictum that “war is a continuation of policy by other means” which subordinates war 
to policy came at the cost of de-emphasizing the rest of his “wondrous trinity.” But 
this was not necessarily a failure by either Brodie or his peers. As Echevarria himself 
2164. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 1-2.
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later notes, the scholars of the nuclear age faced enormous risks and dangers, and one 
can hardly blame them for their effort to subordinate war to policy, especially after the 
serial calamities of World War I and World War II. Brodie and his peers were literally 
trying to save humanity from extinction. The pressures of their time were this heavy. 
It was not necessarily a safe time for complexity theory, which is better suited to our 
current era of asymmetric and considerably less lethal warfare, where we no longer 
face an existential threat of such an enormously destructive magnitude as was faced 
by Brodie and his peers, often with great courage as well as originality of thought.
Our broad look at Brodie’s enduring interest in, interpretation of, and inspiration 
by Clausewitz as made in the pages above shows that Brodie’s approach to the Prus-
sian was in fact less uni-dimensional than Echevarria and others suggest. True, his 
language is naturally dated by his historical context, and his conceptual vocabulary 
does emphasize simpler concepts such as the primacy of politics rather than more 
complex elements such as Clausewitz’s trinity (and when discussing the trinity, he 
does not employ a more contemporary language infused by complexity theory or 
non-linearity, since these disciplines had not yet been fully developed) But he does 
approach Clausewitz with great breadth and insight, borrowing concepts from disci-
plines as varied as psychology, history, and strategy. Thus this primary critique may 
instead be understood as something of a cross-disciplinary misperception, akin to a 
political scientist criticizing an historian for being too historical, or a philosopher for 
dwelling too much on philosophy and not enough on more social-scientific methods. 
A more nuanced presentation of Brodie’s understanding of Clausewitz is made by 
Beatrice Heuser in Reading Clausewitz, which among the more recent contributions 
to the Clausewitz literature is less reflexively critical of Brodie and more appreciative 
of his full breadth of effort in all their detail and presents one of the most in-depth 
descriptions of the role played by Brodie in the renewal of interest in Clausewitz 
studies by post-World War II scholars. She also identifies two distinct currents in 
Clausewitz’s thought that describes as the “two Clausewitz’s,” one an idealist and the 
other a realist, the former evident in his earlier writings prior to 1827 and the latter 
emerging in his final four years of life. As Heuser describes, Heuser writes: “Even 
after hus great insight of 1827, Clausewitz regarded absolute war as more true to the 
essence of war (he uses the term Begriff), and merely finds in politics, friction and 
circumstances the reasons why a particular war stops short of becoming absolute 
war.”2165 Adds Heuser: “We have to remind ourselves ... that Clausewitz not only did 
not complete the revision of his work, but that he was only happy with the sole revised 
book, Book I, by the time he stopped working on the opus.”2166 Heuser recalls that 
2165. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), 41.
2166. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 41.
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“in his earlier work -- the first draft of Book I and Books II-VI - Clausewitz wrote 
mainly with ‘absolute’ war in mind, war that unfailingly aims to shatter the enemy 
in a major, decisive battle, to bring down his state, occupy his territory and break his 
will to resist. In Book VIII he described it as the wars he experienced in his time, wars 
that Napoleon brought ‘to their absolute perfection’. In the first version [of ] Book I 
he wrote of ‘absolute’ war more as of an ideal, a theoretical concept (Begriff), which 
reality can come close to but which mostly remains an abstract, the extreme idea of 
what war could be like. In Books VII, VIII and the revised Book I, written after 1827, 
Clausewitz extended his theory of war to encompass not only ‘absolute’ war but the 
many more limited manifestations of war that he had found in history. Only here did 
he introduce the famous tenet of war as a function of the political variable, for which 
he is so famous, into his work in the last four years of his life.” 2167 As Heuser further 
describes, “Clausewitz’s work, although unfinished, and even though it lent itself to 
misinterpretation with most devastating consequences, is outstanding in its strength 
and even in its confusion. For even in his initial blindness to the importance of poli-
tics in war, Clausewitz understood something very important: namely, the boundless 
horror of war and its potential to ‘explode’, to get out of hand, due to its intrinsi-
cally violent nature, even when the political purpose is clearly defined and discipline 
prevails in the armed forces.”2168 Heuser thus sees two Clausewitzes, “Clausewitz the 
idealist” and “Clausewitz the realist,” and thus two distinct kinds of war: “Both the 
teachings of Clausewitz the Idealist on ‘absolute’ war, and of Clausewitz the Realist 
on war as a function of politics, apply to the phenomenon of war, but they must be 
applied discriminatingly, with an eye to all the variables involved.”2169 Brodie would 
himself be fascinated by, and would thus endeavor to wrestle with, “absolute” war, the 
concept that was first articulated by the earlier Clausewitz, “Clausewitz the Idealist,” 
but which, after the splitting of the atom, would become a very real and dangerous 
dimension of war in the atomic age, forever transforming the nature of warfare. But 
because of this, Brodie’s primary interest in Clausewitz would be in the Prussian’s now 
necessary primacy of policy, and thus in the later Clausewitz whom Heuser would 
describe as “Clausewitz the Realist.”
In her first chapter, “The Story of the Man and the Book,” Heuser recalled that: “it 
was only in the late 1950s and early 1960s that American strategists widely began to 
base their reflections on Clausewitz’s tenets,” and citing Brodie’s Strategy in the Missile 
Age, adds that: “One of them, Bernard Brodie, wrote, ‘Clausewitz’s appeal is limited, 
for he is much more given than Jomini to ‘undogmatic elasticity’ in his opinions, and 
2167. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 41.
2168. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 41-42.
2169. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 43.
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he is more metaphysical in his approach’.”2170 And yet, Heuser adds that “Brodie else-
where called Clausewitz’s book ‘not simply the greatest but the only truly great book 
on war,” and who would himself “[a]long with Herman Kahn, the Wohlstetters, and 
others” go on to lead “the American ‘Neo-Clausewitzian’ school of the early Cold War 
period.”2171 In her third chapter, “Politics, the Trinity and Civil-Military Relations,” 
Heuser describes in detail Brodie’s great interest in Clausewitz’s most famous dictum 
that war was a “continuation of politics by other means,” and how Brodie looked to 
military history in his lifetime much the way Clausewitz had a century before for 
insight into the relationship of war to politics: “Brodie pointed out that the military 
leaders on all sides of the First World War had aimed for military victory without 
thinking about the political purpose of such a victory, and on the whole looked down 
upon their political leaders as ignorant of the military preconditions for such a vic-
tory and all too concerned with winning their next election.”2172 Yet World War II 
did not necessarily improve the situation, and Brodie found that “the predominance 
of politicians over military leaders did not guarantee the predominance of political 
purpose over the military aim of ‘fighting to win’,” as political leaders “were all too 
often convinced by the military leaders that military requirements – ‘the exigencies of 
war’ – had to come first,” and with it the need for “a substantial margin of superiority 
over the enemy” as well as “the aim of a clear-cut – ‘absolute’ – victory.”2173 Brodie’s 
thinking on about the relationship of military and civilian leaders and the connection 
of war to politics came together in his 1973 War and Politics, where “Brodie gave his 
interpretation of European and American military policy from World War I to Viet-
nam on the basis of Clausewitz’s paradigm of the ‘intimate and pervasive connections 
between politics and strategy’, highlighting amongst other things the relations between 
civilian government and military leadership;” and also “quoted at length Clausewitz’s 
views on the need for military advice in the formulation of war plans, and the need 
for understanding what the military can do on the part of governing politicians, but 
added also Clausewitz’s caveat about the need to subordinate the military point of 
view to the political one.”2174
In her fifth chapter, “The Defensive – Offensive Debate, the Annihilation Battle 
and Total War ,” Heuser further probes Brodie’s effort to rebut the generation of strate-
gists who over-emphasized Clausewitz’s themes relating to the defense, offense, the 
2170. Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 17, citing Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (2nd ed., Princeton, New 
Jersey: PUP, 1965), 34, 36.
2171. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 18, citing Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War” in Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret (eds), Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: PUP, 1976), 53.
2172. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 70.
2173. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 70.
2174. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 70.
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battle of annihilation, and total war and who conflated Clausewitz’s theorizing with 
an advocacy of these elements of war. In remarks critical of Ferdinand Foch, Brodie 
observed that the famed general “reflects only too faithfully the bent of his entire 
generation of soldiers. Lost completely is the cast of thought that makes Clausewitz 
both timeless and profound, his constant awareness that war is a political act, fought 
for a purpose outside itself. True, Clausewitz had cautioned against unduly temper-
ing violence lest it render one weak against the ruthless, but he nevertheless insisted 
that the end must govern the means. The generation that was to fight World War I 
remembered only the injunction against tempering violence. ‘Blood is the price of 
victory’ was the one dictum of Clausewitz they quoted everlastingly. Less arresting, 
but infinitely wider, was the admonition they forgot: ‘No war is begun, or at least 
no war should be begun if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the 
question: what is to be attained by and in war?’ … Foch gives little indication in his 
writing of having thought about the matter at all.”2175
Heuser later cited Brodie on the tendency to quote Clausewitz out of context on 
the matter of total and absolute war: “It is ironical that some of the every quotations 
which are often cited to prove that [Clausewitz] was the prophet of total or ‘absolute’ 
war are wrenched from a chapter (Ch. 1, Bk. 1) in which he specifically insists that ‘war 
is never an isolated act’ and that the military method must always defer to the political 
object. Clausewitz, ambivalent [concerning victory] as in many other respects, can be 
and has often been quoted out of context to demonstrate his vehement rejection of 
restraint in war.”2176 This is discussed further by Heuser in chapter seven, “Clausewitz 
in the Nuclear Age,” particularly in a section on “Clausewitz and Western Cold-War 
Strategy” in a subsection on “Western Cold-War Strategists and Clausewitz’s Herit-
age” where Brodie is again discussed: “Western strategists in the nuclear age tried to 
draw lessons from the two world wars” and Brodie, “for example, called World War 
I, ‘the greatest catastrophe in modern times, [which] may have more lessons for the 
future than World War II, which was in fact its offspring.’ ‘World War I was the pur-
poseless war, which no one seemed to know to prevent and which, once begun, no 
one seemed to know how to stop.’ Could this catastrophe repeat itself in the nuclear 
age?”2177 Heuser continues: “Some argued that in Clausewitz’s concept of absolute 
war as formulated in Book I of On War, where it is described as the abstract idea of 
a discharge of force without any friction, made him the ‘prophet of the apocalypse’, 
and the ‘incredulous historian of an apocalyptic future’, of an all-out nuclear World 
War III. More frequently, Clausewitz was evoked in a negative sense: how could war 
2175. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 99, citing Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 2nd ed. (Princeton: PUP, 1965), 52f.
2176. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 122, also citing Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 37f, and 315.
2177. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 152.
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still be a rational continuation of politics by other means if the consequence of war 
could not but be disproportionate to any political aim?”2178 This is precisely what 
Brodie asked in 1945, famously concluding that after the bomb’s fiery birth, that 
war’s chief purpose could no longer be winning wars but must from now on be “to 
avert them.”2179 And, as Heuser further noted, Brodie explained that: “On the simple 
Clausewitzian premise … – that war must have a reasonable political objective with 
which the military operations must be reasonably consonant – we have to work back 
from the assumption that ‘general war’ with thermonuclear weapons must never be 
permitted to begin, however much we find it necessary to make physical preparations 
as though it might begin. Working back from that premise is far from easy, and … the 
idea of large-scale conventional war is simply no solution. There are requirements for 
a new diplomacy, the beginnings of which are in fact appearing.’2180 Heuser adds that 
Brodie “argued repeatedly ‘that nuclear weapons do by their very existence in large 
numbers make obsolete the use and hence need for conventional force on anything 
like the scale of either world war.’”2181
Interestingly, Heuser notes some critics noted the failure of the so-called “neo-
Clausewitzians” to take into account Clausewitz’s trinity, a view that may be fairly held 
of Brodie who did indeed emphasize some specific elements of Clausewitz, most notably 
the dictum linking war to politics and which would define one of his final works, his 
1973 War and Politics, widely viewed as his tribute to Clausewitz (but not necessarily 
to Clausewitz’s trinity, though as noted above, one need not necessarily view Brodie’s 
emphasis on what Echevarria described as the “primacy of policy” to the Cold War-era 
Clausewitz scholars as disinterest in the trinity, since to the democratic West, much of 
the trinity could in fact be folded into the war-politics nexus.) Heuser writes that “not 
everybody was happy with these Clausewitzian attempts to think through the unthink-
able. Anatol Rapoport criticized the enthusiasm of Herman Kahn, Raymond Aron 
and other ‘Neo-Clausewitzians’, who in Rapoport’s views misunderstood the master 
in some important ways. They ‘attempted to reduce nuclear war and deterrence to a 
matter of calculable rationality, susceptible to such mathematical technique as game 
theory. And … it was precisely to this intellectualization of war, this reduction of a 
bloody tragedy to a mathematical problem, this elimination of all more and political 
content from the complex equation, that Clausewitz himself was objecting. Kahn and 
his colleagues in their studies achieved the remarkable result of ignoring all three ele-
ments in the Clausewitzian trinity: popular passion, the risks and uncertainties of the 
military environment, and the political purpose for which the war was fought. Their 
2178. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 152.
2179. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 152.
2180. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 152.
2181. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 153.
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calculations bore no relation to war as mankind has known it throughout history.’”2182 
But because Kahn, to a large degree, epitomizes neo-Jominian thinking in the nu-
clear age and not really neo-Clausewitzianism, this critique of Kahn for neglecting 
the trinity in fact can be viewed as a reprieve for Brodie who took a notably different 
approach to the challenge of nuclear strategy from his rival and long-time colleague, 
better reflecting Clausewitz in both form and substance.
Heuser also noted an interesting shift in Colin Gray’s thinking during the Cold War, 
one from pure theory (absent the goal of prescription) to a more applied theoretical ap-
proach that welcome the prescriptive art, along the way becoming a neo-Clausewitzian 
in contrast to his earlier work: “Ironically, it was Colin Gray – who a decade later 
was to become a policy adviser of the Reagan administration – who in 1971 argued 
that civilian strategists should seek only the truth, not of ‘policy prescription’ or ‘the 
advocacy of viable solutions’. He argued that in the US they had ‘fallen between the 
two extremes’, over-impressed as they were ‘with the potential transferability of theory 
to the world of action.’”2183 But, adds Heuser, “Bernard Brodie took issue with this 
point, invoking Clausewitz to argue that ‘strategic theory is a theory for action’. Brodie 
thought that Gray’s attitude was a ‘sad retrogression from Clausewitz’, and himself 
claimed that ‘strategy is a field where truth is sought in pursuit of viable solutions. In 
that respect it is like other branches of politics and like any of the applied sciences, 
and not all like pure science, where the function of theory is to describe, organize, 
and explain and not to prescribe.’”2184 
Indeed, prescription was central to Brodie’s life-long effort, since he accepted the 
full intellectual and moral responsibilities that came with being a strategist in the new, 
dangerous nuclear-armed world; not to prescribe a solution was akin to complicity in 
potential mass-murder, and after Hiroshima, a specter of violence greater than genocide 
that could result in the extinction of mankind and complete despoliation of planet 
Earth. Brodie’s embrace of the prime Clausewitzian dictum uniting war with policy 
was part and parcel of his acceptance of the heavy responsibilities of his age, and of his 
distinctive profession as what Kaplan colorfully dubbed a “wizard of Armageddon.” 
Heuser notes Gray, like Brodie, in his later work Modern Strategy, also “builds heavily on 
Clausewitz, whose dicta crop up throughout the text” and in his section on “Clausewitz 
and the Bomb” “asserts on the one hand that nuclear weapons have a strategic utility 
‘when the Clausewitzian language of ‘the engagement’ is interpreted to encompass 
‘deterrence action’, which is to say threats and latent menaces at work in the minds 
of those intended to be deterred’, but on the other hand that these are ‘weapons that 
2182. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 159.
2183. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 159.
2184. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 159.
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could not reliably be tamed for good Clausewitzian purpose as tools of high policy’ 
and writes that ‘after the mid-1960s, the political leaders and the military profession-
als of East and West were appalled by the monster of nuclear armament that they had 
created which could not, après Clausewitz, be a rational instrument of state policy.’”2185
Heuser recalls that “Clausewitz’s concept of limited war became popular among 
strategic thinkers in the nuclear age with the advent of the Korean War (1950-53) 
which was called by Bernard Brodie the ‘first modern limited war.’”2186 But it would 
prove a difficult concept to apply effectively, as witnessed in both Korea, which ended 
in a stalemate with a non-nuclear opponent, and Vietnam, which led to America’s 
humbling defeat and a decisive communist victory. Heuser writes that the “Clause-
witzian paradigm needed refinement: there was not merely the need to distinguish 
between wars of different intensity on a sliding scale of limited to unlimited, but the 
same war could be different things to the different contestants. Moreover, again in 
the words of Brodie, ‘The United States is indeed a very great military power, but 
when it fights in a limited manner it automatically cuts itself down to a size that the 
opponent may be able to cope with, even if only temporarily, thus raising our costs 
and prolonging the war.’ If pressure equals counter-pressure, then the result is not 
movement but a stalemate.”2187
One of Heuser’s final observations on Brodie and Clausewitz appears in her very last 
chapter, “Clausewitz’s Relevance in the Twenty-First Century,” in which she describes 
one of Clausewitz’s most enduring ambiguities: “Clausewitz’s dithering between the 
assertion that the true nature of war is eternal and the finding that in reality, every 
war is different, war is a true chameleon, makes him attractive to both ‘International 
Relations Realists’, who believe that strategy never changes (and that the basic pat-
terns of international relations never change), and to those who stress the variability 
of war and strategy, as they are a function of political aims which in turn they see 
as a function of different cultures and values, threat perceptions and unique sets of 
circumstances.”2188 Heuser again pits Brodie against Gray: “Thus on the one hand Colin 
Gray, who defines himself as a ‘Realist’, asserts that ‘the need to use or threaten force 
for political objectives, the need to behave strategically, is perennial and universal.’ 
(He for one would be unable to explain why the member states of the EU no longer 
obey this rule in their behavior towards each other.) On the other hand, inspired 
by Clausewitz’s Book VIII of On War, Bernard Brodie in War and Politics devotes a 
chapter to changing attitudes towards war. While he overestimated the continuity in 
values and beliefs from antiquity until the French Revolution, he justly highlights the 
2185. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 160.
2186. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 161.
2187. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 167.
2188. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 190.
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changes that have occurred since then … and concomitantly proves the inadequacy of 
all international relations theories which are posited on the immutability of interests, 
values and beliefs.”2189
Brodie’s embrace of change, whether in technology, or in attitudes toward war, set 
him apart, and while he did not write with the style familiar to today’s complexity 
theorists, the breadth of his knowledge, the depth of his insight, and the dynamic 
nature of his thinking as the world evolved from its pre-nuclear state to the early 
atomic age (marked by America’s atomic monopoly) to the latter atomic age (after 
that monopoly ended) to the thermonuclear era, punctuated by various limited wars 
of the Cold War era, revealed a complexity to his thought. That he sought clarity, and 
was drawn to simple precepts like Clausewitz’s dictum on the war-policy nexus, this 
not mean he ignored complex realities, but rather that he felt his job was to help us 
navigate our way through them. Just as Brodie’s ideas on the “absolute” nature of the 
atomic bomb would evolve as the new thermonuclear “superbomb” appeared, and 
his thinking about escalation and limited war would also evolve throughout the Cold 
War era, Clausewitz’s ideas responded to the epochal changes of his time in a similarly 
dynamic and evolutionary manner. 
Some theorists, like Heuser, thus describe the seeming existence of “two Clausewit-
zes,” a distinct “early” (or as Heuser describes, an “Idealist”) Clausewitz, and a distinct 
“late” (or “Realist”) Clausewitz, and thus see a marked bifurcation in the evolution of 
his thinking (the earlier or Idealist seeming to favor the decisive battle, and empha-
sizing war’s inherent tendency to violently escalate toward “absolute war”, and the 
latter being more concerned with the political context that defined war’s purpose, and 
which tended to restrain its means.) Others saw in Clausewitz’s On War an “unfinished 
symphony” (as Echevarria has described it), riddled with contradiction and suffering 
from an inherent editorial inconsistency that leaves the Prussian vulnerable to mis-
interpretation (and diverse reinterpretations in each subsequent era), a tendency that 
Colin S. Gray noted in his 1999 tribute to Clausewitz, Modern Strategy. 
As noted above, Stephen J. Cimbala presents a synthesis of the seemingly distinct 
(and to some degree contending) “early” and “late” Clausewitzes, arguing that instead 
of two separate Clausewitzes, that Clausewitz is instead describing two separate and 
contending forces in his theory of war: a “strong” and a “weak” force, the former in-
cluding “those which propel war toward its absolute form,” and the latter including 
“those which resist this trend.”2190 Another interesting and refreshing interpretation 
is presented by Andreas Herberg-Rothe in his 2007 Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political 
Theory of War, where he describes a more dynamically evolutionary and theoretically 
2189. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 190.
2190. Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 
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integrated Clausewitz. As Herberg-Rothe writes, “This new interpretation of On War 
tries to restructure Clausewitz’s ‘unfinished symphony’ (Echevarria) on the basis of this 
methodological approach as well as his analysis of Jena, Moscow, and Waterloo.”2191 
Herberg-Rothe argues that the trinity is Clausewitz’s principal legacy, a view that was 
not apparently shared by earlier theorists including Brodie who were more focused on 
reuniting war with political purpose, and thus to ensure that the Cold War’s nuclear 
legacy did not result in mankind’s extinction. As he argued in his prologue, “The Trin-
ity, with all its problems, is the real legacy of Clausewitz and the real beginning of his 
theory, as he emphasized himself” when writing at the end of Chapter 1 that the Trinity 
that he “formulated casts a first ray of light on the basic structure of theory, and enables 
us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components.’”2192 
Herberg-Rothe further writes that “Clausewitz’s concept of the Trinity is explicitly 
differentiated from his famous formula of war, described as a continuation of politics 
by other means,” and while “Clausewitz seems at first glance to repeat his formula in 
the Trinity, this is here only one of three tendencies which all have to be considered if 
one does not want to contradict reality immediately, as Clausewitz emphasized.”2193 
And, Herberg-Rothe adds, by “[l]ooking more closely at his formula, we can see that he 
describes war as a continuation of politics, but with other means those that belong to 
politics itself. These two parts of his statement constitute two extremes: war described 
either as a continuation of politics, or as something that mainly belongs to the military 
sphere. Clausewitz emphasizes that policy uses other, non-political means. This creates 
an implicit tension, between war’s status as a continuation of policy, and the distinc-
tive nature of its other means. Beatrice Heuser has demonstrated in her overview of 
Clausewitz’s ideas and their historical impact, that resolving this tension in favour of 
one side has always led to a primacy of the military. This implicit tension is explicated 
in the Trinity.”2194 As Herberg-Rothe further notes: “It is not accidental, and is indeed 
a characteristic feature of both the most emphatic critiques of Clausewitz published in 
the 1990s by Martin van Creveld and Sir John Keegan, that they nearly always quote 
only half of the formula, the part in which Clausewitz states that war is a continuation 
of politics. Their interpretations suppress, often explicitly and always implicitly, the 
second part of Clausewitz’s determination that politics in warfare uses other means. 
The paradoxical aspect of the criticism of Clausewitz is that he himself is well equipped 
to respond to it. Keegan is obviously criticizing the early Clausewitz, the supporter of 
Napoleon’s strategy and of the destruction principle as a military method. Van Creveld, 
on the other hand, is attacking the later Clausewitz, who emphasized the antithesis 
2191. Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9.
2192. Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War, 4.
2193. Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War, 5.
2194. Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War, 5.
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between limited and unlimited warfare, which became the critical point of his inten-
tion to revise his whole work.”2195 Herberg-Rothe argues there is but one Clausewitz, 
responding to three distinct phases of Napoleonic warfare, modifying his theory of war 
in response to each of these phases, and in the end recognizing the early and seemingly 
unlimited potential as well as the ultimate limits of Napoleonic strategy, much the 
way Brodie himself evolved to equally convulsive changes in the nature of war that he 
observed, as war stood poised to leap from the global catastrophe of “total war” to the 
hitherto theoretical abstraction but now seemingly manifest reality of “absolute war.”
Reconsidering Clausewitz’s Influence: Measuring the Unmeasurable
Stuart Kinross takes a broad, historical approach in his 2008 Clausewitz and America: 
Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq, part of Routledge’s Strategy and 
History Series edited by Colin Gray and Williamson Murray, and a revision of Kinross’ 
1996 doctoral thesis at the University of Aberdeen on “the influence of Clausewitz on 
American strategic thought from Vietnam to the Gulf War of 1990-91,” and updated 
a decade later “to include the tumultuous events of the past few years.” Tackling the 
thorny issue of Clausewitz’s “influence,” a topic others have intentionally avoided 
(as was the case for Chris Bassford, who instead discussed Clausewitz’s “reception.”) 
As described in an abstract at the front, Kinross’ “book demonstrates how Carl von 
Clausewitz’s thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam 
War and the current conflict in Iraq,” and how the Prussian’s “thought played a part 
in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after 
the Vietnam War,” and how by the time of the 1991 Gulf War, “American policymak-
ers demonstrated that they understood the Clausewitzian notion of utilising military 
force to fulfill a clear political objective,” and how the “US armed forces bridged the 
operational and strategic levels during that conflict in accordance with Clausewitz’s 
conviction that war plans should be tailored to fulfill a political objective.”2196 With the 
end of the Cold War, Kinross observed, and “an increasing predilection for technologi-
cal solutions, American policymakers and the military moved away from Clausewitz,” 
and it was “only the events of 11 September 2001 that reminded Americans of his 
intrinsic value,” though Kinross remained concerned, despite the potential accom-
modation of the GWOT and the war in Iraq “within the Clausewitzian paradigm” 
that “the lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggests that the US 
may have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam.”2197
2195. Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War, 5.
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Kinross, following in the footsteps of Bassford, recognized the problematic nature 
of defining Clausewitz’s influence. His introduction starts out by quoting General 
Jacob Meckel of the Imperial German Army who said a century ago that: “Everyone 
who nowadays either makes or teaches war in a modern sense, bases himself upon 
Clausewitz, even if he is not conscious of it.”2198 As Kinross himself describes: “One 
of the problems in examining the contemporary and historical influence of a writer 
who died in the early nineteenth century is the temptation to relate everything, past 
and present, to his way of thinking,” and with regards to “addressing the influence 
of Clausewitz, one needs to be very careful about exactly what one means by that 
word.”2199 Even Michael Howard, “rightly regarded as one of the world’s foremost 
military historians,” in an essay on “The Influence of Clausewitz” introducing the 
renown 1976 translation that Howard co-edited with Peter Paret, “did not explain 
what he meant by influence.”2200 And Bassford, as noted above, “who prefers to write 
of Clausewitz’s ‘reception’, has written: “Influence is rather hard to define. One can 
be influenced by a book without agreeing with it, without reading it, or without even 
being aware of its existence.”2201
Citing Brodie, Kinross recalls how in “an essay written in 1959, Bernard Brodie 
argued that Clausewitz’s contemporary and rival, Antoine-Henri Jomini, has exercised 
the greater influence of the two,” basing this conclusion on “the basis that Jomini 
lived to witness the changes in warfare wrought by the Industrial Revolution, whereas 
Clausewitz did not, and that he wrote in French, a far more accessible language than 
Clausewitz’s native German.”2202 Adds Kinross, “Perhaps more pertinent, in the context 
of this work, is Daniel Moran’s observation that Jomini’s interpretation of Napoleon’s 
achievements ignored their revolutionary roots and began a school of military theory 
that was politically and socially naive ... a tradition that the American military has 
generally embraced: ‘Schooled to prefer formulaic answers, checklists, and school 
solutions, the American military is decidedly Jominian, not Clausewitzian.”2203 And, 
on the perceived difficulty in reading Clausewitz, Kinross echoes Echevarria (who 
rejected, quite vehemently, Brodie’s suggestion otherwise): “Another difficulty in in-
terpreting the thoughts and actions of contemporaries in a Clausewitzian light is that 
Clausewitz, for all his wonderful use of language, is very difficult to read, especially if 
one does not take the time to reflect on what it is he is trying to say.”2204
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Kinross traces Clausewitzian currents in US strategic thinking, looking at civilian 
leaders, thought leaders, military leaders, and evolving doctrine. As evident in several 
other recent works on Clausewitz, Brodie has a recurrent voice, though a limited 
one, appearing on just six pages of text, first commenting on the seemingly un-
Clausewitzian strategic bombing during World War II: “In his analysis of American 
strategic bombing during the Second World War, Bernard Brodie criticised the air 
campaigns against Germany and Japan despite recognizing a certain operational efficacy 
in them. Strategically, however, he was far from convinced, believing that force had 
been employed out of all proportion to the objective being sought. One can criticise 
the bombing campaigns as being indiscriminate, despite the dedication of planners 
to military targeting. On the other hand, it can be argued that the desire of the Allies 
to save their own soldiers’ lives, through hastening the end of the war via airpower, 
justified the campaigns. The argument applies especially to the atomic bombing of 
Japan.”2205 And then, “In November 1945, Bernard Brodie responded to the challenge 
of the nuclear age by predicting that deterrence would now be the dominant strategic 
concept. This prediction swiftly became reality when, after the rapid demobilisation 
of its conventional forces, America’s policy moved to threatening to utilise its atomic 
monopoly ... in retaliation for any attack upon its interests,” which Kinross found to 
be ‘Clausewitzian’ in that “Clausewitz had written that strategy could have (and indeed 
frequently had) the negative object of making clear to the opponent ‘the improbability 
of victory ... [and] its unacceptable cost.’”2206 While Clausewitzian, Kinross suggests 
it was nonetheless revolutionary, citing Weigley – who had “noted that the advent of 
deterrence was a turning point in American strategic thought” – that this “‘amounted 
to a revolution in the history of American military policy.’”2207
In his discussion of the legacy of Vietnam, Kinross again turns to Brodie and the 
guide that he authored to the 1976 “Paret/Howard edition of On War” in which 
Brodie “highlighted the problem that confronted the US in Vietnam” by quoting 
from Clausewitz, who wrote in On War that: “To discover how much of our resources 
must be mobilised for war, we must first examine our own political aim and that of 
the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must 
gauge the character and abilities of its government and people and do the same in 
regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states 
and the effect the war may have on them.”2208 Kinross suggests “that no such analysis 
was undertaken in the United States during the 1960s,” and “[w]hat this illustrates 
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is that, given the infatuation with quantitative analysis during the McNamara years, 
a scientific approach to war is incompatible with treating war as an art as all success-
ful strategists in history have.”2209 Brodie would, of course, famously butt heads with 
McNamara, as he was excluded from the “best and the brightest” who went on to 
lead America to military defeat. Kinross, like Brodie, came to believe ultimately that: 
“Clausewitz’s most fundamental contribution to strategic thought is his analysis of 
the relationship between war and politics.”2210
America’s loss in Vietnam would, curiously, stimulate what Kinross described as 
the “renaissance of American strategic thought,” the title to his fourth chapter. As he 
writes, “The traumatic effect of the Vietnam War upon the American military and 
upon society at large mirrored the impact of the First World War upon the democra-
cies of Western Europe. Fortunately for the Americans, an intellectual effort began to 
absorb the lessons of Vietnam and therefore to prevent the slide into demoralisation 
and pacifism that had afflicted inter-war France, for example.”2211 Kinross adds: “That 
the American armed forces did not slide into permanent decline owed much to the 
revival in strategic thought that originated during Admiral Stanfield Turner’s tenure 
as president of the Naval War College after 1972,” who “overhauled the College’s cur-
riculum by placing an emphasis on rigorous instruction based on historical examples 
... such as Thucydides and Clausewitz,” who “would provide students with valuable 
practical and theoretical lessons.”2212 Interestingly, Turner “also criticised the ‘increased 
reliance on civilians and on ‘think tanks’ to do our thinking for us [the military]. We 
must be able to produce military men who are a match for the best of the civilian 
strategists or we will abdicate control of our profession.’”2213
In the coming years, Clausewitz’s On War would become required reading at mili-
tary academies, first being adopted by the Naval War College in 1976, the very year 
of its translation and publication by Princeton University Press, followed in 1978 by 
the Air War College, and in 1981 by the Army War College.2214 Adds Kinross: “At 
the US Military Academy, West Point, students also read this edition of On War and, 
in so doing, became aware of the political objectives of war.”2215 This may seem to be 
an overstatement, since cadets swear an oath of loyalty to the US Constitution and 
its Commander-in-Chief, both embodying civilian control over the military. But it is 
fair to say that reading Clausewitz surely reinforced student awareness of the political 
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objectives of war. On Princeton University Press’ Clausewitz project, Kinross recounts 
that: “The Howard and Paret translation has become the definitive edition of On War 
in the American military’s schools. Paret was an expert on the period during which 
Clausewitz lived, while Howard was determined that the work should be available in 
comprehensible English. Bernard Brodie was also involved in the project. His concern 
was that Clausewitz should be available to the public and also be put into the hands 
of soldiers.”2216 Kinross reiterates that Vietnam “had convinced some officers of the 
importance of the Clausewitzian relationship between war and policy.”2217 He later 
added, in the conclusion to his chapter, “In the mid-1970s, the post-Vietnam mili-
tary began to read Clausewitz more widely than ever before when a new generation 
of junior officers were introduced to On War at the various services’ colleges. Almost 
simultaneously, a steady stream of articles began to appear in military journals that 
referred to Clausewitz as a guide in the debate over US strategic thinking and doctrine, 
whether through a historical evaluation of his thought or through its application to 
contemporary problems.”2218 Kinross further noted: “At the strategic level, the Soviets 
had a firm grasp of the Clausewitzian relationship between war and policy, something 
the US armed forces would only slowly begin to appreciate.”2219
Kinross reflects upon Clausewitz’s contribution to American military thinking: “The 
articulation of the relationship between war and policy is one of those ‘contributions 
of Clausewitz’ that will always be relevant. Others of relevance today are those of fric-
tion, the centre of gravity, the concept of real war, and the fascinating trinity,”2220 the 
latter which has recently emerged as a current theme of interest to several Clausewitz 
scholars who find in the trinity a concept that seems particularly well-suited to the 
current era of asymmetric and complex warfare. Kinross further notes that “Clause-
witz’s most enduring legacy, aside from his interconnection of war and politics, lies in 
his rethinking on the nature of war: limited war can be just as effective as war waged 
at a higher level of intensity, something more apt than ever today.”2221 But Clause-
witz’s voice has been just one voice; as Kinross wrote at the end of (chapter four), “it 
should be noted that the use of Clausewitz’s ideas compared to other thinkers was by 
no means exclusive. Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, in particular, were studied in some 
detail at the service schools.”2222 And while Jomini may no longer be widely read, his 
influence endures, hard-wired into the American way of war; as Kinross writes in 
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the conclusion of his book, “The Jominian approach is reflected in a continuation of 
the tradition of ‘prescrib[ing] principles of war’. The result is that quality doctrinal 
manuals ... are the exception rather than the rule. Even joint publications ... tend to 
reflect the prescriptive tendencies of a Jominian ‘cookbook’.”2223 
Kinross thus sees in Clausewitz an important guide for America’s continuing effort 
to reform its military after Vietnam: “The process of military reform that took place 
in the United States after the Vietnam War can be compared to the revival in the 
Prussian military after its defeat by Napoleon in 1806, a revival in which Clausewitz 
played a practical part. This work has shown that his thought played some part in the 
American revival. The US military found Clausewitz to be a theorist whose writings 
were compatible with its desire to adopt the operational level of war and to ensure 
a seamless link between tactics and strategy. Though he was not the only theorist to 
influence military doctrine during this period, Clausewitz’s work was more commonly 
drawn upon than anyone else’s. Politicians found in him, albeit mainly second hand, 
a theorist who articulated the requirement that military power should be seen as an 
instrument of policy that, if wisely used, would benefit the national interest.”2224 Many 
challenges still remain, as Kinross pointed out at the Cold War’s end: “Now American 
strategy had to adapt itself to the uncertain realities of a post-Cold War world. ... At a 
time when threats to national security range from terrorists and rogue states armed with 
weapons of mass destruction to recidivist nations armed with high-tech conventional 
weapons, US military and civilian leaders must develop a way of reconciling operations 
success with clear strategic objectives across the whole spectrum of conflict. A close 
reading of On War would serve as a sound point of departure.”2225
It wasn’t just the Cold War theorists who emphasized the primacy of policy when 
interpreting Clausewitz for their time and place. Consider the observations made by 
Jon Tetsuro Sumida in his Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, which 
considered the influence of Clausewitz on several theorists who followed, including 
the famed British naval strategist, Julian Corbett, who like Brodie a generation later 
would focus upon the most famous of Clausewitz’s dicta, that war was a “continua-
tion of policy by other means.” In fact, one of Corbett’s contributions was to extend 
Clausewitzian theory into the naval realm, and it would be through this famous dictum 
that he would first bring Clausewitzian theory to sea. Recalling Corbett’s increasing 
interest in the Prussian, Sumida writes: “In 1906, Corbett added a lecture on ‘The 
System of Clausewitz” to his War College program,” and that “Clausewitz’s ideas are 
strongly evident in Corbett’s ‘Strategic Terms and Definitions Used in Lectures on 
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Naval History’ of 1906,”2226 also known as his “Green Pamphlet,” and where Corbett, 
“like Clausewitz before him, identifies politics as an inhibitor of strategic action. The 
‘deflection of strategy by politics,’ Corbett argues, though ‘usually regarded as a disease,’ 
is ‘really a vital factor in every strategical problem,” a view he maintains in the 1909 
revision of the Green Pamphlet.2227 He further recalls how, “In 1907, Corbett published 
his England in the Seven Years’ War … that to an even greater degree than England in 
Mediterranean focuses upon the interplay of diplomacy and naval and military power,” 
and in which “Corbett justifies his approach with a direct reference to Clausewitz. In 
‘modern times,’ Corbett observes, people habitually though that war and peace repre-
sented two distinct conditions that meant ‘there was always a point where intercourse 
or diplomacy ended, and severance or strategy began.’ ‘Now Clausewitz,’ he argues, 
‘with all the experiences of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars to guide him, long 
ago pointed out that this conception of international relations was false both in theory 
and practice.’ Corbett then declares that the English statesmen who are the subject of 
his study drew ‘no hard and fast line between diplomacy and strategy,’ and that indeed 
‘every turn of hostilities presented itself diplomatically, and every diplomatic move 
as an aspect of strategy.’”2228 Adds Sumida: “Reference to Clausewitz’s most famous 
aphorism is not, however, the only mark of the Prussian author’s influence on Corbett. 
Although Corbett does not explicitly cite Clausewitz again in this work, to a remark-
able degree it is clear that he chose his subject and cast his approach along lines that 
embodied some of the most important arguments that Clausewitz had put forward 
in On War. Corbett’s style of writing about war changed, and it is not difficult to see 
that this is because he had begun to emulate Clausewitz.”2229 It’s interesting to note 
that Corbett emulates Clausewitz yet seeks to differentiate himself from the Prussian 
by advocating limited war theory that he wrongly believes contradicts Clausewitz; 
Sumida corrects the record, noting Clausewitz would surely have agreed with Corbett. 
The parallels to Brodie’s comparable efforts after Hiroshima are intriguing, though in 
Brodie’s case he recognizes limited war theory to be inherently Clausewitzian, with 
the means modified to reflect the more limited political objectives.
Sumida turns to a discussion of “Corbett’s most famous book, Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy,” which “was published in 1911,” and in which Corbett “provides 
a systematic presentation of his fundamental concepts of strategy.”2230 In this work, 
Sumida writes, “Corbett makes Clausewitz’s writing both an authoritative source and 
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a foil for his own arguments. Corbett claims Clausewitz’s backing when he argues that 
the proper role of theory is to ‘assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook whereby 
he may with greater rapidity and certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation.’ 
He quotes Clausewitz to support the proposition that theory creates ‘a common vehicle 
of expression and a common plane of thought’ that makes efficient deliberations of a 
military staff or conference of the national leadership possible. Corbett identifies the 
concept that war is ‘a continuation of policy by other means’ as the prevailing funda-
mental theory of war. After naming Clausewitz as its inventor, he proceeds to explore 
the implications of the phrase, in so doing endorsing its validity and insisting upon 
its great significance. Corbett, as before, defines a proper defense in Clausewitzian 
terms, namely, as resisting enemy moves followed by counterattack, and he marshals 
a plethora of strong arguments in favor of the defense over the offense.”2231
But Sumida notes that “Corbett does qualify his position, noting that he is ‘not in 
whole-hearted agreement with Clausewitz’s doctrine of the strength of the defense,” 
and instead “founds his own advocacy of maritime strategy as an effective form of 
limited war on Clausewitz’s writing on the subject, but claims his views are different 
on a critical point. Corbett maintains that, unlike Clausewitz, he believes that the 
destruction of the enemy’s main forces, under the conditions of limited war, need not 
be the primary objective. Clausewitz is in fact of the same opinion. Corbett, however, 
appears to have thought otherwise – he is convinced that Clausewitz’s position is that 
action should always be directed at the enemy army. Clausewitz’s supposed failure 
to recognize that his own concept of limited war could require action against objec-
tives other than the main fighting forces of the enemy prompts Corbett to observe, 
‘Clausewitz himself never apprehended the full significance of his brilliant theory.’”2232 
Sumida observes that Corbett’s 1911 treatise “marks a retreat from the uncompromis-
ing declaration of agreement with Clausewitz in the Green Pamphlet,” and suggests 
“Corbett’s later writing was probably influenced by political expediency.”2233 Impor-
tantly, Sumida finds that “Corbett’s representation of On War, while incomplete and 
occasionally faulty, nonetheless engages Clausewitz’s thinking about the nature of 
strategic decision-making and about defense as the stronger form of war. His analysis 
is in many respects perceptive and his general evaluation highly favorable,” but in 
the end his “judgments, however, were to be overshadowed by the work of a younger 
countryman who held On War responsible for what was universally believed to be the 
greatest catastrophe in modern European history.”2234 And that would be B.H. Liddell 
Hart, whom Sumida next discusses. 
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After his discussion of Liddell Hart, Sumida turns to Raymond Aron, including 
his “direct critique of B.H. Liddell Hart, which … in effect summarizes his general 
conclusions about why Clausewitz had been so badly misunderstood.” As Sumida 
observes, Aron “begins by stating that Liddell Hart is ‘too intelligent to fail to see 
that Clausewitz was greater than his disciples, and too English to devote months to 
unraveling his skein of logical and empirical propositions, of theory and doctrine.’ 
Aron then makes four observations. First, he says that an ‘attack on Clausewitz requires 
more attentive reading of the treatise, and less summary of historical analysis.’ Second, 
he states that ‘you can find what you want to find in the Treatise; all that you need 
is a selection of quotations, supported by personal prejudice.’ Third, ‘If the Treatise 
is read carefully, the conclusions that it reveals are contrary to those normally drawn 
from it.’ And fourth, Clausewitz ‘does not approve or disapprove, he merely takes 
note.’ To these four admonitions he adds remarks that amount to an assertion that 
Clausewitz is a difficult read because of the contradictions between the first chapter 
of On War and what followed.”2235 Aron in marked contrast to Liddell Hart sought 
“to portray his subject as ‘a preacher of moderation, not excess.”2236
Clausewitzian Theory Meets the Nuclear Age
How Clausewitzian theory responded to the post-Hiroshima world was discussed in 
detail by Hugh Smith in his 2005 On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political 
Ideas. Smith writes in his preface that: “On War – the lengthy and somewhat disjointed 
magnum opus of an otherwise obscure Prussian general of the Napoleonic era … has 
occupied a critical place in Western thinking about war for over a century and a half. 
It has been both vilified and venerated. Detractors have dismissed it as the work of a 
pseudo-philosophical pedant, a narrow-minded Prussian, or an unabashed militarist 
committed to war as an instrument of policy. Clausewitz, others suggest, has been 
made redundant by successive revolutions in military technology that began after 
his death and still continue to transform war. The most radical critics argue that he 
makes the fundamental mistake of treating war as a rational act.”2237 But as Smith 
observes, introducing Brodie to his discussion, “Supporters of Clausewitz have also 
made extravagant claims. For Bernard Brodie On War is ‘not simply the greatest book 
on war but the one truly great book on that subject yet written’. Only Sun Tzu’s The 
Art of War might be mentioned in the same breath.”2238
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At the end of Chapter 19, on “Clausewitz to 1945,” Smith addresses the distinct 
challenges of the nuclear age: “In August 1945 a radically new weapon – the atomic 
bomb – brought about surrender in a matter of days. Japan was coerced by military 
force to yield to the will of another state but everything else seemed different. Nuclear 
weapons promised an unprecedented revolution in military and political affairs. Clause-
witzian war, already stretched beyond the battlefield, might finally lose its relevance.”2239 
And so, Smith turns next in chapter 20 to “Hypermodern War,” where he addresses 
the challenges posed by the nuclear age to Clausewitzian theory. He writes: “Only two 
nuclear weapons have ever been used in anger yet they dominated military thinking 
between 1945 and the end of the Cold War. Some believed Clausewitz’s relevance lost 
once and for all since nuclear war would be so destructive it could never serve as an 
instrument of policy. Through a massive increase in destructive capacity modern war 
had reached its ‘logical extreme’, its hypermodern form. But others, focusing on the 
ends of policy, argued that Clausewitz’s importance had increased since the need to 
understand the linkages between war and policy was greater than ever. In either case 
nuclear weapons promised a radical impact on strategy and international politics.”2240
In his discussion on “The Nuclear Revolution,” Smith further observes: “The strik-
ing parallel between Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war and nuclear war was soon 
noticed. A nuclear war could be ‘an isolated act’ which ‘breaks out unexpectedly’, 
arising through a single irrational decision, a simple miscalculation or a mechanical 
accident. Fought only with weapons constructed before hostilities began, ‘preparations 
would tend toward totality, for no omission could ever be rectified.’ It could take the 
form of ‘a single short blow’, consisting ‘of one decisive act, or of a set of simultane-
ous decisions’ determined in advance. Nuclear war could ‘be spread simultaneously’, 
engulfing not only belligerents but also third parties fearing for their survival. And 
the outcome might be ‘final’ with the annihilation of the states involved and even 
civilization itself.”2241 Smith adds that: “For Clausewitz, of course, absolute war could 
not exist in the real world. Extreme effort is a ‘fantasy’ while the nature of military 
resources ‘means that they cannot all be deployed at the same moment’.”2242 And 
yet, Smith further reflects, “Nuclear war, however, seemed to have overcome all the 
modifying factors in real war – from human frailties to political constraints. Maximum 
destructions was possible with minimal effort. But while Clausewitz’s absolute war was 
a theoretical construct unachievable in practice, nuclear war seemed all too possible.”2243 
Smith reintroduces Brodie to his discussion, writing how: “Some strategists, notably 
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in the US Air Force, initially saw nuclear weapons as simply an extension of World 
War II ‘strategic bombing’,” but that “[a]s early as 1946, however, Bernard Brodie 
argued that the role of the military establishment could no longer be to win wars,” 
and a “new field of inquiry, sweepingly labeled ‘strategic studies’, arose to tackle the 
problems of war in the nuclear age, examining options for nuclear arsenals, scenarios 
for employing nuclear weapons, and ways of deterring nuclear attack. As Clausewitz 
had observed with absolute war, so it was with nuclear war: ‘the inquiring mind can 
never rest until it reaches the extreme’. But it was a field of inquiry lacking something 
he considered essential to strategy – historical experience. Weapons could be tested in 
the real world but strategies for their employment could not. Nuclear war remained 
war on paper.”2244 
Smith finds that “nuclear weapons challenged Clausewitz’s four levels of war,” which 
he defined to be “fighting, contest, national strategy and politics. All seemed totally 
confounded by the nuclear arsenal yet in each case some of Clausewitz’s ideas appeared 
more relevant than ever.”2245 As Smith explained: “Most fundamentally, nuclear war 
seemed to have abolished fighting in the sense of an encounter between military forces 
on the battlefield with outcomes shaped by traditional soldierly virtues like courage, 
endurance, experience and leadership. An enemy’s will to resist, indeed his entire 
country, could be destroyed without meeting and defeating his armed forces in battle. 
Where modern war sought to isolate fighting on a battlefield, hypermodern war made 
entire societies into targets, abolishing traditional distinctions between soldier and 
civilian, and between front and rear. Rather than a clash of arms nuclear war would 
be simply ‘a process of mutual destruction without any combat’. Or, if one state pre-
vailed by some good fortune, a unilateral campaign of devastation. Since fighting had 
disappeared the term ‘nuclear exchange’ was sometimes preferred to ‘nuclear war.’”2246 
Another casualty of nuclear warfare, Smith suggested, was that of friction: “At the same 
time nuclear arsenals promised to eliminate friction. For Clausewitz friction normally 
slowed down action, a burden to be carries by the efforts and endurance of armies. 
But now all the internal restraints that shackled war and prevented realization of the 
extreme were thrown off. Where conventional war operates in a resistant medium, 
nuclear weapons had created a condition of superconductivity. … A rapid, virtually 
instantaneous rise to extremes was the likely result.”2247 But Smith pauses to question 
whether friction would in fact be eliminated in the event nuclear war took place: 
“But friction remained in Clausewitz’s strict sense – the difference between war on 
paper and war in reality. In the nuclear context it might lead to greater violence than 
2244. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 245.
2245. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 245.
2246. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 245.
2247. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 246.
482 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
intended or speed up the process of destruction – or it might retain its usual sense of 
degrading performance. Orders to fire missiles might be misunderstood or disobeyed, 
missiles might fail to work as intended, and targets might be missed. Nuclear war, 
like all war, could not escape mistakes, malfunctions and miscalculations. Aware of 
these dangers, nuclear powers cooperated to avoid such eventualities as mechanical 
accident, misreading radar screens and misunderstanding an opponent’s intentions.”2248
Smith next addresses the primacy of policy, or Clausewitz’s famous dictum of “War as 
a Continuation of Policy,” writing that: “Nuclear weapons also transformed campaign 
strategy, causing it to merge with both tactics and national strategy. A nuclear campaign 
would no longer take the form of generals maneuvering forces to threaten and give 
battle in a defined theatre of war. The use of even a single nuclear weapon was a matter 
for national leaders, not for the military alone. Efforts were made to restore campaign 
strategy by deploying ‘tactical’ (low-yield) nuclear weapons and delegating authority 
for their use to commanders in the field. This strategy promised effective deterrence, 
and effective war-fighting if deterrence failed. But few were confident that initial use 
of tactical nuclear weapons would not be followed by rapid escalation, controlled or 
uncontrolled, to the global level.”2249 Smith continues, “The function of the military 
became instead to develop, maintain and deploy the nuclear arsenal in peacetime for 
use as required by government. Generals ceased to be commanders with a degree of 
independence in their own theatre of operations. The army consisted not of fighting 
soldiers, but of technicians and experts skilled in targeting and dispatching weapons 
against military and non-military targets alike. … The army had lost its normal function 
of protecting civilians from attack and being the principal object of enemy attack.”2250 
And thus with these sweeping changes wrought by nuclear weapons, Smith writes 
that: “Nuclear weapons immediately prompted the question whether war could any 
longer serve as an instrument of policy. … Finding a way to use nuclear weapons for 
positive purposes proved elusive. Even during major conventional conflicts no state has 
used nuclear weapons against either a nuclear or non-nuclear opponent. Nuclear war, 
many concluded, might be a continuation of politics arising from political rivalries or 
miscalculations, but could never be a rational continuation of policy.”2251 
But this was not necessarily the case with regard to deterring nuclear war, as Brodie 
had so quickly realized at the dawn of the atomic age: “For others, however, the point 
was to apply Clausewitz’s formula while taking into account the changed values in the 
equation. The costs and risks of initiating nuclear war are manifestly enormous while 
prospective gains are dubious or simply illusory. The formula still applies – even, or 
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especially, at the extreme. It effectively rules our nuclear war since the costs have risen 
beyond all reason.”2252 Indeed, Smith continues: “Supporters of the formula also argue 
that it can accommodate the idea of using the threat of nuclear war as an instrument 
of policy. While actually fighting a nuclear was is ‘devoid of sense’, creating a finite risk 
of nuclear war to bolster nuclear deterrence can be rational policy. …The rationality 
lies in making careful use of a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’ such a that a 
prospective attacker cannot be sure the victim will not respond. Even simple possession 
of nuclear weapons, for example, without explicit threats or doctrines – ‘existential 
deterrence’ – can be a rational and effective instrument of policy.”2253
In Smith’s concluding discussion, on “Clausewitz and Hypermodern War,” he 
explains that: “Nuclear weapons threatened to abolish Clausewitz’s structure of war 
as fighting, campaigning and an instrument of policy. For some the new means of 
war meant his relevance had been lost. Anatol Rapoport, for example, dubbed ‘neo-
Clausewitzians’ those who continued to believe that war remained normal in inter-
national relations and could be managed as a rational means of policy. Critics argued 
that even to consider war and its attendant risk of nuclear escalation was to accept its 
legitimacy and the risk of catastrophe. Policy could not and should not be conducted 
with an admixture of military means.”2254 And yet, Smith continued, “for others 
Clausewitz’s formula still provided wise counsel to statesmen. It means the careful 
tailoring of war to meet the ends of policy and hence a natural reluctance to resort to 
force when its consequences were unknowable and potentially catastrophic. Though 
Clausewitz had said little about deterrence, he had pointed to the risks of escalation. 
His principle of political supremacy over the military reinforced the importance of 
ends over means. Like pure war, the idea of nuclear war might serve as a reference 
point for those concerned with national security – but as an extreme to be avoided, 
not an ideal to be pursued.”2255
In Reading Clausewitz, Beatrice Heuser describes Colin S. Gray as one of “Clause-
witz’s greatest admirers,”2256 but notes that Gray nonetheless recognizes the Prussian’s 
inherent challenges and contradictions,2257 as described in Gray’s 1999 tribute to 
Clausewitz, Modern Strategy. It might seem that Gray’s embrace of Clausewitz came 
late, but this is more a reflection of Clausewitz’s own inconsistencies and the perception 
of a duel within Clausewitz between “absolute” and “limited” war, as reflected in the 
discussion in the literature of a seeming “early” and “late” (or “Idealist” and “Realist,” 
2252. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 248.
2253. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 248.
2254. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 249-50.
2255. Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, 250.
2256. Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), 17.
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or even “strong” and “weak”) Clausewitz. Gray’s Cold War nuclear thinking seemed 
more in tune with the “early” Clausewitz of “absolute” war fame, and only later would 
evolve to more closely align with what some describe as the “late” Clausewitz. Indeed, 
Heuser recalls Gray’s Cold War embrace of warfighting as nuclear strategy, thus plac-
ing him on the other side of the strategic-theoretical fence from Brodie, and more in 
tune with the approach taken by Herman Kahn; as Heuser describes, the “war-fighting 
school of nuclear strategists, which included ... Gray, argued essentially that ‘victory’ 
had to be the aim of military planning while war was an instrument of policy” and 
that “military planners had no choice, even in the nuclear age, but to assume that it 
was,” as would be reflected in America’s 1980 “countervailing” nuclear strategy.2258 
Heuser recalls with irony that Gray, “in 1971 argued that civilian strategists should 
seek only the pursuit of truth, not of ‘policy prescription’ or ‘the advocacy of viable 
solutions’” and rebuked American civilian strategists, “over-impressed as they were 
‘with the potential transferability of theory to the world of action’,” an issue Brodie 
himself would strongly challenge, “invoking Clausewitz to argue that ‘strategic theory 
is a theory for action’” and who castigated Gray, finding his “attitude was a ‘sad retro-
gression from Clausewitz’,” and arguing instead that “‘strategy is a field where truth 
is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions ... like any of the applied sciences, and 
not at all like pure science, where the function of theory is to describe, organize, and 
explain and not to prescribe.’”2259 Heuser also notes that Michael Howard similarly 
“dismissed Colin Gray’s call for a ‘war-winning capacity’ as irrational, arguing that 
Gray and like-minded strategists advocated it ‘not because their masters have any 
serious political motive for extirpating the societies of their adversaries, but because 
in a grotesque inversion of logic the means now dictate the ends.’”2260 Stephen J. Cim-
bala presents a more moderate view of Gray and his fellow warfighters, writing that 
“scholars and other military strategists might refuse to consider nuclear war fighting 
as a serious subject for study, but policy makers and commanders would be tasked to 
produce policy guidance, plans, and forces for the conduct of nuclear warfare in case 
deterrence failed,” and while the “point of deterrence, as Bernard Brodie said in 1946, 
was to avoid war,” Cimbala explains – much like Colin S. Gray would have argued 
in the 1980s – that “[a]voiding war by means of deterrence meant being able to fight 
if war was forced upon you,” and it was upon “this, if little else” that the “U.S. and 
Soviet militaries agreed.”2261
Heuser observes that Gray would eventually come to agree with Howard and Brodie, 
as reflected in his 1999 Modern Strategy, where he recognized the important distinc-
2258. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 151.
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2260. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 160.
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tion between deterring war as strategic policy, in contrast to winning nuclear wars 
through fighting; thus, as Heuser writes, “Gray asserts on the one hand that nuclear 
weapons have a strategic utility ‘when the Clausewitzian language of ‘the engagement’ 
is interpreted to encompass ‘deterrence action’” but not otherwise, when they “‘could 
not reliably be tamed for good Clausewitzian purpose as tools of high policy’,” and 
that “after the mid-1960s, the political leaders and the military professionals of East 
and West were appalled by the monster of nuclear armament that they had created 
which could not, après Clausewitz, be a rational instrument of state policy.” 2262 But 
Heuser cautions that “there is no safety in Colin Gray’s assumption that deterrence 
works in the same way between any ‘pair’ of nuclear adversaries, and that limited war 
is the only option open to them.”2263 Indeed, Heuser turns to Stephen J. Cimbala, 
adding: “As Cimbala has reminded us, Clausewitz would urge anyone to beware of 
war’s tendency towards escalation, to get out of hand, and of passions aroused by war. 
And it is worth reminding ourselves that while ideally all governments should follow 
Clausewitz’s precept of thinking about the possible last step before venturing on the 
first, not all governments ... have always done so.”2264 Heuser later notes both Gray and 
Brodie took inspiration from Clausewitz, albeit different portions of his work, with 
Gray among those who “believe that strategy never changes,” in contrast to Brodie 
who finds himself among those who “stress the variability of war and strategy,”2265 
though the late Gray (as reflected in his 1999 Modern Strategy) finds more common 
ground with his old sparring partner Brodie, and with the dimensions of Clausewitz 
that some describe as the “late Clausewitz” or even the “Realist” Clausewitz as Heuser 
so describes him – noting there were two distinct Clausewitzes or phases of Clause-
witzian theory, an idealist and a realist, diverging on the issue of war’s tendency to 
violently and passionately escalate toward the extreme of absolute war, and its actual 
inertial tendency to remain limited, contained by the logic of political objectives.2266
Gray’s Modern Strategy is at heart a tribute to Clausewitz’s enduring influence, but 
within this tribute to the Prussian can be found an implicit tribute to Brodie, evident 
in Gray’s recurrent discussion of Brodie’s ongoing effort to reconcile Clausewitzian 
theory with the nuclear age. Gray describes Clausewitz’s influence throughout the 
work: in chapter two, he “explores the political and ethical dimensions of strategy 
and finds that politics (or policy), in Clausewitz’s sense, is eternal, as is strategy,” and 
“explains why strategy is more than just ‘a continuation of political intercourse, with 
2262. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz, 160, note 81, citing Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
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the addition of other means’” as Clausewitz wrote, and instead “ventures into a land 
where Clausewitz did not tread – the friction that can impede relations between the 
realms of policy and war.”2267 Chapters three and four, he notes, “examine critically the 
Clausewitzian legacy of strategic theory, with particular reference to the proposition 
that Clausewitz should retain the title of First Theorist of War,” and adds: “Chapter 
3 argues that, although the exceptionally violent twentieth century has bequeathed us 
many notable works of strategic importance, the continuing intellectual supremacy of 
On War is not hard to demonstrate,” and “Chapter 4 advances and discusses many pos-
sible reasons for the relative (to On War) poverty of modern strategic theory worthy of 
the name,” and while acknowledging that “it is too soon to judge which of the strategic 
theorists of the twentieth century wrote truly classic works, and which did not,” Gray 
notes his fourth chapter “speculates that in some ways Clausewitz probably tackled an 
easier set of tasks in his dedication of On War fairly strictly to the nature and higher 
conduct of ‘war proper’ than would have been the case had he addressed rigorously the 
connections between the causes and the conduct of war, and the course and outcome 
of war.”2268 Gray would later add, on page 361 of his book. That: “Clausewitz’s most 
powerful claim to fame is that he spoke more eloquently than anyone else about the 
difficulties of his subject. It is standard to praise him for his determination not to offer 
a cookbook on war, a manual for the practical soldier,” and yet, Gray adds, while “[s]
uch self-abnegation is certainly praiseworthy,” that the “fact remains that he left the 
most difficult terrain of his subject almost wholly unmapped, let alone untilled.”2269
In his preface Gray embraces Clausewitz’s definition of strategy, writing: “Above 
all others, my preferred definition of strategy … is strictly Clausewitzian,” and while 
Gray does “not claim that Clausewitz’s definition of strategy is correct,” noting that “a 
definition cannot be so described,” he does make the “claim that Clausewitz’s definition 
provides the path for superior strategic understanding to those wise enough to adopt 
it.”2270 He later writes, “Much of whatever merit this book may have is attributable 
to the educational effect of the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. Whether I have been 
studying nuclear targeting, the leverage of seapower, or the strategic utility of special 
operations, Clausewitz’s On War has been my constant companion and by far the most 
heavily used book in my library,” and among the more recent scholars he credits for 
their “personal inspiration,” he includes Donald G. Breenan, Herman Kahn, Bernard 
Brodie, and Albert Wohlstetter,” each of whom “in his way was a giant in the field,” 
and while “not uncritical” of them, he is likewise not “any more … uncritical of 
2267. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12.
2268. Gray, Modern Strategy, 12.
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Clausewitz.”2271 Indeed, after himself, Gray identifies Clausewitz as the second most 
responsible person “for the shape and even some of the detail of this work.”2272 Re-
calling the Cold War, he writes: “I do not try to argue that I – and theorists, officials, 
and soldiers who thought like me – was correct in my advice and theorizing about, 
say, nuclear strategy in the 1970s. But I do believe that many academics, particularly 
the younger ones, are apt to lack empathy with the policymakers of the superpowers 
who had to respond to the novelty of the nuclear challenge to strategy as best they 
could.”2273 He thus has much sympathy with theorists like and including Brodie. 
He adds that, “In the writing of this book as honestly as I knew how, I found that 
while over thirty years I may sometimes have reached the wrong conclusions, and at 
other times sought to achieve the wrong objectives, the reasons for those errors were 
honourable.”2274 Addressing the question, ‘Why is strategy so difficult,” as he does on 
page five, Gray writes: “Although modern technology is wonderful and many military 
establishments are characterized by a sophisticated professionalism, superior strategic 
performance is as difficult to achieve today as it was in 1900,” and as “Clausewitz’s 
comments: It might be thought that policy could make demands on war which war 
could not fulfill; but that hypothesis would challenge the natural and unavoidable 
assumption that policy knows the instrument it means to use. If policy reads the course 
of military events correctly, it is wholly and exclusively entitled to decide which events 
and trends are best for the objectives of war.”2275 
Chapter three of Gray’s tome, “The Strategist’s toolkit: The Legacy of Clausewitz,” 
starts off with this tribute to the Prussian: “Most of what we need to know in order to 
understand modern strategy is on offer to the careful reader of Carl von Clausewitz’s 
On War,” and he agrees with Richard K. Betts’ “claim that ‘[o]ne Clausewitz is still 
worth a busload of most other theorists.’”2276 Just as he disagrees with one of Clause-
witz’s toughest critics: “John Keegan could hardly be more in error than when he 
judges Clausewitz to have promulgated ‘the most pernicious philosophy of warmaking 
yet conceived.’”2277 And, he adds, “Whether or not readers share my enthusiasm for 
Clausewitz, it is notable than an incomplete book manuscript first published in 1832 
can inspire opinions today as diverse as those just quoted.”2278 And so, Gray explains, 
his third chapter “is devoted to the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz for the practical reason 
2271. Gray, Modern Strategy, xi.
2272. Gray, Modern Strategy, xii.
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that he provides most of the conceptual tools needed for the strategist’s toolkit,” and 
in it he’ll “explain the reason why the argument in On War remains the gold standard 
for theory about war and strategy,” and demonstrate that “Clausewitz bequeathed to 
posterity a body of thought on war that is more persuasive by far than is any body 
of thought by a rival theorist, or even a rival camp of theorists.”2279 And while he 
admits that “[t]here can be no last word on war and strategy,” and while “certainly 
there can be no sacred texts,” he finds “Clausewitz, simply, is more persuasive than 
other theorists.”2280
Gray turns to Brodie when contemplating whether there have yet arisen worthy 
successors to the Prussian, and writes: “To quote Bernard Brodie, ‘Clausewitz’s book 
[On War] is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war,” and Brodie’s 
“judgement is widely shared among the strategic theorists of many countries today, 
and indeed endured for much of the twentieth century.”2281 And while Gray reiterates 
that his Modern Strategy is “about modern strategy, not about Clausewitz,” he adds 
that, “Nonetheless, whatever one’s view of the quality of On War, or its relevance 
to modern strategy, Clausewitz enjoys an intellectual near-hegemony as the leading 
general theorist of war and strategy,” with Sun Tzu being “the only possible competi-
tor” though noting “that competition would be ill-matched, as Art of War provides 
cook-book guidance for statecraft, rather than c comprehensive theory of war.”2282 
Gray further notes in chapter four that Brodie “also then argues, cleverly though not 
unchallengeably: ‘While genius has scarcity value in every field of human endurance, in 
the field of strategic writing it has a special rarity. The reason is that soldiers are rarely 
scholars, and civilians are rarely students of strategy. Clausewitz’s genius is indisput-
able, and also in his field unique.”2283 This, in part due to the effort of Brodie and his 
peers who would foster the emergence of the contemporary field of strategic studies, 
may no longer be the case and today’s civilian scholars of strategy, as is also the case 
for military scholars as well, define a large and growing demographic. 
Gray further cites Brodie on Clausewitz’s unique strategic genius: “In the process 
of praising and explaining Clausewitz, Brodie was not above exorcising some of the 
demons that impeded his own career, but his claim for the importance of history, a 
claim endorsed by Napoleon and Clausewitz, is as convincing as it is also self-serving: 
‘Our own generation is unique, but sadly so, in producing a school of thinkers who 
are allegedly experts in military strategy and who are certainly specialists in military 
studies but who know virtually nothing of military history, including the history of 
2279. Gray, Modern Strategy, 75.
2280. Gray, Modern Strategy, 75.
2281. Gray, Modern Strategy, 84.
2282. Gray, Modern Strategy, 84.
2283. Gray, Modern Strategy, 120.
After Brodie: The Continuing Evolution of Clausewitz Studies 489
our most recent wars, and who seem not to care about their ignorance … the only 
empirical data we have about how people conduct war and behave under its stresses 
is our experience with it in the past, however much we have to make adjustments 
for subsequent changes in conditions.’ In this forceful and personal restatement of 
the viewpoint of the historical school of strategic thought, Brodie is arguing not only 
that history is ‘the only empirical data we have’ about war and strategy, but also that 
many influential modern strategic theorists are historically severely challenged and are 
content to remain such. This argument by Brodie is probably less true today than it 
was in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, but it continues to warrant respect.”2284
But like other recent theorists, Gray takes care to note that Clausewitz’s relative 
greatness does not translate necessarily into influence. As he puts it, “To argue for the 
greatness of Clausewitz and for his continuing relevance is not necessarily to suggest 
that he has been notably influential. Great books need not be read; if read they need 
not be understood; and even if understood, they may not be allowed to help guide 
strategic behavior. Clausewitz has not been as influential as he should have been,” and 
despite the “unique superiority of Clausewitz as a general strategic theorist” in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms, Gray like other has noted that “On War is pretty 
close to unreadable from beginning to end, given its lack of coherent intellectual or 
narrative trajectory,” though “it rewards browsing readers with gemlike insights at 
almost any random opening of its pages.”2285 Adding to the challenge, Gray notes that 
“Clausewitz provides uneasily both an Old Testament and a New Testament in On 
War,” as his “intellectual crisis in 1827 obliged him to begin to write-in the revelation 
that political guidance ensures that real, which is to say limited, war almost always 
dampens the prospect for war to proceed to exhibit its ideal, absolute character. Not 
for nothing is the comment often made that On War is copiously quoted but much 
less frequently read, let alone read from cover to cover. It provides a general and 
considerably but still incompletely unified theory of war and strategy unmatched 
by the works of other theorists before or since. Furthermore, the partial theories of 
seapower, airpower, and nuclear strategy, all of which could draw upon the strengths 
of Clausewitzian general theory, have failed to come within close reach of Clausewitz’s 
standard of excellence.”2286
But other scholars question the degree to which these two distinct “testaments” 
contained in Clausewitz’s treatise mark an abrupt conceptual break for the Prussian, 
and suggest that his core thinking on issues such as the political dimensions of war and 
their restraining effect on the conduct of war show a marked continuity between his 
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so-called “early” and “late” phases. As Dan Moran writes in “Late Clausewitz,” in the 
2011 anthology, Clausewitz, the State and War, “The central interpretative challenge 
presented by Clausewitz’s late work is not that it diverges so profoundly from what 
he had done before that we must start over. It is that Clausewitz’s premature death 
makes it difficult to judge the full consequences that might have followed from his 
intention to subordinate war more systematically to politics,” and Clausewitz, like 
Beethoven who also died in his fifties, “might have enjoyed an additional decade or 
more of vigorous, creative productivity, in which case the works we regard as ‘late’ 
would be viewed less conclusively, as stages toward further achievements whose na-
ture we can only guess.”2287 But in contrast to Beethoven, whose later work “does not 
require that Early Beethoven be re-evaluated,” Clausewitz’s works “are habitually seen 
as contributions toward a single Unfinished Symphony, whose final pages appear to 
have been written not merely in a different key, but in a different tonal system alto-
gether. Clausewitz’s failure to publish more than a few articles during his lifetime has 
encouraged this tendency, by inviting posterity to view the entirety of his oeuvre as a 
gigantic work in progress.”2288 Moran adds this “issue is complicated by the difficulty 
of judging how far Clausewitz was able to execute his planned revisions of On War. 
Whatever feelings of catastrophe may have overtaken him in 1827, they did not lead 
to anything like intellectual paralysis” but instead “proved to be a spur to new pro-
ductivity” that would be primarily channeled to his examination of “the theoretical 
challenges presented by the subordination of war to politics” which “reinvigorated 
his study of history, which he regarded as the fundamental ground of all theory.”2289 
Indeed, as Moran elucidates: “We know from correspondence and internal textual 
evidence that Clausewitz’s histories of the campaigns of 1796, 1799, and 1815 all 
date from the last years of his life. Collectively these manuscripts are longer than On 
War itself, and exemplify the kind of integrated military-political analysis the July 
note promises,” as is “true of Clausewitz’s correspondence with a fellow officer, Karl 
von Roeder” in 1827, and of two 1831 articles by Clausewitz “in which the primacy 
of the state’s interests, and the integrity of the international system, are the central 
concern.”2290
What is less clear is how much of On War reflects Clausewitz’s “more ambitious 
theoretical agenda [as] he set for himself in 1827,”2291 particularly in the case of Book 
VI whose “subject is inherently political” but which “seems to have remained un-
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touched after 1827,” and Moran suggests that “Clausewitz’s determination, in what 
proved to be the last years of his life, to resolve his long pursuit of a unified theory of 
war by placing additional stress on its interaction with politics, does not mean that 
his understanding of politics had changed.”2292 He adds that “[m]uch of the conten-
tion surrounding Clausewitz’s work, as well as its reputation for abstruseness (which 
contention has amplified), arise from the question of how, and whether, his life-long 
study of war can or should be transposed into the new tonal register of his late texts; 
and, by extension, how far Clausewitz’s understanding of politics, which define the 
new register, was limited by his concept of the state.”2293 Moran finds that Clausewitz, 
even “after a lifetime of thinking about war ... had no idea how war might again be 
restricted to the relatively modest forms it had once assumed,” but it was nonetheless 
“clear, however, that he expected that it would be a political, and not a social or cultural 
process,” as “the state was the repository of reason within political communities” and 
thus “deserved its authority to the extent that its capacity to reach sounds judgments 
and learn from experience were superior to that of society as a whole. And while it 
may well be true, as Clausewitz says, that the maximum use of force is not compatible 
with the use of reason, it can never represent its triumph. For the triumph of reason, 
one must have peace, the ultimate public good – the ultimate aim of war, indeed – 
and the final measure of any polity’s success. The ascendancy of the modern state 
had depended on its capacity to make war. Its future would depend on its ability to 
master war, which was something else entirely.”2294 One could similarly view Brodie’s 
contribution to the study of war in the nuclear age as quite similar to Clausewitz’s, 
with only one minor caveat: rather than the future of the state depending upon its 
mastery of war, Brodie would argue strongly from the very dawn of the nuclear age 
that it would henceforth depend on war’s avoidance, and the path to war’s avoidance 
in an era of such destructive weapons would depend ultimately upon the mutuality 
of deterrence.
In his eleventh chapter of Modern Strategy, on “Second Thoughts on Nuclear 
Weapons,” Colin Gray revisits his earlier view as articulated in his preface that there 
is “considerable danger that the making of nuclear strategy and the practice of nuclear 
deterrence will be misjudged by historians who lack empathy in their scholarly forays 
into the nuclear archives,” and while he cautions that his chapter “should not be read 
as a prolonged apologia,” he is nonetheless “appalled at the scale and character of the 
contingent nuclear threats that the US government embraced as its evolving nuclear 
strategy during the Cold War,” a strategy to which Gray contributed – though he also 
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finds “nonetheless that there was a method in the apparent madness, and that ‘just’ 
intentions hovered behind the contingent emergency action messages (EAMs – the 
signals for nuclear action).2295 In his discussion of “A Second Look,” Gray further 
writes that: “Modern strategists have been shaped by the challenges posed by nuclear 
weapons. For more than forty years the nuclear issue all but defined the domain of 
(Western) strategic studies. The intellectual heroes of modern strategic thought have 
been individuals who sought to make strategic sense of nuclear weapons. Bernard 
Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas C. Schelling, Herman Kahn, and – with reserva-
tions – Henry A. Kissinger were soon recognized as giants not only because of the 
quality of their theorizing but also because they tackled the most pressing security 
problems of the era.”2296
Nonetheless, Gray does criticize Brodie’s presumption that the bomb was somehow 
an ‘absolute’ weapon, even though Brodie himself would prove quick to question this 
very presumption as nuclear weapons evolved in their destructiveness, and as the early 
atomic fission bomb was dwarfed by the thermonuclear superbomb. But as Gray argues, 
“Neither the atomic bomb nor even the hydrogen bomb was ‘the absolute weapon’. 
That negative claim is not contradicted by the fact that thus far nuclear weapons have 
had the strategically unusual potential of being able to defeat a foe without first defeat-
ing that foe’s armed forces. Furthermore, no less unusually, defeat of the foe could not 
guarantee that his undefeated armed forces would be unable or unwilling to deliver 
a fatal (nuclear) counterblow in retaliation. That, of course, is the familiar logic of 
mutual deterrence in the content of mutual assured destruction, or MAD. There is 
some sense in the proposition that holds that between the superpowers in the Cold 
War, MAD was simply a fact of military life: it was neither policy nor strategy.”2297 
Gray emphasizes his belief that “an existential claim on behalf of an alleged abso-
lute quality to nuclear arms is, strictly, fallacious. Nuclear weapons do not represent 
the end of strategic history. Quite the contrary: the raw physical potency of nuclear 
arms has stimulated energetic endeavours to sideline or ‘marginalize’ such arms. The 
arrival of atomic armament in 1945 opened a new chapter in strategic history, it did 
not write finis to strategy.”2298 Gray explains that, “When Brodie, and later Freedman, 
speculated to the effect that strategy had hit a ‘dead end’ with the age of nuclear plenty, 
their plausible claims had a rather narrow strategic writ. Specifically, the superpowers 
discovered that large-scale employment of nuclear weapons would most probably prove 
self-defeating, in fact would sunder the rational connection between military power 
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and political purpose that lies at the core of strategy”2299 – the very point that Brodie 
himself would emphasize from the first hours of the atomic era through to the end 
of his life near the Cold War’s peak in 1978. Indeed, as Gray recalls, “The American 
defence establishment sought to come to terms with this astrategic implication be-
tween approximately 1955 and 1965; the Soviet defence establishment grappled with 
its recognition of this same inconveniently astrategic fact between 1972 and 1982. 
Tactically, nuclear weapons could be rendered less than absolute by other nuclear, as 
well as by ever more precisely delivered conventional, weapons. Operationally, the 
potentially absolute character of nuclear weaponry may be evaded by provision of 
massive disincentives to nuclear war. Finally, politically one may so set the stage that 
some mix of taboos, ‘lore’, and net military and political disadvantage renders nuclear 
use all but unthinkable.”2300 In these ways, the primacy of policy in the nuclear age 
was restored, enabling strategy to continue, and transcend the strategic “dead end” 
whose perceived arrival Brodie had so feared.
Rather than being absolute, Gray emphasizes the relative nature of the bomb and 
its potential use – something that Brodie himself came to recognize with the advent 
of the H-bomb. As Gray comments, “Nuclear war must always be a terrible event. 
But there are degrees of terrible, and those degrees could matter,” much as if World 
War III had erupted in 1948, which would then have likely “seen the use of 50-250 
US atomic weapons,” which “would have been a deeply regrettable but survivable ca-
tastrophe” for all involved, whether “the human race, for planet earth, for the United 
States, and even for Europe,” in stark contrast to later on when its “result would most 
probably have been terminal for ‘civilization as we know it’.”2301 Thus writes Gray: 
“Given the blessed absence of historical evidence of nuclear use in battle after 1945, 
it is difficult to discipline theoretical discourse with regard to particular periods. 
Suffice it to say for now that much of the alleged strategic wisdom that supposedly 
explains state behaviour during the Cold War is distinctly ahistorical with reference 
to the military balance or, in Soviet terms, the correlation of forces. Nuclear weapons, 
like nuclear wars, come in a wide range of different possibilities, and the differences 
could matter profoundly.”2302 On the other hand, Gray concedes: “The point is not to 
claim that Western strategists were correct in their determination to wage great arms 
competition with vigour in the 1980s. Rather, the argument is that Western strategists 
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s were obliged, on the evidence available, to assume 
that the USSR was a formidable foe ready, willing and able to take advantage of any 
slackening of will and effort on the part of the Western Alliance,” and looking back 
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he finds that those “historical figures who conducted nuclear policy during the Cold 
War did so for reasons, and eventually according to all but codified principles and as-
sumptions, that are surprisingly resilient to criticism from hindsight” – as they found 
themselves “propelled from outset to conclusion by tolerably accurate perceptions of 
political antagonism.”2303 
Gray salutes the pioneers of nuclear strategy and the architects of the nuclear order; 
as he writes: “Talented theorists as far apart in age and dates of authorship as Bernard 
Brodie and Robert Jervis have written persuasively of the nuclear revolution”2304 – the 
former editing in 1946 The Absolute Weapon and the latter authoring in 1989 The 
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, as Gray adds in a footnote.2305 As Gray further 
writes, “The case for a nuclear revolution in military and security affairs is paradoxically 
unanswerable, but not unarguable,” with Jervis making the case that “‘it is mutual 
second-strike capability and not nuclear weapons per se that has generated the new 
situation,’” and Brodie arguing, as Lawrence Freedman would later echo in his 1989 
second edition of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, that “‘strategic thought … may 
have reached a dead end’, because of the nuclear fact which commands a context 
wherein ‘stability depends on something that is more the antithesis of strategy than 
its apotheosis.’”2306 Gray adds that “Brodie, and then – much later – Robert Jervis 
and Lawrence Freedman, to cite only three of the more cogent theorists, all write 
eloquently about the implications of the central organizing feature of the nuclear age. 
Specifically, nuclear weapons can transform the character of war and strategy because 
of their inability to deliver military victory at bearable cost to the ‘victor’. In addition, 
nuclear weapons could deny the validity of the rule of classical strategy which holds 
that the enemy’s armed forces, in one or several geographical mediums, have to be 
overcome before victory can be secured.”2307
Citing Brodie’s early and oft-quoted observation, Gray writes that: “Viewed in long 
retrospect, the following pronouncement by Bernard Brodie in 1946 appears uncan-
nily prescient: ‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to 
win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost 
no other useful purpose.’ This early celebration of the overwhelming importance of 
deterrence scores high on the scale of accurate focus on the greatest of problems, but 
2303. Gray, Modern Strategy, 313. Gray does concede in a footnote that his 1981 Orbis article, “The Most Dangerous 
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it missed the mark in other respects. Some of the historical commentary today on 
strategy in the Cold War is scarcely wiser with the advantage of hindsight than was 
Brodie, who was very largely in the realm of speculation in 1946.”2308 Today’s historians 
of the Cold War “cannot but know that a nuclear Third World War did not conclude 
the Cold War,” while the strategists “on both sides who ran the statecraft and strategy 
of that famous struggle had no way of knowing that there was not a nuclear war in 
their near or medium-term future. … Unlike the strategic historian, even the excel-
lent strategic historian, the strategist and those who must advise him inhabit a world 
wherein the future has yet to happen, where information is often horribly uncertain, 
and, indeed, where all of Clausewitz’s contributors to friction work overtime.”2309 And 
so Gray finds himself “troubled lest historians provide distorted judgement on the past 
for reason of their superior knowledge.”2310 Indeed, in contrast to today’s historians 
of the nuclear age, Brodie and his peers did not have this luxury of hindsight – and 
had only their wits and theoretical instincts to safely guide them through the nuclear 
storm clouds that so ominously threatened their generation. 
Armageddon by Other Means: Challenges to Clausewitz, from the Age 
of Air Warfare to the Atomic Age
When two atomic bombs were dropped in rapid succession upon the Japanese cities 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, ushering mankind into the 
new, uniquely dangerous nuclear era, the events were not entirely without precedent 
in their scale of destruction or loss of human life. Indeed, the evolution of air power, 
and the American way of waging air warfare, seemed to enjoy as much continuity 
with those infamous events in early August 1945 as discontinuity. While Brodie has 
been lauded for being amongst the first to recognize a strategic discontinuity with the 
advent of what has been called, at least briefly, the ‘absolute weapon,’ Brodie himself 
would come to recognize those first atomic devices dropped from strategic bombers 
in the closing days of World War II as less of a strategic revolution and more a tacti-
cal innovation, with the newer, far more destructive hydrogen bomb created a few 
years later fulfilling that role, particularly when coupled to intercontinental missiles. 
But the atomic incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not greatly differ in 
destruction from that inflicted by the preceding incendiary missions, which used 
low-tech napalm canisters with equal devastation – albeit with much less efficiciency, 
requiring hundreds of bombers in contrast to just one. As Michael S. Sherry explains 
2308. Gray, Modern Strategy, 304.
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in his preface to The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, he has 
sought to redress what he has described as today’s “fragile remembrance” of that time, 
exploring “the profound difficulties people faced in comprehending air war even as it 
unfolded, and the manner in which thinking about bombing before August 6, 1945, 
has shaped attitudes and approaches to the nuclear question.”2311 Indeed, as Sherry 
recalls: “Almost as soon as Hiroshima was destroyed, the reflex reaction of most ob-
servers was to regard the atomic age as revolutionary and the previous history of air 
war as irrelevant, just as earlier commentators on the bomber tended to dismiss the 
previous history of warfare. In both cases, declarations of the past’s irrelevance masked 
the persistence of old habits. This book examines that persistence.”2312 
Sherry observes continuities that link the pre- and post-atomic worlds, noting 
conventional strategic bombing had evolved during World War II to the point where 
conventional destruction had become qualitatively no less destructive than its atomic 
counterpart, evident in the firebombing of Hamburg during the second Hamburg raid 
in the summer of 1945, which Sherry described as “a meteorological phenomenon 
in its own right” – fueled by a lethal mix of incendiary and high-explosive bombs 
whose “greed for oxygen sucked in the fresher air from the fringes of the cauldron, the 
bellow-like draft creating terrific winds that sent bodies, trees, and parts of buildings 
flying through the air heated to 600 degrees centigrade.”2313 Sherry recalls that the 
“firestorm erupted so rapidly that the population caught in it was trapped. Measures 
that were sensible in a high-explosive attack – rushing to shelters and basements – were 
disastrous because the fire drained these quarters of oxygen, asphyxiating inhabitants, 
then baking the bodies through radiant heat.”2314 This was truly Apocalyptic war: “Not 
merely death but the manner of death, not merely destruction but its otherworldly 
suddenness and totality triggered among survivors a world-ending event, one ‘tran-
scending all human experience and imagination.’ Theirs was a speechless horror, one 
usually identified later only with the victims of atomic bombing.”2315
Sherry writes that not only did “few doubts about the wisdom of the Hamburg raids 
and their place in overall strategy”2316 surface in Britain, but that the Americans looked 
to Hamburg not with complaint, but instead for instruction; “the firestorm was care-
fully studied by American experts, particularly with an eye to the bombing of Japan,” 
and “Roosevelt saw in Hamburg ‘an impressive demonstration’ of what America might 
2311. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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achieve against Japan.”2317 The Manhattan Project would only further illustrate “how 
the disjunction between technical means and strategic ends ... perversely increased in 
proportion to a weapon’s promise.”2318 Indeed, in his eighth chapter, “The Sources of 
Technological Fanaticism,” Sherry recounts how Roosevelt’s “declining energies” had 
led him to “put command of the Twentieth Air Force directly in [General Hap] Arnold’s 
hands, thereby reaffirming that the aerial weapon was to play an independent, strategic 
role in defeating Japan.”2319 The strategy was “‘to force the unconditional surrender 
of Japan by ... invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan’ after 
a campaign of blockade by air and sea; ‘intensive air bombardment’ was designed to 
lower the enemy’s ability and will to resist.”2320 Sherry notes that the “origins of that 
strategy lay in both American military traditions and the circumstances of the mo-
ment,” and the “‘strategy of annihilation’ aimed at engaging the enemy’s main forces 
and seizing his territory and capital had deep roots in the American style of warfare, 
especially as it had developed since 1860.”2321 
Thus by December 1944, Sherry believes the “American government succumbed to 
a ‘failure to distinguish between the problem of inflicting strategic defeat on the enemy 
and that of inducing him to surrender,” and Sherry attributes this failure to a variety 
of factors, including “the newness of total war and of air power’s role in such a war,” 
“the cultural difference between the two enemies as well as the racism flowing from 
it,” and “the indifference of strategic planners to the question of relating destruction 
to surrender and from the failure of political leaders to provide them leadership when 
they did become concerned.”2322 So while it became evident that “[d]estruction would 
win the war,” Sherry comments that “[w]ithout a clear and accurate model of how 
the enemy thought and how destruction might compel his surrender, little guided 
the course of bombing beyond its own internal dynamics and the fearsome prospect 
of invasion. Once again, intangible criteria invited ultimate destruction.”2323 Sherry 
adds that the “formula for unconditional surrender has been faulted often enough 
for making the enemy fight on” but that, “[p]articularly in the American war against 
Japan, it provided few criteria for measuring the relationship of destruction to the 
attainment of political ends” and thereby “seemed only to indicate that the path to 
unconditional surrender lay through unconditional destruction,”2324 a surrendering – 
2317. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 156.
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in Clausewitzian terms – to war’s coldest logic and tendency toward extremes, and a 
dissociation of the all-important Clausewitzian dictum that sought to web war and its 
means to the objectives of reasoned policy. As we will see in the chapters that follow, 
one nuclear strategist in particular, Bernard Brodie, would endeavor to re-establish 
this severed Clausewitzian connection between policy and war, and to restore policy’s 
primacy; while later criticized by Clausewitz scholars for too narrow a focus on this 
singular dictum as the expense of Clausewitz’s more holistic “trinity of war” or “won-
drous trinity,” Brodie’s efforts responded to the profound breach between war and 
policy that Sherry has observed.
While eschewing a Clausewitzian language, the problem of “technological fanati-
cism” as Sherry described was the self-same problem that Brodie would grapple with 
from the very dawn of the nuclear era, as he challenged his peers to resist technological 
imperatives and the unthinking fanaticism they can breed, much like his colleague 
Herman Kahn who imagined logically waging war all the way up the ladder of thermo-
nuclear destruction, driven by the same technological inertia as the aerial bombers of 
World War II. Indeed, Sherry argues the “leaders and technicians of the American air 
force were driven by technological fanaticism – a pursuit of destructive ends expressed, 
sanctioned, and disguised by the organization and application of technological means. 
Destruction was rarely the acknowledged final purpose for the men who made air war 
possible. rather they declared that it served the purpose of securing victory and that 
its forms were dictated by technological, organizational, and strategic imperatives. In 
practice, they often waged destruction as a functional end in itself, without a clear 
comprehension of its relationship to stated purpose.”2325
Sherry takes care to explain why he applies the term fanatic here, noting that doing 
so “may defy the usual understanding of the terms, which sees in fanaticism the work-
ings of a single-minded, frenzied emotional devotion to a cause,” and also noting that 
the term, within the context of World War II, “usually refers to America’s enemies.”2326 
But Sherry counters that “fanatical acts are not always the product of frenzied or 
hateful individuals, as Hannah Arendt has shown in capturing the banality of Adolph 
Eichmann,” and also observes that “there was a suggestion of the megalomaniacal 
among the practitioners of air war in their aspirations for technological omnipotence: 
over the natural universe for some of the scientists, over the geographic and political 
world for the airmen striving to achieve a ‘global’ air force.”2327 As Sherry describes: 
“The shared mentality of the fanatics of air war was their dedication to assembling 
and perfecting their methods of destruction, and the way that doing so overshadowed 
2325. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 251-252.
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the original purposes justifying destruction. Their coolness, their faith in rational 
problem-solving, did not easily appear fanatical because its language was the language 
of rationality and technique,” but to Sherry it was fanatical nonetheless.2328 Thus, “The 
lack of a proclaimed intent to destroy, the sense of being driven by the twin demands 
of bureaucracy and technology, distinguished America’s technological fanaticism from 
its enemies’ ideological fanaticism.”2329 And, fueled by this unprecedented power of 
destruction, Sherry writes that “[t]echnological fanaticism, long developing, could 
not be fully achieved.”2330
Sherry’s next chapter, “The Triumphs of Technological Fanaticism,” chronicles the 
rain of fire delivered to Japan, culminating in many ways with the unprecedented March 
10 firebombing of Tokyo which lay waste to sixteen square miles and extinguished 
the lives of “at least eighty-four thousand people,” leaving much of Tokyo a “smoking 
moonscape” punctuated by “fleshless hands or feet or bloody masks that once were 
faces”2331 on countless surviving burn victims, and a “sense of a horror transcending 
human capacity”2332 reminiscent of not only the forthcoming atomic attacks, but of the 
Hamburg firestorm as well. Sherry recounts how the “momentum of destruction”2333 
would continue, with unconditional surrender still the goal: “Without refinement of 
surrender terms, strategists saw little choice but to plan on applying every kind of force 
against Japan: conventional bombing, use of the atomic bomb, Soviet entry into the 
war, and of course invasion.”2334 Citing Air Force staff records: “Unless a definition 
of unconditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there 
is no alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat 
will bring about capitulation. The accomplishment of the unconditional surrender 
objectives then must be entirely brought about by force of arms.” In short, plans for 
invasion had to go forward. For the bombing effort the implications were perhaps less 
clear. But whereas revision of the surrender formula might have sanctioned resort to a 
more limited attack on lines of communication, the prospect of invasion justified the 
systematic destruction of all components of Japan’s strength, including its cities.”2335 
And so, “LeMay was sent off to destroy more cities without a clear rationale for doing 
so.”2336 In June, he recounts that when Arnold met LeMay for meetings in Guam, 
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“LeMay told Arnold that he would run out of targets by about September 1, and that 
‘with the targets gone we couldn’t see much of any war going on.’”2337 Sherry sees in 
this “a revelation of the air force approach to war, rich with the emptiness of strategic 
reasoning about how to win the war and of the desire even to formulate it. Destruc-
tion would win the war, and the war would have to end when the destruction was 
complete.”2338 In his tenth chapter, “The Persistence of Apocalyptic Fantasy,” Sherry 
writes of the “Inversion of Dream and Reality,” and recounts how, “In the last week 
of May 1945, American bombers almost fulfilled an old fantasy about air power, that 
a catastrophic attack on an enemy’s capital would shock it into surrender.”2339 Though 
the bombers were instructed not to attack the imperial palace, bombs “either fell ac-
cidentally into the royal quarters” or flames “simple spread there,” bringing “the air 
war … home to the very seat of imperial authority.”2340 As Sherry describes, “Beyond 
increasing the intimidation and destruction, strategists had as much difficulty as ever 
expressing how present and future operations would bring about surrender.”2341
Nonetheless, Sherry observes that “Airmen were not naïve about the dangers of 
plunging into the next stage of the century’s technological revolution. Arnold was 
reminded that because of rocketry and nuclear weapons, the United States and other 
nations ‘will face destruction on a scale undreamed of in the wildest, most sensational 
fancies of fiction writers and comic strip artists,’ ultimately ‘endangering human 
survival.’”2342 As for the Japanese in the bombed-out cities, ultimate terror was already 
their reality: “Many Japanese had by now experienced the science-fiction fantasy. … 
Scarcely less than the deindustrialization and deurbanization of modern Japanese was 
now taking place.”2343 And yet, “all the bewilderment, anxiety, depression, and anger 
still did not add up to an immediate threat to the government or constitute the lever 
Americans could work to effect surrender. ”2344 Sherry records how “LeMay’s bombing 
campaign proceeded largely unmonitored and unnoticed by diplomats and states-
men in London and Washington,” and in contrast to Berlin, whose “ruins could be 
viewed with a kind of sorrow and foreboding, as a crumpled monument to Western 
civilization”; Sherry observed that “Few Americans recognized much of value being 
lost in Japan.”2345 Nonetheless: “Compared to other forms of warfare, the bombing 
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of cities retained an unmentionable and inexpressible quality, lying variously beyond 
or beneath description. With exceptions, that quality had characterized the predictive 
literature before the war, and it now persisted despite changed circumstances. Whereas 
in prospect bombing had been an almost unimaginable horror, by 1945 it was also 
a numbing but distant commonplace. Celebration and aversion, deliverance and 
doomsday remained the contrasting ways in which bombing was viewed, categories that 
allowed peoples and nations to avoid confronting the realities of mass destruction.”2346
This would continue into the atomic age. Sherry turns his attention to “The Nuclear 
‘Apparition’” and recalls how “The tenacity of those categories was most tragically dem-
onstrated in the final deliberations upon the atomic bomb, for in them the bomb’s use 
was never seriously debated and its destructive consequences were barely examined.”2347 
Indeed, as Sherry notes, “If the atomic bomb had little to add in the way of carnage 
and rubble except its singular efficiency, attention naturally turned to other dimensions 
of its novelty.”2348 Seeing continuity with the air war prior to the bomb, Sherry notes: 
“The apparent similarity between atomic bombing and firebombing caused anxiety 
as well as uncertainty, a fear that the incendiary attacks would eliminate the virgin 
targets led to surprising misconceptions. … It was all too easy for some to see Fat Man 
and Little Boy as little more than bigger bombs.”2349 And, while “Firebombing was 
a crude standard of reference for measuring the atomic bomb,” Sherry writes that in 
“retrospect at least, the destructiveness of incendiary attacks invited attention to the 
bomb’s psychological effect and obliterated any perceptible moral difference between 
bombing in its old and new forms.”2350 
However, despite these moral continuities, Sherry points out: ‘Clearly there was 
something different about nuclear weapons. The comparisons to firebombing later 
made to justify use of the atomic bomb revealed the difficulty scientists and politicians 
had in grasping that difference. Nuclear weapons had peculiar consequences, radiation 
and fallout, whose insidious and persistent potential the bomb’s managers understood 
poorly. But the bomb’s uniqueness lay less in its lethality, either immediate or lasting, 
then in the certainty of its effects. An incendiary firestorm, its creation so dependent 
on the vagaries of both man’s and nature’s behavior, was not predictably repeatable. 
It also could not erupt without some warning to its victims. It was a kind of planned 
accident, like “a hole in one in a game of golf,” as Freeman Dyson said. The atomic 
bomb was a planned certainty.”2351 Nonetheless, Sherry agrees that, “To be sure, when 
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the planned accident did occur, the horror for its victims approached that visited upon 
the cities hit with the atomic device. As a discrete event, March 10 neatly balanced 
the scales of cruelty. But in the grim game of air war, it was only a chance event.”2352 
In contrast to the a-bomb, “Firebombing was a well-established and nearly perfected 
technique of war,” and its associated casualties “were still commensurate with losses 
inflicted by more conventional forms of warfare.”2353Sherry writes that the “legacy of 
firebombing was not technical, for the atomic bomb still involved a quantum leap in 
that regard. It lay instead in the ways of thinking about bombing that it perpetuated. 
The persistent focus of the bomb’s visual and psychological effect fell squarely in the 
long tradition of regarding bombing more as an idea, an “apparition”, than as a real-
ity of war. The technology was revolutionary, as the bomb’s managers appreciated 
to a degree, but the perspective was traditional. Imagined as conventional bombing 
had been, the atomic bomb would smite the enemy and reorder the affairs of man 
because the very appearance of it, over a city and the globe, would be awesome. As 
such, it would establish at last the validity of powerful fantasies about the shock value 
of bombing.”2354 Adds Sherry: “After years of bombing cities and after the creation of 
rationalizations and euphemisms to mark the terror, the distinction between ‘mili-
tary target’ and ‘city’ had totally collapsed. The attention to Kyoto indicated that the 
shell of a distinction remained, but not its substance, reflecting less a confrontation 
with the moral issue than a wish it need not even arise. That failure shaped not only 
the fact but the manner of the bomb’s use.”2355 He continues, “Just as almost all of 
Tokyo could be regarded as a military target, so could Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Just 
as workers could be ‘dehoused’ without being killed, they and their leaders could be 
impressed without being incinerated. Just as it had rarely been clear whether con-
ventional bombing aimed to achieve practical effect against the enemy’s war-making 
power or psychological impact on his ‘will’ to fight, so too was the distinction blurred 
in rationales for the bomb’s use.”2356 
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The bomb was thus viewed as a “transcendent force,” one that could “mean the doom 
of civilization or it might mean the perfection of civilization.”2357 Indeed, he observes 
that “the awesomeness of the new weapon made the past seem irrelevant even as men 
unconsciously drew upon it. The bomb was seen as severing rather than unfolding 
familiar patterns in modern technology and international relations.”2358 Added Sherry: 
“Like the bomber had been earlier, the atomic weapon was recognized as a transcendent 
form of power, only to be conceived and used in the familiar ways.”2359 But, Sherry 
observed, “There was another, even more familiar use of the doomsday-or-deliverance 
dichotomy. Frightening as it was, the bomb would also liberate the warring nations 
and perhaps all of mankind from the horror of conventional warfare.”2360 With the 
atomic attacks, “Like countless others, two cities had been destroyed, but in seconds 
rather than hours or days.”2361 And, “The psychic scars that survivors carried were 
in many ways similar to those which Germans in Dresden or countrymen in Tokyo 
had suffered … what decisively distinguished the atomic bomb survivors was their 
reactions in the months and years to follow. Knowledge of the long-term lethality of 
radiation, of their special place in the inauguration of nuclear technology, and of the 
special attention given them fed a lasting sense of experiencing a life-ending trauma 
with global implications.”2362
With the atomic attacks, “The fantasy that had ebbed and flowed for decades – that 
of a new weapon that transcended and thereby ended war – had been realized.”2363 In 
the epilogue to his book Sherry writes that the “sin of atomic bombing, like the sin of 
the whole war’s bombing, certainly resulted from choices but not from a moment of 
choice. Both were products of a slow accretion of large fears, thoughtless assumptions, 
and incremental decisions. If anything characterized the earlier era, it was the capac-
ity of leaders to avoid the appearance of choice.”2364 He adds, “Just as one generation 
learned to accept bombing as the terror that could not happen, so too has this genera-
tion accepted the bomb itself. The parallel, hardly comforting, may be instructive.”2365
Striking in Sherry’s historical analysis of the evolution of air war and its parallels with 
atomic warfare, is the marked lack of interest in or recognition of Clausewitz (or even 
formal strategy) by the Air Force commanders who architected the air war over Japan, 
2357. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 324.
2358. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 325.
2359. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 330..
2360. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 325.
2361. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 344.
2362. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 344.
2363. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 355-356.
2364. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 363.
2365. Sherry, The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon, 363.
504 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Generals Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold and Curtis LeMay: “The airmen differed from the 
army generals in one important way, however. Marshall and Eisenhower knew history, 
and by virtue of long association with military and political leaders, they understood 
politics. They preferred, as the deepest traditions of American civil-military relations 
taught them, to ground their decisions in arguments from military utility; but they 
comprehended Clausewitz’s precepts about war as an extension of politics, and they will-
ingly responded when civil authority altered strategy to fit political needs. … Similarly, 
LeMay and Arnold lacked a strong sense of the political and ideological meaning of war, 
the one being fought in 1944 or the ones that might come in the future.”2366 Indeed, 
Sherry observes, “Fascism, genocide, hegemony, freedom, national interests – these were 
simply not in their vocabularies. The task, not the purpose, of winning governed.”2367 
Moreover, “War penalized the ideologues and rewarded the pragmatists, the men who 
maximized the number of trained crews, bombers in the air, targets hit.”2368 
Indeed, Stephen Cimbala, in his 1991 Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective 
on Nuclear Strategy, writes that we “now know with the advantage of hindsight that 
the assumption of a decisive war-winning strategy solely by strategic bombardment 
was not proved valid in the Second World War,” and yet he suggests, ironically – and 
perhaps potentially tragically, that the “result was not the burial of airpower doctrine 
of this kind, but its revival in the form of U.S. nuclear strategy following the use 
of the atomic bombs against Japan.”2369 Indeed, with the arrival of ICBMs, “which 
threatened destruction of targets within thirty or fifteen minutes of launch,” there 
was even greater impetus for assuming “strategy was now a totally one-sided affair.”2370 
In Cimbala’s terms, the “strong” force in war now appeared to greatly outweigh the 
“weak” force responsible for “restraining war from its absolute form,”2371 as nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems looked to be increasingly shifting war 
toward the absolute, and in so doing, challenging efforts to re-assert the primacy of 
policy – whch Brodie embraced as his central challenge as a theorist. As Cimbala 
describes: “The disproportionate effects of nuclear weapons, relative to their use 
in total or general war, argued for restriction of their role in deterrence, as Bernard 
Brodie noted” – and “to make this connection between nuclear deterrence and policy 
objectives, strategists were required to address both sides of Clausewitz’s relationships 
between force and policy.”2372 
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It would fall to the post-war diplomats, strategists, and theorists to wrestle with this 
paradox of the bomb, and find a way to embed it into a theory of war that restored its 
essential interconnection to the ends of policy, and in so doing, the strategists (Brode 
foremost among them) would ultimately wed nuclear weapons with a theory of war 
that had been formed in an earlier time – by the Napoleonic-era theorist, Carl von 
Clausewitz. 
War and Theory: The ‘Overlooked Characteristic’ in  
American Strategic Culture
What Sherry has described as “technological fanaticism” has been described more 
favorably by Antulio J. Echevarria II as “technological romanticism,” or “fascination 
with technology,” which he observes is one of three principal defining characteristics 
recurrent in the literature on American strategic culture, as he discusses in his chapter, 
“American Strategic Culture: Problems and Prospects,” in Hew Strachan and Sibylle 
Scheipers, eds., The Changing Character of War.2373 The two other commonly recog-
nized defining characteristics are casualty aversion, and the preference for fighting wars 
as battles, which Echevarria notes more accurately describe “traits [that] pertain to the 
waging of war” and “thus describe a ‘way of war’ more than a strategic culture, per 
se,”2374 and, upon reflection, are not “uniquely American” but could be thought of as 
reflective of “a larger Western way of war.”2375 Moreover, none of these three purported 
components of American strategic culture “appears to have the quality of permanence of 
semi-permanence” but instead “seem contingent on political objectives and conditions 
rather than enduring or established biases,”2376 with “fighting wars as battles” counterbal-
anced by military professionals having “generally been made to submit to the logic of 
politics,”2377 and technological romanticism likewise counterbalanced “by a certain dread 
or anxiety about how technology itself was changing society in dramatic and apparently 
irreversible ways.”2378 Even casualty aversion, on closer look, “cannot be considered to 
be a unique or enduring part of American strategic culture,” particularly with regard 
to wars of necessity, which have consistently demanded high sacrifices in casualties to 
achieve victory, though “casualty aversion is a critical element in any war of choice.”2379
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But Echevarria posits there is “an overlooked characteristic” of the American way 
of war and that is “theory.”2380 As he writes, “[T]he American penchant for theorizing 
when it comes to military affairs … has long been overlooked because the prevailing 
assumption has been that American tend to emphasize practice over theory.”2381 One 
could argue that in fact there is an inherent tension between American theorizing about 
war, and American waging of war -- much like the schism between Clausewitzian and 
Jominian responses to the Napoleonic wars, with the former emphasizing reflection 
and a more complex and nuanced intellectual reaction while the latter boiled down 
the experience to a set of actionable maxims, a schism that would resurface during 
the Cold War between deterrence theorists and warfighting strategists. The schism 
was more a dialectical boundary line between thesis and antithesis, with the synthesis 
drawing from both sides of the line and interpolating between theory and reality as 
thought drove action, which in turn was checked by reality, in turn revising thought. 
This was suggested by Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers in their introduction to The 
Changing Character of War, who looked back to Clausewitz and observed, “Because 
Clausewitz was not sure that all wars in the future would conform to the pattern of the 
Napoleonic wars, just as wars in the past had not, he used paradox to probe for truth,” 
and thus On War “uses dialectic to reveal war’s nature more than it uses unequivocal 
assertion,” an approach that the Changing Character of War program found “suits 
our academic natures, just as it revealed the tension in Clausewitz between the man 
of action, the soldier and aspirant field commander, and the reflective product of the 
enlightenment.”2382 They explain that “the essence of a dialectical approach to the 
study of war may reside less in the pairing of dichotomies and more in their fusion. 
For Clausewitz, this was part of the interplay between theory and reality; the former 
sets up alternative propositions, but the latter shows how much they react off each 
other in practice.”2383
Historically, Echevarria notes, military theory took root in Europe but over time 
would be fully embraced by American thinkers, particularly after World War II. As 
Echevarria describes, “While early in their history, Americans copied a great deal from 
their European counterparts, by the Cold War, American military theories, proffered 
by civilians and military professionals alike, came into their own,”2384 with Brodie play-
ing no small part. But in his recounting of America’s Cold War strategic-theoretical 
emergence, Echevarria focuses instead on the work of Brodie’s contemporaries - lim-
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ited war theorist Robert Osgood; coercive diplomacy theorist Thomas Schelling; and 
escalation theorist (and famed warfighting strategist) Herman Kahn.
On a spectrum from “the ridiculous to the sublime,” Echevarria places Osgood 
and Schelling on the sublime side, noting they both “promoted the idea that the use 
of military force could still be a rational extension of policy even in the nuclear age,” 
while on the ridiculous side goes “the escalation ladder of Herman Kahn.”2385 Ironi-
cally, Brodie is neither mentioned here nor cited in his chapter, and in fact, Echevarria 
suggests that “Herman Kahn was perhaps the most well known” among the “so-called 
nuclear strategists,” and notes Kahn “argued that there were a number of scenarios in 
which ‘limited’ nuclear exchanges could take place between states without necessarily 
ending in global destruction.”2386 His neglect of Brodie here, whose work both predated 
and on many levels surpassed that of Kahn, and his elevation of Osgood and Schell-
ing to the “sublime” without noting Brodie’s prior contributions – which were in fact 
graciously acknowledged by Schelling – is curious, and reinforces this author’s belief 
that knowledge of Brodie’s important contributions have been in decline since the Cold 
War’s sudden end – but Echevarria’s principal argument, that “the penchant for theo-
rizing about war and warfare is relatively consistent in American military history,”2387 
and that theorizing about war is thus an oft-overlooked and thus under-appreciated 
dimension of American strategic culture, presents us with additional context for un-
derstanding Brodie’s contribution, and his important place in this strategic culture. 
Further, that Echevarria also notes the “number of sound theories may, however, be 
a minority compared to those which are not,”2388 this too reinforces an argument of 
this thesis, that Brodie stood out amongst his peers for the soundness of his theoretical 
efforts, and for the wisdom he brought to the study of war. Brodie would look to the 
long-dead Prussian for inspiration throughout his career, endeavoring to update the 
Prussian’s theoretical framework for each new technological innovation of the atomic 
age. And while Brodie’s efforts to wed Clausewitz to the bomb look dated today, they 
were well ahead of their time, in marked contrast to the efforts of his peer Herman 
Kahn, whose own work appear to be more inspired by Jomini than Clausewitz and 
their separation of warmaking from the political context of war.
‘Cross of Iron’: The Rise of the U.S. National Security State
Further helping us to re-contextualize the nuclear era in which Bernard Brodie’s 
theoretical efforts would come to prominence and help define the strategic discourse 
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(and architecture) for the coming Cold War with the Soviet Union is the cultural 
and intellectual history of the “national security state” as it began to emerge in post-
World War II America, and which has been chronicled by Michael J. Hogan in his 
1998 treatise, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security 
State, 1945-1954. 
Rooted in part in the “insights of Clifford Geertz, especially his view of ideologies 
as formal, coherent systems of belief that usually emerge in periods of crisis, influence 
the way people make sense of the world, and enable them to act politically,” Hogan 
looks at the “debate over national security initiatives as one between two broad groups 
– those who believed in a new ideology of national security and those who adhered 
to values rooted in an older political culture.”2389 He explains that the new “ideology 
of national security refers to a set of assumptions that emerged from the crises of 
World War II and the Cold War,” and that this ideology “laid the groundwork for a 
more internationalist foreign policy and for a supportive program of state making, 
both of which challenged such received traditions as isolationism, antimilitarism, and 
antistatism.” Hogan writes, “Much that happened in American state making during 
the first decade of the Cold War can be viewed as a struggle between these new and 
residual ways of thinking, between the national security ideology and the old political 
culture, with the outcome in many cases being a program of action that reconciled 
the differences between them.”2390 Hogan’s book examines “the struggle between these 
two groups, which was fundamentally a struggle to shape the nation’s political identity 
and postwar purpose.”2391
While this struggle would echo “the persistence of themes in a political discourse that 
predates the Cold War,”2392 Hogan observes that after 1945, as America “had emerged 
from World War II as the leader of a ‘free world’ coalition, with global obligations and 
responsibilities it had not shouldered before,” there is “no doubt that new responsibili-
ties and perceived threats led to an unprecedented peacetime allocation of resources 
to the military arm of the state, and to the creation of powerful government agencies 
that had not existed before,” including a “peacetime national security establishment” 
that “added enormously to the size and power of the state.”2393 Counterbalancing 
those who feared the emergence of a “garrison state that would undermine alternative 
centers of authority, destroy democracy, and militarize American life” were those who 
understood that America “had entered an era of total war in which the line between 
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citizen and soldier, civilian and military, war and peace, had disappeared forever,” 
and for whom “it was no longer possible to separate the defense of American liberties 
from the defense of liberty everywhere.” This new era “inspired demands for a larger 
pool of military manpower, for a permanent peacetime military establishment, for the 
military mobilization of science and industry, and for new agencies, such as the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the National Security Council, that could bring the resources 
of the nation to bear in the struggle against communism.”2394 As Hogan recounts: 
“American leaders emerged from the Second World War absolutely convinced that 
science had saved the day by achieving dramatic breakthroughs in military technology. 
With government support, scientists had developed or improved systems of naviga-
tion, bomb targeting, and submarine detection, not to mention the atomic bomb, 
which became the preeminent symbol of the successful wartime partnership between 
science and the state. No group was more impressed with science as an instrument of 
national power than were military leaders, and none was more determined to harness 
that power to its own purposes in the postwar period.”2395 He further observes that this 
new “partnership between science and the state, between university labs and Pentagon 
policy makers, was particularly important and especially helpful to a handful of elite 
universities” including MIT and Stanford, and “made it possible for universities to 
attract new faculty, build new facilities, and recruit good students,” even if it ulti-
mately “compromised the independence of university scientists, allowed the military 
to establish research priorities, and diverted scientific talent and energy from more 
productive peacetime purposes.” Hogan notes, however, that the “benefits of the new 
partnership between science and the state pilled from the university into the private 
sector,” stimulating the electronics industry in Boston, the aviation industry in Los 
Angeles, and even the creation of the Silicon Valley,2396 in addition to fueling a mining 
rush in strategic minerals across the American West after the Korean War began.2397
As Hogan describes, even in the face of numerous corrosive anti-democratic pressures 
– most notable being “McCarthy’s wild assault on civil liberties” but also including “the 
loss of economic resources to military investment” and the “increasing concentration 
of power in the executive branch” – he finds that “the most important constraints on 
the national security state were those built into the country’s democratic institutions 
and political culture,” and in the end, “the desire to adapt national security needs to 
the country’s democratic traditions also drove Truman and then Eisenhower to seek 
better control over military leaders, to protect their own prerogatives, and to worry 
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about diverting too much of the country’s resources to national security purposes.”2398 
Thus, Hogan concludes, the “American people and their leaders, or least the best of 
them, would go so far and no further, lest a reckless abandon destroy the very Republic 
they sought to protect.”2399 
Brodie, once more, found himself at a fascinating nexus, as a new corps of civilian 
academic advisors came to unique prominence, advisors to the new national security 
apparatus of the world’s first nuclear state, and briefly its only superpower. His embrace 
of Clausewitz, as we will shortly observe, and in particular Clausewitz’s famous (if 
perhaps, as argued by several recent Clausewitz scholars, overstated) emphasis of the 
fundamental interconnection between war and policy, would become part of Brodie’s 
intellectual tool kit to ensure that the bomb neither destroyed the republic he sought 
to protect nor overwhelm those who would be entrusted with the responsibility of 
integrating the new weapon into American strategic policy. Just as the new genera-
tion of national security experts would juggle the dueling imperatives of defending 
America with the preservation of its democratic traditions and spirit, Brodie would try 
to maintain balance between the ends and means of the nuclear peace, and to ensure 
that this precarious balance was maintained. 
Responding perhaps to the seeming banality of aerial bombardment that came to 
define the airmen of World War II, as chronicled by Sherry, and noting the inherent 
risks to the republic of ends and means remained out of sync, Brodie would step up 
to the new and unique responsibilities inherent in being a civilian strategist, literally 
at the nexus of the civilian and the military worlds. Brodie would in the end spend 
less time on the inside of the military establishment or along its periphery than many 
of his peers, and in the end would retreat to the very academy he first left as a young 
man when America found itself at war and Brodie’s first ideas on naval power found 
an appreciative audience among the new generation of sailors entrusted to roll Japa-
nese naval power back across the Pacific; there, in the civilian academy once more, 
Brodie would continue to wrestle with the dilemmas of the new nuclear world, and 
to advocate the importance of preserving the delicate balance between war and policy 
that enabled the bomb to serve a rational political objective, and preventing it from 
becoming a tool of wanton destruction disproportionate to the objectives being sought, 
as Sherry suggests happened during the air war in the Pacific.
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Before and After Hiroshima: Strategic Continuities and Discontinuities
As noted above, there were both continuities and discontinuities evident in the tran-
sition from conventional air warfare to atomic warfare at the end of World War II, 
as Sherry has chronicled, just as there were when the Cold War commenced when 
a new set of tensions emerged as the architects of the new national security state 
collided full-on with those who sought to preserve America’s more traditional civil-
ian and democratic values. This presents us with an intriguing parallel and one that 
helps to further re-contextualize the strategic environment in which Brodie emerged, 
with its own contradictory set of strategic continuities and discontinuities. A well-
known observer of the continuing historical duel between forces of continuity and 
discontinuity is the intellectual historian and theorist of war, Azar Gat, whose work 
has looked closely and comparatively at the context in which Carl von Clausewitz – 
Brodie’s principal theoretical inspiration – emerged, in addition to Machiavelli and 
B.H. Liddell Hart, each of whom contributed to the evolution of military theory, 
each representative of his own age and whose combined stories illustrate, in a grand 
historical narrative, how the theory of war has evolved from ancient to modern 
times. As gat recounts, each theorist, and each associated era, presents its own clash 
of continuities and discontinuities. Gat describes his sweeping 2001 work of histori-
cal synthesis, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War, 
as bringing “together in one volume [his earlier] trilogy on the evolution of modern 
military thought” published separately in 1989, 1992, and 1998, presenting what he 
describes as “a panoramic but clearly-focused view of the wider conceptions of war, 
strategy, and military theory” in the West.2400 
Gat observed that the “idea that war could be studied systematically by historical 
observation, by the selection of successful forms of organization, and by the limita-
tion of stratagems emerged in antiquity, and was powerfully revived – with a strong 
practical tendency – in the Renaissance,” taking the form of a “counterpart to the 
tradition of classical political philosophy” that “stemmed from historical experience 
in which fundamental change was hardly recognized and the basic features of human 
reality were perceived as enduring and recurring in numerous ways in different peri-
ods and societies.”2401 Gat further explained that “[m]ilitary theory was then simply 
a synthesis of the best military models of the known cultural past, whether in Greece 
or Rome,” and “[r]oughly speaking, very little had changed from the classical era to 
Machiavelli’s time in what can today be called the technological dimension of war, 
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nor consequently in the character of war itself.”2402 And while the tools of war would 
evolve, as the “foot soldier, horse, armour, manual weapons, fortifications, and siege-
machinery undeniably underwent considerable developments and transformations, 
and the importance of each fluctuated in a diversity of military establishments,” Gat 
observes that on the whole “these weapon-systems remained remarkably similar, and 
the diversity of military models which were based upon them also revealed the fun-
damental recurring characteristics.”2403 As a consequence, “Historical experience thus 
offered an extensive testing ground of a relatively limited number of military systems, 
exposing their strong and weak points in multifarious circumstances.”2404
Gat recalls how in the Renaissance, “Machiavelli attempted a synthesis of the whole 
of military experience” based upon his “basic assumption … that despite historical 
change, man and society remained ‘in essence’ the same at all times and cultures,” and 
because of the immutability of human nature across time and culture, history “could 
thus teach us lessons which were valid in every period.”2405 This would change during 
the Enlightenment, during which “a new attitude to the past, including military his-
tory, took shape,”2406 with the “emergence of historicism with its supreme sensitivity 
to the diversity of historical experience and the uniqueness of every period.”2407 Thus 
Clausewitz, “who introduced the historicist outlook into military thought, wrote: ‘… 
The further back you go, the less useful military history becomes … The history of 
Antiquity is without doubt the most useless.’”2408 And so, Gat tells us, “the relative 
uniformity of historical experience as the basis for a theory of war which could be 
derived by direct observation, analysis, and critical analogy from the major military 
models of the past, and applied to the similar conditions of the present, was therefore 
gradually breaking down in the early modern period. Yet, this development was more 
than matched by the growth of a powerful, new theoretical ideal to subject all spheres 
of reality, including war, to the rule of reason … [an ideal that] was greatly stimulated 
by the vision and achievements of the natural sciences which also put forth a new 
systematical model: to reveal the universal principles that dominate the diversity of 
phenomena. The overwhelming success of this enterprise, culminating in Newtonian 
science, was one of the principal driving forces of the Enlightenment and generated 
a corresponding awakening of military thought.”2409 Gat later writes, in the second 
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part of his tome – originally the second volume in his trilogy – on Clausewitz, that 
“[o]ne of the most striking impressions in reading the works of the military thinkers 
of the Enlightenment is the all-embracing uniformity of their historical outlook. … 
War, like all fields of nature and human activity, was susceptible to a comprehensive 
and systematic theoretical study. In part, it could be reduced to rules and principles 
of universal validity and possibly even mathematical certainty, for which Newtonian 
mechanics set the example. However, like the arts, it was also partly in flux, constantly 
changing, dependent on circumstances, affected by the unforeseen and incalculable, 
and therefore always requiring application through the general’s creative genius.”2410 
Their outlook would reign supreme for half a century, and it was within this context 
that Clausewitz, who would become a dominant intellectual influence and inspiration 
to Brodie – both of whom are thus discussed in greater detail in the chapters that fol-
low – “began to formulate the most comprehensive and sophisticated expression of 
new ideas in the field of military thought, thus laying the intellectual foundations for 
what was to be a new German military school,” an expression that would over time 
come to overshadow the Enlightenment military thinkers like Jomini who preceded 
him, and which, even in in our own, contemporary time would continue to dominate 
military theorizing.2411 Indeed, as Gat describes, “the domination of this school over the 
field of military theory secured the ‘canonization’ of Clausewitz in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, albeit with a somewhat popular and selective interpreta-
tion of his thought,” and “this imbalance has only been exacerbated in our times.”2412 
Concluding Observations
While his embrace of Clausewitz came relatively early in this process of the Prussian’s 
canonization, Brodie greatly contributed to the Prussian’s resurrection in military 
studies, particularly in the United States during and after its Vietnam trauma. Be-
cause Brodie stood at the front end of a wave of interest in Clausewitz that continues 
to this very day, he lacked the many benefits of a diverse and contemporary body of 
Clausewitz literature to be infused and inspired by, and was in fact amajor player in 
the effort to bring forth a contemporary translation of Clausewitz, so that the Prus-
sian’s ideas might take root in postwar American military studies. Indeed, with his role 
in Princeton Universty Press’ Clausewitz Project, Brodie was in many ways present 
at this rebirth of Clausewitz studies in America, and as such brought to this nascent 
field his limited armory of intellectual tools shaped primarly by his prewar research 
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on the study of war conceived before the bomb had been invented. With these limi-
tations in mind, Brodie ably ushered Clausewitz forth into the new and dangerous 
nuclear era, finding much of value in the Prussian’s work to draw upon in his effort to 
wrestle with the challenges of the bomb. With time the body of Clausewitz scholar-
ship would grow, becoming more diverse and even more contemporary as additional 
concepts including those from the emergent field of complexity theory, and numerous 
revisionist interpretations of Clausewitz’s role in the history of military theory, were 
introduced to the literature. 
Brodie’s life would come to an end in 1978, only two years after the publication – 
with Brodie’s enthusiastic participation – of the 1976 edition and translation of On 
War published by Princeton University Press, still relatively early in America’s postwar 
renaissance in Clausewitz studies. It is this barometer of time that we should keep in 
mind when endeavoring to measure Brodie’s contribution, and assessing his limitations. 
Later scholars would become increasingly vocal in their criticism of Brodie’s approach to 
Clausewitz, finding it increasingly dated and simplistic. But it was Brodie’s promotion 
of Clausewitz, and his longstanding effort to awaken interest in the Prussian’s ideas 
as America responded to the new challenges of the nuclear world and grappled with 
new military issues ranging from limited warfare in the nuclear age to maintaining a 
proper and (to as much a degree as possible) stable nuclear strategic balance with its 
Soviet opponent, that must not be forgotten – and which contributed immeasurably 
to the modernization of strategic studies as America emerged as a global power after 
World War II, and into the new, and little understood, nuclear world.
Helping us to further contextualize Brodie’s place in the intellectual and strategic 
history of his time, we can briefly consider the many recent intellectual histories and 
strategic biographies that place leading realist thinkers within their historical-cultural 
contexts in order to elucidate the intellectual and philosophical influences that were 
acting upon them, such as Quentin Skinner’s 2002 three-volume treatise, Visions of 
Politics, which chronicles the evolution of humanistic theories of self-government in 
the Renaissance – and then in its third and final volume turns its attention to Thomas 
Hobbes, and in particular his repudiation of those very “fundamental tenets of human-
ist political thought” that were examined in the first two volumes, and in which Hob-
bes himself had been “nurtured,” but which he came to ultimately – and infamously 
– reject.2413 A fusion of Hobbes’s writing, correspondence with contemporaries, and 
secondary sources, this literature establishes in many ways the high-water mark that 
I aspire to with this thesis, even if falling short of the distinctive comprehensiveness 
achieved by Skinner in his sweeping work. In addition to Skinner’s paradigmatic work 
are several of intellectual histories and reinterpretations o the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, 
2413. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.1
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such as Richard Tuck’s 1989 Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction, and Noel Malcolm’s 
2002 Aspects of Hobbes.2414 One can also turn to the growing number of intellectual 
histories of Brodie’s own contemporaries, such as Hans Morgenthau, one of the 
principal contributors to the modernization and Americanization of realist political 
theory and its extension to twentieth-century international relations theory, albeit not 
the subfield of strategic theory – though Morgenthau’s ideas did address some of the 
very same fundamental strategic challenges that the strategists like Brodie confronted, 
including the challenge presented by nuclear weapons to man’s continued ability to 
survive in a structureless world of international anarchy, in which sovereign states 
struggle to survive, each seeking to maximize its own power and leading Morgenthau 
to dub the now-ubiquitous but easily misunderstood – and perhaps unnecessarily 
oversimplified – phrase “power politics.” 
Several theorists have contributed to a contemporary reinterpretation of Mor-
genthau, who has come back to prominence with the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of its bipolar system, which had become associated with the now widely cri-
tiqued theory of neorealism. Michael C. Williams has been a leading theorist involved 
in this Morgenthauian renaissance, with his anthology, Realism Reconsidered: The 
Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations as well as his own monograph, 
The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations which reinterprets Mor-
genthau within the tradition described by Williams as “wilful realism” – a tradition 
to which both Rousseau and Hobbes, often viewed as contending theorists, have 
contributed, and which restores realism to a more ethical, ideational, and humanistic 
universe.2415 Also exploring the evolution of Morgenthau’s ideas across the stage of 
twentieth-century history is William Scheuerman’s 2009 biography, Hans Morgenthau: 
Realism and Beyond, in which he shows the “conventional picture” of Morgenthau to 
be “badly flawed.” Scheuerman describes Morgenthau as “a blunt writer who loved 
rhetorical flourishes” which “made his work accessible” but also “allowed readers to 
overlook the richness and nuances of his highly idiosyncratic international theory.”2416 
Scheuerman’s reinterpretation presents Morgenthau as a complex, nuanced and moral 
thinker who “recognized that contemporary conditions required a novel global order 
as well as new ways of thinking about international politics,” and who believed these 
must “represent more than politically unrealistic and morally painless escapes from 
2414. Richard Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Noel Malcolm, Aspects 
of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
2415. Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). A briefer exposition by Williams is presented in his 2004 International Organization article, “Why 
Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization 58, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), 633-665.
2416. William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 4.
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pressing domestic reforms.”2417 His realism was not without hope, nor without an 
underlying moral fabric. Much the same can be said of Bernard Brodie.
With the Cold War’s end came a rapid end to bipolarity and a return of global 
complexity, whose own dangers became apparent on 9/11; and though that day’s at-
tacks were conventional mass-terror attacks, it refocused attention on how the bomb 
had continued to proliferate after the Cold War’s end, and this renewed concern with 
nuclear proliferation led to a recommitment to counterproliferation policies by the great 
powers, as well as one very misconceived war of counterproliferation in Iraq (which 
in the end had neither an active WMD program, nor weaponized stocks of existing 
WMDs).2418 This new nuclear anxiety in the years since 9/11 and renewed fears of 
nuclear proliferation reveal a notable under-appreciation of the predicted moderating 
effect of nuclear weapons on state behavior, a moderation that many believe led to 
the Cold War’s relative calm and its absence of general war between the two nuclear-
armed principal opponents.2419
The nuclear strategists, and their associated international relations theorists (the 
structural realists, or neorealists) erected a theoretical framework for the Cold War 
predicated upon the mutuality of restraint that nuclear weapons would instill in 
their possessors, and with the end of bipolarity, not only has interest in the nuclear 
strategists waned, but their counterparts in the field of international relations theory 
would experience a devastating assault within the academy upon their predominance 
as alternate theories and worldviews, most notably by neoliberal and constructivist 
theorists (as well as postclassical or neoclassical realists who likewise rejected structural-
ism), came to prominence.2420 As Richard Ned Lebow recalled in “Texts, Paradigms, 
2417. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond,198.
2418. See the following: The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf, especially Section V, “Prevent Our Enemies 
from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html; The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 
2002, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf; and General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. “An update on the global war on terror,” SecurityInnovator.com, November 24, 2002; Andrew Gray, “Iran nuclear 
bomb would be calamitous - US military,” Reuters, May 21, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2140020320090521; 
Voice of America, “Clinton: Middle East May Start Arms Race If Iran Gets Nukes,” Voice of America, May 20, 2009, http://
www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-20-voa59-68786472.html; Barry Zellen, “Countdown to a Nuclear Iran,” 
SecurityInnovator.com, May 1, 2009, http://securityinnovator.com/index.php?articleID=15839&sectionID=29; John R. 
Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Speech delivered at the Heri-
tage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 2, 2002, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/V24-4%20PDF%20Files%20By%20
Author/Bolton,%20John%20R.,%20Axis%20of%20Evil.pdf.; Charles V. Peña, “Axis of Evil: Threat or Chimera?” CATO 
Institute, Summer 2002, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/pena-020905.html.
2419. This has been noted in Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
2420. There’s a rich and diverse literature on the relationship of neorealism and the nuclear order. See: Kenneth N. Waltz, 
“The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory 
of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May 
Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a 
New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Robert 
O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconstructing 
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and Political Change,” his chapter in Williams’ 2007 Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy 
of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, “The end of the Cold War provided 
critics of realism with both an opportunity and need to go on the offensive,” and “for 
some was the need to dethrone realism as the reigning paradigm to make room for 
other approaches” such as neoliberalism and constructivism.2421 Thus the “battle lines” 
for post-Cold War international relations theory were drawn: “Realists of all stripes 
maintained that anarchy was the defining characteristic of the international system, 
and that it was impossible and downright dangerous to pretend that war was not the 
final arbiter of international disputes,” while neoliberals and constructivists, “by con-
trast, thought it possible to escape from, or at least, to mitigate, the worst features of 
anarchy through a dense network of institutions or a robust international society.”2422 
Lebow has also observed that both the “[c]ritics of realism and realist critics of 
neorealism have displayed increasing interest in earlier realist texts, works that predate 
neorealism,” including “growing interest in mid twentieth century writings, including 
those of Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, and E.H. Carr,” who in a refreshing “contrast 
to Waltz … distinguish material capabilities from power and power from influence,” 
and who “understand that their theories are products of the epoch and culture that 
produced them.”2423 
The Cold War’s end was “not the first major international transformation or upheaval 
to provoke a return to older texts with the goal of the rethinking of contemporary ideas 
and approaches and developing alternatives to them”;2424 theorists have been doing 
this since as far back as the ancient Romans. Lebow writes that “Morgenthau, who 
speaks to use across the abyss of Weimar, the Nazi era, the Second World War, and 
Political Realism: The long march to scientific theory,” Security Studies 5, No. 2 (1995), 3-94; Richard Rosecrance, “Inter-
national Theory Revisited,” International Organization 35, No. 4 (Autumn, 1981), 691-713; Paul Schroeder, “Historical 
Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” International Security 1 (Summer 1994), 108-148; Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of 
Neorealism,” International Organization 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), 225-286 (also reprinted in Robert O. Keohane, ed., 
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 257-300); Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of 
the Tradition of Political Realism,” International Organization 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), 287-304 (also reprinted in Robert 
O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 301-321); Stephen G. Brooks, 
“Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1997); Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International 
Relations and International Political Economy: The continuing story of a death foretold (New York and London: Routledge, 
1998); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: 
Verso, 2003); Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary 
Realism and International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation 
as Self-Help,” International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), 50-90. 
2421. Richard Ned Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” in Michael C. Williams’ Realism Reconsidered: The 
Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 244.
2422. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 244.
2423. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 246.
2424. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 246.
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the Cold War, still has much to teach us,”2425 and Lebow’s observations, in this tribute 
to Morgenthau, naturally turn to the subject of the tribute – but the words ascribed 
to Morgenthau could also be attributed to Brodie, whose reasoned approach to the 
challenge of the nuclear age appears rooted in a pragmatic sense of realism that mirrors 
Morgenthau’s, even if his contribution to the erection of the mutually-annihilatory 
nuclear system would ultimately yield a new generation of structural realists wedded 
to that very system in contradistinction to the more classical “Morgenthauian” realism. 
As Lebow observed: “For Morgenthau, the absence of external constraints on state 
power was the defining characteristic of international politics at mid century,” and 
with the superpowers “locked into an escalating conflict, made more ominous by the 
unrivalled destructive potential of nuclear weapons … [r]estraint was needed more 
than anything else.”2426 And thus realism “in the context of the Cold War was a plea 
for statesmen … to recognize the need to coexist in a world of opposing interests and 
conflict,” and “Morgenthau insisted that restraint and partial accommodation were the 
most practical short-term strategies for preserving the peace.”2427 Morgenthau, writing 
in “the aftermath of destructive wars that undermined communities and conventions 
that had previously sustained order at home and abroad,” sought “some combination of 
the old and the new that could accommodate the benefits of modernity while limiting 
its destructive potential,”2428 and thus “envisaged realism, with its emphasis on state 
interests, as a means of ultimately transcending the nation state.” 
This combination of wisdom and restraint is reminiscent of Brodie’s own effort to 
foster a greater appreciation of the primacy of policy as the ultimate restraint upon war’s 
dangerous tendency to approach the absolute, as Clausewitz had theorized long before 
Hiroshima.2429 Similarly, in his introduction to Realism Reconsidered, Williams recalls 
how, “As the field of IR became increasingly dominated by the neorealism advocated 
by Kenneth Waltz, Morgenthau’s realism came to be seen as ever more anachronistic 
– an interesting and important episode in the history of thinking about the subject, 
no doubt, but one scarcely to be seen as a serious contribution to the construction 
of the rigorously parsimonious scientific theory that was ... the goal of this mode of 
thinking about world politics.”2430 Williams had “seen a marked recovery of interest 
in Morgenthau’s thinking, and indeed a renewed interest in ‘classical realism’ as a 
whole,” and observed “there has been a notable re-engagement with the substance of 
2425. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 264.
2426. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 253.
2427. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 253.
2428. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 254
2429. Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” 255
2430. Michael C. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 1.
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Morgenthau’s thinking, an engagement often allied to the claim that his realism is 
not only more complex than we have often been led to believe, but of considerably 
greater contemporary relevance than we have imagined.”2431 Williams’ edited volume 
thus sought to demonstrate that Morgenthau and, one might add, his generation of 
more classically-inclined realists, had “more to tell IR today than has generally been 
recognized, and that to engage with his thinking raises a set of issues much broader 
than those usually considered under the rubric of realism today.”2432 
Much the same can be said of Brodie and his contribution to strategic studies, 
and in particular his effort to not only reawaken interest in Clausewitz studies but to 
effectively modernize Clausewitzian theory for the nuclear age. Like Morgenthau’s 
decline during the ascendancy of neorealism, Brodie has similarly fallen from sight, 
and his bountiful contribution to the literature is seldom appreciated today. Brodie’s 
decline in influence – while very hard to measure, as has been the case with Clausewitz 
as well and the topic of much discussion in the Clausewitz literature – began relatively 
early in his career, leading him to be perceived by strategic studies scholars much 
the way Morgenthau came to be perceived by late-Cold War international relations 
scholars, as a transitional figure but no longer a central one. And just as Williams 
and his colleagues participating in the recent renaissance in Morgenthau studes came 
to recognize in Morgenthau a more nuanced theorist whose ideas had been greatly 
oversimplified to the detriment of their full understanding, Brodie can be understood 
to be at a similar crossroads, mentioned briefly in passing, appreciated perhaps for 
his foundational contribution to deterrence theory, but largely unacknowledged any 
more by all but a few dedicated Clausewitz scholars for his efforts to re-engage with 
Clausewitz and in so doing to foster the modernization of Clausewitzian theory for 
the new, nuclear – and soon to become bipolar – world.
Uniting these above-mentioned works is the effort by contemporary scholars to re-
interpret the lives and ideas of key philosophical and theoretical figures, and wed their 
works to the broader intellectual currents that shaped them, and from which they at 
times would famously deviate. I have thus sought to embed Brodie’s work within his 
broader intellectual context, and to chronicle his search for inspiration that began with 
the iconic figure of Socrates, proceeded to the pioneering theorist of American naval 
strategy, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and finally settled upon the Prussian theorist of war, Carl 
von Clausewitz, who was only then being rediscovered by American scholars, a process 
of rediscovery to which Brodie would commit his full intellectual energy and efforts, 
resulting in the seminal 1976 Princeton translation of Clausewitz, which modernized 
On War for the contemporary Anglo-American community of scholars and soldiers alike. 
2431. Williams, Realism Reconsidered, 1-2.
2432. Williams, Realism Reconsidered, 2.
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That Brodie was also a leading theorist of nuclear strategy in addition to being 
an early advocate of Clausewitz studies presents us with a compelling convergence 
of two distinct currents that shaped Brodie’s ideas: the broader tradition of western 
military theory, in which both his pre- and post-Hiroshima works find their place; 
and the more specific field of Clausewitz studies, to which Brodie not only contrib-
uted, but from which Brodie derived conceptual tools to guide his evolving – and 
in many ways foundational – ideas on nuclear strategy, and on strategic thought for 
the nuclear age.
Indeed, despite the contextual limitations on Brodie’s methodology set by the 
nascent stage of Clausewitz studies in America that defined his times, one of Bernard 
Brodie’s most enduring contributions to strategic theory is as a pioneer in what we 
now call complex warfare, in much the same way Alan D. Beyerchen argues that Carl 
von Clausewitz was a century before Brodie’s birth, working with a similarly prema-
ture vocabulary and thus drawing upon a variety of adjacent (and sometimes not so 
adjacent) academic disciplines to articulate his ideas.2433 Most analysts and scholars 
of Brodie, including his biographer Barry Steiner, would focus less upon the central-
ity of ambiguity and complexity to Brodie’s strategic thought, and thus looked more 
linearly at the evolution of Brodie’s strategic thinking over time. Brodie’s head start in 
the literary dimensions of the nuclear arms race – the race to publish first, and thereby 
dominate the emerging discipline of nuclear strategic thought, evident in his editorship 
of The Absolute Weapon in 1946, which catapulted him to the front of the pack – did 
position him well in this linear contest between top scholars in the emergent field of 
nuclear strategy, and Steiner can be fairly credited for recognizing Brodie’s important 
foundational role, as suggested by the title of his 1991 book about Brodie and his 
influence, Bernard Brodie and the Foundation of American Nuclear Strategy. But an 
important part of Brodie’s journey was, at heart, nonlinear; indeed, as linear journeys 
go, Brodie’s was somewhat backwards, starting out with a precocious bang but ending 
with a frustrating whimper, and a bitter sense of influence lost. As a young man, Brodie 
rose quickly, straight from the obscurity of graduate school to the highest echelons 
of American strategic thinking, thanks largely to his fortuitous timing in completing 
a dissertation on naval strategy just as America became embroiled in a global naval 
conflict that stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific,quickly ushering Brodie from 
the expected anonymity of an early academic career to a position of intellectual and 
2433. See Alan D. Beyerchen, Alan D. “Chapter 7: Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery,” in David 
S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=A-
DA460550. Also see Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” Appendix 1, in 
Tom Czerwinski, ed., Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1998), 151-197, as posted on The Clausewitz Homepage, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/
Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm.
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doctrinal influence, first as a naval strategist and later as one of America’s first nuclear 
strategists, all during his very first years out of graduate school. 
But while Brodie kept theorizing, and continued prolifically publishing highly 
regarded if not necessarily best-selling works on strategy under prestigious imprints 
including Princeton University Press, he would come to feel a marginalization from 
the halls of power and from the nerve-centers of decisionmaking, alienating his 
military counterparts for his uncensored critique of the military mind and culture, 
while also losing influence among his civilian counterparts as well. His decline was 
not as a result of any shortfall in his theorizing, nor any criticism of his published 
work, which remained far and above the most sophisticated and faithful to the high 
bar set by Clausewitz when compared to his peers. Indeed, one might fairly speculate 
that his marginalization was the result of the distinct sophistication of his work, so 
complex that many failed to fully comprehend its many nuances as they gravitated 
toward those who advocated simpler and more actionable solutions to the profound 
challenges of the nuclear era, such as Herman Kahn. Indeed, Brodie’s eclipse by lesser 
minds was neither the first nor the most offensive example of such a phenomenon – 
consider the tragic fate of Socrates, one of the greatest thinkers of all time who was 
unceremoniously executed by the seething Athenian demos on trumped up charges. 
One could conclude that the fate of poor Socrates presents us with a compelling, 
albeit dispiriting, metaphor for the fate that befalls great minds in an unappreciative 
world, one that extends up to our own time and thus includes the marginalization 
of America’s pioneering nuclear theorist, Bernard Brodie. Clausewitz himself faced 
similar resistance to his novel ideas, persuading the Prussian that his work could only 
be appreciated post-mortem, by future generations – looking to posterity for an af-
firmation denied during hs lifetime, and thus yielding to his rival Jomini, who would 
cast a more immediate influence over military education, training, and doctrine for 
a century before Clausewitz’s eventual resurrection. 
It is intriguing, and perhaps no coincidence, that Brodie himself would grapple 
with the riddle of Socrates – his life, death, and legacy – early on as a student, when 
in his later years he would experience something metaphorically quite similar; not an 
unjust execution but an alienation more subtle, leaving Brodie feeling embittered and 
alone. Indeed, Brodie’s earliest known writing starts with a quest for understanding 
the legacy of Socrates, the founder of western philosophy, revealing a willingness to 
embrace complexity and ambiguity and accept the dualities inherent in political and 
strategic reality. Later, as Brodie sought to harness his intellect and apply it to the chal-
lenges of strategic thought, he would turn to Mahan, America’s very own “Clausewitz 
of sea power,” a towering figure in not just naval strategy but in the broader intellectual 
history of war. But after Hiroshima, Brodie recognized that Mahan’s insights, so useful 
for navigating America’s emergence as a global maritime and naval power, had reached 
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the limit of their utility. As he gazed into what Joseph Nye has called the “crystal ball” 
of the nuclear age, recognizing an “absoluteness” in contemporary warfare that knew 
no earlier parallel, Brodie realized that there was at least a template that could guide 
him forward theoretcally – and that was provided by the famed Prussian theorist, 
Carl von Clausewitz, who grappled with the emergence in his time of “total war” on 
an historically unprecedented scale. 
While the “total war” of the Napoleonic era was an order of magnitude less destruc-
tive than that of the atomic era, which was again an order of magnitude less destructive 
than that of the thermonuclear era that would soon follow, the theoretical framework 
provided by Clausewitz offered Brodie a starting point for his own analysis, and in 
particular to arm him as he challenged the more doctrinaire solutions offered by his 
peers and colleagues, civilian and military, as they staked out their own positions in 
the nuclear doctrinal debates that took place from 1945 until the Cold War’s end 
nearly a half century later. Clausewitz would thus become Brodie’s constant, and 
while this never meant a simple or elegant solution to the riddles of the nuclear age, 
the Prussian at least provided Brodie with a starting point for debate, and a reference 
point to drive forth a dialectic, as thesis was countered by a series of antitheses in the 
hope that at the end, something like a synthesis might emerge. Brodie’s contribution 
to the nuclear debate was often perceived to be advocacy of one thesis or another, 
and at times he came out stridently for or against a certain policy, but he would later 
adapt and respond to changes in technology and the military balance on the ground, 
amending his viewpoints as required; as such, his enduring contribution was in the 
provision of a framework that offered his colleagues the best hope for attaining syn-
thesis, including the occasional kick by way of antithesis to a popular thesis of the day, 
thereby helping the pendulum to continue its swing. With both the end of America’s 
atomic monopoly, and the advent of thermonuclear weapons in the arsenals of both 
superpowers, the already dangerous art of nuclear strategy became ever more lethal. 
The “absolute weapon” kept getting more absolute, forcing a rethinking with each 
new level of destructive potential. 
In many ways, Brodie represented a pole of sorts, a more theoretical, more philo-
sophical pole opposite his colleagues such as Herman Kahn, the celebrity author 
of the Cold War who came to be parodied in Dr. Strangelove, and even the more 
widely respected escalation and bargaining theorist, Thomas Schelling, with Brodie’s 
rivals representing an opposing pole, one that tended toward an elegant simplicity 
and prescriptive clarity that proved more suitable to action (and not the inaction the 
undergirded Brodie’s doctrinal adaptations, such as basic deterrence (MAD) and 
later his ‘no-cities’ notion of withholding countervalue attacks and limiting strategic 
retaliation in order to keep hostilities below escalation thresholds and thereby reduce 
the risks of uncontrolled escalation beyond “total war” and thus avoidng the hitherto 
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only-theoretical but now much too real potential for “absolute war.” So while more 
popular and better known nuclear thinkers like Kahn looked lucidly but simplisti-
cally at the “escalation ladder” as a linear metaphor whose every rung represented an 
opportunity for escalation dominance and hence for military victory – mirroring the 
work of Schelling and others of his era whose emphasis on linearity and logic and 
de-emphasis of the philosophical and psychological would contribute to America’s 
Vietnam tragedy by conflating tactics with strategy and allowing logical increments 
of escalation to become divorced from the political connectivity that defines Clause-
witzian strategy by embedding war’s violence within an inherent ends-means balance 
– Brodie questioned the strategic logic and wisdom of escalation itself, hence his 
RAND Research Memorandum as well as his published book on escalation, Escala-
tion and the Nuclear Option, which came out around the same time as Kahn’s more 
widely read On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. Brodie’s approach to escalation 
offers something of a rebuttal to Kahn’s (and others’) dependence upon escalation 
ladders, which enshrined within their structure their own escalatory dynamic up the 
ladder. Brodie instead “stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies, 
including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons, of gauging the 
intent behind the opponent’s military moves.”2434 Brodie’s approach to escalation offers 
some telling insights, including a fascinating, if unusual, sidebar on the psychology of 
war included in the published book version, but not included in his Rand Research 
Memorandum, of Escalation and the Nuclear Option.
Many strategic studies scholars credit Brodie for being one of America’s greatest 
strategic thinkers, on that rare and distinguished historical level epitomized Clausewitz, 
often noting Brodie’s passionate embrace of Clausewitz’s most famous dictum unifying 
war and politics, and Brodie’s recognition as early as The Absolute Weapon that with 
the splitting of the atom, real war had become what Clausewitz had considered only a 
theoretical maximum, necessitating Brodie’s impassioned (if not subtle or nuanced) re-
affirmation of the primacy of policy. But with few exceptions – such as Barry Steiner’s 
recognition of the personal connection Brodie felt with Clausewitz’s frustration (and 
possible clinical depression) and Ken Booth’s nuanced appreciation of the parallels 
that bound these two great philosophers of total war – most scholarly treatments of 
Brodie do not convey how thoroughly imbued Brodie’s work and thought became 
with the very spirit of Clausewitz, from their shared abhorrence of total war to their 
mutual recognition of the omnipresence of friction and fog and their joint conclusion 
that strategic guidance and vision must be provided by true strategic ingenuity – for 
Clausewitz, this meant a brilliant practitioner of war like Napoleon or before him 
Frederick II, but for Brodie it meant neither the military nor political leadership of 
2434. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, RAND Research Memorandum, RM-4544-PR, June 1965, iii.
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his day whom he routinely lambasted for their parochial thinking, but instead the 
strategic theorist, in the new form of the civilian defense intellectual whose very ascent 
he helped to foster, even if in the end he proved unable to ascend along with the more 
successful strategic thinkers of his day who came to stand at the nexus of war and 
policy. Brodie would find himself on the sidelines of power, while his ideas would take 
root at the foundation of the new field of strategic studies that would elevate his peers 
to more prominent positions of influence. As pointed out at the start of this thesis, 
Ken Booth once observed of Brodie’s declining influence on the making of strategic 
policy precisely what Brodie had earlier observed of Clausewitz: “Who now worries 
whether Clausewitz had any influence? What counts is the enduring worth of what 
he wrote.”2435 Brodie marveled at how “the startling insights that leap up at us from 
so many pages of [Clausewitz’s] great work are still often directly applicable to our 
own times,” how there had “been no one to match him since.”2436 As Booth has so 
aptly put it: “Among the first generation of nuclear strategists, these words could be 
Brodie’s own epitaph.” 2437 
Brodie Remembered: A ‘Gardener in the Fields of the Mind’
Just a few months after the decade-long Clausewitz Project came to its conclusion in 
1976, Brodie would be forced to confront the challenge of posthumous influence in 
a very personal way. Just as Brodie had originally hoped, the project would help to 
stimulate a renaissance in Clausewitz studies. In November 1977, shortly after retir-
ing from UCLA, Brodie was diagnosed with cancer, derailing his ambition to “focus 
his creative energies on research and writing” and to further explore his interests in 
Clausewitz “who had been a major focus in his recently published War and Politics,” 
and to “edit a number of von Clausewitz’s writings” in addition to being “urged by the 
University of Indiana Press to revise and update From Crossbow to H-Bomb.”2438 As early 
as 1963, Brodie had been “plagued by back problems resulting from deteriorating disks, 
which had affected him for a number of years. As the condition became increasingly 
debilitating, he sought relief through a surgical procedure performed in November 
1963. The surgery eased the pain somewhat, but he would have the problem for the 
remainder of his life.”2439 Ten years later, his health problems intensified, and as Newell 
Bringhurst recounts, “Bernard, who had undergone back surgery in 1963 to relieve 
chronic back pain, was again suffering” and “a neurological surgeon with the [UCLA] 
2435. Booth, “Bernard Brodie,” 51.
2436. Booth, “Bernard Brodie,” 52.
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2438. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life, 235.
2439. Bringhurst, Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life, 168.
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Medical Center suggested that Bernard’s condition was the early stages of Lou Gehrig’s 
disease. The Brodies sought other opinions. After further evaluation, two other doc-
tors ruled out Lou Gehrig’s disease, much to the couple’s relief. Following treatment, 
Bernard’s condition improved to the point that more surgery appeared unnecessary.”2440 
But as Bringhurst chronicles, “such relief was only temporary and Bernard’s back 
problems continued to grow worse with the deterioration of his disks and the involve-
ment of arthritic nodes on his spine. Ultimately, he was compelled to undergo a second 
major operation in the fall of 1974. The surgery appeared to go well. But this operation, 
like the first, brought only temporary relief; it was, in fact, less successful. Bernard 
continued to teach his classes at UCLA campus, though he walked bent over in order 
to alleviate the back pain.”2441 Bringhurst recounts Brodie’s struggle with cancer, not-
ing: “Initially, Bernard responded well to chemotherapy treatment” and “was almost 
back to normal” by January 1978, and his “improvement also prompted plans for a 
visit to Japan in June” where he and Fawn had both “been invited to lecture at Japan’s 
National Defense Academy” but they were ultimately “forced to cancel their Japanese 
journey” when Brodie’s “lymphoma returned, despite six months of chemotherapy and 
one month of radiation treatments,” and Brodie “became bedridden.”2442 Brodie was 
hospitalized in July, and in “early August he was given radiation treatments on his spine 
where the original cancerous lesion was belatedly located, lending hope for remission. 
He recovered the use of his left leg and was able to walk with a cane and some help,” 
but these “[i]mprovements were short-lived” and his “condition deteriorated,” with 
“no real hope for remission, let alone recovery. By late October, he was paralyzed from 
the waist down and was experiencing weakness in his arms and hands.”2443 
Brodie “hated the idea of dying and could not even talk about it until the final week 
of his life – by which time he was so crippled and weak that he actually welcomed the 
thought of escape. His only consolation seemed to come from directing the planting 
of daffodil bulbs and lilies in his beloved garden – and from listening to music, in 
particular, to Richard Strauss’s ‘Death and Transfiguration,’ which he played over and 
over again. He refused to eat or to take medication, though at the end he begged for 
chemotherapy in the forlorn hope for recovery.”2444 As Bringhurst recounts Brodie’s 
wife Fawn describing in a letter to Alexander and Juliette George, “‘We both felt 
terribly cheated … there were times of black despair,” and then on November 24th, 
“one day after Thanksgiving, Bernard Brodie died. He was sixty-eight years old.”2445 
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In its obituary marking the passing of Bernard Brodie on November 24, 1978, 
Arms Control Today recalled in its February 1979 issue how five years earlier, in her 
dedication of Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History, Fawn Brodie wrote, “to Bernard, 
ever the young gardener,” and explained that Bernard Brodie, “like Jefferson, took joy 
in working the soil of his garden,” and under his attentive care, the “Brodie hilltop 
… dripped color and fragrance under Bernard’s hands.”2446 It was “[w]ith the same 
attentiveness – and the same fecundity” that he“gardened in the fields of the mind,” 
and across his “twenty-years of teaching, writing and lecturing, he left those who think 
about military history, strategy and arms control a good deal to ponder.”2447 Further, 
the “richness of Bernard Brodie’s work came from his sensible bias against lifting 
problems of strategy from their contexts in human history and human psychology,” 
as he “spent a lifetime cautioning against what he called ‘the temptation to throw the 
past out the window.’”2448 
Saluting his foresight, Arms Control Today noted that Brodie “wrote The Absolute 
Weapon in 1946, just a year after the use of the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima, when 
debates were still raging about what exactly were the physical effects of an atomic blast,” 
while “[t]oday the paragraphs” of that work “seem extraordinarily prescient.”2449 As 
foreseen by Brodie, the “gravest danger … would result from a failure of U.S. military 
and political leaders to adjust to the atomic bomb in their thinking and planning,” 
and was one of the very first to foresee “the nature of mutual deterrence” between the 
superpowers.2450 Brodie thus “shaped as well as predicted the U.S. approach to strategy 
in the atomic age,” and was a “technical advisor to the U.S. delegation at the United 
Nations Conference in 1945, a RAND Corporation thinker, a teacher at Dartmouth, 
Yale and [the] University of California at Los Angeles, a visiting scholar at Princeton 
and the Carnegie Endowment, and a frequent lecturer to the military at the National 
War College in Washington, and elsewhere,” and further “supplemented the influence 
of his writing with the imprint he left upon three generations of students, colleagues, 
military officers and friends.”2451 Importantly, Brodie’s “word always carried an opti-
mism that through logic and rationality mankind could cut through the darkness of 
the atomic age.” And so, Arms Control Today concluded, “Many, many generations of 
students of defense will look to Bernard Brodie’s lifetime of thought as a touchstone of 
reasoned thinking, persuasive argumentation, rich contextuality, and great wisdom.”2452 
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A survey of Brodie’s contribution to the strategic literature was presented in the 
1981 article in the U.S. Army War College’s journal, Parameters, by Col. (ret.) Wil-
liam P. Snyder and Col. John A. MacIntyre, Jr., who conclude that Brodie “was the 
most original and thoughtful of the civilian strategists who helped shape American 
and Western strategic thought in recent decades and deserves ranking with the major 
classical strategists.”2453 
Several months after Brodie’s death, Thomas Schelling published “A Tribute to 
Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to RAND” in the Winter 1978/79 edition of In-
ternational Security 3, No. 3, which was reissued as a RAND paper in July 1979. In it 
he noted “The 1950s were the first time in at least a century that Americans became 
professionally concerned, in peacetime, with military strategy,” and “[a]mong the 
originators of that academic profession, Bernard Brodie was first – both in time and 
in distinction,” and in addition to his early works on naval strategy, as “editor and one 
of the chief contributors to The Absolute Weapon (1946), he set standards for thinking 
about nuclear strategy;” and “his articles on limited war, deterrence, and strategy as 
science . . . culminating in Strategy in the Missile Age (1959), were of an analytical and 
literary distinction that set him apart,” making him a “central figure in the RAND ‘oral 
tradition’ that gave shape to strategic thinking as it emerged in the 1960s and – it is 
still about all we have – the 1970s.”2454 Schelling wrote that by the mid-1960s, Brodie 
“had to change sides on a number of policies to oppose ‘carrying an intrinsically good 
idea so much too far,’ publishing the brief and slightly polemical Escalation and the 
Nuclear Option,”2455 followed by in 1973 his War and Politics, which revisited the very 
real wars fought in his lifetime “rather than the hypothetical nuclear wars that his 
own work, I truly believe, has helped us to avoid.” As Schelling saluted his esteemed 
colleague and close friend: “He, more than anyone else, helped us to learn to think 
about how to survive in a world with nuclear weapons.”2456
2453. William P. Snyder and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic Thinker,” Parameters 
Vol XI, No. 4, 2. At the time of publication, Snyder served as Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M Uni-
versity, whose faculty he joined in 1975 upon retirement from the U.S. Army as a Colonel. He was a 1952 West Point 
graduate who earned his Ph.D. in political science at Princeton University in 1963, and a graduate of the U.S. Army War 
College in 1971. He is the author of The Politics of British Defense Policy, 1945-1962 (1964), Case Studies in Military 
Systems Analysis (1967), in addition to numerous articles and reviews. Colonel John A. Maclntyre, Jr. was, at the time 
of the article’s publication, assigned to the Office of the Surgeon General in the Department of the Army. A graduate of 
Pennsylvania Military College, he earned master’s degrees from George Washington University in international business 
in 1971 and from Trinity University in health care administration in 1975. Colonel Maclntyre graduated from the U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College in 1976 and the U.S. Army War College in 1980.
2454. Schelling, “A Tribute to Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to RAND,” RAND, July 1979, 1.
2455. Schelling, “A Tribute to Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to RAND,” 2.
2456. Schelling, “A Tribute to Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to RAND,” 2.
528 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Bibliography
Abella, Alex. Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire. New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008.
Alberts David S., and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997.
Aldridge, Robert. Counterforce Syndrome. Washington, D.C.: Transnational Institute, 1978.
Aligica, Paul Dragos and Kenneth R. Weinstein, eds., The Essential Herman Kahn. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2009.
Arms Control Today (G.D.), “Bernard Brodie 1910-1978,” Arms Control Today (February 1979), 10.
Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, tr. Christine Booker and Norman Stone. Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985.
Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, tr. Christine Booker and Norman Stone. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.
Aron, Raymond. “Modern Strategic Thought,” tr. J. E. Gabriel, Problems of Modern Strategy. New 
York: Praeger, 1970.
Ashley, Richard K. “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38, No. 2 (Spring 
1984), 225-286.
Bailey, Herbert S. Letter to DeHaven, February 16, 1959, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Bailey, Herbert S. Letter to Vaughan, March 6, 1958, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Bailey, Herbert S. Letters to Brodie, January 29, 1958; March 22, 1958; March 31, 1958; De-
cember 8, 1958; December 16, 1958; January 2, 1959; February 3, 1959; February 10, 1959; 
March 13, 1959; March 25, 1959; August 21, 1959; September 15, 1959; January 20, 1960; 
February 11, 1960; February 23, 1960; January 12, 1973; February 22, 1973; May 22, 1973; 
September 16, 1973; October 10, 1974; December 31, 1975; October 14, 1976; October 29, 
1976, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles 
E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Bailey, Herbert S. Letters to Paret, May 22, 1973; October 10, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Col-
lection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Barnett, Frank R. “Preface,” Towards a New Defense for NATO: The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons. 
New York: National Strategy Information Center, July 1976, vii-viii.
Bassford, Christopher. Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 
1815-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Bassford, Chris. E-mail to the Author, February 26, 2012.
Bassford, Christopher. “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction,” The Clausewitz Homepage, 
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm, an edited version of a paper 
presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State 
University, 26 February 1993. 
Bibliography 529
Bassford, Christopher. “Review Essay: Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Berlin, 1832),” posted online 
at: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/DefAnReview.htm, originally published in 
Defense Analysis, June 1996.
Bateman, Lewis. Letter to Brodie, December 19, 1975, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Baylis, John and John C. Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear Strategy. London: Pinters Press, 1991.
Bayne, M.G., U.S. Navy Vice Admiral and Commandant. Letter to Brodie, August 28, 1974, 
Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. 
Research Library, UCLA.
Betts, Richard K. “Should Strategic Studies Survive?”, World Politics, 50, No. 1, Fiftieth Anniversary 
Special Issue (October 1997), 7-33.
Beyerchen, Alan D. “Chapter 7: Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of Imagery,” in David 
S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/Get
TRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA460550.
Beyerchen, Alan D. Clausewitz, “Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” Appendix 1, in 
Tom Czerwinski, ed., Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 151-197, as posted on The Clause-
witz Homepage, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm.
Bobbitt, Philip, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton. U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader. 
London: Macmillan, 1989.
Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2002. 
Bolton, John R. “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion,” Speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 2, 2002, http://
www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/V24-4%20PDF%20Files%20By%20Author/Bolton,%20John%20
R.,%20Axis%20of%20Evil.pdf.
Bonaparte, Napoleon. Napoleon’s Maxims of War with notes by General Burnod. Translated from 
French by Lieut.General Sir G.C. D’Aguilar, C.B., and published by David McKay of Phila-
delphia in 1902. Available online: http://www.pvv.ntnu.no/~madsb/home/war/napoleon/.
Booth, Ken. “Bernard Brodie,” in John Baylis and John Garnett, eds., Makers of Nuclear Strategy 
(London: Pinters Press, 1991), 19-54.
Boyd, John R. “Destruction and Creation,” Unpublished Paper, September 3, 1976, 6-7. A copy 
is available online at: http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_
CREATION.pdf.
Bringhurst, Newell G. Fawn McKay Brodie: A Biographer’s Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1999.
Brodie, Bernard. “A Comment on the Hoag Doctrine,” RAND Working Paper, July 17, 1962.
Brodie, Bernard. “A Commentary on the Preventive War Doctrine,” RAND Working Paper, June 
11, 1953.
Brodie, Bernard. “A Critique of Army and Navy Thinking on the Atomic Bomb,” The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, August 1947, 207-210.
530 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Brodie, Bernard. “A Critique of the Doctrine of Conventional War in Europe (CWE),” RAND 
Working Paper, September 24, 1962.
Brodie, Bernard. A Guide to Naval Strategy. New York: Praeger, 1965, Fifth Edition.
Brodie, Bernard. A Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942.
Brodie, Bernard. “A Slightly Revised Proposal for the Underemployment of SAC in an H-Bomb 
Era,” RAND Working Paper, January 23, 1953.
Brodie, Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, Revised Edition. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1973. Originally published by New York: Dell Books, 1962.
Brodie, Bernard. “Can Peaceful Change Prevent War?” Term Paper Submitted to Political Science 
363, Spring 1938, University of Chicago.
Brodie, Bernard. “Changing Attitudes Towards War,” Chapter 6, in War and Politics. New York: 
Macmillan, 1973, 223-275.
Brodie, Bernard. “Changing Attitudes Towards War,” in Henry A. Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, 
eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper Number 17 (Los Angeles: UCLA 
Security Studies Project, 1968), 15-26. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Changing Attitudes Towards War,” Paper Presented at the Studies in Violence 
Symposium, UCLA, June 1-2, 1968, 1-16. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” Lecture to the Air War College, 
April 17, 1952, 1-20.
Brodie, Bernard. “Characteristics of a Sound Strategy,” Lecture Delivered to the Naval War Col-
lege, March 17, 1952, 1-24.
Brodie, Bernard, C.J. Hitch, and A.W. Marshall, “The Next Ten Years,” RAND Working Paper, 
December 30, 1954.
Brodie, Bernard, “Conclusion: The Future of Deterrence,” in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Future of 
Deterrence in U. S. Strategy, UCLA Security Studies Project (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1968).
Brodie, Bernard. “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War.” Daedalus 91, No. 4, American 
Foreign Policy: Freedoms and Restraints (Fall 1962), 733-748.
Brodie, Bernard. “Defense Strategy in its Political Context,” a paper delivered to the Fifth Inter-
national Wehrkunde Conference sponsored by the Verlag Europaisch Wehrkunde, Munich, 
Germany, February 10-11, 1968, in William P. Gerberding and Bernard Brodie, The Political 
Dimension in National Strategy, Security Studies Paper No. 13 (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1968), 36-47. 
Brodie, Bernard, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York. Harcourt, 
Brace and Company. 1946. See in particular, Part I: The Weapon, Chapter One, “War in the 
Atomic Age,” and Chapter Two, “Implications for Military Policy.” 
Brodie, Bernard, ed., The Future of Deterrence in U. S. Strategy, UCLA Security Studies Project 
(Los Angeles: UCLA, 1968), in particular, “Conclusion: The Future of Deterrence,” 126-134.
Brodie, Bernard. “Ending a War: Is the Korean Lesson Valid for Vietnam?” in Henry A. Kissinger 
and Bernard Brodie, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper Number 17 
(Los Angeles: UCLA Security Studies Project, 1968), 41-45 under the original title of 
Brodie, Bernard. Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
Brodie, Bernard. Escalation and the Nuclear Option, RAND Memorandum RM-4544-PR. Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, June 1965.
Bibliography 531
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of the Eastern Europe,” in Quincy Wright, ed. A Foreign Policy 
for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 202-223.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of the Far East,” in Quincy Wright, ed. A Foreign Policy for the 
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 139-161.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of General Security,” in Quincy Wright, ed. A Foreign Policy 
for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 97-125.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of Great-Power Relationships,” in Quincy Wright, ed. A Foreign 
Policy for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 34-71.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of International Economic Policies,” in Quincy Wright, ed. 
A Foreign Policy for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 292-310.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of International Informational Policies,” in Quincy Wright, ed. 
A Foreign Policy for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 349-392.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of the Latin America,” in Quincy Wright, ed. A Foreign Policy 
for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 234-255.
Brodie, Bernard et al., “Discussion of the Near East,” in Quincy Wright, ed. A Foreign Policy for 
the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 170-193.
Brodie, Bernard. “How Much Conventional Force Do We Need?” Foreign Service Journal, April 
1973, 18-22.
Brodie, Bernard. “How Not to Lead an Alliance,” The Reporter, March 9, 1967, 18-24.
Brodie, Bernard. “How Strong Is Britain?” Foreign Affairs 26, No. 3 (April 1948), 432-449.
Brodie, Bernard. “Implications of Nuclear Weapons in Total War,” RAND Paper (P-1118), July 
8, 1957, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD606443&Location=U2&doc=Get
TRDoc.pdf. 
Brodie, Bernard. “In Quest of Socrates: Man and Philosopher,” Paper Submitted to Course 101, 
Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, December 1932. Bernard Brodie Papers (Col-
lection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA. 
Brodie, Bernard. “In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz.” [A review of Paret’s Clausewitz and the 
State.] International Security 1, No.3 (Winter 1977), 63-66.
Brodie, Bernard. “Influence of Mass Destruction Weapons on Strategy,” Lecture, Naval War Col-
lege, February 6, 1956. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Introduction,” Towards a New Defense for NATO: The Case for Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons. New York: National Strategy Information Center, July 1976, 1-9.
Brodie, Bernard. “Introduction,” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Brodie, Bernard. “Learning to Fight a Limited War,” originally published in the Los Angeles Times, 
December 3, 1967, reprinted in The Political Dimension in National Strategy: Five Papers, ed. 
William P. Gerberding and Bernard Brodie, Security Studies Paper No. 13 (Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Security Studies Project, 1968), 26-32.
Brodie, Bernard. Letter to Hans Speier, November 23, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 
1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letter to Hans Speier, November 5, 1954, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 
1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
532 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Brodie, Bernard. Letter to Klaus Knorr, January 24, 1964; February 26, 1964; March 27, 1964; 
May 15, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letter to Michael Howard, September 1, 1974; October 3, 1974, Bernard Brodie 
Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research 
Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letters to Bailey, February 6, 1958; March 28, 1958; July 17, 1958; December 
29, 1958; January 30, 1959; February 16, 1959; March 20, 1959; August 25, 1959; February 
4, 1960; February 18, 1960; May 19, 1973; December 25, 1975, Bernard Brodie Papers (Col-
lection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letters to Gordon Hubel, March 20, 1959; April 8, 1959; March 18, 1964; 
March 19, 1964; Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letters to Herman Kahn, January 4, 1962; January 12, 1962; January 19, 1962; 
January 25, 1962; January 31, 1962; February 9, 1962; February 16, 1962; September 18, 
1963, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles 
E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letters to Max Singer, November 9, 1963; November 11, 1964, Bernard Brodie 
Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research 
Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. Letters to Peter Paret, January 17, 1964; May 22, 1964; May 28, 1964; May 1, 
1967; January 21, 1974; May 30, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department 
of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard, Michael Intriligator, and Roman Kolkowicz, eds. National Security and Interna-
tional Stability (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983).
Brodie, Bernard. “Morals and Strategy: Distinguishing Virtue from Ignorance in Problems of 
National Defense,” Worldview Magazine, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 
September 1964, 4-8.
Brodie, Bernard. “More About Limited War,” World Politics 10, No. 1 (October 1957), 112-122.
Brodie, Bernard. “Must We Shoot from the Hip?” RAND Working Paper, September 4, 1951.
Brodie, Bernard. “Navy Department Thinking on the Atomic Bomb,” The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, July 1947, 177-180, 198-200.
Brodie, Bernard. “New Preface for Paperback Edition of ‘Strategy in the Missile Age’,” RAND 
Paper (P-3033), Santa Monica: RAND, December 30, 1964.
Brodie, Bernard. “New Tactics in Naval Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 24, no. 2 (January 1946).
Brodie, Bernard. “New Technologies of War and National Policies,” Technology and International 
Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
Brodie, Bernard. “Nuclear Strategy in its Political Context” Box 20, Bernard Brodie Papers at 
the UCLA Library Special Collections, reprinted in Marc Trachtenberg’s The Development of 
American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy, 1961-1969 (New York: Garland Press, 1988), 
353-368.
Brodie, Bernard. “Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks,” Lecture, U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, February 20, 1956. 
Bibliography 533
Brodie, Bernard. “Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks,” RAND Paper P-811, 
February 27, 1956. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks,” February 1957 edition of 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 56-61. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks,” Lecture, Dartmouth Col-
lege, Great Issues,” March 1956.
Brodie, Bernard. “Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?” Foreign Affairs 32, No. 2 (January 1954).
Brodie, Bernard. “On the Objectives of Arms Control, Bernard Brodie,” International Security 1, 
No. 1 (Summer 1976), 17-36.
Brodie, Bernard. “Paying in Full for a Limited War,” L.A. Times, Part II, October 17, 1968. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Political Consequences of the H-bomb,” RAND Working Paper, November 
7, 1952.
Brodie, Bernard. “Political Impact of U.S. Forces,” Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) Talk, 
RAND, May 28, 1963.
Brodie, Bernard. “RAND Memo to Thomas W. Wolfe, March 24, 1965, Bernard Brodie Papers (Col-
lection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Bernard. “Review of Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 8, No. 3 (Winter, 1978), 572-574.
Brodie, Bernard. “Review: On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” World Politics 25, No. 2 (January 
1973), 288-308.
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941).
Brodie, Bernard. “Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,” World Politics 7, No. 3 (April 
1955), 349-370.
Brodie, Bernard. “Some Preliminary Observations on Escalation,” RAND Working Paper, Sep-
tember 13, 1962.
Brodie, Bernard. “Some Strategic Implications of the Nuclear Revolution,” RAND Working Paper, 
P-1111, May 14, 1957.
Brodie, Bernard. “Strategic Bombing: What It Can Do,” The Reporter, August 15, 1950, 28-31.
Brodie, Bernard. “Strategic Objectives and the Determination of Force Composition,” RAND 
Working Paper, June 9, 1959.
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy and National Interests: Reflections for the Future (New York: National 
Strategy Information Center, January 1971).
Brodie, Bernard. “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics 1, No. 4 (July 1949), 467-488.
Brodie, Bernard. “Strategy as an Art and a Science,” Naval War College Lecture, September 18, 
1958., reprinted in the Naval War College Review, February 1959. Online at: http://www.au.af.
mil/au/awc/awcgate/theorists/brodie1.htm.
Brodie, Bernard. “Strategy Hits a Dead End,” Harper’s, October 1955, 33-37.
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation Report R-335, 
January 15, 1959.
534 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Brodie, Bernard. “Tactical Effects of H-Bombs,” RAND Working Paper, November 7, 1952.
Brodie, Bernard. “Technology, Politics, and Strategy,” Adelphi Papers 9, No.:55 (1969), 21-29.
Brodie, Bernard. “Technology, Politics, and Strategy,” in Henry A. Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, 
eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper Number 17 (Los Angeles: UCLA 
Security Studies Project, 1968), 27-40. 
Brodie, Bernard. “Technology, Politics, and Strategy,” Paper Presented to the Tenth Annual Con-
ference of the Institute for Strategic Studies at St. Catherine’s College in Oxford, September 
19-22, 1968, 2. 
Brodie, Bernard. “The American Scientific Strategists,” RAND Working Paper (P-2979), October 
1964.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” RAND Research Memorandum (RM-2218), 
July 23, 1958.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Anatomy of Deterrence” World Politics 11, No. 2 (January 1959), 173-191.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker,” Foreign Affairs 27, No. 1 (October 1948), 
17-33.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Atomic Bomb and American Security,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freed-
man, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (London: Macmillan, 
1989).
Brodie, Bernard. “The Atomic Bomb and American Security,” Memorandum Number Eighteen, 
Yale Institute of International Studies, New Haven, Connecticut, November 1, 1945,
Brodie, Bernard. “The Atomic Dilemma,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 249, Social Implications of Modern Science (January 1947), 32-41.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited 
and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976, 45-58.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” Advanced Concepts and Information 
Strategy (ACIS) Working Paper, UCLA, 1976.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” Chapter 2 in National Security and 
International Stability (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983) eds. Bernard Brodie, 
Michael D. Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz, 5-21.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, No. 4 (Spring, 
1978), 65-83.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Heritage of Douhet,” RAND Research Memorandum (RM-1013), De-
cember 31, 1952.
Brodie, Bernard. The Intractability of States: A Distinctive Problem, RAND Paper P-2970 (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1964).
Brodie, Bernard. “The McNamara Phenomenon,” World Politics 17, No. 4 (July 1965), 672-686, 
a review article of William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, Harper & Row, 
1964).
Brodie, Bernard. “The Missing Middle – Tactical Nuclear War,” RAND Working Paper, May 8, 
1964 (a revised version of his April 9, 1964 speech to RAND’s Air Force Advisory Group 
(AFAG) of the same title).
Bibliography 535
Bernard Brodie, “The Scientific Strategists,” in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., 
Scientists and National Policy-Making. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 240-266.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy,” in Quincy Wright, ed. 
A Foreign Policy for the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 89-96.
Brodie, Bernard. “Theories on the Causes of War,” in Henry A. Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, 
eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper Number 17. Los Angeles: UCLA 
Security Studies Project, 1968, 46-60.
Brodie, Bernard. “Theories on the Causes of War,” Presented at Royce Hall, UCLA, on November 
11, 1968 as part of the Faculty Lecture Series on “War and the Human Race,” 1-20. 
Brodie, Bernard. “U.S. Political Objectives in a Context of Strategic Bombing,” RAND Corpora-
tion Working Paper, February 19, 1953.
Brodie, Bernard. “Unlimited Weapons and Limited War,” The Reporter, November 18, 1954, 16-21.
Brodie, Bernard. “Unlimited Weapons Choices and Limited Budgets,” Public Lecture at Berkeley, 
November 18, 1954, 1-31.
Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1973.
Brodie, Bernard. “War Department Thinking on the Atomic Bomb,” The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, June 1947, 150-155, 168.
Brodie, Bernard. “What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?” The Reporter, May 23, 1963, 
25-33.
Brodie, Bernard. “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy 5 (Winter 1971-72): 
151-161.
Brodie, Memo to C.A.H. Thomson, J.M. Goldsen, and R. McDermott , Jan 22, 1964, Bernard 
Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Re-
search Library, UCLA.
Brodie, Memo to Max Ascoli, September 6, 1957, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Brokaw, R. Miriam. Letter to Brodie, September 14, 1973, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 
1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Brooks, Stephen G. “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, No. 3 (Summer, 1997).
Brubeck, Marcia. Letter to Brodie, July 29, 1976, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), De-
partment of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Brubeck, Marcia. Letter to Brodie, October 6, 1976, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Bryant, Stewart F. “Review of Sea Power in the Machine Age,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 218, Public Policy in a World at War (November 1941), 202.
Buchan, Alastair. “Review: War and Politics,” The American Political Science Review 69, No. 2 
(June 1975), 731.
Calder, Nigel. Nuclear Nightmares. New York: Viking Press, 1980.
Calder, Nigel. Nuclear Nightmares: An investigation into possible wars. London: British Broadcast-
ing Corporation, 1979.
Cannon, Michael W. “Clausewitz for Beginners,” Air Power Journal (Summer 1989).
536 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Carnesale, Albert, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Scott D. 
Sagan, Derek Bok (Harvard Nuclear Study Group), Living with Nuclear Weapons. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983.
Cavell, R. G. “Review of The Absolute Weapon,” edited by Bernard Brodie,” Pacific Affairs 19, No. 
4 (December 1946), 450-51.
Chapman, John W. “American Strategic Thinking,” Air University Review 18, January-February 
1967, 25-33, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/jan-feb/chapman.
html. 
Chapman, John W. Letter to Brodie, January 6, 1966, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Choice. “Review: Escalation and the Nuclear Option,” Choice, June 1967, Bernard Brodie Papers 
(Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, 
UCLA.
Cimbala, Stephen J. Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy. Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2001.
Cimbala, Stephen J. Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy. London: 
Frank Cass, 1991.
Claude Jr., I.L. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization 4th 
edition (New York: Random House, 1971)
Clausewitz, Carl von. “Chapter 1, Strategy,” Book III, Of Strategy in General, On War (London: 
N. Trübner, 1873), tr. Colonel J.J. Graham, posted on the Clausewitz Homepage, http://www.
clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK3ch01.html. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, translated by J.J. Graham, 1873, http://www.clausewitz.com/read-
ings/OnWar1873/BK2ch01.html.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, edited by Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret.
Clausewitz, Carl von. Principles of War were translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke, and re-
published in 1942 by The Military Service Publishing Company, http://www.clausewitz.com/
CWZHOME/PrincWar/Princwr1.htm.
Clausewitz, Carl von. “The Introduction of the Author,” On War, translated by Col. James .John Gra-
ham. London; N. Trubner, 1873, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Intro.htm.
Clausewitz, Marie von. “Preface to the First Edition,” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated 
by Col. J.J. Graham, London, 1873, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.
htm#2H_4_0004.
Cody, Edward. “After 43 Years, France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member,” Washington Post, March 
12, 2009. 
Craig, Campbell. Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and 
Waltz. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Curl, Richard L. “Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age,” Strategic Review 3 (Winter 1975), 46-56.
DeHaven, James C. Letters to Herbert Bailey, January 2, 1959; January 26, 1959, Bernard Brodie 
Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research 
Library, UCLA.
Bibliography 537
Dulles, John Foster. “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin 30 (January 
25, 1962): 107-10.
Dunn, Frederick S. “Foreword,” in Bernard Brodie, The Atomic Bomb and American Security,” 
Memorandum Number Eighteen, Yale Institute of International Studies, New Haven, Con-
necticut, November 1, 1945.
Dunn, Frederick S. “Law and Peaceful Change,” American Society of International Law Proceedings 
38 (1944)
Durieux, Benoit. “Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking,” in Hew 
Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007, 251-265.
Echevarria II, Antulio J. “American Strategic Culture: Problems and Prospects,” in Hew Strachan 
and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., The Changing Character of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, 431-445.
Echevarria II, Antulio J. Clausewitz and Contemporary War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Echevarria II, Antulio J. “The Cold War Clausewitz: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On 
War,” in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Jan Willem Honig and Daniel Moran, eds., Clausewitz, the 
State and War. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011, 129-148.
English, John A. Marching Through Chaos: The descent of armies in theory and practice. Wesport: 
Praeger 1996.
Fleming, Bruce. “Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?” Parameters (Spring 
2004): 65-69.
Ford, Daniel. “When Sun-tzu met Clausewitz: John Boyd, the OODA Loop, and the Invasion 
of Iraq,” 2009.
French, Bevan M. “Brodie Discusses ‘Limited’ Conflicts, Says All-Out War is ‘Meaningless’,” The 
Dartmouth CXV, No. 126 (March 20, 1956), 1.
Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001.
Gerberding, William P. and Bernard Brodie, eds. The Political Dimension in National Strategy: Five 
Papers. Security Studies Paper Number 13. Los Angeles: UCLA Security Studies Project, 1968.
Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon. The Worlds of Herman Kahn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon. Website of Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, www.sharonghamari.com/excerpt/
GhamariExcerpt.pdf. 
Glaser, Charles L. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, No. 
3 (Winter 1994/95), 50-90.
Goldsen, J.M. RAND memo to George Clement, May 7, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collec-
tion 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Gray, Andrew. “Iran nuclear bomb would be calamitous - US military,” Reuters, May 21, 2009, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2140020320090521.
Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Gray, Colin S. Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience. Lexington, Kentucky: 
University Press of Kentucky. 1982.
538 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Gray, Colin S. Strategy And History: Essays on Theory And Practice. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006. 
Gray, Colin S. “What RAND Hath Wrought,” Foreign Policy No. 4 (Autumn 1971), 111-112.
Guzzini, Stefano. Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The con-
tinuing story of a death foretold. New York and London: Routledge, 1998.
Harknett, Richard J. “State Preferences, Systemic Constraints, and the Absolute Weapon,” in T.V. 
Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms 
and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 47-72.
Hart, B.H. Liddell. Strategy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
Haslam Jonathan. No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machi-
avelli. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
Herberg-Rothe, Andreas. Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007.
Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Jan Willem Honig and Daniel Moran, eds., Clausewitz, the State and 
War. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011.
Herken, Gregg. Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, 
Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller. New York: Henry Holt, 2002.
Herken, Gregg. Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992.
Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War (New York: Knopf, 1985).
Herken, Gregg. “The Not-Quite-Absolute Weapon: Deterrence and the Legacy of Bernard Brodie,” 
Roman Kolkowicz, ed., Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1987), 15-24.
Herken, Gregg. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.
Heuser, Beatrice. Reading Clausewitz. London: Pimlico, 2002.
Heuser, Beatrice. The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz. 
Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010.
Hirsch, Susan. Letter to Brodie, Feb. 28, 1962, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Depart-
ment of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Holst, Johan Jorgen. Norwegian Military Review (Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift), tr. N. Bertelsen, Vol-
ume 5 (1967), Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Howard, Michael. “Brodie, Wohlstetter and American Nuclear Strategy.” Survival 34, No. 2 
(Summer 1992), 107-116. 
Howard, Michael. Letters to Bernard Brodie, August 23, 1974; September 18, 1974; September 
23, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles 
E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Hubel, Gordon. Letters to Bernard Brodie, March 25, 1959; February 22, 1960; July 29, 1964, 
Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. 
Research Library, UCLA.
Bibliography 539
Huntington, Samuel P. “Review: Strategy in the Missile Age by Bernard Brodie,” The American 
Political Science Review 54, No. 2 (June 1960), 505-506.
Huntington, William. “Clausewitz and Strategy in the Missile Age: A Critique of Bernard Brodie’s 
Strategic Thought,” Unpublished Paper Submitted to Foundations of National Security Strategy, 
National War College, October 9, 1990, 1-6.
Hutchins, Robert M. “Scholarly Opinions on Atomic Energy – and its Control,” New York Times, 
June 9, 1946, 6.
Iklé, Fred Charles. “When the Fighting has to Stop: The Arguments about Escalation,” World 
Politics 19, No. 4 (July 1967), 692-707.
Jane, Frederick T. Heresies of Sea Power. London: Longmans, Green, 1906.
Jervis, Robert. “Security Regimes,” International Organization 36, No.2 (Spring 1982), 357-378. 
Jomini, Baron Henri-Antoine, Art of War. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, trs. Philadelphia: 
Lippicott, 1892.
Jomini, Baron Henri-Antoine, The Art of War: A New Edition with Appendices and Maps, Translated 
from the French by Capt. G.H. Mendell, Corps of Topographical Engineers, U.S. Army, and 
Lieut. W. P. Craighill, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 
1862. 
Kahn, Herman. Letters to Bernard Brodie, February 22, 1962; October 3, 1963, Bernard Brodie 
Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research 
Library, UCLA.
Kahn, Herman. “Major Implications of a Current Non-Military Defense Study” (P-1497-RC), 
RAND, November 7, 1958.
Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Transaction Publishers, 2009.
Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Kahn, Herman. Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
Kahn, Herman. Thinking About the Unthinkable. New York: Avon Library, 1966.
Kahn, Herman. Thinking About the Unthinkable. New York: Horizon Press, 1962.
Kaplan, Fred and Martin J. Sherwin. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1991.
Kaplan, Fred. 1959: The Year Everything Changed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
Kaplan, Fred. The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.)
Kaplan, Morton A. Justice, Human Nature and Political Obligation. New York: The Free Press, 1976.
Kaplan, Morton A. Macropolitics: Selected Essays on the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: Aldine, 1969.
Kaplan, Morton A. Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis. New 
York: The Free Press, 1979.
Kinross, Stuart. Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq. 
London: Routledge, 2008.
Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.
540 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Kissinger, Henry A. and Bernard Brodie, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies 
Paper No. 17 (Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 1968).
Knorr, Klaus. Letters to Bernard Brodie, January 22, 1964; March 2, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers 
(Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, 
UCLA.
Kolkowicz, Roman, ed. Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy. London: Frank Cass, 1987.
Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Lebow, Richard Ned. “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” in Michael C. Williams. Real-
ism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007.
Leonard, L. Larry. “Review: Escalation and the Nuclear Option,” Current Thought on Peace and 
War, Summer 1967, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collec-
tions, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Lewis, Charles Lee. “Review of Sea Power in the Machine Age,” The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 28, No. 2 (September 1941), 273-74.
Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and 
International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995).
Malcolm, Noel. Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
McDonnell, Captain Robert H. “Clausewitz and Strategic Bombing,” Air University Quarterly 
Review VI, No. 1 (Spring 1953), 43-54.
McGray, Douglas. “The Marshall Plan,” Wired 11, No. 02 (February 2003), http://www.wired.
com/wired/archive/11.02/marshall.html.
McNamara, Robert. “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” 
Foreign Affairs 62 (1983): 59-81.
Menand, Louis. “Fat Man: Herman Kahn and the nuclear age,” New Yorker, June 27, 2005.
Meyers, Richard B. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. “An update on the global war on terror,” 
SecurityInnovator.com, November 24, 2002
Mochalov, Vladimir. Introduction to the Russian Edition, Strategy in the Missile Age. Moscow: 
Soviet Ministry of Defense, 1961; English translation of Russian introduction as preserved in 
the Bernard Brodie Papers at the UCLA special collections.
Montross, Lynn. War Through the Ages. New York: Harper and Bros., 1946.
Montross, Lynn. War Through the Ages, Third Edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.
Moran, Dan. “Late Clausewitz,” in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Jan Willem Honig and Daniel Moran, 
eds., Clausewitz, the State and War. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011, 91-207.
Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopf, 1985, 6th ed.
Nelson, Jean Ware. Letter to Brodie, May 2, 1960, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Nelson, Keith L. “Review: War and Politics,” Pacific Historical Review 45, No. 1 (February 1976), 
152.
Ogburn, William Fielding, ed., Technology and International Relations. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1949.
Bibliography 541
Osgood, Robert E. “Review: Strategy in the Missile Age by Bernard Brodie,” The Journal of Modern 
History 32, No. 4 (December 1960), 426.
Owada, Hisashi. “Peaceful Change,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Section 3, http://www.mpepil.com/sample_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1452&recno=19&
Pacific Historical Review, “Review of A Guide to Naval Strategy, Pacific Historical Review 13, No. 
4 (December 1944), 484.
Paret, Peter. “Carl von Clausewitz: Biographical article for the International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences,” Center for International Studies, Princeton University, from September 16, 
1963.
Paret, Peter. “Guerre et Politique selon Clausewitz,” Revue Francaise de Science Politique V, No. 2 
(Avril-Juin 1955): 291-314.
Paret, Peter. Letters to Bernard Brodie April 23, 1967; April 25, 1964; May 31, 1964; November 
7, 1963; November 13, 1963; September 11, 1974; September 22, 1975, Bernard Brodie 
Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research 
Library, UCLA.
Paret, Peter. “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” in Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander, and Fe-
lix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986, 123-142.
Paret, Peter. “The Political Ideas of Clausewitz,” Paper Submitted to the Annual Meeting of the 
American Historical Association, December 29, 1962, 1-9.
Parks, Eric R. Letter to Brodie, n.d., Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223). Department of 
Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Paul, T.V., Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear 
Arms and the Emerging International Order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
Peña, Charles V. “Axis of Evil: Threat or Chimera?” CATO Institute, Summer 2002, http://www.
cato.org/research/articles/pena-020905.html.
Petraeus, David H. and James F. Amos, eds., FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency. Wash-
ington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, December 2006.
Phillips, Thomas R., ed. Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics. Harrisburg, PA, Military 
Service Publishing Co., 1940.
Porro, Jeffrey D. “The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38, No. 
6 (June/July 1982), 16-20. 
Posvar, Wesley W., Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh. Letter to Brodie, September 24, 
1968, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223). Department of Special Collections, Charles 
E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Princeton University Press Editorial Board. Minutes from 13-14 June 1964 Meeting of the Edito-
rial Board, Princeton University Press, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department 
of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Princeton University Press. Contract for Clausewitz, February 28, 1974, Bernard Brodie Papers (Col-
lection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
542 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Princeton University, Public Announcement, April 10, 1964, Department of Public Information, 
Princeton University, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Col-
lections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Reagan, Ronald. Speech on the Strategic Defense Initiative, December 28, 1984. A transcript of 
President Reagan’s speech is available online at the website of NuclearFiles.org: http://www.nu-
clearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/missile-defense/history/reagan_on-strategic-defense-iniative.htm.
Reid, Julian. “Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship between War and Power,” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 28, No. 1 (January 1, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_hb3225/is_1_28/ai_n28987201/?tag=content;col1.
Rodgers, William L. Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design 
from Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1937.
Rodgers, William L. Naval Warfare Under Oars, 4th to 16th Centuries: A Study of Strategy, Tactics 
and Ship Design. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1939.
Romer, Alfred. “Review of Sea Power in the Machine Age,” Isis 34, No. 3 (Winter 1943), 230-231.
Ropp, Theodore. “Review of Sea Power in the Machine Age,” The American Historical Review 47, 
No. 4 (July 1942), 821-22.
Rosecrance, Richard. “International Theory Revisited,” International Organization 35, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1981), 691-713.
Rosen, S. McKee. “Review of Sea Power in the Machine Age,” The American Journal of Sociology 48, 
No. 2 (September 1942), 292.
RUSI. “Review: Escalation and the Nuclear Option,” Royal United Service Institution, RUSI 
Journal, May 1967, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collec-
tions, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA. 
Saxon, David S. Letter to Brodie, July 18, 1977, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223). Depart-
ment of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Schelling, Thomas. A Tribute to Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to RAND, RAND Paper P-6355, 
Santa Monica: RAND, July 1979, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/
P6355.pdf.
Scheuerman, William. Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009. 
Schlatter, Richard. “Thomas Hobbes and Thucydides.” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 
3 (June 1945), 350.
Schmidt, Brian C. “Realism as Tragedy: Review of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John J. 
Mearsheimer,” Cambridge Review of International Studies 30, No. 3 (July 2004).
Schmidt, Brian C. The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Rela-
tions. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998.
Schroeder, Paul. “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” International Security 1 (Summer 
1994), 108-148.
Schelling, Thomas. “Brodie (1910-1978): A Tribute to Bernard Brodie and (Incidentally) to 
RAND,” International Security 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), 23.
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987.
Bibliography 543
Shy, John. “Jomini,” in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear 
Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Shy, John. “Jomini,” in Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern 
Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 143-185.
Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Singer, Max. Letter to Brodie, Feb. 22, 1962, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Depart-
ment of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Singer, Max. Letter to Brodie, November 12, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Singer, Max. Letter to Brodie, November 4, 1963, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Smith, George H. E. “Review of Sea Power in the Machine Age,” The American Political Science 
Review 35, No. 5 (October 1941), 1002-1003.
Smith, Hugh. On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas. New York: Palgrave MacMil-
lan, 2005.
Smith, Peter D. Doomsday Men. New York: Macmillan, 2007.
Smith, Peter D. Doomsday Men. New York: Penguin, 2008.
Snyder, William P. and John A. MacIntyre, Jr., “Bernard Brodie: America’s Prophetic Strategic 
Thinker,” Parameters XI, No. 4 (1981), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Arti-
cles/1981/1981%20snyder%20and%20macintyre.pdf.
Speier, Hans. Letters to Bernard Brodie, November 19, 1954; November 30, 1954, Bernard Bro-
die Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research 
Library, UCLA.
Steiner, Barry H. Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy. Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991.
Steiner, Barry. “Using the Absolute Weapon: Early Ideas of Bernard Brodie on Atomic Strategy,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 7, No. 4 (1984), 365-393.
Steiner, Barry. “Using the Absolute Weapon: Early Ideas of Bernard Brodie on Atomic Strategy,” 
ACIS Working Paper No. 44 (January 1984), Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 
UCLA.
Strachan, Hew. “Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War,” in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-
Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 
14-44.
Strachan, Hew. Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007.
Strachan, Hew and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007.
Strachan, Hew and Sibylle Scheipers, eds. The Changing Character of War. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011.
Strachan, Hew and Sibylle Scheipers, “Introduction: The Changing Character of War,” in Hew 
Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., The Changing Character of War. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, 1-24.
544 Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar World
Strausz-Hupé, Robert. “Review of The Absolute Weapon by Bernard Brodie,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 249, Social Implications of Modern Science (January 
1947), 177-78.
Stuart, Reginald C. “Clausewitz and the Americans: Bernard Brodie and Others on War and Policy,” 
in War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History, Volume 2. New York: Holmes and Meier, 
1977, ed. Brian Bond and Ian Roy, 166-172.
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War. Lawrence, Kansas: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 2008.
Tellis, Ashley J. “Reconstructing Political Realism: The long march to scientific theory,” Security 
Studies 5, No. 2, 1995, 3-94.
Teschke, Benno. The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International 
Relations. London: Verso, 2003.
The Key Reporter. “Review: Escalation and the Nuclear Option,” The Key Reporter, Spring 1967, 
Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young 
Research Library, UCLA.
Thomas, Roy E. Letter to Brodie, August 29, 1969, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young. Research Library, UCLA.
Time Magazine, “ATOMIC AGE: Absolute Weapon?” Time, June 10, 1946, http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,793035,00.html.
Trachtenberg, Marc, ed., The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy, 
1945-1951 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1987). 
Trachtenberg, Marc, ed., The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy, 
1952-1960 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1988). 
Trachtenberg, Marc, ed., The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy, 1961-
1969, and Retrospectives (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1988). 
Trachtenberg, Marc. History and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Trachtenberg, Marc. “Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966,” Political Science Quarterly 104, 
No. 2 (Summer 1989), 301-334.
Tuck, Richard. Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Voice of America. “Clinton: Middle East May Start Arms Race If Iran Gets Nukes,” Voice of America, 
May 20, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-20-voa59-68786472.
html.
Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.
Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, 
No. 2 (Fall 1993).
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171. 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/
intrel/waltz1.htm.
Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War (Maxwell 
AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, December 1984). 
Bibliography 545
The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf.
The White House. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf.
Wildrick, Craig D, Capt. “Bernard Brodie: Pioneer of the Strategy of Deterrence,” Military Review, 
October 1983, 39-45, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp. 
Williams, Michael C. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Rela-
tions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Williams, Michael C. The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Williams, Michael C. “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical 
Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 58, No. 
4 (Autumn, 2004), 633-665.
Wolfe, Thomas W. “The Levels of Nuclear Strategy,” The Reporter, January 12, 1967, 63-64.
Wolfe, Thomas W. Comments on ‘Escalation and the Nuclear Option,’” RAND Memo to Brodie, 
March 16, 1965, Bernard Brodie Papers (Collection 1223), Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
Wolk, Herman S. “Politicians, Generals, and Strategists,” Air University Review, January-February 
1974, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/jan-feb/wolk.html.
Wright, Quincy, ed. A Foreign Policy for the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1947.
Wright, Quincy. “Modern Technology and the World Order,” in Ogburn, ed., Technology 
and International Relations, 177-198.
Young, Elizabeth. “On War in Europe,” The Guardian, March 31, 1967, Bernard Brodie Papers (Col-
lection 1223), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA. 
